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“A beginning is the time for taking the most 
delicate care that the balances are correct.”
- Fom Manual of Muad’Dib by Prinses Irulan (Herbert, 1965)
The Pagan elements are 4 + 1. Though many neo-paganists use the Hellenic or 
Alchemical triangular symbols for the Earth, Air, Water and Fire, the 5th element is 
almost always the circle divided into 8 segments, signifying the element of Spirit, the 
Unifying force. Sometimes it is also called Heaven or Æther after Aristotle’s 
quintessence, though Plato associates it with the world of Forms (Ideai). The five 
elements may be aligned along points of a pentagram, a geometrical figure which 
plays an important role in many Pagan rituals. This practice is thought to have 
originated with the early Pythagoreans (de Vogel, 1966) although annotated penta-
grams have been found on coins and artifacts as early as the 4th century BCE. It 
must be noted that the Chinese 5 elements are also often diplayed along the points 
of a pentagram.
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de Vogel, C. J. (1966). Pythagoras and Early Pythagoreanism. Van Gorcum, Assen, The 
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This book is not about developmental dyslexia.
This book is about a science.
A science in perpetual crisis.
The hardest science.
The science that boldly sets out to accumulate knowledge about Human Nature.
Therefore, this book is about a Natural Science.
The majority of the empirical and theoretical content of this book may be sum-
marised as an attempt to evaluate knowledge accumulated about a well studied
phenomenon of human nature (developmental dyslexia), from a perspective on
theory evaluation that has been very successful in advancing scientific knowledge
about natural phenomena. It comes down to this: Empirical inquiries, inferences,
and conjectures should be guided by theories of principles that can be truth-like
or false, not by theories that can be constructed such that virtually any outcome
constitutes a corroboration of its `predictions'.
The purpose of this preface is to point to a crisis in the science of human nature,
that is much more fundamental than a crisis of confidence in the validity of sta-
tistical inferences or empirical record due to questionable research practices.
Science is one of the arts that studies the structure of reality. The difference
between the scientist and the artist is that the latter is free to choose the meth-
ods that constrain the way reality may be observed and expressed. The scientist
has just one option:the scientific method. The scientific method is not a tool for
building an industry that produces facts about reality. It is a tool designed to
prove explanatory claims about the structure of reality wrong. Science should
not produce anything other than more questions.
Notes Preface
SANE AS IT EVER WAS
The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology
A Tapestry Wanted
In an article entitled “Has Psychology Failed?” Joseph Jastrow reﬂects on whether prominent schol-
ars such asWilliam James and Stanley Hall had been right to be pessimistic about the advancement
of psychology since the days of its conception as an empirical science. He notes the following:
``The present text-book chaos is the work of drifting pilots. They leave the student with the
impression of a patch-work quilt whereas actually the mind is a tapestry.'' (Jastrow, 1935,
p. 268)
In this preface to the chapters of a book that concern the speciﬁc case of evaluating competing
ætiologies of developmental dyslexia, I conjecture that the general failure to advance the empirical
social sciences as a natural science lies in the not so recent past. The current crisis of conﬁdence in
the empirical record of the social and life sciences is not due to the (ab)use of inferential statistics
as a means to haul in huge quantities of scientiﬁc knowledge, but is more likely due to the inability
of the scientiﬁc community to stop expanding the patch-work quilt by suggesting a new theory (or
paradigm) for each freshly caught fact. That is, this crisis concerns the curious case of an empirical
science in which the very thing that separates this branch from the other disciplines –knowledge
inference by means empirical tests of theoretical claims– seems to have little or no authority at the
level of evaluating the truth-likeness (verisimilitude) of theories.
The conjecture: If empirical disciplines of social science experienced crises of conﬁdence before
statistical hypothesis testing was adopted as the main tool for scientiﬁc inference, it is unlikely that
inferential statistics are the true cause of the current crisis. Reforms exclusively aimed at improv-
ing this type of scientiﬁc inference, although necessary, are unlikely to be successful in preventing
another crisis from happening again in the next decade. Based on an examination of historical com-
mentaries on the state of theory evaluation in psychological science, I will suggest that the only way
forward for the empirical social sciences in general, is to join the tapestry weaving guild and estab-
lish a consensus science, a science in which “theory and data speak more for themselves” (Fanelli,
2010). In the ‘softer’ ﬁelds of empirical science theoretical disputes mainly concern circular ‘special
sauce’ arguments: “You did not evidence the phenomenon I study, because you do not know what
it takes to evidence the phenomenon I study and neither do I when you ask me to be explicit about
it a-priori”.
This transition will not happen overnight, but as I will argue in what follows, the claim of being
young and still maturing as a science as an excuse for its delayed occurrence is untenable. The im-
portance of transforming into a consensus empirical science was recognised in the earliest Principia
of Psychology. Moreover, I believe it is essential to start this discussion right now, because the Open
Science movement has all the potential to play a crucial role in laying down the foundations for a
discipline that studies human nature as a natural science within the next decade.
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Figure 0.1 – Intriguing times in the history of science. The great schism between the harder and softer
disciplines.
The Reports of your Immaculate Conceptions are Greatly Exaggerated
The other day, when I released my conjecture into the wild in front of the coﬀee machine, a senior
colleague objected: “What do you mean, the crises in psychology before the current one? This is
the ﬁrst crisis I have ever experienced!” Well, to give a hint, the subtitle “The Historical Meaning of
the Crisis in Psychology” is not my invention1. It is the title of a 1925 manuscript attributed to Lev
Vygotsky (for details see Zavershneva, 2012) and is one ofmany analyses of the ‘psychological crisis’
published in the pre-NHST era, among which are works by Karl Bühler, Kurt Koffka, William Stern,
Mary Whiton Calkins, Edmund Husserl and Kurt Lewin (cf. Yasnitsky, 2011). Upon hearing those
names, one might object those works could not possibly concern anything related to the crisis in
‘modern’ psychology.
For convenience I will mark the years 1925-1935 as a transitional period after which the cur-
rent statistical era began (see Figure 0.1), it includes the publication of the famous works by Fisher
(1925, 1935) and Neyman and Pearson (1933). Before I discuss the nature of the pre-NHST crisis,
its relation to the current crisis, and the unique role the open science movement could play in its
resolution, I need to put a date on the birth of psychological science as a modern empirical disci-
pline:
``Modern Psychology surely began, not ``three or four years ago,'' with the publication
of the Willenshandlung, –but some forty years ago, with Fechner's notion of the definite
functional correlation of psychical with physical processes. The modern psychologist is the
experimental psychologist.'' (Titchener, 1893, p. 456, emphasis added)
1Neither is the main title, see http://www.comicvine.com/cerebus-70-sane-as-it-ever-was/4000-124733/
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Box 0.1: A (non-exhaustive) comparison between announced origins ofmodern psychology (hyper-
links to text in electronic document) and origins of modern versions of other disciplines of science.
Herbart (1824; 1825) Psychology as a Science Modern life science / medicine (1855)
(Synthetic & Analytic Volume) Remak / Virchow discover the building
Combe (1834) Principles of Physiology block of life, cause of pathology: The cell
Spencer (1855) The Principles of Psychology Modern Biology: (1859)
Fechner (1860) The Elements of Psychophysics Darwin’s famous book was published
Carpenter (1874) Principles of Mental Physiology Spencer: “survival of the ﬁttest” (1864)
Münsterberg (1888) Die Willenshandlung Modern (Theoretical) Physics: (1865)
James (1890) The Principles of Psychology Maxwell’s dynamical theory of the
(Volumes I & II) electromagnetic ﬁeld
Wundt (1874; 1897) Principles of Physiological Psychology Modern (Cognitive) Neuroscience: (1868)
Outlines of Psychology F.C. Donders’ mental chronometry
Titchener (1898) The Postulates of a Modern Mathematics: (1859-1900)
Structural Psychology Riemann, Minkowski, Poincaré, Hilbert
This suggests experimental psychological science is of the same generation as many other modern
disciplines of science, some of which can be considered as belonging to the ‘harder’ disciplines.
Biology, physiology and medical science all began in their modern form in the middle of the 19th
century when the cell was discovered as a fundamental building block of living organisms and a
cause of pathology (cf. Remak, 1855; Virchow, 1855). Naturally, Darwin’s famous book published in
1859 set the stage for a whole range of new areas of scientiﬁc inquiry (see Figure 0.1).
The conclusionmust be that the systematic study of psychological phenomena using the scientiﬁc
method Novalis described in 1798 as:
``Hypotheses are nets; only he who casts them will catch. Was not the discovery of America
the result of a hypothesis? Long, and above all, live the hypothesis - Only she will stay forever
new, no matter how often she defeats herself.''
The casting of nets to catch some facts, has been practiced for at least 160 years, with or with-
out the help of statistical inference. Herbert Spencer published one of the ﬁrst “The Principles of
Psychology” and the opening chapter, “A DatumWanted”, stresses the importance of achieving con-
sensus about the object of study in order to establish a genuine science of psychology. Spencer also
coined the term ‘survival of the ﬁttest’ in the “Principles of Biology” (1864). Therefore, measured in
chronologically ordered units of Principia produced by Herbert Spencer (of which there are at least
6, covering psychology, sociology, biology, education, ethics and philosophy of science), modern
psychological science is older than modern biological science.
2 (±7) Some Limits on the Capacity to Produce Principles, Please!
Spencer’s “The Principles of Psychology” triggered exactly the opposite response of what he had
wished for. A number of rather diﬀerent Principia for psychology were published in the second half
of the 19th century, all of them were intended to lay the foundations for a study of psychological
phenomena as a natural science, but a consensus datumor theoretical frameworkwas never found.
Arguably the most famous of the Principia is William James’ “The Principles of Psychology, Vol.
I & II” (1890a; 1890b). Other Principia, were Combe’s “Principles of Physiology” (1834, and later
editions), Fechner’s “The Elements of Psychophysics” (1860/1912), Carpenter’s “Principles of Men-
tal Physiology” (1874), Münsterberg’s “Die Willenshandlung” (1888), then there is of course the
“Outlines of Psychology” (1896/1897) and “Principles of Physiological Psychology” (1874/1904) by
Wundt and “The Postulates of a Structural Psychology” (1898) by Titchener. Other foundational
texts printed after the turn of the century could be added. The behaviourists certainly produced
xi
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the most formal theories of behaviour: Watson, Thurstone, Hull, Thorndike, Pavlov, Lashley. Other
scholars from the pre-NHST era known for initiating (or terminating) foundation debates are Cattell,
Baldwin, Dewey, Hall, Allport, Binet, Galton, Pearson, Mead, Lange, Koffka, Freud and Jung.
My guess is few scholars will have studied more than 2 of the primary Principia over the course
of their career. I immediately confess my number came up negative about four years ago (when I
discovered some Principia I did not know even existed) and it has been very diﬃcult to improve on
that number. So before embarking on a reading spree of classical texts (most of which are freely
available on-line), let me suggest another strategy. A good place to start is by reading the com-
mentaries, or reviews of these works, of which there are many. For example, here is what George
Trumbull Ladd had to say about William James’ Principia:
``Of the conception of psychology, its nature, problems, and method, which is proposed
in these volumes, and of the defence in detail of this conception, the following statements
seem to me true: The conception is such, and so narrow, that a consistent adherence to it
compels us to admit the utter impossibility of establishing psychology as a natural science. It
excludes almost all the really scientific data and conclusions; it includes only those data and
conjectures which are most remote from genuine science.'' (Ladd, 1892, p. 28, emphasis
added)
Ladd ﬁnds himself in good company when he concluded it would be impossible to establish psy-
chology as a natural science based on William James’ work. Here is what the author himself had to
say about his two volume opus magnum:
``No one could be more disgusted than I at the book. No subject is worth being treated
in more than 1000 pages. Had I ten years more, I could rewrite it in 500; but as it stands,
it is this or nothing –a loathsome, distended, tumefied, bloated, dropsical mass, testifying to
nothing but two facts: 1st, that there is no such thing as a science of psychology, and 2nd,
that W.J. is an incapable.'' (James, 1920
2008, pp. 293–294, emphasis in original)
That’s a quote you don’t see in textbooks very often. It does reveal how serious the pre-NHST
crisis in psychology actually was. A view emerges of a discipline in search of ﬁrst principles that is
clueless about how to decide whether they have actually been found.
Blinded by Downward Seepage
The most comprehensive analysis of the state of pre-NHST psychological science must be Lev Vy-
gotsky’s ‘crisis in psychology’ manuscript. Themanuscript was never published in his lifetime (much
later in collected works, e.g., Rieber & Wollock, 1997), but improved and amended versions of his
analysis and conjectures appeared in the second half of the 1920s, as parts of articles on other sub-
jects (cf. Zavershneva, 2012). The manuscript is more than just an analysis, it provides directions
for a future psychology that makes sense today, for instance the interventionist methodology (San-
nino & Sutter, 2011). According to his student Luria, Vygotsky had basically studied all the Russian
andWestern Principia of psychology that were available at the time (cf. Yasnitsky, 2011), the entire
patch-work quilt.
One of the causes of the crisis suggested by Vygotsky is intriguing, especially in the context of the
recent contribution to the Open Science Collaboration blog by Denny Borsboom (Borsboom, 2013)
on Theoretical Amnesia:
``When one mixes up the epistemological problem with the ontological one by introducing
into psychology not the whole argumentation but its final results, this leads to the distortion
of both.'' (Vygotsky, 1925). Roughly translated, even before the rules of statistical infer-
ence governed the accrual of scientific knowledge (epistemology), some form of theoretical
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amnesia was identified that was caused by an exclusive focus on observable effects (''fi-
nal results''), without investigating the derivational chain of theoretical propositions (''whole
argumentation'') that actually led to the observation of those empirical phenomena.
This situation resembles a reverse “Ramsiﬁed upward seepage” (Meehl, 1990). Paul Meehl used
‘upward seepage’ to explain how logicians account for the implicit empirical, or, real-world content
that formal, abstract theoretical propositions acquire (the answer is: by means of a Ramsey sen-
tence). Remember that in scientiﬁc theorising there is just a one-way logical route from a derivation
based on formal propositions to an observational constraint whose veracity can be empirically ap-
praised, not the other way around. In modern psychological science there appears to be a blinding
by ‘downward seepage’, in which empirical phenomena acquire theoretical content. Like theoreti-
cal amnesia, a scientist who is blinded by downward seepage, is generally unaware that EVERY
empirical inquiry in science is guided by a derivation chain of theoretical propositions. Discovery
of unexpected phenomena is of course possible when a scientist pokes around in the speciﬁc do-
main of reality that presents itself due to his or her theoretical tunnel vision. Novalis was right to
observe that the inquiries that led to the discovery of America (that is, by Columbus), were based
on propositions, hypotheses about the constituents of reality and their properties: “It is the theory
which decides what we can observe” (Einstein as quoted by Heisenberg, 1971, pp. 62–63).
The consequence of blinding by DS is that theoretical constructs escape falsiﬁcation by repeated
application of the scientiﬁc method, simply because they are no longer perceived as a theoretical
proposition whose truth-likeness (verisimilitude) should be questioned. This resembles a fallacy
described by William James:
``The great snare of the psychologist is the confusion of his own standpoint with that of the
mental fact about which he is making his report. I shall hereafter call this the `psychologist's
fallacy' par excellence.'' (James, 1890a, p. 196)
The diﬀerence is that instead of mental facts or experiences, blinding by DS concerns more ab-
stract theoretical constructs. Some examples: Phoneme representation, working memory, mental
lexicon, cognitive load, attention, motor program, predisposition, competence, information pro-
cessing, true eﬀect, and the most important one, event probability. These are all theoretical propo-
sitions used to describe constituents of reality and the laws that connect them in a theoretical
framework, formalism, or philosophy. A curious thing happens when you question their existence
in front of empirical scientists. In many cases you will get a response along the lines of: “Really?
Try to explain [insert complex human behaviour] without using [insert theoretical proposition that
invaded reality]”. Do try this at home, in the classroom, or in front of the coﬀee machine!
Why Psychology is the Hardest Science: The Thin Ontic Line
To many cognitive scientists it will be inconceivable to explain something like chess without as-
suming mental representations and a database metaphor of humanmemory as actual constituents
of reality. However, to date, there is no evidence to suggest mental representations should be
awarded an ontological truth status (e.g., Haselager, de Groot, & van Rappard, 2003) and eﬀorts
to ﬁnd memories as discrete states of the central nervous systems haven’t advanced much since
Lashley announced his failure to ﬁnd the engram (e.g., Dudai, 2004). It’s not the case the existence
of these constructs has been shown to be false, their existence is often assumed as science fact and
this is rarely rigorously tested experimentally. As for the mental representation, there isn’t even
a formal deﬁnition available that can be used to provide an empirical existence proof. That reeks
of classical metaphysics, not empirical science! The fact that a practitioner of science might ﬁnd it
inconceivable to dispense with a theoretical construct as a constituent of reality, should be irrele-
vant for guidance of attention of empirical inquiries or theory evaluation. The verisimilitude of a
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construct can only be evidenced by an immaculate track record of corroborative events obtained by
rigorous testing of all the theoretical propositions in the derivational chain, nothing more, nothing
less.
Psychological science is the hardest science, not because human behaviour is more context sen-
sitive, or more retro- or prospective than any other animal that can pass the mirror test, even less
so because one just can’t play chess with turbulence and explaining spatiotemporal chaos is child’s
play compared to explaining chess. All those complexities can be addressed by a science of psy-
chology seeking scientiﬁc explanation based on ﬁrst principles and universal law and if you do not
believe that is possible we should stop calling it a science right now. The reason it is hard to trans-
form into a consensus science that studies human nature is due to the thin ontic line that separates
phenomena that should be predicted by a formal scientiﬁc theory, from the phenomenological ex-
perience of reality as it unfolds in front of our mind’s eye. The very ﬁrst sentences of the very ﬁrst
chapter, of the very ﬁrst principles of modern psychology already provide a complete description
of this problem:
``§ 1. The postulates and axioms prefacing our expositions of exact science—our works on
Geometry and our Mechanical Treatises—are received on the direct warrant of conscious-
ness that they are indisputable. Similarly with all that we regard as objective truths; whether
known immediately by simple intuitions, or mediately by the series of intuitions constituting
a deductive argument. But when from objective truths we pass to subjective ones—when
from the outer phenomena cognized, we turn to the inner phenomena presented by the
act of cognition—when, after analysing knowledge, we begin to analyse that which knows,
we are met by the question—What is here our test of validity? Consciousness vouches
for the truth of propositions concerning external relations; but what shall vouch for the
truth of propositions concerning those internal relations which constitute the phenomena
of consciousness?'' (Spencer, 1855, p. 8)
The primary Principia each take position with respect to where this line between phenomena of
the mind and phenomena of the physical world should be drawn. This demarkation also implicates
whether the mind and subjective experience should be considered a valid object of scientiﬁc in-
quiry. The pre-NHST crisis in empirical psychology concerns the inability to achieve consensus on
these matters and is therefore philosophical in nature. It is a crisis that could not be resolved by a
laboratory experiment or ﬁeld study, but requires formal theorising. This insight is indeed described
by Vygotsky in the new direction he envisioned for psychological science:
``Such a system has not yet been created. We can say with confidence that it will not
arise out of the ruins of empirical psychology or in the laboratories of reflexologists. It will
come as a broad biosocial synthesis of the theory of animal behavior and societal man. This
new psychology will be a branch of general biology and at the same time the basis of all
sociological sciences. It will be the knot that ties the science of nature and the science
of man together. It will therefore, indeed, be most intimately connected with philosophy,
but with a strictly scientific philosophy which represents the combined theory of scientific
knowledge and not with the speculative philosophy that preceded scientific generalizations.''
(Vygotsky,1925/1997, p. 61).
Oh no! Empirical psychology was in ruins back then as well. Could it be that the speculative philoso-
phy that preceded scientiﬁc generalisationswas replacedwith speculative statistical generalisations
in order to revive empirical psychology from its ruins, without connecting to any strict philosophy
of science? We should have listened to Vygotsky. the causes of not being able to decide between
the veracity of theoretical claims he described in 1925 do not appear to be very diﬀerent from the
current crisis: The rules of inference, whether based on some arcane metaphysical philosophy, or
statistics, do not suﬃce to advance the scientiﬁc knowledge base of an empirical science that stud-
ies psychological phenomena.
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To summarise so far, the pre-NHST crisis in psychology shares with the current one the inability of
the scientiﬁc community to produce a formal, consensus deﬁnition of what it actually studies and
more importantly, how to go about appraising and amending such formal deﬁnitions. This inability
to produce and evaluate a consensus formalism may be caused by aﬄictions such as blinding by
downward seepage or theoretical amnesia. Its consequence is that some of the fundamental con-
structs or propositions that drive scientiﬁc inquiries, the things that cause reality to be observed by
the empirical scientist through a very speciﬁc set of tainted glasses, are never evaluated for their
verisimilitude.
The Existential Question
One very important theoretical construct that manages to escape evaluation is probability, or more
accurately: The probability theorems and derived statistical properties that are assumed to apply to
the physical systems in which we may observe psychological phenomena. In psychological science
it is generally assumed that the phenomena it studies obey the same rules as the phenomena that
may be observed in a classical ergodic system (e.g., Molenaar, 2008; Molenaar & Campbell, 2009).
Without going into too much detail, the classical ergodic condition assumes the space averaged
behaviour of a system is equal (in the limit) to the time averaged behaviour of the system. If the
ergodic condition applies, the outcome of the following 2 experiments is the same: Throwing 100
dice on one occasion (cf. data points aremeasurements obtained froma sample of 100 participants)
and throwing 1 die 100 times in a row (cf. data points are 100 repeated measurements obtained
within 1 participant). If you disagree with this assumption when applied to human behaviour (and
you should) you can probably begin to see the contours of the real crisis that needs to be resolved
in the empirical social sciences.
The history of science reveals the importance of questioning whether sets of axioms or formal-
ism still suﬃce to describe the phenomena in the empirical record. The period of 1925-1935 was a
transitional period in science for many other reasons than the “invention” of inferential statistics.
For example, the realisation by Born, Heisenberg and Jordan (1926) that a new conception of proba-
bility and stochastic events was necessary to describe the statistical properties of quantum systems
was one of the building blocks that led to a permanent schism between the ‘harder’ and ‘softer’
ﬁelds of science. The insight was that a non-commutative probability theory was needed in which
the sequence of occurrence of stochastic events (i.e., the order of multiplication of probabilities)
will yield diﬀerent outcomes. Incidentally, the applicability of non-commutative probability theory
to describe the statistics of various psychological phenomena has gained some interested recently
(e.g., Busemeyer et al., 2011).
According to Max Born, their discoveries were driven by a crisis in particle physics. There are
some similarities between the crisis in physics and the one in psychology of the same era, both con-
cerned problems with epistemology and ontology of competing theoretical perspectives. Several
simultaneously existing theories about diﬀerent appearances of reality based on conﬂicting ontol-
ogy (e.g., waves and particles), were eventually integrated into a single underlying formalism. The
quantum formalism is based on about four foundational works that deﬁne the nature of quantum
systems, relevant phenomena and levels of analysis, thus including rules for statistical inference
(Born et al., 1926; Dirac, 1930; von Neumann, 1932; Schrödinger, 1935). The basic quantum for-
malism doesn’t make any initial ontological claims, it lays down the general principles from which
scientiﬁc endeavours should depart. It provides an arena in which theories can compete for preci-
sion and accuracy of their predictions.
Among other things, establishing a consensus formalism allows for a program of theory evalu-
ation by strong inference (e.g., Platt, 1964). There will be no confusion about what counts as a
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phenomenon that belongs to the domain of reality described by the formalism or not, something
that is much needed in psychological science. For theories operating within the formalism, there is
no need for preregistration of hypotheses or a discussion about how a failed replication should be
interpreted. Data and theory truly speak more for themselves and any peer can in principle check
the derivation of a prediction from the theory and assess which measurement outcomes can be
expected and what the most likely interpretation of the possible outcomes should be in terms of
verisimilitude of the theory. Interpretations in terms of explanation, or, description of why the uni-
verse at the quantum scale behaves as the theories predict it does are amatter of great debate (e.g.,
more than a dozen interpretations exist). This kind of interpretation has however been completely
irrelevant for the advancement of quantum physics. Nomatter which interpretation you prefer, the
level of precision and accuracy of quantum theories is unaltered: They are the most precise and
accurate theories about reality ever produced by science.
A Game of Clones: Never Let a Good Crisis Go to Waste
An existential question for the empirical social sciences now emerges, one that requires examining
howmuch blinding and amnesia have aﬀected contemporary scientiﬁc practice and the loss of con-
ﬁdence in the empirical record: Is the goal of the scientiﬁc endeavour to produce theories that are
precise and accurate in the empirical sense, or should theories be produced with high explanatory
power, whose ontology its practitioners can be realist about, like good radical empiricists? Perhaps
the best description of the mindset that will be needed to answer the realist question, one that will
prevent us from cloning and implementing the failed solutions of the past to resolve the recurring
crisis, is provided by Henry Poincaré:
``Whether the ether exists or not matters little - let us leave that to the metaphysicians;
what is essential for us is, that everything happens as if it existed, and that this hypothesis is
found to be suitable for the explanation of phenomena. After all, have we any other reason
for believing in the existence of material objects? That, too, is only a convenient hypothesis;
only, it will never cease to be so, while some day, no doubt, the ether will be thrown aside
as useless.'' (Poincaré, 1889
1905, p. 211).
This quote contains a clue that should raise some sympathy from scientists in other disciplines for
the dire position the social sciences are in today. About the existence of material objects Poincaré
notes that this, like the Æther, is just a convenient hypothesis about the constituents of reality.
However, it is one that “will never cease to be so”. Why should material objects receive this special
status? Material objects are sensory phenomena, manifolds of immediate sensory experiences, or
direct experience. The luminiferous Æther on the other hand was one of the invisible constituents
of reality physicists needed to imagine into existence, because everything appeared to happen as if
it were really there. It was like the ﬁfth element, a quintessence to complete our understanding of
the world around us. In a way, it is ‘easy’ for physicists to identify something like the luminiferous
Æther as a theoretical concept that may be discarded. Perhaps the greatest advances in physics
have been made after the scales of measurement depleted or inﬂated beyond the capacity of our
senses to register them as direct experience. For psychological science, the classical analogue to
the Æther as a quintessence would be the Spirit, or Soul, but what about more contemporary ones
such as the information processing Mind, the attentional spotlight, or the input-output model of
perception and action?
The task at hand for a science that studies phenomena of themind is to detach theoretical propo-
sitions about manifolds of sensory experiences from beliefs in their existence as a fundamental
constituent of reality, let’s indeed leave that to the metaphysicians. One should realise that when
a theoretical proposition is discarded, thrown away as useless, this is the throwing away of a pre-
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viously convenient hypothesis, which means that science advanced and more of the unobservable
structure of reality has bee uncovered. Physicists know the theoretical constructs allowed for by the
quantum formalism, such as quarks and bosons will eventually suﬀer the same fate as the luminif-
erous Æther, but for now, everything seems to happen as if it they exist and competing constructs
such as cosmic strings, though intuitively appealing and formally plausible, cannot be empirically
appraised for their verisimilitude. Realism in science should concern the structure of reality that
highly corroborated seem theoretical constructs seem to capture (cf. Structural Realism, Worrall,
1989), not their literal interpretation or one-shot observation.
This (hi)story deserves a positive ﬁnale and it can be found in the realisation that the successful
resolution of the crisis in physics that resulted in the quantum formalism was the result of intense
debates by the leading scientists during the early Solvay conferences. These scholars recruited and
created themathematical tools and formal language thatwas necessary to describe the phenomena
that were observed in labs around the world. The consensus was about the formal description of
these phenomena, not about their interpretation (see Einstein’s famous quote about some dice and
a deity). Although not currently interpreted as such, I see there is a consensus about the nature
of empirical psychological phenomena as well. What is observed in psychology labs around the
world is that some phenomena are diﬃcult to replicate, that there may be phenomena that are
exquisitely context sensitive, whereas others are extremely resistant to perturbation. Even those
robust phenomena are elusive to exact numerical replication based on current theories. I believe
a consensus will emerge about the fact that many relevant phenomena currently in the empirical
record, are insuﬃciently described as observations originating from an ergodic system.
These problems are solvable, but this will require recruiting and possibly creating mathematical
tools and formal language. The task is to ﬁnd a way to collectively agree on this solution, we need
a 21st century analog to the Solvay conferences and I know just the right venue: The open science
community. The movement harbours all the potential to ﬁnally make a diﬀerence and stop play-
ing this tedious game of cloned ‘solutions’. If there ever were a time in which the social sciences
should attempt to join the tapestry weaving guild, it is right here, right now! We are witnessing the
emergence of a science community that is ready to be open and reproducible. It has already initi-
ated a close inspection of the patch- work quilt by questioning the veracity of theoretical claims in
journals, on open fora and the scientiﬁc blogosphere. Increasing numbers of community members
are engaging in post-publication peer-review, see Had I Been A Reviewer and the blogs linked there,
or the PubMed Commons commentary system, the Winnower . The reason these developments
are taking place right now is that the stamp of approval provided by a consensus among just a few
expert peer reviewers is no longer accepted as suﬃcient for corroboration of a theory or hypoth-
esis (see e.g., Van Noorden, 2013). What is needed is a consensus of a majority of the scientiﬁc
community and online platforms are being developed to facilitate this process.
In 1935, Jastrow shared the wish to establish a sane science of psychology:
``There are consoling reflections. A science that can endure the ravages of two such dis-
tempers as behaviorism and psychoanalysis and recover without permanent disfigurement
must have a lusty constitution. Still more, when I dwell upon the rich heritage of supremely
significant knowledge which is all entitled to be called psychology, and the vitality of the
tasks awaiting the psychologists of the future, the winter of my discontent becomes tinged
with the promise of a glorious summer, when all psychologists shall practise the sanity they
preach.''
I can feel it: Summer is coming… let’s make it a glorious one, or at least a little more sane.
Fred Hasselman
Lost Archetype Labs, Lent
March 2014
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Das Wesen
das begriffen werden kann
Ist nicht das Wesen
des Unbegreiflichen.
- Lao Tzu (±500 BCE, Tao-Te-Ching)
In scientific discourse, there is often much confusion about ontology and epistemology, 
as well as sufficiency and necessity.
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LAO-TSE - TAO TE KING Das Buch vom Weltgesetz und seinem Wirken Verlag 
Otto Wilhelm Barth, Erstauflage 1928.
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Notes Chapter 1: Theoretical Diversity
Chapter 1
DEALING WITH THEORETICAL DIVERSITY
Ætiologies of Developmental Dyslexia as a Case in Point
1.1 The elusive ætiology of developmental dyslexia
When a child fails to acquire a proﬁcient level of reading and spelling performance after about two
years of regular literacy education in their native language and such possible causes of delay as
below average intelligence, a speciﬁc sensory or motor deﬁcit, or a general learning disability have
been ruled out, the diagnosis is usually developmental dyslexia. Though many dyslexic readers will
beneﬁt from a timely intervention, the impairment will persist into adulthood with varying severity.
Estimates of people aﬄicted with this speciﬁc learning disorder vary from country to country and
ranges from 5-20% of the population (Blomert, 2005).
The deﬁnition of developmental dyslexia provided above is based on exclusion criteria. It de-
scribes the inability of otherwise typically developing children to acquire a proﬁcient level of reading
and spelling after regular literacy education (here typical just means average or normal with respect
to development). Of course, there are more sophisticated diagnostic deﬁnitions that include a ge-
netic component and mention a neurological basis for the impairment (cf. Fletcher & Lyon, 2008).
There are also many more exclusion criteria based on results from elaborate test batteries and co-
morbidity with, for example, ADHD or Autism (e.g., Blomert, 2005). All these deﬁnitions remain
however descriptive (or statistical) in nature and are essentially based on exclusion criteria. The
practice of including genes or a brain region or function as an essential part of the deﬁnition ap-
pears to provide more precision or a deeper understanding of what causes developmental dyslexia,
but that is just illusory precision. To date, there is no speciﬁc genetic proﬁle (cf. Grigorenko, 2001),
no speciﬁc brain structure or function (Caylak, 2009; Eckert, 2004, 2010) and no speciﬁc psychome-
tric test proﬁle (Blomert & Vaessen, 2009; Ramus & Szenkovits, 2008; Wimmer & Schurz, 2010) that
can serve as the ultimate diagnostic tool. So what is it that is so speciﬁc about this speciﬁc learn-
ing disability, other than the observed problems with acquisition of proﬁcient reading and spelling
ability?
A quick survey of recent literature pertaining to the performance of dyslexic readers on a wide
variety of tasks and experimental conditions seems to suggest that there is always some sample
of dyslexic readers in some part of the world that can be found to deviate from average perfor-
mance. There now exist a plethora of theoretical accounts of developmental dyslexia that explain
such observed deviations from average performance as impairments in low-level sensorimotor pro-
cesses or high-level cognitive processes, or both. The reported deﬁcits span almost all modalities
of perception (Beaton, Edwards, & Peggie, 2006; Breznitz, 2003; Goswami, Fosker, Huss, Mead, &
Szűcs, 2010; Huss, Verney, Fosker, Mead, & Goswami, 2010; Skoyles, 2004; Talcott et al., 2003; Tal-
lal, 2004), include deﬁcits in motor control (McPhillips & Jordan-Black, 2007; Nicolson & Fawcett,
2006; Ramus, Pidgeon, & Frith, 2003; Savage, 2004), balance (Rochelle & Talcott, 2006; Stoodley,
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Fawcett, Nicolson, & Stein, 2005), attention deﬁcits (M. Reynolds & Besner, 2006; S. E. Shaywitz &
B. A. Shaywitz, 2008; Valdois, Bosse, & Tainturier, 2004), impaired cognitive abilities (Aleci, Piana,
Piccoli, & Bertolini, 2010; Heim et al., 2008; Helland, 2007), ﬂuency of naming (Araujo, Pacheco,
Faisca, Petersson, & Reis, 2010; Vaessen, Gerretsen, & Blomert, 2009), learning (Menghini, Vicari,
Mandolesi, & Petrosini, 2011; Nicolson, Fawcett, Brookes, & Needle, 2010; Vicari et al., 2005) and
language (Berninger, 2000; Joanisse, Manis, Keating, & Seidenberg, 2000; Koster et al., 2005). The
studies reportedhere represent just a small anthology of the literature; the actual number of deﬁcits
proposed by scientists is much larger.
Areas of inquiry that have received much interest in the past decades due to their perceived po-
tential to shed more light on the underlying causes of the observed impairments are the genes and
brains of dyslexic readers. However, as mentioned above, the current empirical record of neuro-
biological facts and neural and genetic correlates of behaviour related to developmental dyslexia
has not been decisive in the resolution of any theoretical dispute that existed before in vivo brain-
imaging and gene-sequencing became available as tools for scientists. It has not provided a consen-
sus on the aetiology of the reading impairment (Dowker, 2006; Marinelli, Angelelli, Di Filippo, & Zoc-
colotti, 2011; Pugh et al., 2001; Ramus, White, & Frith, 2006; Ramus, 2003a, 2004; Stanovich, 1985,
1988), neurobiological evidence has not givenmore scientiﬁc credibility to one theory of (impaired)
reading and spelling over others (Heath, Bishop, Hogben, &Roach, 2006; Howes, Bigler, Burlingame,
& Lawson, 2003; Mechelli, Gorno-Tempini, & Price, 2003; Ramus & Szenkovits, 2008; Ramus et al.,
2003) and it has certainly not helpedwith achieving a clearer deﬁnition of developmental dyslexia as
a speciﬁc learning disability or developmental psychopathology (Bishop & Snowling, 2004; Fletcher
& Lyon, 2008; Frith, 1999; Landerl & Wimmer, 2000; Lyon, 1995; Lyon, S. E. Shaywitz, & B. A. Shay-
witz, 2003; Wolf, 1999). In fact, new disputes about the‘real’ neural correlates of impaired reading
have erupted, about the myth of the existence of a visual word-form area (Price & Devlin, 2003),
the signiﬁcance of the observed cerebellar dysfunction (Nicolson & Fawcett, 2006) and how letters
and speech sounds are integrated in the brain (Blau et al., 2010; Blomert, 2010). The main diﬀer-
ence with the times of Galaburda and Kemper, who in 1979 presented some of the ﬁrst evidence
for anomalous neural organisation in a post-mortem study of the brain of a dyslexic reader, appears
to be that now each hypothesised deﬁcit comes with its own neural correlates. Thus providing an
apparent existence-proof for the deﬁcit in question. Not surprisingly, most suggested deﬁcits have
their own treatment program (see section 1.2.3) and new intervention studies emerge based on
studies of brain activity as well (Breteler, Arns, Peters, Giepmans, & Verhoeven, 2010). It is even
the case for some hypothesized deﬁcits to have their own associated genetic correlates (Grigorenko,
2001; Ramus, 2004).
How can the diﬃculties with the acquisition of proﬁcient reading and spelling ability give rise
to such diversity in apparently veridical ætiologies proposed by scientists? That is, explanations of
causes of the impairment all seem to be evidenced by a considerable empirical record spanning
every level of analysis from genes to overt behaviour. Fletcher (2009) interprets the current status
quo as the result of the evolution of developmental dyslexia as a scientiﬁc concept. After decades
of scientiﬁc studies some authors are indeed questioning whether the proposed deﬁcits are‘real’
(Moores, 2004; Ramus & Szenkovits, 2008) or whether dyslexia actually exists as a collection of
deﬁcits (Elliott & Gibbs, 2008). In any case, history may be repeating itself, since summarizing pa-
pers with a title along the lines of‘What have we learned so far?’ can be found in almost every
decade (Hudson, High, & Al Otaiba, 2007; Snowling, 1996; Stanovich, 1985; Vellutino & Scanlon,
1998; Vellutino, Fletcher, Snowling, & Scanlon, 2004). Most scholars and research programs are
well aware of all the other theories out there, but they still embark on a quest for the Holy Grail:
To identify a single, one-way, causal pathway from genes to impaired reading. The type of causality
the scientists pursue in their quest is a chain of eﬃcient causes hypothesised to be attributable to
components or component processes at various levels of analysis as depicted in Figure 1.1. An ex-
ample of such a quest is a series of papers by Ramus (2003b, 2003c, 2004), who concluded after an
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Figure 1.1 – The quest for the Holy Grail in the scientiﬁc study of developmental dyslexia: Connect the
dots and ﬁnd the proper arrangement of components from biology to behaviour that cause develop-
mental dyslexia.
extensive review of the literature that a whole range of proposed deﬁcits may be associated with
developmental dyslexia, but play no causal role in its ætiology. In other words, those deﬁcits should
be considered epiphenomena of the‘true’ cause.
Ramus’ quest in that series of articles was to draw causal pathways through the phenomena (the
boxes in Figure 1.1) that were substantially backed by empirical results. It is exactly this type of sci-
entiﬁc inference, in combinationwith the inconclusive results of such inferences that –from ameta-
theoretical1 point of view– raises the questionwhether the proposed causal mechanisms should be
considered to be similar (high similitude of theories). Or, perhaps they have a low‘truth-likeness’
(low verisimilitude), or at least are not appraised in a rigorous fashion to assess their verisimilitude.
I take that it is uncontroversial to suggest that the purpose of a science is to evaluate whether the
claims it produces about the way the world works have some truth to them and eventually select
the most truthful of all such claims2 In the remainder of this chapter I will attempt to analyse the
origins of the theoretical diversity and the apparent incapacity of the scientiﬁc method to resolve
it by means of appraising verisimilitude of individual claims. The conjecture I have made my goal
to elucidate in this chapter is: A theoretical account about the ætiology of developmental dyslexia
of higher verisimilitude than current accounts, should be able to explain how it is possible that the
current plenitude of theories can be hypothetically true at the same point in time (or space for that
1Meta-theory is the empirical study of scientiﬁc theorising (Meehl, 1992; 2002; 2004a).
2I will use the term ‘truth’ here in the most practical sense possible: To distinguish between scientiﬁc claims, that
is, the precision and accuracy with which they describe observable phenomena in some domain of reality. If ‘truth’ is
an uncomfortable word in this context, I see no objection to exchange it for ‘scientiﬁc credibility’. There is however a
formal distinction between a hypothetico-deductive test and a crediballistically-deductive test of scientiﬁc claims (see
Rozeboom, 1982).
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matter, see the recent special issue of Dyslexia 2013, volume 16, issues 3 and 4: Investigating the
links between Neurocognitive Functions and Dyslexia).
It is thus explicitly not the purpose of this chapter, or any other chapter in this book, to describe
a successful scientiﬁc quest that ends in the discovery of the Holy Grail: A unique causal pathway.
An empirical quest will be reported in the chapters that follow, but its Holy Grail takes on a very
diﬀerent shape and form. The results of the (meta-)theoretical analysis and historical and philo-
sophical perspectives on the conjecture-made-goal described above, have motivated virtually all
of the theoretical and empirical decisions made in studies described in chapters 2-5.3 The present
chapter is an essential general introduction to the more speciﬁc empirical inquiries into the role of
speech perception in developmental dyslexia.
1.2 Corroborative evidence: A growing body, or morbid obesitas?
The introduction to the scientiﬁc study of developmental dyslexia so far, requires from me to evi-
dence at least two claims and oﬀer some explanations if those claims turn out to be true:
Claim 1 Thenumber of substantive4 theoretical accounts for theætiology of developmental dyslexia
has been growing rather than shrinking.
Claim 2 High quality data measured to corroborate one theoretical account and its causal pathway
is of no consequence for the perceived verisimilitude of a competing theory.5
To do so I present a historical analysis of the terminology used in the scientiﬁc literature on the
ætiology of developmental dyslexia.
What exactly causes developmental dyslexia has been debated for quite some time, at least since
competing theories appeared in the literature in the 1970s. These theories disputed whether the
reading deﬁcit was caused by impaired auditory processing or impaired phonological processing
(Bradley & Bryant, 1978; Tallal & Piercy, 1973) and were further developed based on evidence from
post-mortem studies of the brains of dyslexic readers (Galaburda & Kemper, 1979; Galaburda, Lo-
Turco, Ramus, Fitch, & Rosen, 2006). Both assumed an impaired theoretical entity, the phoneme
representation, to be causally entailed in causing the diﬃculties with acquiring a proﬁcient level of
reading and spelling. What may be reasonably expected of a discipline of science is that it works
towards a more uniﬁed formal description of reality instead of generatingmore contradictory ones.
Figure 1.2 reveals, among other things, that the latter situation seems likely when scientiﬁc descrip-
tions of the ætiology of developmental dyslexia are concerned.
The graphs in the ﬁgure are representations of the connectivity between terms (categories of
words) found in 1407 abstracts of scientiﬁc papers on the ætiology of developmental dyslexia on
PubMed (see Appendix A for details). The abstracts were analysed as a corpus based on the decade
of their publication date. As an example, take the 1970-1980 era. The boundaries of the graph are
inhabited by a few terms that are closely associated. The upper side contains auditory perception
(per~aud), pathology in brain structure (cns~str~, cns~pat), treatment (~trt~), motor learning and
speech production (lrn~mot, ~spr~). These terms and associations seem to evidence studies about
3Pardon my hindsight bias. Chronologically, this chapter was completed last, but note that ﬁve years ago, I could not
have written it.
4I will use ‘substantive theory’ almost exclusively to refer to a theory backed by a substantial amount or quantity
of empirical evidence. This is somewhat diﬀerent from what Paul Meehl described as‘The theory has money in the
bank’. The latter refers to the track record of corroboration events that constitute risky predictions by a theory and it is
questionable whether the predictions by the theories I will discuss can be categorised as risky. Or corroborated for that
matter.
5Stated less formally, there appear to be no theorieswith silverback-alpha-male-pack-leader-results, towhich theories
competing for resources and proliferation succumb (empirical grid-lock). Or, perhaps there are only alpha theories; all
Indians, no chiefs, and this is a stand-oﬀ (ontological indiﬀerence).
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Figure 1.2 – Weighted graphs of term associations used in four decades of the scientiﬁc study of the
causes of developmental dyslexia. The associations represent a cumulative sumof terms occurring in the
same abstract of a scientiﬁc paper (N = 1407). The abstracts were obtained via a PubMed search query
on theætiology of developmental dyslexia. The large, red nodes have a high (standardised) degree, that
is, more connections to other nodes in the network (see text and Appendix A.1 for details).
the impaired auditory processing hypothesis mentioned earlier (Tallal & Piercy, 1973). The other
two clusters contain terms like language and literacy (~lan~, ~lit~) associated with brain function
(cns ~fun) and this seems in accordance with the impaired language processing account mentioned
earlier (Bradley & Bryant, 1978). There are alsomany connections to comorbid diagnoses, cognitive
or psychopathological, associatedwith biological terms including development (com~cog, com~psy,
bio ~dev, bio~env) and visual perception (per~viz). No doubt these terms appear due to attempts
to deﬁne and diagnose dyslexia, but they also herald the arrival of the (visual) magnocellular deﬁcit
hypothesis (cf. Stein, 2001).
The graphs reveal that the structure of the graphs does not change just due to an increasing num-
ber of terms (the nodes or vertices), but it is clearly the case that the terms become less uniquely
speciﬁed. That is, the number of connections (edges) a node has to other nodes in the network
increases and nodes representing new terms do not lag behind‘old’ ones in this respect. It really
seems to be the case that what started with roughly two to three substantive theoretical accounts
has grown into a vast collection of diﬀerent theories, deﬁcits and hypotheses, all backed by a con-
siderable empirical record that contains every type of data from behavioural, neurophysiological,
to genetic. Also, every design seems to be represented, there are data sets that were acquired ex-
perimentally, bymeans of decade long prospective studies and/or by comparing subpopulations, as
well as computer simulations. It is truly an impressive body of evidence, but what does it evidence?
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Figure 1.3 – Bars represent the normalised degree distribution for each node in the graphs of Figure 1.2.
This represents the number of connections each term has to other terms divided by the total number
of connections in the graph. The bars are colour coded to indicate terms that can grossly be categorised
as Biology, Brain, Comorbidity and Theory (compare to levels of Figure 1.2). See text and Appendix A
for details, such as, a list of the terms and their meaning in Table A.1.
The pattern inferred from eyeballing the term networks can be quantiﬁed by calculating the de-
gree distribution in the network. Figure 1.3 represents for each term the normalised degree of
the node. A normalised degree of 0.5 (the horizontal line) means that the connections of a node
to other nodes consist of 50% of the unique connections that are available in the network. This
does not imply that a node is particularly important; in a fully connected network all the nodes
host 100% of the connections. Interestingly, more varieties of comorbid diagnoses are mentioned
in association with other terms as time goes by. This could be related to the observation in the ﬁrst
paragraph that a deﬁnition of developmental dyslexia is still mostly a deﬁnition of exclusion crite-
ria, like excluding comorbid diagnoses. Another pattern that emerges is that as more terms appear,
they are often connected to more than 50% of the other terms in the network. Terms categorised
as Biology (e.g., genes, epigenetics) and Brain seem to‘lead the way’ in reaching the 50%mark, they
are almost always mentioned in association with any of the other terms in the network.
1.2.1 The nomological network: A rough sketch
To interpret what the degree signiﬁes, it is important to consider what kind of network this is. What
do its nodes and edges represent? I believe it is sensible to argue that the networks represent a
very crude sketch of a nomological net as suggested by Crohnbach and Meehl (1955). They de-
scribed nodes of a nomological net representing theoretical (or ontological) entities and their con-
nections to other entities as lawful relations (functional or compositional). Using the terminology
of graph theory and complex networks in combination with basic meta-theoretical concepts, I sug-
gest a more detailed speciﬁcation of the nomological net is possible. The formalized theories of
physics will often consist of deduced entities and laws, whereas theoretical accounts in social sci-
ence are predominantly based on induction by statistical regularities (see Table 1.1 for a reminder
of the diﬀerences between deduction and induction, cf. Salmon, 1999). If laws were allowed to be
either universal or statistical and the entities can pertain to particular facts or general regularities,
the four types of scientiﬁc explanation in the received view of scientiﬁc explanation (Hempel & Op-
penheim, 1948; Hempel, 1968) could be represented by the net (see Box 1.2). By using a weighted
and directed graph, one could indicate Deductive-Nomological / Deductive-Statistical explanations
as directed edges (one way connections) and Inductive-Statistical explanations by equating the de-
gree of inductive strength to the edge weight.
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Box 1.1: The Diﬀerences Between Deduction and Induction. Adapted from Salmon (1999, p.11)
DEDUCTION INDUCTION
All humans are mortal
Socrates is human All observed ravens have been black
Socrates is mortal All ravens are black
1. In a valid deductive argument, all of the content
of the conclusion is present, at least implicitly, in the
premises. Deduction is non-ampliative.
1. Induction is ampliative. The conclusion of an in-
ductive argument has content that goes beyond the
content of its premises.
2. If the premises are true, the conclusion must be
true. Valid deduction is necessarily truth preserving.
2. A correct inductive argument may have true
premises and a false conclusion. Induction is not
necessarily truth preserving.
3. If new premises are added to a valid deduc-
tive argument (and none of the original premises
is changed or deleted) the argument remains valid.
Deduction iserosion-proof
3. New premises may completely undermine a
strong inductive argument. Induction is not erosion-
proof
4. Deductive validity is an all-or-nothingmatter; va-
lidity does not come in degrees. An argument is to-
tally valid or it is invalid.
4. Inductive arguments come in diﬀerent degrees of
strength. In some inductions the premises support
the conclusions more strongly than in others.
An ideal rendering of a nomological net should thus be able to represent a topology of scientiﬁc
explanation: A single theory, a larger theoretical framework, or all the diﬀerent theories that can be
connected in someway. Only a subset of the net will make contact with the empirical record, that is.
The verisimilitude6 of purely theoretical entities could be the node degree or if observable entities
are associated to it statistically, the sum of the edge weights could be used. The structure of the
topology can be thought of to represent the‘success’ of scientiﬁc theorising, or its global verisimil-
itude. The goal is to strengthen the logical structure of the net by strengthening connections in
a derivation chain upon corroboration or deduction, but pruning derivation chains that fail severe
testing are logically inconsistent. Graph theory and network analysis also allow detecting similitude
of graphs (isomorphism) this oﬀers a potential tool to examine whether uniﬁcation is possible.
The networks under consideration here do not represent this ideal rendering of the net. The
nodes could represent theoretical constructs and perhaps the edges even laws, but not as just de-
scribed. First, it is important to remember that the terms in the networks are conditional on the
result of a search query that contained terms used to refer to developmental dyslexia and its ætiol-
ogy (otherwise a much larger set of abstracts would have been found). The nodes representing the
search terms (dyslexia, etc.) have been deleted, as we already know they appear in each abstract
and are therefore connected to all the other terms. Otherwise each hub in the network would be
connected to nearly all other hubs due to these terms. Second, the terms that make up the nodes
are general categories, not strictly representing theoretical entities as somewords just mean diﬀer-
ent things in diﬀerent contexts. Mentioning a brain structure in an abstract could have theoretical
6Yes, objections were raised against the received view, most importantly that the goal of scientiﬁc explanation is
uniﬁcation, not causality (Kitcher, 1989). In the everyday practice of empirical science, causality will be on the mind of
the researcher, not uniﬁcation. The received view seems to me a most complete account of scientiﬁc explanation that
strikes a balance between idealised science and a taxonomy of theorising in the wild. Moreover, uniﬁcation is explicitly
deﬁned as a goal of science in the notion of strengthening the logical structure of the net. Also, the received view has
been declared a straw man of philosophy of science and has been defended quite successfully recently (see Lutz, 2012).
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Box 1.2: The Four Forms of Scientiﬁc Explanation According to the Received View. Adapted from
Salmon (1999, p.16). Note that the Nomological Net Metaphor implies the Goal of Uniﬁcation.
Explananda
Particular Facts General Regularities
Laws (Ideographic) (Nomothetic)
Universal laws
D-N D-N
Deductive-Nomological Deductive-Nomological
Statistical laws
I-S D-S
Inductive-Statistical Deductive-Statistical
reasons as well as be the result of an empirical study of that structure.
Finally, the weight of the edges connecting the nodes in the graphs is calculated as a sum over
the abstracts, indicating how often the term pairs were mentioned in concert in the corpus. These
weights could very well evidence an underlying empirical law, as the terms must be correlated in
some way, but this cannot be interpreted as a correlational measure. As for the structure of the
network topology, I see no reason why the general idea of the structure of scientiﬁc explanation
represented as entities that can be related either by frequency of co-occurrence or by the number
of connections they make to other terms does not apply here. This is in fact how graph theory
was used recently to analyse the structure of symptoms of psychopathology listed in the DSM-IV
(Borsboom, Cramer, Schmittmann, Epskamp, & Waldorp, 2011).
Even when these restrictions on the scope of the results are taken into account, from the per-
spective of theory evaluation as an attempt to strengthen those structures in the net that are sci-
entiﬁcally credible, and at the same time prune the less credible laws and their associated nodes,
the graphs do not show a tendency towards less connected nodes, the opposite is the case. When
each term ends up associated to every other term, the network cannot be very informative as a
knowledge base. Lebel and Peters (2011), discussing claims of evidence for paranormal phenom-
ena (Bem, 2011), suggested that a weak knowledge system contributes to the publication of such
incredible claims in psychological science. The verisimilitude of the entities and laws involved in a
theoretical claim should be severely tested and ruthlessly discarded if they cannot pass the tests.
That is how the logical structure of knowledge represented in the nomological net increases. In ad-
dition to (or instead of) a possible low logical structure of the theories represented by the networks
in Figure 1.2, one could interpret the observed non-speciﬁcity as the sign of a high similitude of the
theories that spawned the studies whose abstracts were analysed.
This could be an explanation for Claim 2: Empirical evidence cannot be decisive in assessing
the verisimilitude of competing theoretical claims, not because they are not severely tested, but
because the entities and laws from which observations are predicted are essentially two sides of
the same structural coin. The question of similitude will be discussed in the last paragraph of this
chapter.
1.2.2 Meet ~theo~ … there goes the neighbourhood!
The ﬁnal support forClaim 1 (the number of substantive theoretical accounts has been growing
rather than shrinking) and its logical consequence Claim 2 (the credibility of substantive theoretical
accounts is invulnerable to apparent corroborations of competing substantive theoretical accounts)
will be provided by examining the category Theory. The bars representing diﬀerent theories are
grouped at the end of the x-axes in Figure 1.3. These terms exclusively representword combinations
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Figure 1.4 – The graphs represent the ﬁrst order neighbourhood of the ~theo~node based on the net-
works displayed in Figure 1.3. Here, speciﬁc classiﬁcations of terms were collapsed into broader cate-
gories. The nodes in the graphs now have an equal number of categories for each decade. The blue
connections represent direct associations of theory terms to other categories. The other connections
represent associations between the terms in the ﬁrst order neighbourhood of node ~theo~. See text
and Appendix A.1 for details.
associated with a particular theoretical account, from multi-causal theories to those that focus on
deﬁcits in temporal processing (see Table A.1). One could object that their appearance is normal
due to the progress of a scientiﬁc ﬁeld of study and advancement of technology in general. The
number of studies with downloadable abstracts published on the subject seems to grow as a power
law of 2n (n = 36, 123, 264, 686 respectively). The networks do reveal that more detailed, speciﬁc
terms appear in the scientiﬁc record as time goes by. One could argue that as science advances
and advanced technologies like in vivo brain imaging and behavioural-genetic analysis are more
commonly available, this will boost connections between terms that were previously unconnected;
a logical consequence of scientiﬁc progress. To gain more insight in the relevance of the evolution
of this nomological net for appraising and amending theories about the ætiology of developmental
dyslexia, the corpus of abstracts was re-analysed as shown in Figure 1.4. The focus of the analysis
is to assess the impact of the explosive growth of the empirical record on theory evaluation. To
do so, all the speciﬁc terms were collapsed into 16 broader categories that occurred in all four
decades and every word indicating a theoretical statement was collapsed to the term ~theo~(17
nodes, seeAppendix A.2, TableA.2). As a next step the node representing theory terms and its direct
neighbourhood was isolated from the total network. This is a neighbourhood of order 1, meaning
it contains only nodes that have one direct connection to the theory node. Those connections are
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displayed in blue in Figure 1.4, the other connections are those that exist between the other nodes
in the neighbourhood.
Using the broader categories, the networks now appear to present a more balanced picture. In
1970-1980 on this much coarsely grained scale, terms directly associated to theory indicator words
were also connected to each other. Important is to note the diﬀerence in the weights of the con-
nections (how often did the terms appear together in an abstract in that decade?) and the degree
of the nodes (how many connections does the node make to other nodes?). These values (repre-
sented by size and colour of nodes and edges) are rescaled to the minimum and maximum values
observed in each decade and therefore comparable across decades. The conclusionmust therefore
be that the pattern persists: The degree distribution and weights of the connections of the nodes
in these neighbourhood networks increase over time. One way to express this for an individual
node is to look at its co-citation coupling (Small, 1973). Two connected nodes are co-cited if an-
other node‘cites’ (connects to) both of them. For each of the four decades the average co-citation
coupling of ~theo~to the other nodes is: 11.7 (SD = 1.9), 14.3 (SD = 1.1), 14.6 (SD = 0.7) and 15
(SD = 0), respectively. This means that in the last network where ~theo~is connected to ~gen~all
the other nodes connect to both ~theo~and ~gen~. Such is the case for all possible node combina-
tions with ~theo~as there is no dispersion in co-citations. A summary metric of the weights of the
connections is usually expressed as the sum of all edge weights connecting to a node, or the graph
strength (Barrat, Barthélemy, Pastor-Satorras, & Vespignani, 2004). For the ~theo~node the graph
strength is: 24.4, 41.2, 52.7 and 69.0 for each consecutive decade.
To summarise: More connections emerge between theory words and other terms as time goes
by and the strength of those connections (how often they co-occur in abstracts of scientiﬁc articles)
also increases. In the most recent decade (2000-2010) the terms found in 686 abstracts that are
most directly associated with theoretical claims about the ætiology of developmental dyslexia form
a network in which:
1. Indicators of theoretical claims are associated to every other term in the network.
2. The strength of these associations is equal and maximal for all connections.
3. Each node that is associated to a theory word is also connected to every other node in the
network.
1.2.3 The‘inventors’ in social science: Interventions as technology.
What are the causes and consequences of this weak knowledge system? One consequence that
should raise some concern is the development of‘technology’ based on these ætiologies of devel-
opmental dyslexia. In the‘applied’ social sciences the scientiﬁc knowledge produced by the‘pure’
ﬁelds is turned either into diagnostic or performance measuring instruments or into intervention
programs whose goal is behavioural change, which can be anything from optimal design of adver-
tising campaigns to a treatment program for a psychopathological disorder.
In the case of developmental dyslexia, the technology produced is intervention programs that
ultimately should ameliorate reading and spelling performance. The fact that just about any the-
oretical claim seems to enjoy empirical success has resulted in an equal plethora of intervention
studies, some of which are so esoteric, or‘armchair unlikely’, that I consider it a real possibility that
as a consequence of the inability of scientists in these ﬁelds to properly evaluate their theories for
verisimilitude, the lives of children were adversely aﬀected. At the very least it should raise ques-
tions about the ethics of intervention research. A whole range of interventions, some without any
apparent relation to reading and spelling, continue to be proposed by serious scientists in serious
scientiﬁc journals. The interventions reveal we are dealing with a science that is realist (in the most
direct sense) about the phenomena and entities its theories posits to exist in reality. In principle,
this is not at all a bad trait for an individual scientist, as long as there is the realisation that the
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ontology is a temporary one. In an arena with so many diﬀerent competing theories claiming to‘get
it right’, one would expect some more pervasive scepticism from a genuine scientiﬁc endeavour.
The proposed treatments are clearly inspired by the (causal) ontology associated with a speciﬁc
deﬁcit (see Figure 1.1) and the rationale behind most of these interventions is not very diﬀerent
from attempting to repair a faulty component in a machine. Recent examples of studies reporting
treatment eﬀects are: Adding Fish Oil (Omega-3 fatty acids) to the diet to improve the diminished
myelination of the magnocellular part of the central nervous system (e.g. Cyhlarova et al., 2007 »
magnocellular deﬁcit hypothesis); Using coloured lenses and coloured overlays to improve reading
ﬂuency (e.g. Lightstone, Lightstone, & Wilkins, 1999; Whiteley & Smith, 2001) » visual disturbance
/ visual stress hypothesis); Music therapy (Cogo-Moreira et al., 2012; e.g. Overy, 2003) » rhythm /
coordination imbalance hypothesis); Intensive training with tonal sweeps and acoustically modiﬁed
speech (e.g. Tallal, 2004 » auditory temporal processing hypothesis); Neuro-Feedback training (e.g.
Breteler, Arns, Peters, Giepmans, & Verhoeven, 2010 » brain dynamics deﬁcit hypothesis); Training
motor skills (e.g. D. Reynolds, Nicolson, & Hambly, 2003; D. Reynolds & Nicolson, 2007 – cerebellar
deﬁcit hypothesis); Presenting stimuli to visual, auditory and touch modalities opposite a dysfunc-
tional hemisphere (e.g. Smit-Glaudé, van Strien, Licht, & Bakker, 2005) » hemispheric balancemodel
of reading and dyslexia); Training Rapid Serial Naming of pictures, colours, numbers and letters (e.g.
Eleveld, 2005 – rapid naming / ﬂuency deﬁcit hypothesis); Training children by letting them play ac-
tion video games (Franceschini et al., 2013) » visuo-spatial crossmodal temporal attentional deﬁcit
/ (dorsal) magnocellular deﬁcit hypothesis. These interventions were chosen because they appear
rather unorthodox and they all but one report positive eﬀects some of which are close to mirac-
ulous. Twelve hours of‘training’ with action video games was reported to cause gains in reading,
spelling and phonological skills equivalent to 1 year of ‘regular’ remediation (Franceschini et al.,
2013). There are many more reports of eﬀective interventions in the literature, most of which are
based on these ‘regular’, but in my opinion at least less harmful remediation programs: Repetition
learning of reading and spelling performance.
As Novalis suggested in the epigraph, in social science, the inventors are also the true hypoth-
esisers, they cast their nets and they always catch. This problem of‘easy’ evidencing of eﬀects of
interventionwas recently discussed as one of the pervasive problems in psychological science (Boot,
Simons, Stothart, & Stutts, 2013). The solutions oﬀered mostly concern the design of experiments
(e.g., active control groups as placebo stand-ins) and fail to recognise that interventions are in fact
a technology produced by scientiﬁc theories and their tests should perhaps be treated diﬀerently
from tests of theories (seeMeehl, 1997). As has been known for a long time, eﬀective technologies
of the social and life sciences, from psychotherapeutic or surgical intervention to pharmacologi-
cal treatments have a high likelihood of‘breaking down’ when they are brought into the real world
where they have to be eﬃcient as well as mere eﬀective under ideal conditions of a clinical trial (cf.
Cochrane, 1972).
My goal, as stated earlier, is to seek an explanation for the persistence of the weak knowledge
structure in the empirical record, that is, focus on substantive theories and examine in what re-
spect they are similar and if they are not, to what extent we can understand theoretical diversity
arises due to weakness of applied methods and philosophy of science. First, I will sketch a meta-
theoretical account of the mechanism behind the erosion of authority of theory corroboration by
empirical evidence (section 1.3). Second, I will examine the diﬀerences between theorising in the
empirical social sciences and the natural sciences (section 1.4). Before solutions can be presented,
I provide an overview of the problem of theoretical diversity and discuss some causes for its emer-
gence speciﬁc for the object of study in psychological science (section 1.5). Section 1.6 is a proposal
to deﬁne developmental dyslexia as a state-entity and study claims about its ætiology guided by de-
grees of theory speciﬁcation. The remaining chapters in this book will be characterised according
to the level of theory speciﬁcation they set out to test.
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1.3 Epistemic Sloughing: How to Erode the Authority of Corroborative
Events
``If Psychology is ever to become anything more than a mere aggregation of opinions, it can
only be by the establishment of some datum universally agreed to.’’
-Herbert Spencer (1855, p. 8)
What appears to have occurred in the study of developmental dyslexia is that any signiﬁcant
pattern in the data was interpreted as a phenomenon of signiﬁcance for the ætiology. Although
direct tests of predictions by diﬀerent theories do exist, the empirical results appear to have no
authority on the level of perceived verisimilitude of the competing theories, even if those results
pertain to empirical studies of the brain or genes and are therefore indirect discorroborations with
respect to competing theories (Ramus, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; Ramus & Szenkovits, 2008; Ramus et
al., 2006;). These theories are in empirical gridlock, or perhaps due to the shear volume of empirical
phenomena that are perceived as being relevant, an ontological indiﬀerence has evolved among the
researchers in the community. The energy spent on attempts to dispose of competing theoretical
accounts is apparently perceived as a waste of time and resources by the ﬁeld; in any case, such
attempts do not seem to occur often. The result is a ﬂooding of the empirical record with empir-
ical facts representing unrefuted hypotheses, a condition I call Empiarrhhea.7 Each phenomenon
is‘saved’ to support a speciﬁc theoretical deﬁcit and each deﬁcit ends up with its own anatomical
and functional brain anomaly and genetic anomaly. If there is anything evidence from neuroscience
and genetics has done, it is an ontological truth status for diﬀerent deﬁcits that resonatesmorewith
a generally accepted world-view, than verisimilitude of a theoretical whole: Such deﬁcits must exist
as constituents of reality, after all, aren’t we determined by our brains and genes according to sci-
ence? This is why in Figure 1.1 the CNS and genes are at the top of the causal pathways, the origin
of the derivative chain, with most (apparent) epistemic weight.
It seems as if the scientiﬁcmethod, the repeated application of the empirical cycle in which theo-
ries are tested based on their predictions of observable phenomena has turned into a vicious cycle
of consisting only of corroboration events. I use the term corroboration event loosely to indicate
that a theoretical prediction (and as such the whole of theoretical claims in the derivational chain)
was ‘evidenced’ or ‘conﬁrmed’ or ‘supported’ or ‘veriﬁed’ or ‘not falsiﬁed’ or ‘considered plausi-
ble’8 by an empirical observation according to a cultural convention speciﬁc to a community of
scientists. Often this convention concerns turning the prediction into a hypothesis that is tested
using an observational threshold for evidencing phenomena. The threshold represents a certain
degree of conﬁdence about the truth-status of the hypothesis, for example, whether the proba-
bility of an observation falls below the α-level (false positive rate) in null hypothesis signiﬁcance
testing (NHST). The 3σ evidence level and 5σ discovery level for elementary particles is used to de-
cide how remarkable an observation is, compared with observations that may be expected if the
predicted particle was not part of the description of reality (i.e., the standard model).
The corroboration strength, or weight of the event granting truth-likeness to a theory in the per-
ception of scientists, should however not be confused with the magnitude of a probability or an
eﬀect size associated with the event. Together with a complex interaction of less objective judge-
ments about the novelty, aesthetics, or risky-ness of the prediction and the severity of the test,
it is the objective precision and accuracy of a theoretical prediction that decide the corroborative
7I introduced the term Empiarrhea to indicate the zealous empiricists practice of ﬂooding the empirical record with
cute facts that have no impact on the veracity of theoretical claims. Rick Dale (personal communication, 18-03-2011)
pointed out one could also call this phenomenon Theorrhea indicating the inﬂux of new theoretical accounts into the
scientiﬁc record by theorists in search of a monism.
8These terms mean diﬀerent things to philosophers of science and logicians. I hope my generalisation for the sake of
the argument will be forgiven.
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strength of the event and its eﬀect on perceived verisimilitude of the theories involved (Mayo &
Spanos, 2006; Meehl, 1990b, 2002). For example, in general a lesser corroboration strength is as-
signed to a convergence of evidence compared to the prediction of novel facts. General Relativity
Theory (GRT) could account for Mercury’s perihelion advance, a known anomaly to Newton’s the-
ory of celestial mechanics, but it was the corroboration event of a predicted observation (bending
of star light during an eclipse in 1918) that convinced most scientists, and the general public (com-
pare Hasselman, 2013 on usingmodel ﬁt indices as corroboration strength). One group of scientists
formed an exception, most astrophysicists were more impressed by the after-the-fact prediction of
Mercury’s perihelion advance (Brush, 1989). Meehl (2002) oﬀers an interpretation that I believe
is crucial for understanding the weak structure of the nomological net described in the previous
section. I will refer to it as the epistemic sloughing9 of theoretical predictions by means of hypoth-
esis testing. In order to understand the mechanisms of this process consider the diﬀerent types of
research that are commonly used in the empirical ﬁelds of the social and life sciences.
The kind of research conducted in the social and life sciences can be categorised (basedon Lykken,
1968) as follows:
3. The eﬀect of some treatment on some output variables in applied research (e.g., the testing of
technology, (cf. Meehl, 1997). These studies are a special case of studies that:
2. Examine the diﬀerence between two or more groups of individuals with respect to some
variable. These studies are again a special case of studies that:
1. Examine the relationship or correlation between two or more variables within some
speciﬁed population.
In general, it can be said that data patterns that might evidence or refute hypotheses, irrespective
of the kind of study that is conducted, will be patterns of association (e.g., variables share a de-
gree of common variance, value sequences display a degree of recurrence or symmetry (breaking);
Neyman, 1969). Whether or not an observed association between variables represents a causal
entailment is a matter of interpretation of the results in the context of the study as a whole. At the
most basic level, all studies are tests of sign predictions.
To predict the sign of a correlation is the least risky of predictions10 a theory could produce about
future empirical observations. The values can take on: Positive, negative, or no correlation, or in
terms of a diﬀerence between variables: Larger, smaller, or about equal to 0. The most risky pre-
dictions a theory can make are point-value predictions (actual measurement outcomes), because
the variation in possible outcomes of such future observations is countably or uncountably inﬁ-
nite. To test a prediction in the social and life sciences, most often a hybrid of Fisherian signiﬁcance
testing and the Neyman-Pearson paradigm of Null Hypothesis Signiﬁcance Testing (NHST) is used
(Nickerson, 2000 is a review of the use of NHST in social science).11 Other ﬁelds may use diﬀerent
procedures, but generally speaking it involves estimating how likely it is to have observed the data,
if the theory would not have urged us to make an observation (the chance of observing the data, or
more extreme data, given that the or the null-hypothesis (H0) is true). This concerns data patterns
that could have revealed –absent the theory– the predicted observational constraint against the
background noise of‘obvious’ observations. The predicted observation has to stand out above this
background noise and the null-hypothesis test is a decision on whether to accept or reject the ob-
servation as being background noise. The diﬀerence between corroborating the prediction of a
9Admittedly, I had not heard of this word before I read‘Sloughing Ontology’ (Dale, 2008). Given our Theorrhea /Em-
piarrhea exchange, it seemed appropriate to use Epistemic Sloughing here.
10Strictly speaking the undirected Boolean prediction:‘there is a diﬀerence / correlation’ or‘there is no diﬀerence /
correlation’, is weaker because it can just take on two values. The diﬀerence is lost due to the dichotomous nature of null
hypothesis signiﬁcance testing. The signiﬁcance threshold is adjusted to represent the diﬀerence the two (one-tailed or
two-tailed test).
11I will not consistently distinguish between the two approaches and refer to thewhole enterprise of hypothesis testing
as NHST.
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positive correlation by rejecting H0 and an expected instrument reading of 8 decimal points ac-
curacy by rejecting H0 is lost in the dichotomous accept-reject outcome (Cumming, 2012; Steiger,
2004). In the accept-reject dichotomy lies the meta-theoretical problem: Assigning a weight to the
corroboration of the theory when H0 is not refuted. The epistemic linkage between the substantive
theory T, and the hypothesis test of its prediction H*, has been broken (Meehl, 1997, 2002). The
exoskeleton of truth-like scientiﬁc knowledge that supports the derivation chain of a theoretical
prediction is eﬀectively shed by hypothesis testing and interpreting the signiﬁcance of a body of
empirical evidence compares to picking scabs.
So why were scientists studying cosmology more impressed by GRT’s convergence on predicting
the orbit of Mercury? Meehl suggests it was the extreme numerical accuracy of the after-the-fact
prediction. The bending of light phenomenon could also be derived fromNewton’s theory of gravity
and GRT was indeed much more accurate than those predictions. This was however incomparable
to the numerical accuracy of Mercury’s predicted orbit. As an example of the odd consequences
this epistemic sloughing can have on evaluating theories, consider the evidence for the existence
of atoms and molecules. In 1913 Perrin made a famous argument in favor of the postulate that
atoms needed to be included in the scientiﬁc description of reality by showing 13 qualitatively diﬀer-
ent ways to calculate Avogadro’s number (amount of atoms in a volume of space). One could use
the kinetic theory of gases, the electrochemical theory of electrolysis or X-rays to arrive at an es-
timate. Einstein’s 1905 observations on Brownian motion were used and one derivation could be
made based on the fact that the sky is predominantly blue during the day (Meehl, 1990a; Salmon,
1978). This argument convinced even the most persistent skeptics (except Ernst Mach apparently,
seeMeehl, 1990b), because it would be extremely unlikely if these diﬀerent calculationswould con-
verge (by order of magnitude) close to 6.02214129(27)×1023mol−1 based on chance alone (Meehl
estimates the odds are over a quadrillion to one against). As Poincaré lucidly stated, if 13 ways
to count something yield approximately the same number, something must have been counted
(Meehl, 1990a).
The 13 estimates were however not exactly the same and this did not surprise any physicist,
because the theories used in the derivation of the estimates (the auxiliary theories) were per-
ceived to represent diﬀerent degrees of verisimilitude. In an interesting twist, Meehl (1990b) ex-
plores what would have happened if in those days a statistical test were demanded to test the
null-hypothesis‘there is no diﬀerence between the estimates’. The result would be that H0 should
be rejected and as a consequence the atomic/molecular theory should be rejected. No physicist
would have even contemplated declaring the theory refuted based on this evidence, because the
epistemic relevance of the entire derivational chain of the argument leading to this convergence of
estimates was uncanny. A concrete indicator of this relevance is the order of magnitude of the val-
ues (1023) that was recovered by all 13 estimations. The epistemic signiﬁcance of this magnitude
is lost if one considers the 13 estimates as a distribution of observations that should represent a
true score, but take on diﬀerent values due to measurement / estimation errors (T = X + E). To give
an example of what physical science has achieved in terms of precision of point-value predictions,
consider one of the most precise predictions of a measurement outcome by a scientiﬁc theory. It
concerns the existence of an anomalous electron magnetic dipole moment (which is anomalous to
the Dirac equation) by Quantum Electrodynamics (QED). According to the most accurate calcula-
tions the anomaly, when measured in a metal trap with a cylindrical cavity whose resonance struc-
ture is known, should have a value of: aµQED = 11659180.4(5.1) × 10−10 (Aoyama, Hayakawa,
Kinoshita, & Nio, 2008; Hagiwara, Martin, Nomura, & Teubner, 2007). The most accurate empiri-
cal measurement of the predicted value of the anomaly in the described measurement context is:
aexp = 11659208.0(6.3)x10 − 10 (Bennett et al., 2006). Indeed, the residual diﬀerence between
theory and measurement is not zero, but the precision and accuracy of the theoretical prediction
are unparalleled by any scientiﬁc theory (this residual diﬀerence can however be understood in
Quantum Chromodynamics or QCD). No cats were killed in the process of measuring this accuracy
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(Schrödinger, 1935).
Such examples of accuracy do not exist in any other discipline of science, moreover note that the
theory in fact predicts the entiremeasurement context in which the phenomenonmay be observed
to yield the predicted measurement outcomes. It would be the same as having a psychological
theory that yielded a formula that could be used to predict numerically the diﬀerence between
running a test on a computer and ﬁlling out a paper and pencil version of the same test. In social
science, the prediction of measurement context is implicit, but very real; consider the factorial
design of experiments or the observation of a variable corroborating a theoretical entity only at
the level of a sample of a certain size. In fact, I propose to consider all actions taken to make sure
that‘everything else being equal’ the evidenced prediction should be attributed to the theory (the
ceteris paribus clause) reﬂect expectations by the experimenter about the measurement context in
which the phenomenon should be observable.
In principle, the statistical testing of hypotheses is not a problem as long as sensible scientists
uphold the epistemic linkage between theory and tested hypothesis in their evaluation. The nature
of the prediction made by the theory plays an extremely important role in this respect. The odds of
a quadrillion to one against count as a‘damn strange coincidence’ (Salmon, 1984), but these odds
are the exclusive result of point-value predictions. Therefore, in physics this will hardly present a
problem (note, they often do not use statistical tests at all). In the softer empirical sciences, whose
theories do not predict anything beyond the direction of an association between variables, a whole
range of obfuscating factors make it extremely diﬃcult for scientists who are genuinely willing to
do so, to reconstruct the epistemic linkage in a meaningful way:
`Thesis: Null hypothesis testing of correlational predictions from weak substantive theories
in soft psychology is subject to the influence of ten obfuscating factors whose effects are
usually (1) sizeable, (2) opposed, (3) variable, and (4) unknown. The net epistemic effect
of these ten obfuscating influences is that the usual research literature review is well-nigh
uninterpretable.’ (Meehl, 1990c, p. 197)
If Meehl’s thesis is correct and essential mechanisms for deciding the veracity of theoretical
claims in a ﬁeld of science are sabotaged such that its claims are uninterpretable, it cannot be con-
sidered a scientiﬁc enterprise that generates increasingly accurate knowledge about the structure
of the domain in reality it studies. There may be other goals for genuine scientiﬁc endeavours to
pursue, but I am considering empirical sciences with just cause: In this scenario we cannot expect
the applied ﬁelds of the social and life sciences to produce eﬀective and eﬃcient technology (e.g.,
Ioannidis, 2005; Worrall, 2011). Table 1.3 lists Meehl’s obfuscating factors of which many will even-
tually be discussed one way or another in this book. In this section I will address two categories of
factors: 1) Factors that indicate a credibility hurdle is necessary for the empirical ﬁelds (1.3.1) and 2)
Factors indicative of obscurantist practices concerning the derivation and evaluation of a prediction
(1.3.2).
1.3.1 The crud factor and the credibility hurdle
Lykken (1968) estimated that the‘unrelated’ molar variables involved in most studies in psychology
share 4-5% common variance, meaning, with 0 measurement error a correlation of about .20 can
be expected between any one of them. This really depends on the ﬁeld of inquiry, but it seems
that estimates between .15 and .35 are by no means an exaggeration (Lykken, 1968; Meehl, 1990a,
1997). Based on the lower estimate, the expected diﬀerence between any group-based averages
would be about 0.5 standard deviations. The test against the null hypothesis of‘no association’ is
often a test against a‘straw man’ null hypothesis (LeBel & Peters, 2011), because it can be known
in advance that an assumption of no association at all is false (Bakan, 1966; Bower, 1997; Ferguson
& Heene, 2012; Gliner, Vaske, & Morgan, 2001; Meehl, 1967; Nunnally, 1960; Rozeboom, 1960).
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Table 1.1
Meehl’s (1990a, 1990b, 1990c) Obfuscating Factors that render Scientiﬁc Claims Uninterpretable in
the Context of NHST and Weak Predictions. The last Columns display the Eﬀects of the Factors on the
Perceived Verisimilitude of Theories that are in fact Truth-like and Trivial or Likely False.
Eﬀect on perceived verisimilitude of a theory that is in fact:
Factor Truth-like
Trivial /
False
1 Loose (nondeductive) derivation chain, making several ‘obvious’
inferential steps requiring unstated premises (intuitive, common-
sensical, or clinical experience).
-
2 Problematic auxiliary theories, although explicitly stated. -
3 Problematic ceteris paribus clause. -
4 Imperfect realization of particulars (experimenter mistakes in manip-
ulation) or experimenter bias in making or recording observations.
-
5 Inadequate statistical power to detect real diﬀerences at the convent’
ional signiﬁcance level.
-
6 Crud factor: In social science everything correlates with everything to
some extent, due to complex and obscure causal inﬂuences.
+
7 Pilot studies used to (a) decide whether ‘an eﬀect exists’ and (b)
choose a sample size of adequate statistical power if the pilot eﬀect
is borderline but in the ‘right’ direction.
+
8 Selective bias in favor of submitting reports refuting the null hypoth-
esis.
+
9 Selective bias by referees and editors in accepting papers refuting the
null hypothesis.
+
10 Detached validation claim for psychometric instruments. - +
Therefore, a researcher canmaximize his chances to corroborate anyweak prediction of association
between variables, by making sure a large enough number of data points are collected. This‘crud
factor’ (cf. Meehl, 1990c) implies a researcher has a chance of 1 in 4 to evidence an association using
a sample size of 100 data points, without even needing a truth-like theory to predict an association
(Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Ioannidis, 2012; Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2013). This
is of course not something a researcher deliberately plans to do (one assumes), or a statistical error
that is committed. It is a genuine problem of theory evaluation, rather speciﬁc for the domain of
the social and life sciences. The problem does have a practical solution and this involves what may
be called raising the credibility hurdle for observed phenomena.
By increasing the number of data points to evidence a pattern, one increases the statistical power
of the study (its sensitivity) to detect an association when it is indeed truly present in the data
as posited by the theory (a‘true eﬀect’). Suppose a researcher publishes a multi-experiment ar-
ticle that reports multiple corroborations of a predicted association between two or more vari-
ables. Why publish multiple experiments if the association was evidenced in the ﬁrst experiment?
One reason is purely meta-theoretical; to increase the credibility of the theory that predicted the
phenomenon, add to its perceived verisimilitude (in empirical reports of psychological science, au-
thors often report they attempt to show a certain eﬀect is‘real’). Assume H0 was refuted in 5 in-
dependent replications at p < .05, this would be an impressive corroborative track-record for the
theory that predicted the association. That is, if there ever were a truth-like theory that made a
prediction. As explained above, this scenario could happen just as likely for any pair of‘unrelated’
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Table 1.2
The Power Failure (Decline of Total Power) for Subsequent Corroborations Using the same Sample Size.
Values calculated for 3 Diﬀerent Levels of Cohen’s d, using G*Power 3 
N corroborations Total Power N for Large N for Moderate N for Small
1 80 - 81 52 128 788
2 71 - 72 52 128 788
5 0.5 - 0.9 52 128 788
10 0 52 128 788
variables, provided the sample sizes are large enough. Knowledge of such facts does not prevent
the zealous researcher from the impression that the corroborations of his predictions are really due
to the verisimilitude of his theorising (not to forget the ingenuity of his experimental methods of
course).
It is possible to solve this problem by taking seriously the rules of statistical inference and the
epistemic sloughing eﬀect of the null-hypothesis test when corroborating weak theoretical claims.
In the multi-experiment example, the probability of each subsequent rejection of H0 being a false
positive (rejecting H0 when it is true, a type-I error) represented by the α-level, eﬀectively reduces
to .055 = .000000312 (Schimmack, 2012). This is approximately the‘discovery level’ used to evi-
dence phenomena in particle physics, like the Higgs Boson (the 5σ criterion). At ﬁrst sight, this
drop in the probability of rejoicing over a false positive seems rather welcome, but what about
the probability of committing type-II errors (false negatives)? The decrease of the eﬀective α-level
represents the fact that the distribution of values that could be observed if H0 were true (the back-
ground noise) changes and becomes narrower. This means, everything else being equal, there is a
drop in statistical power, sensitivity to detect the true eﬀect with the same sample size.
To maintain equal power across subsequent observations, one needs to increase the sensitivity
of the study for each observation that adds to the credibility of the phenomenon. In social sci-
ence this often means increasing the sample size of the study, in physics one resorts to building a
more sensitive measurement apparatus. Table 1.2 shows what happens to the Total Power (of the
replications as a whole) if the sensitivity is not adjusted. At 5 subsequent corroborations the Total
Power has already dropped below 1%. If H0 is rejected at this sensitivity level, it is very unlikely the
results represent a true eﬀect. This is a very real problem, it was recently concluded by studying a
large number of meta-analyses that individual studies in Neuroscience are severely underpowered
ranging from 8% to 21% (Button et al., 2013).
Schimmack (2012) provides a table with requirements for a multiple-experiment study to main-
tain a sensitivity of 80% for each individual rejection of H0 (Table 1.3 is an excerpt). In other words,
in order to be credible as a streak of corroborative events of a theoretical prediction, the obser-
vational hurdle has to be increased. The observation of n+1 signiﬁcant eﬀects out of N attempts
at the Total Power level, is unlikely to be due to chance alone (or the crud factor): The probability
of observing 5 signiﬁcant results in 5 studies whose Total Power is 50% is 0.0313. So in just 3 out
of 100 ﬁve-experiment studies of the same Total Power, we would expect to see 5 signiﬁcant re-
sults. That would probably qualify as a‘damn strange coincidence’ (Salmon, 1984) if it had occurred
absent the theory predicting the observation. Schimmack (2012) calculates an incredibility index
(IC-index) as the binomial probability of observing at least one non-signiﬁcant result in the streak of
corroboration events, given an estimate of the Total Power to detect the eﬀect (post-hoc observed
power). For this 5-study example, given a large eﬀect size (Table 1.2) the IC-index would simply be
1-Total Power = 96.9%. That’s how incredible these results would be, given the sensitivity of the
test. Should I have increased the observational hurdle as indicated by Table 1.3, the IC-index would
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Table 1.3
The Relation between Subsequent Corroborations Events by Statistical Signiﬁcance and Sample Size
needed tomaintain 80% Power for each individual Corroboration. Values calculated for 3 diﬀerent Levels
of Correlation |r| (based on Cohen’s d), using G*Power 3. 
N corroborations Total Power Needed Large (|r|=.4) Moderate (|r|=.25) Small (|r|=.1)
1 80 52 128 788
2 89.4 136 336 2068
5 95.6 440 1090 6750
10 97.8 1020 2560 15820
have been 4.4% and I would have been much more comfortable to proclaim to have evidenced an
association predicted by a theory.
There is no tradition to raise the credibility hurdle for subsequent corroborations of associated
variables in the social sciences and in combination with the crud factor a dangerous recipe for im-
mobilizing the scientiﬁc method emerges. Suppose dyslexic and average readers in fact belong to
the same population of normal variation of reading ability and the only‘true’ characteristic that
separates these groups is some demarcation of ability in the lower end of the reading ability distri-
bution (see Shaywitz, Escobar, Shaywitz, Fletcher, & Makuch, 1992). Just by taking into account a
crud factor, it may be expected that reading ability correlates with any other variable, meaning, if
we sample a group based on low reading ability, this group can be expected to have low scores on
any other variable as well. The structure of the networks in section 1.2 seems to be a logical result
of this ambient correlation. To illustrate the consequences of the premise, consider a numerical ex-
ample by Meehl (1990a; see also Meehl, 1990c). Imagine he is talking about reading ability (x) and
some random other variable, for instance, amount of music education received during childhood
(y):
“I provide one simple numerical example to illustrate the point that a modest crud fac-
tor cannot be discounted in the metatheory of significance testing. […], suppose that a
representative value of the crud factor in a certain research domain were r = .30, not an im-
plausible value from the examples given. We have a substantive theory T, and we are going
to `test’ that theory by a correlational study involving observable variables x and y, which,
however, have no intrinsic logical connection with T and have been drawn randomly from
our huge pot of observables. Assume both x and y are approximately normal in distribution.
We dichotomize the independent variable x at its mean, classify each subject as high or low
on the x trait, and compare their scores on the dependent variable y by a t test. With the
mean standard score of the highs on x being .8 (at + 1 MD) and that of the lows being -.8,
there is a difference of 1.6 sigma in their means. Hence the expected mean difference on
the output variable is d = .48, about half a sigma. Assuming sample sizes for the highs and
lows are around 37 (typical of research in the soft areas of psychology), we find that the
probability of reaching the 5% level in a directional test is .66. So a theory that has negligible
verisimilitude, and where there is no logical connection between the theory and the facts,
has approximately a 2-to-1 chance of being corroborated provided that we were predicting
the correct direction. If one assumes that the direction is completely chance (which in any
real research context it would not be, for a variety of reasons), we still have a .33 probability
of squeaking through with a significant result; that is, the empirical probability of getting a
positive result for the theory is larger, by a factor of 6 or 7, than the .05 we have in our
minds when we do a t test’ (Meehl, 1990a, p. 125)
In this example the high/low cut is made at the mean of x, but if this were a study in devel-
opmental dyslexia and x were reading ability, the cut would be much more extreme (10th or 25th
percentile). The probability of ﬁnding a positive result without a theory is likely somewhat higher
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Figure 1.5 – A simulation of the eﬀect of sampling from diﬀerent regions of a population distribution
(Npop = 500000) in the presence of a crud factor, a population--level correlation between any two ran-
dom variables. Each dot represents the number of signiﬁcant results (p < .05) observed in 100 t--tests
for independent groups of the size represented on the x--axis (10 – 100). Two random variables were
generated for each population correlation: .1, .2, .3 (columns). One random variable was used to sam-
ple data points in the 10th (top row) or 25th (bottom row), or between the 25th and 75th percentile
(comparison group). The means concern the aggregated values of the second random variable for each
sampled case. The directional hypothesis tested against the null was (M[.25,.75] − M[0,.10]) > 0 or
(M[.25,.75]–M[0,.25]) > 0”
than 33% for a non-directional hypothesis, because in studies of developmental dyslexia one is al-
ways comparing whether the diﬀerence in means of performance measures is greater (or smaller)
than 0.
Whether this complicates matters can be relatively easily tested. Figure 1.5 shows results that
were obtained from a simulation of diﬀerent levels of the crud factor and dyslexic reading selection
criteria. First, three diﬀerent population-level correlations values were used to simulate the crud
factor association between any two random variables x and y (Npop = 500000, with a correlation of
x and y of .1, .2 and .3). Second, based on x (e.g., a standardised reading ability test), the population
was cut into regions to sample dyslexic readers from (the 10th percentile and lower, and the 25th
percentile and lower) and average readers (between the 25th and 75th percentile). These cut-oﬀs
were used to draw samples to conduct a t test for the diﬀerence between dyslexic and average
readers in the sample on their mean value of y (e.g., amount of music training received). The sam-
ple size for each group was varied from 10 to 100 data points and 100 tests were performed for
each group size. For each test a new random group sample was from the diﬀerent regions of the
population distribution.
The graphs represent the number of signiﬁcant (p < .05) t tests found in the series of 100 tests
conducted for each group size. If the correlation between any variable were .1, comparing to the
samples from the 10th and 25th percentile would yield 25% signiﬁcant results at group sizes of 44
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and 58 data points, respectively. The total study sample sizewould be 88 and 116. At this crud factor
level the chances do not get much better than 1 in 4 corroborative events without there being any
theory to pat on the back and grant some verisimilitude. When the correlation is .2, 25% signiﬁcant
tests can be expected at group sizes of 12 (10th) and 23 (25th) and at a correlation of .3 it’s 10 (10th)
and 12 (25th) participants in each group to ﬁnd 25% signiﬁcant diﬀerences. The crud factor of .3
even implies that 100% of the conducted tests could give a signiﬁcant result if group size is larger
than 87 and the dyslexic group is drawn from the 10th percentile of the population distribution of
reading ability.
The neglected credibility hurdle for evidencing empirical phenomena raises an important point:
Predictions of phenomena have to be risky (Popper, 1959), ideally they should be point-values, mag-
nitudes, but interval predictions should also be possible (Cumming, 2012;Meehl, 1997). Predictions
have to be severely tested (Mayo & Spanos, 2006), but perhaps the best characterisation that is rel-
atively school-of-philosophy and discipline-of-science free, was given by Salmon (1984): A scientist
has to make sure it would have to be a‘damn strange coincidence’ to have observed the predicted
phenomenon, without guidance by the theory. Perhaps we should just acknowledge that in the
presence of the crud factor, even if it is just .1, evidencing a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between average
and dyslexic readers on whichever performance measure you can imagine, is not that impressive.
It does not qualify as a‘damn strange coincidence’ and therefore not as a corroborator of theories:
Enter my characterisation of the state of the current scientiﬁc record on causes of developmental
dyslexia.
1.3.2 Investigator James corroborates his muse: The EVA-ætiology
The crud factor is one of the many important factors listed in Table 1.3 that make the appraisal of
theories in the context of weak predictions and NHST problematic, if not impossible. One more
general cause underlying this notion are the unknowns, such as the number of pilot studies that
were conducted prior to the publication of the corroboration of a prediction (factor 7, Table 1.3).
This is in principle the same eﬀect as just demonstrated in Figure 1.5, except the decision where to
place the cut-oﬀs is purely guided by a previous sample of values that turned out to yield signiﬁcance
of the hypothesis test.
There are other reasons than statistical ones, to be explicit about assumptions, expectations, un-
knowns and every decision that leads to a change of method or procedure (i.e., the opposite of
being obscurantist). It is essential for understanding the deductive chain that led to a prediction,
its logical structure (if any) and which link should be to blame, or be rewarded when the results
are known. As a demonstration, I sketch an example of the evaluation of a novel ætiology for de-
velopmental dyslexia. As far as I know, this ætiology has not been proposed yet, but all the claims
and derivations are based on the actual scientiﬁc record. To prevent any confusion about my actual
scientiﬁc claims (e.g., due to out of context quoting), I will present the evaluation as a description
of the theory of Investigator James, Tij12
Investigator James published a paper in which a prediction of the EVA-ætiology of developmen-
tal dyslexia, or, Early Vestibular-Auditory deﬁcit hypothesis is tested. Recently a‘strong, early
vestibular-auditory interaction that is critical for the development of music behaviour’ was evi-
denced in 7-month-old infants, who were able to encode rhythm in music using their body as ev-
idenced by their bouncing behaviour. Encoding only took place if they could actively bounce by
themselveswhile listening to themusic. The authors suggest that‘the experience of bodymovement
plays an important role in music rhythm perception’ (Phillips-Silver & Trainor, 2005). According to
Investigator James this allows the derivation of a causal pathway for understanding developmental
dyslexia, because:
12Investigator James is a zealous, but honest researcher who produces so many theories they have to be indexed Tij.
He is my terrestrial equivalent of Omniscient Jones, whose theories (TOJ) are always true (Sellars, 1956).
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T1: Rhythm, beat and meter perception in non-speech, speech and music is impaired in dyslexic
readers as well as rhythm production (Corriveau & Goswami, 2009; Goswami, 2006, 2011;
Huss et al., 2010; Overy, 2003; Ramus, Nespor, & Mehler, 2000; Thomson & Goswami, 2008)
Results are accounted for by a theory proposing the real cause of dyslexia concerns timing
deﬁcits understood in a neurobiologically inspired temporal sampling framework (Goswami,
2011).
T2: Balance andmotor learning are impaired in dyslexic readers due to a cerebellar deﬁcit (Brookes,
Tinkler, Nicolson, & Fawcett, 2010; Ramus et al., 2003; Reynolds et al., 2003; Rochelle & Tal-
cott, 2006; Stoodley et al., 2005; Stoodley & Stein, 2012). Exercise based training ameliorates
language and literacy diﬃculties of dyslexic readers (Franceschini et al., 2013; Reynolds et al.,
2003; Reynolds & Nicolson, 2007).
T3: In average developing children and adults, a larger amount of lifetime music training is as-
sociated with better auditory discrimination, ﬁne motor skills, a larger vocabulary, better
non-verbal reasoning ability, better letter recognition and better speech in noise percep-
tion (Forgeard, Winner, Norton, & Schlaug, 2008; Proverbio, Manfredi, Zani, & Adorni, 2013;
Strait, Parbery-Clark, O’Connell, & Kraus, 2013). A novel theoretical framework about training-
related plasticity induced by the complex nature of learning, listening and playing music pro-
vides a neuroscience explanation for these associations (Herholz & Zatorre, 2012).
T4: There is a genetic factor associated to impaired speech perception and language production
(vocabulary) in infants of dyslexic parents, noticeable as early as 2-17 months of age (Been,
van Leeuwen, & van Herten, 2008; Koster, Been, & Diepstra, 2005; Richardson, Leppänen,
Leiwo, & Lyytinen, 2003; van Herten et al., 2008; van Leeuwen et al., 2006; van Leeuwen
et al., 2008). These impairments in infancy are associated to reading and spelling problems
later on in life (Guttorm, Leppänen, Hämäläinen, Eklund, & Lyytinen, 2011; Molfese, 2000).
Speech perception based training ameliorates language and literacy diﬃculties of dyslexic
readers (Tallal, 2004).
T5: The genetic factor must be at work to impair auditory and speech perception in utero. It is
known that there is learning-induced plasticity of speech processing before birth (Partanen
et al., 2013) in addition to speech perception, voice-pattern recognition and language learn-
ing (DeCasper & Spence, 1986; Moon, Lagercrantz, & Kuhl, 2012). The cognitive and percep-
tual abilities that are higher in the population of well-trained musicians are typical of the
abilities that are much lower in the dyslexic reader population. Given the conjectures of the
musical training-related plasticity framework, it is likely that the temporal sampling theory
and the cerebellar theory can be uniﬁed into a general deﬁcit in the ﬂuency of coordination
of perception and action. Such a deﬁcit was recently evidenced by examining long term cor-
relations in naming latencies of dyslexic readers (Wijnants, Hasselman, Cox, Bosman, & Van
Orden, 2012).
Using these 5 theoretical claims Investigator James believes he can predict an observational con-
straint between two unlikely variables that can ﬁnally resolve the long-standing debate on whether
there is a speech perception deﬁcit in developmental dyslexia (Ramus & Szenkovits, 2008; Serni-
claes & Sprenger-Charolles, 2006):
Conjecture: From the theoretical claim about importance of early vestibular-auditory interaction
and the experience of self-initiated bodily coordination to musical rhythm as crucial factors
for the development of music behaviour and rhythm perception it follows that impaired mu-
sic and speech rhythm perception together with impaired balance and motor learning skills
in dyslexic readers are also due to the reduced in utero/neonatal/infancy learning-induced
plasticity due to the general deﬁcit of ﬂuent coordination (T5).
Prediction: If the amount of training-related plasticity induced by engaging in music related be-
haviour is associated with better letter recognition, a larger vocabulary and better auditory
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and speech perception in non-dyslexic readers and if action and speech training-induced plas-
ticity can ameliorate reading ability of dyslexic readers then there must be a positive asso-
ciation between amount of music training received and speech perception performance in
dyslexic readers (T1 + T2 + T3 + T4 + T5 + conjecture).
Most of the theoretical entities used by Investigator James touch the data base, the empirical
record of the ﬁeld, but he posits some novel functional or compositional laws to exist between
entities, like T5 and the implication in the conjecture. The prediction is derived using at least ﬁve
theoretical claims, each consisting of several auxiliary hypotheses and theories. Following Lakatos’
terminology I will call the theoretical whole (T1 + T2 + T3 + T4 + T5) the hard-core of the EVA-ætiology,
or its theoretical core Tij. Box 1.1 shows the elements involved in corroborating the theory. The
sentence can be read as:‘from Tij and auxiliary theories and auxiliary instruments and assuming no
interference of unknown factors and causes (ceteris paribus clause) and a truthful report of what
transpired during the observation, it follows that if O1 is observed then O2 must also be observed.’
The horseshoe is the symbol formaterial implication and the turnstile represents a deduction of the
material implication based on the left hand side. O1 concerns evidencing developmental dyslexia
and O2 concerns observing a positive correlation between amount of music training received and
speech perception performance. The four possible theoretical outcomes for the observations are
that O1 and/or O1 can be evidenced or not at all. However, the consequences for Tij concern just
two outcomes, being whether the material implication is true or false. By applying the valid logical
syllogisms (see Table 1.5), it is clear there can be only one valid logical inference when appraising
a scientiﬁc theory: If the right hand side is false, then Tij is false (modus tollens). The other valid
syllogism (modus ponens) is the derived prediction: Tij is true and therefore the right hand side is
true (the observational constraint). This is Investigator James’ assumption, his theoretical claim, it
is the hypothesis he wants to test. Only Omniscient Jones’ (TOJ) theories are true (Sellars, 1956)
and therefore all a scientiﬁc community can do is decide how truth-like Tij appears to them which
means assessing its verisimilitude.
LetO1 andO2 be observed, meaning the right hand side of the corroboration formula is true. The
only valid conclusion is that Tij is not falsiﬁed. To claim to have evidenced the truth of Tij is to commit
the invalid third ﬁgure aﬃrming the consequent. This is probably the most often committed invalid
inference made in science and known as the‘eﬀect = structure fallacy’. It is often committed when
inferring a cognitive modules exists based on each behavioural eﬀect one observes (Bosman, Cox,
Hasselman, & Wijnants, 2013; Van Orden & Kloos, 2003; Van Orden, Pennington, & Stone, 2001).
Or, perhaps positing causal pathways for developmental dyslexia for each observed impaired per-
formancemeasure evidenced in dyslexic readers as a group? Note that Investigator James, to derive
the theoretical core of the EVA-ætiology, uses a mix of the syllogisms, mostly aﬃrming the conse-
quent, as if using modus ponens. This is based on a track record of just several corroborative events
(the empirical studies cited), whose weight of corroboration we do not know much about. The on-
tological relevance of genetic and brain components does seep through in the weight attributed to
some links in the derivative chain.
To be scientiﬁcally credible, or plausible, to enjoy a high perceived verisimilitude, the only thing
Tij can do is to make risky predictions that are severely tested. Not just once, it has to show a
vita without any gaps, a track record of corroboration events (e.g., at least the 5 corroborative
events at proper Total Power mentioned in the previous paragraph). More weight will be added
to the corroboration if, absent Tij the probability of observing O2 conditional on O1 is very low or is
considered a‘damn strange coincidence’. Known factors such as the crud factor andweak directional
hypotheses should greatly diminish the corroborative weight awarded to observing the predicted
observational constraint. In the case of Tij one should ask: How extraordinary is the observation of a
positive association betweenmusic education and speech perception in dyslexic readers, without Tij
suggesting the empirical inquiry? Perhaps there is some surprise left after discounting for the crud
factor and the weak prediction, it is for the community to discuss. What would have guaranteed
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Box 1.3: The corroboration formula for appraising a theory, adapted from (Meehl, 1990a; 1990b;
1997; 2002). The outcome in the case of a falsiﬁed conjunction (observation 2 was not evidenced)
is given as two forms, one falsifying the conjunctions and its logical equivalent, falsifying at least
one of its elements. Explanation of symbols: The dots state conjunctions (‘and’), the ∨ disjunction
(“or”), the turnstile (`) signiﬁes deductive derivability (entailment, ‘from …it follows that …’), the
horseshoe (⊃) is a material implication or conditional (‘If …then …’), a tilde (~) represent negation
(‘not’), the three horizontal bars indicate full equivalence of the left and right hand side.
The corroboration formula for appraising a theory:
(T ·AT · Cp ·AI · Cn) ` (O1 ⊃ O2)
T : The theory of interest
AT : Auxiliary theories relied on in the particular experiment
Cp : Ceteris paribus clause (other things being equal)
AI : Instrumental auxiliaries (devices relied on for control and observation)
Cn : Realised particulars (conditions were as the experimenter reported)
O1,2 : Observations, or statistical summaries of observations
The case of the falsiﬁed conjunction (O1· ∼ O2) :
∼ (T ·AT · Cp ·AI · Cn) ≡∼ T ∨ ∼ AT ∨ ∼ Cp ∨ ∼ AI ∨ ∼ Cn
high corroboration strength without any discussion at all would be Investigator James’ prediction
of the exact value of the positive correlation, conditional on the severity of dyslexia of a participant
(a point-value prediction). Unfortunately, that is beyond the scope of current theory.
1.3.3 When is a Lakatosian defence defendable?
What happens if the right hand side is false (the case of the falsiﬁed conjunction in Box 1.3)? A
consequence of the logical structure of the formula is that the falsiﬁcation by modus tollens aﬀects
all the elements in the left hand conjunction that give rise to the derived prediction of observations.
This means that the‘cause’ for not observing the predicted observations, the falsiﬁcation, can apply
to each (at least one) individual element in the formula. This can be called a‘Lakatosian defence’
as it represents the important amendments Lakatos added to Popper’s logic of scientiﬁc discovery
(Lakatos, 1970, 1974; Meehl, 1990b; Popper, 1959). Oversimplifying, in Popper’s version of science,
there would only be a T and modus tollens would dictate scientist to abandon the theory in an act
of‘instant rationality’ (Meehl, 1990a). As in the case of Avogadro’s number, molecular theory was
not abandoned because the estimates weren’t exactly the same. Some of the auxiliaries did not
enjoy as much perceived verisimilitude as others and the community knew this. What eventually
happened was that auxiliary theories used in the derivation chain were amended or replaced by
more accurate versions which give the very accurate number presented earlier.
A Lakatosian defence allows a community of scientists to examine what in the derivation of the
prediction might have caused the failed observation, without immediately abandoning the theory.
It is possible a theory may need to be amended or that experimental procedures or instruments
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Table 1.4
The Four Figures of Deductive Inference. Two Syllogisms Constitute Valid Logical Inferences.
Figure Statement Deduction Name Conclusion
1 if p then q   p ∴ q Modus ponens (“establishing mode”) Valid
2 if p then q ∼ p ∴∼ q Denying the antecedent Invalid
3 if p then q q ∴   p Aﬃrming the consequent (“eﬀect = structure fallacy”) Invalid
4 if p then q ∼ p ∴∼ p Modus tollens (“destroying mode”) Valid
need to be reﬁned. In my opinion this is a sensible thing to do in a science that has a tradition of
seeking rigorous tests of theories that would maximise the corroborative strength of an observa-
tion, like a program of strong inference (Platt, 1964). Crucial experiments devised to test divergent
predictions of competing theoretical claims. What is needed is a science that is able to keep track
of the verisimilitude of the theories it produces in a more or less formal way (use meta-theoretical
tools). Or, it has to be relatively clear to all practitioners of the science in question whether a theo-
retical prediction is supported by the data or not and which ﬁnite set of testable factors could cast
doubts on that assertion (i.e., physics). This ensures that eventually the options for deﬂecting a
modus tollens falsiﬁcation death ray of instant realism to other factors besides T will be depleted in
a relatively short period of time. In a science that does not formally and rigorously appraise its the-
ories a situation could arise that should be somewhat familiar to the reader by now: Many diﬀerent
theories, apparently corroborated by empirical evidence, but the evidence has no authority to dis-
corroborate or negatively aﬀect the perceived truth-likeness of other theoretical claims. Returning
to Investigator James’ theory, let the observational conjunction be falsiﬁed, the positive correlation
was not observed in dyslexic readers. What are the credible options for saving Tij from refutation?
What is often observed in empirical reports of the social sciences is that causes for a (partial) fail-
ure to corroborate a prediction are attributable to unknown or unexpected factors thatmay have in-
ﬂuenced a result. Thismeans the ceteris paribus clause (Cp) is sacriﬁced in order to save T. Cp states
that under the conditions of the test (e.g., the experiment), there are no causes other than those
in the derivation chain that could lead to the predicted observation. Assuming Cp is true prior to
the experiment is extremely important for the corroboration of the derivational chain. Assuming Cp
must have been false after a failed test is the easiest way out of falsiﬁcation of T. Common statement
are:‘sample was too heterogeneous’,‘eﬀect was observed after including an [ad hoc] moderator’. In
the ﬁeld of developmental dyslexia one can ﬁnd discussion sections in which authors ask whether
the dyslexics were‘real’ dyslexics, whether IQ was taken into account, biological age vs. academic
or reading age, comorbidity. Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters provide a possible explanation
for the easy and apparently credible Cp sacriﬁces and suggest context relativity of measurements
should be a part of the derivative chain of observations. It has been known for some time that
the tendency to make sure that‘all other things being equal’ is true, by imposing strict procedures
for sampling, selecting and matching of participants, and so forth, basically means that verisimili-
tude will apply to that context alone. For studying properties of particles in a collider, that may be
ﬁne, but when a medical procedure has to be introduced into the public domain, it often turns out
that theoretical causes (a pharmaceutical substance) proven very eﬀective in a randomised control
trial (RCT), turns out to be much less eﬀective (= eﬃcient) when introduced into society (Cochrane,
1972; Higgins, Green, & Collaboration, 2008).
The Cn part of the equation has received a lot of recent attention in psychological science, some
of which were be brieﬂy discussed in the preface (e.g., questionable research practices, p-hacking).
The essential point is, if one cannot trust authors to provide full disclosure about everything one
needs to know about the particulars of the predicted observation, its verisimilitude cannot be as-
sessed (a recent call for public disclosure of particulars revealed some authors may violate this
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clause without even knowing it, see Lebel et al., 2013).
For Tij and the EVA-ætiology the degree of truth-likeness of the theories that have been used to
derive the prediction are important. These auxiliary theories and hypotheses (AT) have been used
to infer ‘modus ponens’-like relations connecting diﬀerent theoretical entities (e.g., functional or
compositional laws), without actually appraising them. In addition, the verisimilitude of the enti-
ties is unlikely to be known in any formal way, as in a track record of known precision and accuracy
of corroborative events. In the case of Tij the theoretical core consists of ﬁve theoretical statements
(i = 1, … 5) and the conjecture‘binds’ them in a ‘modus ponens’-like manner in order to allow the
actual prediction of the observational conjunction. Within each of the ﬁve postulates that consti-
tute the core, there are many auxiliary hypotheses and theories (indexed by j = 1, … n). I estimate
on average 5 theoretical claims or events that corroborate a hypothesis within each core postu-
late are important enough to be blamed for not observing what was predicted. Ranging from the
inference of a genetic factor based on infant prospective studies of children at risk for dyslexia to
the increased speech in noise perception in non-dyslexic readers due to music training. There are
at least 25 possible targets to which refutation may be deﬂected before Investigator James’ actual
prediction or the theoretical core is aﬀected. Lakatos called this the protective belt, preventing the
core from falsiﬁcation. If ad hockery is allowed in a science, the protective belt of sacriﬁcial aux-
iliary hypotheses is of course inﬁnite. In the spirit of this book, I will use protective boundary to
denote this phenomenon and proclaim that tests of predictions and appraisal of theories, should
aim beyond the protective boundary, straight for the core. A sobering note about this objective,
technically, the reports of corroborative events that constitute a substantial part of the 25 possible
auxiliary sacriﬁces, will have a similar corroboration formula associated with the observation, the
auxiliary takes on the role of T but with its own personal stock of sacriﬁcial of auxiliaries. It almost
seems as if there were a dark plot to keep us all occupied indeﬁnitely.
Finally, one might suggest the use of meta-analysis as a tool to gain some conﬁdence about the
credibility of an entity or law. These analyses report a summary eﬀect size of a particular predicted
phenomenon, and magnitudes of eﬀect sizes are generally not predicted by theories, mostly signs
of associations. Using a meta-analysis for these purposes (to gain credibility for an eﬀect) is com-
mitting the eﬀect = structure fallacy quite literally, because no eﬀect magnitude has been predicted
except for a lower bound, the critical value associated with the α level. The summary eﬀect sizes
can be interesting to asses after the fact, to see if a study included in the meta-analysis was sensi-
tive enough to have detected the summary eﬀect size (Button et al., 2013). As a corroboration of
predictions meta-analysis does not yield any empirical accuracy or precision outcomes that should
comprise the track record of the theory. From the meta-theoretical perspective, meta-analysis can
help to improve precision and sensitivity of future measurements by quantifying the sources of
variation between studies that are supposed to measure the same phenomenon.
Meanwhile, Investigator James’ eagerly awaits the reviews of his new and improved funding pro-
posal to further test the EVA-ætiology, using RCTs this time. A systematic review of 851 studies on
the relation between music education and language and literacy development of dyslexic readers
had of course nothing to do with his design change and new focus of inquiry:
“There is no evidence available from randomized controlled trials on which to base a judg-
ment about the effectiveness of music education for the improvement of reading skills in
children and adolescents with dyslexia. This uncertainty warrants further research via ran-
domized controlled trials, involving a interdisciplinary team: musicians, hearing and speech
therapists, psychologists, and physicians.’ (Cogo-Moreira et al., 2012)
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1.4 The tenuous nomological net: Theories of construction vs. theories
of principles
The problems with theory evaluation presented so far are not new and can be appended to a long
list of critiques tracing back to the earliest conceptions of some ﬁelds of scientiﬁc inquiry. For ex-
ample, Ladd (1892) reviewing William James’ ‘The Principles of Psychology’ (1890) concluded that
establishing psychology as a natural science was an‘utter impossibility’. James’ had suggested that
psychology was already using the methods of the natural sciences to test deep hypotheses about
its object of study, while in according to Ladd:
“[…] psychology as a science, devoid of all postulating of `deeper-lying entities,’ does nothing
of the kind. It assumes only the phenomena - the thoughts and feelings as actually known,
and the possibility of ascertaining uniform relations among them.’ (Ladd, 1892, pp. 29–30,
emphasis added)
Based on some of the work discussed in the previous paragraphs, Lakatos classiﬁed the kind of
theorising practiced in the empirical social sciences as one of the worst kinds of ad hockery{foot-
noteThere is also honest ad hockery: “In our theories, we rightly search for uniﬁcation, but real life
is both complicated and short, and we make no mockery of honest ad hockery” (Good, 1965) and
predicted grave consequences if it were allowed to continue:
``After reading Meehl [1967] and Lykken [1968] one wonders whether the function of sta-
tistical techniques in the social sciences is not primarily to provide a machinery for producing
phoney corroborations and thereby a semblance of ‘scientific progress’ where in fact, there
is nothing but an increase in pseudo-intellectual garbage. […] Or, as Lykken put it: ‘Statistical
significance [in psychology] is perhaps the least important attribute of a good experiment;
it is never a sufficient condition for claiming that a theory has been usefully corroborated, that a
meaningful empirical fact has been established, or that an experimental report ought to be
published.’ […] Thus the methodology of research programmes might help us in devising
laws for stemming this intellectual pollution which may destroy our cultural environment even
earlier than industrial and traffic pollution destroys our physical environment.’’ (Lakatos, 1975, p.
176, footnote 1, emphasis added)
Why do the softer ﬁelds of science rely on NHST, or more generally speaking, signiﬁcance testing
of directional predictions to‘ascertain facts’, when it has been pointed out (by the very people who
invented the techniques!) that to do so is logically ﬂawed, mostly trivial and often just plain wrong?
(Bakan, 1966; Carver, 1993; Cohen, 1994; Hogben, 1956; Lykken, 1968; Mayo & Spanos, 2006;
Meehl, 1967; Michell, 2009; Neyman, 1969; Nix & Barnette, 1998; Nunnally, 1960; Ring, 1967;
Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989; Rozeboom, 1960; Steiger, 2004; Traﬁmow, 2003; Tukey, 1960a, 1960b;
Wilkinson, 1999). Why doesn’t it look for better formal tools, or just hire a mathematician to create
them? In fact, it was sir R.A. Fisher himself who explicitly warned about the dangers of adopting
the abstract mathematical concepts of the theory of probability and measurement error, without
carefully examiningwhether they are appropriate for social science. That is, in service of the goals of
improving‘natural knowledge’ about relevant phenomena, as is customary in the natural sciences:
``I am quite sure it is only personal contact with the business of the improvement of
natural knowledge in the natural sciences that is capable to keep straight the thought of
mathematically-minded people who have to grope their way through the complex entan-
glements of error, […] Certainly there is grave confusion of thought. We are quite in danger
of sending highly trained and highly intelligent young men out into the world with tables of
erroneous numbers under their arms, and with a dense fog in the place where their brains
ought to be.’’ (Fisher, 1958, p. 274; also see Yates, 1968, who reiterates Fisher’s point a
decade later).
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In the sections that follow Iwill attempt to explicate Fisher’s‘grave confusionof thought’ about‘the
improvement of natural knowledge’ in the soft sciences. These observations warrant a broader dis-
cussion of problemswith theory construction in the soft sciences before suggesting novel directions
for the scientiﬁc inquiry into the ætiology of developmental dyslexia. As I referred to in the preface,
we need to respect our elders (and sometimes their frustration and discontent and perhaps their
failures as well), because I see history repeating itself and this time there is even a tendency to feign
ignorance about the severity of non-replicability of phenomena, hypothesising after the results are
known (HARKing; Kerr, 1998) underpowered studies, p-hacking and data-peeking to decide on sam-
ple sizes. To claim ignorance on those issues is to deny the historical scientiﬁc record. I did not cite
some obscure scholars just to taunt scientist of the softer ﬁelds, of which I am one myself13. and
although encouraging practices like data sharing or conducting conﬁrmatory and replication studies
is very necessary, it will not suﬃce to save the empirical social sciences from itself. One must ask,
what is so special about the way the natural sciences theorise about the constituents of reality?
1.4.1 Constructive and Principle Theories: Synthesis versus Analysis
At the time of the ‘conﬁrmation’ of some of the testable predictions of the theory of General Rela-
tivity discussed in paragraph 1.3, Einstein wrote a lucid letter to the London Times (November 28,
1919) in which he characterised two kinds of scientiﬁc theory:
``We can distinguish various kinds of theories in physics. Most of them are constructive.
They attempt to build up a picture of the more complex phenomena out of the materials
of a relatively simple formal scheme from which they start out. Thus the kinetic theory
of gases seeks to reduce mechanical, thermal, and diffusional processes to movements of
molecules – i.e., to build them up out of the hypothesis of molecular motion. When we say
that we have succeeded in understanding a group of natural processes, we invariably mean
that a constructive theory has been found which covers the processes in question.
Along with this most important class of theories there exists a second, which I will call
``principle-theories.” These employ the analytic, not the synthetic, method. The elements
which form their basis and starting-point are not hypothetically constructed but empiri-
cally discovered ones, general characteristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to
mathematically formulated criteria which the separate processes or the theoretical repre-
sentations of them have to satisfy. Thus the science of thermodynamics seeks by analytical
means to deduce necessary conditions, which separate events have to satisfy, from the
universally experienced fact that perpetual motion is impossible.
The advantages of the constructive theory are completeness, adaptability, and clearness,
those of the principle theory are logical perfection and security of the foundations.’’
-Einstein (1934/1952)
Contemporary physical theories are mostly principle theories and although he described con-
structive theories as “most important” it is evident that Einstein believed only principle theories
could advance fundamental scientiﬁc knowledge about the universe. To explain the profound diﬀer-
ence between the two types of scientiﬁc theory, the metaphor of the nomological net is again help-
ful. A part of the nomological net representing a scientiﬁc description of a domain in reality that
is logically strong with a track record of strong corroboration and thus perceived as having high
verisimilitude, may look something like the right panel of Figure 1.6. This is an adaptation of a
drawing by Einstein used to explain his views on scientiﬁc theorising in a letter to his friend Mau-
rice Solovine (see Figure 1.6a)14. This would be a rather coarse rendition of a nomological net as
13This appears to be a sentiment among some peers:‘replication bullies’ and‘data detectives’ ruin their careers by
pointing out statistical errors in their published work. (See e.g., Schönbrodt, ’About Replication Bullies and Scientiﬁc
Progress… Retrieved May 2014 from: http://www.nicebread.de/about-replication-bullies-and-scientiﬁc-progress/ )
14I thank Michael Seevinck for introducing me to this important history of science.
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Theory of construction
a maturing science
• “devoid of all postulating of ‘deeper-lying entities’ ”
There is no (explicit) formal system of axioms and postulates. 
A theory (S1-3) is constructed by association or conceptual 
replication. There is no consensus in the scientific community 
about the system it studies, what the interesting phenomena 
and levels of analysis are.
• “It assumes only the phenomena”
Phenomena are induced directly from the manifold of 
immediate sensory experiences E, as empirical laws S.
• “possibility of ascertaining uniform relations among them”
Predictions by a core of S concern the observation of 
correlated phenomena at some level of confidence. E informs 
and adjusts S by induction.
• Theory Evaluation
Step I: Identify the theoretical core (e.g. S1, S2, S3)
Step II: Identify the core hypotheses
Step III: Scrutinize the empirical evidence
Step IV: Estimate predictive power and empirical accuracy
Theory of principles
consensus formalism science
• Consensus Formalism
A formal system of axioms A, is raised from conjecture to 
postulate (the upward arrow). A describes a specific domain in 
reality for a discipline of science to study; a system, its relevant 
phenomena and levels of analysis. There is a consensus in the 
scientific community about the truth status of the formalism.
• Closed Theory
Laws S are deduced from the formalism and a theory (S4-6) 
competes for scientific credibility within the domain described by 
A. There is no logical route from E to A, only from A to S to E.
• Accurate Prediction
A theory predicts a measurement context in E in which 
phenomena may be observed in terms of measurement 
outcomes. E cannot adjust S, a prediction is accurate or not.
• Theory Evaluation 
Competing predictions are tested under conditions of strong 
inference; predictive power and empirical accuracy are 
assessed over a number of such tests.
E E
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6
A
Figure 1.6 – Adaptation of the “Solovine Schema (see van Dongen 2010, p. 52-53). The quoted text is
from Ladd’s 1892 characterisation of James’ vision of psychology as a natural science.
the nodes A (‘System der Axiome’ [system of axioms])15 and S (‘Gefolgerte Sätze’ [deduced laws])
represent collections of many diﬀerent kinds of theoretical entities. As explained earlier, in terms
of the nomological net metaphor (cf., Cronbach & Meehl, 1955), the strands of the net are sup-
posed to represent the functional or constitutive laws that connect theoretical entities. Turning to
a more stylised version in Figure 1.6 (right column), it is important to note that from A, lawful rela-
tions between theoretical entities S can be deduced and those lawful relations predict observable
phenomena in E (“Mannigfaltigkeit der unmittelbaren (Sinnes-) Erlebnisse’ [manifold of immediate
/ direct sensory experiences]). One or more S together can be regarded as a theoretical whole, a
scientiﬁc theory (e.g., S4-6), the theoretical core.
Whatmakes these theories principled theories? Perhaps surprisingly, it is not the logical strength
of a pathway from observations of phenomena in E to a system of axioms A formally describing a
domain in E. According to Einstein such a logical route from E to A does not exist at all. The pro-
cess of theory construction always starts with a creative-intuitive act in which a scientist raises a
conjecture to a postulate (cf., van Dongen, 2010). This is the upward arrow from E to A (the system
of axioms) and it represents the bold, but inspired act of a scientist laying explanatory claim to a
certain domain in reality, by stating:‘let’s see what happens if we assume it really is like this’. As
mentioned earlier, in the hard sciences it is often the case the deﬁnition of a formalism is a com-
munity eﬀort and therefore there is consensus about its verisimilitude. The purpose of a scientiﬁc
theory departing from within the domain deﬁned by the axioms and postulates of the formalism
is to predict observable phenomena in E with a higher precision and accuracy than predictions by
competing theories that depart from the very same formalism.
15I will refer to the system of axioms as the formalism hereafter. A full mathematical axiomisation of a physical theory
is rare (Bunge, 1967).
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The actual test of the precision and accuracy of the predicted phenomena constitutes an appraisal
of the verisimilitude of the theory whose outcome could ultimately have consequences for the
perceived truth-likeness of the entire formalism as well. Theories based on the same principles
allow for a programof strong inference (e.g., Platt, 1964): A single datumcan be obtained in a crucial
experiment to decide between the veracity of competing theoretical claims. The logical strength of
the derivational chain leading to the prediction is such that‘It is the theory that decides whatmay be
observed’ (Einstein as quoted byHeisenberg, 1971, pp. 62–63). The single headed arrows represent
explanation by D-N (Table 1.2) and as such, principled theories can be characterised as‘closed’ (cf.
Bokulich, 2004). They break down as a whole when a crucial experiment does not yield the results
predicted by the theory:‘[…] if an experiment does not ﬁt in Newtonian physics, you don’t know
what you mean by the words.’ (Heisenberg interviewed by Kuhn, 1963, p. 24 , February 27th).
``The chief attraction of the theory lies in its logical completeness. If a single one of the
conclusions drawn from it proves wrong, it must be given up; to modify it without destroying
the whole structure seems to be impossible.’’ (Einstein, 1934/1952)
Of course, for theories of such logical strength that can be conclusively be shown to be false, a
Lakatosian defence is permitted if the circumstances allow it.
In theories of construction, depicted in the left panel of Figure 1.6b, a theoretical whole (e.g.,
S1-3) is ‘hypothetically constructed’ instead of ‘empirically discovered’ by proposing associations
between phenomena described in the empirical record exist. In the most exemplary case there are
no restrictions whatsoever on forming associations between observed phenomena (Einstein called
this ‘adaptability’ in the quote form the letter). The left panel of Figure 1.6 represents a tenuous
nomological net of theoretical entities that are all connected to, and therefore deﬁned by empiri-
cal observations (exclusively I-S or sometimes D-S explanations, hence the double-headed arrows).
There is no (explicit) abstract formalism deﬁning a domain in reality that could prevent theoretical
entities to become associated with one another in order to constitute a theoretical whole. This is
why it cannot be said they are empirically discovered by testing risky predictions, their adaptabil-
ity can make them ‘complete’: Any theoretical entity can become associated to any other entity
by constructive hypotheses. To identify a theoretical core, one will often look for the least dis-
puted empirical results and the hypotheses that predicted them. The options to avoid refutation,
as explained in section 1.3, will be virtually limitless if the epistemic link is severed. The protective
boundary will speciﬁcally serve to save those phenomena that support the theoretical core.
This bears strong resemblance to the situation described for theoretical accounts of the ætiology
of developmental dyslexia in the previous paragraphs: The node categorising theory words was as-
sociated to all the other nodes that mainly captured diﬀerent experimental designs or performance
measures, hence empirical phenomena (e.g., brain, attention, learning, auditory perception). As
a consequence, all the theoretical entities and laws that constitute the theory are very direct de-
scriptions of empirical phenomena observable as a manifold of direct (sensory) experiences (e.g.,
“it assumes only the phenomena”). That is, inmost cases, to describe theoretical entities in a theory
of construction one can suﬃce with a level of abstraction that does not rise above a common lan-
guage description: speech-sound perception, ‘rules for convertingmental representations of letters
into sounds’, ‘a part of the visual system capable of fast signal transmissions’. Of course, in the liter-
ature these entities be referred to by their own proper neologism, but this is very diﬀerent from the
level of abstraction necessary to describe observables corresponding to non-commutative opera-
tors in a quantum measurement or a Ricci tensor in relativistic cosmology (both are mathematical
abstractions that are hard to relate to any perceptual experiences).
The derivational chain leading to a novel prediction in a theory of construction is weak, or soft
and so are the topologies of its nomological nets, even so, “he who casts, will catch”. In most cases
the chain of ‘derivations’ is based on previously observed particular facts (e.g., “[…] ascertaining
uniform relations among [phenomena]”) associated by probabilistic laws (see Box 1.2). As a conse-
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quence, the failure to observe a predicted phenomenon does not nearly have as many implications
for the perceived veracity of the theoretical entities involved, as is the case in a theory of princi-
ples. The scientist who uses theories of construction to study the structure of reality refrains from
“postulating deeper-lying entities” (Fanelli, 2010) and constructs and amends a theoretical whole
guided by phenomena directly observable in E. In a play of words with Einstein’s dictum, in the
softer sciences: “It’s the observations that decide what may be regarded as the theory”.
1.5 The thin ontic line (and why it must be cut)
1.5.1 This is the story so far:
In section 1.2 the impression that a plethora of diﬀerent theoretical claims about the causes of de-
velopmental dyslexia are considered to be‘true’ at the same point in time or at least the impression
that they escape falsiﬁcation by means of discorroborative empirical evidence, was made plausi-
ble by a quasi-historical, quasi-nomological network analysis of terms used in abstracts of scientiﬁc
articles on the subject.
In section 1.3 meta-theoretical causes were proposed to explain the erosion of the corroborative
authority of empirical evidence. Important causes for the ﬁeld of dyslexia research were identiﬁed
such as the crud factor, epistemic sloughing by hypothesis testing and the inappropriate use of the
Lakatosian defence.
Section 1.4 provided ameta-theoretical taxonomy of theorising in science and identiﬁed the the-
ories produced by the social and life sciences as theories of construction that fail to achieve a level of
abstraction of reality beyond natural language descriptions. They refrain from positing phenomena
at deeper-lying levels of reality.
Which identiﬁed cause is sustained by which identiﬁed eﬀect, or vice versa, is diﬃcult to tell
and most likely futile to attempt to ﬁgure out. One half of the arguments borrow authority from
history, the other half from philosophy and logic, and sprinkled on top are some extra crunchy
authorisations from physics. But what does this strange concoction authorise? To me, it authorises
the rest of this book, including its slightly ridiculous late coming of age. It authorises a critical and
more formal examination of scientiﬁc theorising when applied to inquire about the developmental
origins of an observable state of impaired performance in young children and of the technology
developed to alter that state. First, I sketch the framework for theorising and theory appraisal in
the softer ﬁelds of science that emerges from the story so far.
1.5.2 Theory evaluation in the empirical Social and Life Sciences [a summary]
Tij is posited by a scientist in the softer ﬁelds of science as a set of connected statements about
entities and laws. The text in which Tij is embedded is not an operational text. That is, there
is no separate formalism containing theory language deﬁning the entities and laws that an
operational text commonly connects to observational language. There is no formal calculus
or‘truth-grinding machine’ that can be used to decide on logical structure of derivations and
verisimilitude of corroborations. The embedding text may be something akin to an interpre-
tative text. This is a text in which theoretical concepts are deﬁned in terms of the theory
language alone. Theories of construction contain mostly observation language, so their em-
bedding texts, that is, the scientiﬁc publications in peer-reviewed journals of soft empirical
science, deﬁne operational theoretical entities in terms of other operational theoretical en-
tities.
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A soft embedding text can still be used by a meta-theorist to extract a lot of information from the
set of statements. The text may contain some hidden theory language and a large subset
of laws and entities will be associated to empirical evidence by observational predicates and
statements. This often means formal language is introduced in corroboration (measures of
association, functional forms, etc.).
Tij contains postulates that can be categorised as central (i) or peripheral (j). There are just a few
central, or core postulates and associated to each of them are many peripheral, or auxiliary
postulates (AT) that have to have some degree of truth-likeness. Auxiliary instrumentation
(Ai) the theory relies on is also a part of the periphery. In the case of corroboration by pre-
diction of empirical observations, a ceteris paribus clause (Cp) has to be adopted together
with an assumption about the truth of statements about realised particulars (Cn). The truth
status of the latter clauses represents the basic conditions for an empirical science to work.
Improving assertions about their truth is the topic ofmany contemporary discussions in social
science.
Tij uses entities in derivational chains: Mental representations, genetic andneural components (struc-
tures, complex), developmental milestones (events), persistent disabilities (states), and re-
alisable dispositions such as training induced plasticity to ameliorate language and literacy.
Entities may be classiﬁed by a meta-ontology that I will refer to as mentology16. An example
is Meehl’s ontology (Meehl, 1993). According to this mentological list that has been useful
for appraising psychological theories, the world consists of substances, structures, events,
states, dispositions and ﬁelds. In softer ﬁelds, structures are almost always complexes, never
simplexes like quarks. As diﬀerent parts of a complex can have diﬀerent verisimilitude, ap-
praisal of such theoretical entities is diﬃcult without formal deﬁnitions of the components of
a complex.
Tij uses laws to connect entities in derivational chains: Amental representation of speech sounds
includes frequency and amplitude information (compositional / structural law, deﬁning the
parts and their arrangement). A mental representation that is not composed according to a
law can cause a state of impaired reading ability (functional / dynamic law, change processes).
In mentology there are also developmental laws, they represent a combination of the com-
positional and dynamic laws often pertaining to variables that are not under control, such
as in the‘documentary disciplines”: history, palaeontology, geology and evolution. Darwin’s
theory contains a developmental law.
Laws are the statistical or formal regularities that exist between individual entities: The sign of 1st
and 2nd order derivatives, partial derivatives (order of signs, factor interaction), functional
form (exponential growth function, predator-prey dynamics), rank order of parameter val-
ues, or actual parameter values (point-value prediction) of functional relations.
Tij may be represented as a nomological net: Entities constitute the nodes, the laws the edges. A
proper subset of the netmakes contact with reality in that it is an observational subset. Some
entities can be directly related to observations by I-S inferencewithout violating Einstein’s dic-
tum, or the logicians’ corroboration formula. To logically re-construct theoretical propositions
such that they acquire empirical content can be done using the so-called Ramsey Sentence.
Einstein posited the creative intuitive act to cut loose from reality into abstraction, but‘some-
thing’ empirical is always retained. This implicit phenomenon was named‘Ramsiﬁed upward
seepage’ (Meehl, 1990; Meehl, 1978, 2002, 2004b). What is important to note is that accord-
ing to meta-theory it is possible to assert and deﬁne an entity at the same time, not in the
operationalist sense, but by using a system of formal expressions.
16Mentology could represent a contraction of Meehl’s Ontology or Meta / Mental Ontology, but more importantly it
represents the fact stressed by Meehl that any attempt at a general classiﬁcation of the lynchpins of reality depends on
the mental lynchpins of the scientist. Meehl frequently solicited suggestions for change, expansion or reduction.
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Figure 1.7 – Einstein’s uniﬁcation (see van Dongen, 2010) and the consequences in terms of explanatory
power, predictive power and empirical accuracy of theories by increasing distance from the manifold of
direct experience, E.
Falsiﬁcation of a theoretical core in soft science does not occur very often. The sameholds for cor-
roboration or discorroboration by replication of observations, because such studies are rarely
conducted until very recently (Klein et al., 2014). Much of the perceived verisimilitude of core
theories in soft science is based on corroborative singularities. Black Hole phenomena in the
nomological net that can only be approached as far as the event horizon. Their structure re-
mains obscured to the inquisitive scientist, nomatter howmuch daylight is let in to illuminate
it. More formally stated, a Lakatosian defence is used to deﬂect falsiﬁcation of the core to
auxiliaries, the periphery. Or, the truth status of the ceteris paribus clause is sacriﬁced and
an ad hoc auxiliary hypothesis is postulated. If an identiﬁed Cp falsiﬁer can be changed into
a corroborator on subsequent inquiries, this is a progressive research program, because a
new structure was uncovered. If the falsiﬁer is only used to protect the theoretical core of
the postulates and the Black Hole status of its singular corroborative events, this is a degen-
erative research program. The recent discussions on how to interpret direct replications are
revealing about the willingness to be progressive or degenerative. (compare Brandt et al.,
2014; Cesario, 2014; Dijksterhuis, 2013; Simons, 2014; Stroebe and Strack, 2014)
Figure 1.7 displays what the results might be if a more formal system of theory evaluation was
adopted in the soft sciences, one that allows positing theories of construction that can be evaluated
in progressive research programs and eventually can make point-value predictions about parame-
ters as a theory of principles. In terms of corroboration, a track record of predictive power and
empirical accuracy has to be established by a theory. The goal of scientiﬁc explanation should be
uniﬁcation, ﬁnding out how entities are the same, or can be understood by more fundamental, or
sometimes more general laws, a progressive program. Einstein understood however that a uniﬁed
theory‘pays for its higher logical unity by having elementary concepts […], which are no longer di-
rectly connected with complexes of sense experiences.’ (cf., Seevinck, 2011). To create a theory of
principlesmeans sacriﬁcing a kind of explanation that ismore a personal understanding of theworld
in terms of everyday experiences. This was not just a coincidental oddity for Einstein, he ﬁrmly be-
lieved that the fundamental notions of physics cannot be induced from experience and they cannot
be justiﬁed a priori on the basis of our faculty of knowledge. This strongly opposes Kant’s notion of
incommensurability between Biology and Physics (e.g., Hasselman, Turvey, Seevinck & Cox, 2011;
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Seevinck, 2011).
There is a peculiarity about the role of ontology in this loss of explanatory power that I will leave
for thorough discussion in the ﬁnal chapter of this book in which I will also suggest how to (meta-
theoretically) deal with its loss. It has to do with overcoming the enormous psychological satisfac-
tion that is felt when empirical data agree with a cultural belief system or a personal world-view
(Salmon, 1990). The danger is that an evaluation of the theory that predicted the data in a more
or less formal chain of deductions may be positively biased towards such beliefs by its satisfactory
agreement. This danger is quite literally quoted in the deﬁnition of the hard/soft science divide by
Fanelli (2010): Socio-cultural and psychological factors decide how data are collected, analysed and
interpreted. I call this the interpretation fallacy of theory evaluation and it occurs very often in the
social sciences, but is hardly ever noticed as problematic (Lebel & Peters, 2011 use ‘interpretation
bias’ in a slightly diﬀerent, but related meaning).
1.5.3 Blinded by downward seepage? Cause and eﬀect of the interpretation fallacy.
In the times before modern empirical science the existence-proof of ontological entities to our
senses prompted ancient scholars to theorise about their role in the workings of the physical uni-
verse and the human body, like the classical elements and the Hippocratic humours. This is a very
sensible and scientiﬁc thing to do if you have no highly corroborated nomological net to guide you.
Theories were constructed based upon their empirical evidence as‘measured’ by our senses. This is
essentially related to the logicians explaining implicit empirical content in theoretical propositions,
‘Ramsiﬁed upward seepage’ (Meehl, 1990; Meehl, 1978, 2002, 2004b).
Here, we stumble upon the ancient problem of philosophy (mentioned in the preface): Is our
internal world, the mind or our consciousness, part of reality? Should phenomena of the mind
be allowed as a construct to theorise about the mind or should their existence to our mind’s eye
be ignored in theories? We must acknowledge that in social science, but psychological science in
particular there is a thin ontic line between the theoretical concept of amind and the actual sensory
phenomenon of mind. Is the line too thin? For example, to the minds eye the external continuous
universe appears ﬁlled with discrete objects, our internal thoughts, memories of events and the
words we use to communicate are all discrete. Therefore, wemay be naturally inclined to construct
theories based on discrete components, without ever considering continuous architectures of mind
as an alternative (Spivey, Anderson & Dale, 2008; Spivey & Dale, 2006).
We experience time as a linear ﬂow, memory, history, prospection, but what if it is not like that
at all as some physical theories suggest (Brown & Uﬃnk, 2001; Bunge, 1968; Nottale, 2010). Within
the framework of ecological psychology, intentional dynamics and event perception are a very
diﬀerent conception of time and its passage is posited, a perspective known to very few soft sci-
entists (Gibson, 1966; Kugler, Shaw, Vincente, & Kinsella-Shaw, 1990; Shaw & Kinsella-Shaw, 1988;
Shaw & Turvey, 1999; Shaw, Flascher, & Mace, 1996; Turvey & Carello, 2012). Perhaps not sur-
prising that the‘inventors’, like roboticists and industrial designers have a diﬀerent opinion. In the
ﬁnal activity report of the research project MACS (Multi-sensory Autonomous Cognitive Systems
Interacting with Dynamic Environments for Perceiving and Using Aﬀordances; Rome, 2008) it is
mentioned that a valid starting point for the project was to draw inspiration from cognitive science,
being ecological psychology and embodied, embedded cognition, and situated cognition (Rome,
2008, p. 5). Not a description many cognitive scientists would provide of their own ﬁeld.
As alluded to in the discussion of the historical critiques in the preface, the origin of theoretical
diversity and issues with reproducibility in psychology in particular and in the social sciences in gen-
eral, may be due to fundamental category mistakes. The mistakes concerns identifying theoretical
constructs that emerged from human theorising about reality as direct sensory experiences, quite
literally observations, due to the thin ontic line that separates them. This is a downward seepage in
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which empirical phenomena acquire theoretical content. Such theoretical constructs, about which
only a scientiﬁc theory should be a realist, are mistaken for an actual, or at least a perceptual con-
stituent of reality. As a result the implicit theoretical object or ontology is essentially excluded from
scientiﬁc inquiry, its existence proof is already provided for by the senses. Something onemight call
the empiricist’s blind spot, a blindness induced by downward seepage.
For instance, when an experiment is conducted in which several predictors or independent vari-
ables in a linear additive model should explain variance in a dependent variable of interest, there
are usually two conclusions drawnwhen the explained variance is not satisfactory. The ﬁrst is to add
better predictors in the next study. The second is some notion of measurement error that should
be resolved by using larger samples or better measurement instruments (i.e., deﬂecting the modus
tollens refutation torpedo towards veracity and validity of theoretical and instrumental auxiliaries).
Very rarely one encounters a conclusion that is scientiﬁcally equally sound: Wrong model! The
variance in this variable cannot be explained by a linear additive combination of predictors or by
eﬃcient causation through experimental manipulation. In other words: The wrong causal ontology
is used to scientiﬁcally describe this phenomenon.
1.5.4 We want components!
An example of such an object that escapes genuine theoretical and empirical inquiry in psychologi-
cal science, one of the supermassive Black Holes in the nomological net, is the concept of themental
representation (Haselager, de Groot, & van Rappard, 2003; Spencer & Schöner, 2003). It is associ-
ated with discrete cognitive architectures and is frequently used to posit hypotheses as an object of
measurement or as a vehicle to interpret experimental results. Representations are also attributed
speciﬁc properties (carriers and/or encoders of information) and are even given powers of causa-
tion (Cox & Hasselman, 2013; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). Few authors who
use the concept however, refer to the theoretical or ontological truth status of the representation,
for example by empirically questioning its existence. After careful analysis Haselager et al. (2003)
concluded that cognitive science lacks a proper operationalisation of the concept of representation
and is therefore unable to discuss whether a system has representations or not. Still, its use con-
tinues, far beyond the domain or cognitive science and theories are constructed that have mental
representation at their theoretical core, while viable alternative theoretical frameworks including
those mentioned above are ignored (cf., Dreyfus, 2002)
To demonstrate how real this phenomenon is and how it causes the interpretation fallacy, an
example in which authors explicitly complain about the fact that they cannot interpret predictions
and measurement outcomes of theories in terms of their own preferred constituents of reality. A
recent commentary by Wagenmakers, van der Maas, and Farrell (Wagenmakers, van der Maas, &
Farrell, 2012) entitled: “Abstract Concepts Require Concrete Models: Why Cognitive Scientists Have
Not Yet Embraced Nonlinearly Coupled, Dynamical, Self-Organized Critical, Synergistic, Scale-Free,
Exquisitely Context-Sensitive, Interaction-Dominant, Multifractal, Interdependent Brain-Body-Niche
Systems.” The authors evaluate the promise of 15 years of the Complex Systems (CS) approach to
cognitive science and claim it has failed to live up to its promise because:
1. phenomena associated with complex systems (such as fractal scaling and self-organised criti-
cality) are “mysterious phenomena”;
2. Cognitive scientists are not interested in the methods of CS, because they are too “vague”,
“too general” and “mostly about 1/f noise”
3. Cognitive scientists are not interested in CS because they want to “infer latent cognitive pro-
cesses”.
The authors conclude the claims of the CS approachwill appear to the cognitive scientist as: “mostly
speculation, wrapped in jargon, inside wishful thinking”. This tendency to explicitly prefer results
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that can be interpreted as a mechanism of component processes over these ‘mysterious phenom-
ena’ is encountered in several articles by this group of authors (e.g. Torre & Wagenmakers, 2009;
Wagenmakers, Farrell, & Ratcliﬀ, 2004).
The negative evaluation is based largely on the low explanatory power of these abstract con-
structs. They do not correspond to the familiar phenomena of human nature in the world-view
of the researchers and this should be irrelevant in the evaluation of scientiﬁc credibility, that is, it
the existence of the abstract concepts follows from material implication by observation (corrob-
oration). The interpretation fallacy is most prominently evidenced by the repeated requests to
provide mechanistic models and to provide theoretical concepts that can be used to infer latent
component processes from empirical ﬁndings. At the same time the criticasters do not seem to
recognise anomalies in the empirical record to the mechanistic component ontology. Their criti-
cism really seems to be exclusively based on the usage of mysterious theoretical phenomena and
very general and vague methods, no references are made to evaluations of the predictive power
and empirical accuracy of studies using the CS approach. Such information has been available for
a while (cf., Hasselman, 2013) and the number of studies that bring observables like fractal scaling
under experimental control in human performance is steadily increasing and should be evaluated
for the precision and accuracy of their theoretical predictions based on those ‘mysterious phenom-
ena’. None of the following studies, published in or before 2012, were mentioned in the critical
evaluation of 15 years of the complex systems approach to cognitive and behavioural science: Cor-
rell, 200817, 2011; Holden, Choi, Amazeen, & Van Orden, 2011; Holden, Van Orden, & Turvey, 2009;
Kello et al., 2010; Kello, Beltz, Holden, & Van Orden, 2007; Kuznetsov & Wallot, 2011; Stephen,
Anastas, & Dixon, 2012; Stephen, Dixon, & Isenhower, 2009; Wijnants, Bosman, Hasselman, Cox, &
Van Orden, 2009; Wijnants, Cox, Hasselman, Bosman, & Van Orden, 2012; Wijnants, Hasselman, et
al., 2012).
In other words, because the researchers evaluation the CS approach cannot interpret the mea-
surement outcomes given by observables posited to exist by theories that describe the dynamics
of complex systems, the theory is discarded as vague, uninteresting and void of meaning! In fact,
the deep wish of the cognitive scientists to be able to interpret measurement outcomes as a mech-
anism of components means they want to interpret it as something that corresponds to their daily
experiences, a machine, a computer, a manifold of immediate sense experiences. Cutting loose
theoretical entities from those experiences means introducing deeper levels of abstraction and this
seems a diﬃcult task. Abstraction (and generality) are labelled as problematic quite often when
the CS approach is discussed: ‘The counterpart of this level of generality is that it is to some ex-
tent accompanied by a detachment from the singularity of the phenomenon of interest.’ (Torre &
Wagenmakers, 2009, p. 303). I would argue this is not a counterpart, but a beneﬁt and in fact a
goal of scientiﬁc explanation. The other option is to have a separate theory for each ‘phenome-
nal singularity’ and this is exactly what I believe causes the recurring crises in the empirical social
sciences.
This is the important existential question the empirical social sciences need to answer: Do they
want principled theories that are detached from the singularity of the sensory phenomenon, or
not? If they do, Figure 1.7 sketches what may await them: Explanatory power will initially be lost,
mysterious constructs will emerge that bear no resemblance to anything perceivable by the senses.
If they do not, the crisis will perpetuate. Perhaps the complex systems approach and the responses
evoked by its conjectures are a sign of endeavours that attempt to cut the phenomenological ontic
umbilical chord connecting the experienced world to theoretical entities. Ecological psychology
seems to have attained such levels of abstraction decades ago and are ready to redeﬁne adaptive
behaviour from ﬁrst principles (cf., Turvey & Carello, 2012) .
17 Madurski and LeBel (2014) recently failed to replicate Correll’s study in two samples, with combined N of 296 par-
ticipants. The replicating authors note however that the time series in this large sample should be characterised as 1/f
noise (non-zero spectral slopes). So it was an eﬀect on the scaling exponent that was not replicated.
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Figure 1.8 – Two possible ways to reconstruct the postulates of an ætiology about impaired auditory
perception as a cause of developmental dyslexia.
1.6 An ontology of Failing Components, or a Failing Ontology of Compo-
nents?
The proclaimed goal of this chapter was to ﬁnd a theoretical account for the ætiology of develop-
mental dyslexia that could explain the diversity of apparently corroborated accounts evidenced by
the analyses abstracts of scientiﬁc articles in section 1.2 (the ﬁrst conjecture). Taking into account
the considerations about weak predictions, crud factor and unjust application of the Lakatosian de-
fence a genuine causes of the diversity (the second conjecture), I believe it is sensible to suggest,
based on the historical and meta-theoretical analyses I presented that the ﬁeld is blinded by down-
ward seepage from a (causal) ontology that constitutes a naïve Newtonian physics. Many of the
factors discussed contribute to uphold the ontology, especially the ‘eﬀect = structure fallacy’. What
can we do in terms of meta-theoretical evaluation? First, I will give a practical, and in my opinion
honest perspective on the nomological net as it was evidenced and characterised in section 1.2.
Then I will explain in what way the empirical inquiries described in Chapters 2-5 of this book can
be seen as consequences of adopting this perspective and taking into account most of the issues
discussed here. It should be noted however that this is a convergence of evidence rather than a
prediction of novel facts.
Figure 1.1 is the best representation of the current causal ontology (analogous ﬁgures –with path-
ways drawn in– and explication of the components can be found in: Ramus et al., 2006; Ramus,
2003a, 2003b, 2004). Imagine the components in the ﬁgure are the nodes in a nomological net
without laws connecting the entities. Two thirds of the net can be considered the observational
subset, the biological and the behavioural components (perhaps with the exception of genetic and
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environmental factors). The cognitive layer can only be corroborated by inclusion in a derivational
chain predicting an observation. The entities represented in the cognitive layer mostly concern
states (impaired) and structures that are complexes (representations). When causal pathways are
drawn they generally originate from the biological anomalies (structures), connect to one or more
cognitive component and to the behavioural phenomena.
What seems to be implied, is a structure like the one in Figure 1.7, where A3 is a biological com-
ponent, A1 and A2 are cognitive components and S represent behavioural phenomena. This cannot
be the case, as the biological anomalies should be closer to E because they are observable as di-
rect sensory experiences, or at least closely connected to observational statements. The cognitive
components are the most abstract entities and they should have to be ‘on top’. What this structure
reveals is a world-view in which there is biological determinism, our genes and our brain deter-
mine observed behaviour, overt, as well as our mental behaviour (cognition). As a nomological net,
the speciﬁc graphical hierarchical arrangement with respect to E is not essential, nodes can just be
said to belong to the observational set or not. It does convey information, as can be seen in the
left panel of Figure 1.8. Some components of the observational set have been placed at the bottom
and some laws have been drawn to indicate how an anomalous genetic component dictates the dis-
rupted composition of the thalamic nucleus in the CNS that is associated with the state of impaired
auditory processing. This state has consequences for the composition of phoneme representations
because the frequency information of the speech signal is depleted. A phoneme representation
composed in such a way is associated with the state of poor phonological skills observable in a
small percentage of children.
1.6.1 Really, we don’t need them – Necessity and Suﬃciency in interaction.
What is rather odd behaviour by the theorist who deduced the chain or the meta-theorist who
is reconstructing the derivation is that the entities are deﬁned with states or modiﬁers attached
(impaired, anomalous, poor). There are many rules suggested that should guide theory (re-) con-
struction, from parsimony and Occam’s razor to aesthetics (e.g., Meehl, 2002), but keeping it clean
and simple, with as few invisible constructs to start with seems a sound advice. The right panel
is an attempt to see what happens if states and modiﬁers are removed, preferring only theoretical
constructs that can D-N predict observations by laws. This representation is not necessarily ‘better’,
or representative of a fundamentally diﬀerent theory. Perhaps some explanatory power is gained.
The cleanest solution in my opinion is to deﬁne a state called developmental dyslexia (DD-state);
it is part of the observational set by deﬁnition due to exclusion criteria. These exclusion criteria
take on the role of the ceteris paribus clause in theory corroboration: Everything else being equal,
there are childrenwho fail to acquire proﬁcient levels of reading and spelling performance. Nothing
more, nothing less.
Whether or not there is an anomalous genetic assembly or structural or functional network of
the CNS, conditional on the DD-state, is something that must be corroborated. The same holds for
possible partial derivatives, subtypes within meet the requirements by the compositional law. This
would only turn the DD-state into a complex of states, or a composition of states, like an order pa-
rameter of a dynamical system (which is why I wanted to add that entity to the mentology). In fact,
recently Meehl’s taxometric methods were used to evidence two separate taxa of developmental
dyslexia (O’Brien, Wolf, & Lovett, 2012). It is important to realise that it is this state, by means of
its deﬁnition, that may lead a theorist to predict that an anomalous composition of structural com-
plexes is associated with it. A state inmentology is deﬁned as an event spun out over time. An event
is an occurrencewhere structures interact and change. By declaring something a state, a continuous
interaction that results in resistance to change or stability over time, is implied. Therefore the state
can‘predict’ compositions of structures that are believed to be involved in the enduring interaction.
As suggested earlier, intervention programs are events that attempt to destabilize the DD-state by
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tweakingwhatever structures a theory posits to be responsible for its continuation.‘Merely’ positing
the DD-state implies deductions are possible about its causes and composition.
What happened to the cognitive components? In short, I really think we don’t need them. If
something akin to the right panel in Figure 1.8 would be accepted as an honest meta-theoretical
account of the current situation. There exist mainly theories of construction that predict signs of
associations or anomalous composition of structure. The latter is of the same order of the former
because it implies comparing two groups, hypothesising the structural diﬀerence to the reference
group is non-zero, in the direction of the anomalous group. If I wanted to claim there is a deﬁcit
in auditory processing associated to the DD-state that should also be related to poor phonological
skills, I predict an association between the two constructs based on the DD-state alone. Phono-
logical representations do not have to be included in the chain to strengthen its logical structure
or to hope to improve empirical accuracy. It is hard though, to ﬁnd theoretical accounts that do
not include any notion of phonological representation. One reason may be that they are too close
to the thin ontic line and downward seepage from theories of universal grammar and information
encapsulation have made them part of the furniture of the world. Chapter 5 will explore this thesis
in more detail.
Another reason to keep representations and cognitive modules may be that they are needed as
a vehicle for explanation, in order to understand DD-state’s negative and anomalous associations
to all those other entities. If so, the phoneme representation would be the hub in the network,
the entity receiving a lot of corroboration. It would be the link in the derivation chain without
which prediction would be rendered trivial. Although it may be used very often, corroboration
of its general nature, properties, function, or its vital role in explanation of the DD-state has not
occurred to the best of my knowledge (Blomert, Mitterer, & Paﬀen, 2004; Clark, 1999; Dreyfus,
2002; Farrar & Van Orden, 2001; Haselager et al., 2003; Port, 2010; Ramus & Szenkovits, 2008).
I will not proclaim that science does not need a cognitive level at all, but in most cases it feels
like dressing up perfectly normal (e.g., crud factor) associations between observables using a level
of‘scientiﬁc’ abstraction that serves no formal purpose. Colleagues often object to this statement
by saying something like: ‘Ok, then explain this twitter discussion we’re having without making use
of representations’ I usually ask in such cases: ‘I’ll try, but what would be the evidence that would
convince you that mental representations do not exist?’ No answers so far.
1.6.2 Removing the relata: Interaction dominant dynamics.
What happened to the causal pathways? In short, I really think we don’t need them either. Indeed,
in the left panel one could start at the genetic anomaly and play a game of tag to end up in poor
phonological skills. On the right, phonological skills have been redeﬁned as a disposition, something
that is realisable (or unrealisable) and will often be attached to a structure by a law deﬁning it as a
property or characteristic. When is the disposition realised? This is in fact a complex condition to
work out if one adopts the right panel version. I declare a DD-state is deﬁned as a condition of:
1. exclusion criteria of the kind ‘all else being equal only this particular should be observable’
2. exposure to falsiﬁcation, corroboration, amendment and uniﬁcation, because it is deﬁned as
a theoretical entity in a nomological net.
Therefore the set of conditions to evidence the DD-state is a complex conditional. Let Θ denote
this set of conditions, when Θ is true, it is can be said to be the cause of the DD-state. However, it
is not necessary to infer the state if Θ is met. A ‘cause’, like the anomalous gene assembly, can be
Insuﬃcient by itself, but constitutes a Necessary part ofΘ that is itself Unnecessary, but Suﬃcient
to evidence the DD-state (see Mackie, 1965). The conditionΘ is called INUS.
One example to clarify the INUS condition: Suppose a child is tested on the DD-state and an IQ
measurement results in 110. Further tests are conducted and the diagnosis is: DD-state. Was the IQ
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Figure 1.9 – The diﬀerent ways in which the two ontological frameworks approach the emergence of
(impaired) behaviour.
score the cause of the diagnosis? IQ = 110 by itself is not a necessary condition for developmental
dyslexia, other causes exist thatwould lead to the conclusion if IQwere not 110. It is also Insuﬃcient
as a single condition, not everyone with IQ = 110 is a dyslexic reader. IQ is a Necessary part of the
complex of conditions that is Suﬃcient to evidence a DD-state. This speciﬁc complex condition
with IQ = 110 as one of its values is Unnecessary to evidence developmental dyslexia. Conditions
with other values for IQ or without actual quantitative measurements of IQ, can‘cause’ the same
diagnosis as well. Anyone who wishes to evidence causal pathways should at least consider the
fact that the conditions for evidencing the DD-state are a complex of interacting conditionals. Any
clinician who has had to diagnose a client will know exactly what I mean by‘complex interaction of
conditionals’.
By declaring the compositional law for the DD-state as a ceteris paribus clause, one would ex-
pect that any corroborating evidence of anomalous behaviour or structure would expand the list
of necessary parts of suﬃcient conditions to evidence the state.‘All things being equal’ would stop
to have any meaning, because everything about the DD-state would be diﬀerent from everything
else. Although the scientiﬁc record appears to indicate almost everything is diﬀerent about dyslexic
readers, these things are not added to the INUS condition, save perhaps the recent additional re-
quirements (in the Netherlands) of ﬂuency and response time latencies (Blomert & Vaessen, 2009).
Maybe the reality of clinical practice is a better corroborator of verisimilitude than science in this
case. Most conditionals suggested in the literature that goes beyond evidencing language and lit-
eracy related performance measures are Insuﬃcient by themselves, and Unnecessary for being
considered a part of a complex conditional for developmental dyslexia.
The causal structure that would be represented by a nomological net consisting mainly of struc-
tures that are complexes –like in the social and life sciences– and on complex INUS conditionals –like
in the social and life sciences– wouldn’t have anything to do with the implied component dominant
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dynamics of contemporary causal pathways (cf. Van Orden, Holden, & Turvey, 2003). Familiar‘de-
grees of causation’, or entailment are possible in component dominant dynamics, such as uniquely
explained variance, beta weights or eﬀect sizes. In general, a linear arrangement of partial causes
always neatly sum up to produce the behaviour of interest. An alternative causal ontology is in-
teraction dominant dynamics in which not the components themselves, but their interactions as
a whole are the source of the observed behaviour (Ihlen & Vereijken, 2010; Kello, Beltz, Holden,
& Van Orden, 2007; Van Orden, Holden & Turvey, 2003; Van Orden, Holden & Turvey, 2005; Wij-
nants, Cox, et al., 2012). Here the contribution of components is not additive, but multiplicative
and nonlinear (Holden et al., 2009; van Rooij, Nash, Rajaraman, & Holden, 2013). Such interaction
dominant dynamics render individual component behaviour (which are still posited to exist), such
as poor performance on ability X, impaired representation of that feature Y, as a less interesting
object of theoretical and empirical inquiry.
As a consequence, theoretical and empirical inquiry is aimed at identifying and understanding
the contexts in which impaired behaviour emerged. Adopting such a perspective entails that all
observable behaviour can only be understood relative to the context in which it was observed, that
is, the measurement context (cf. Holden, Choi, Amazeen, & Van Orden, 2010; Van Orden, Kello, &
Holden, 2010). Figure 1.9 presents the fundamental diﬀerences between the twoontologies in their
assumptions about the causes of behaviour and their assumed place of measurement. Figure 1.9
may reveal why the nature of cognitive components and processes remain elusive in their causal
role. They are inferred, not postulated, based on data from diﬀerent places of measurement. Their
causal structure does not incorporate the nested nature of both measurements as well as posited
entities. Applying the concept of the complex conditional reveals hierarchical dependencies of one
condition on another and such a complex, if it were composed of the correct conditionals, should
be considered as a whole. As a consequence, impaired behaviour should be understood as emerg-
ing from the whole of constituent components, not from an individual component. The notion of
a cause is somewhat more radical than the complex conditionals and is known as impredicative,
circular causation (Chemero & Turvey, 2010; Freeman, 1999; Turvey, 2007), or nested causation.
1.6.3 Beyond the boundary: Investigating degrees of theory speciﬁcation
The Chapters 2-5 in this book concern empirical and simulation studies on the role of speech per-
ception and its hypothesised causal role in ætiologies of developmental dyslexia. The studies take
the perspective of interaction dominant dynamics to study the origin of the emergence of impaired
behaviour. Moreover, I will attempt to take into account many of the critical comments made in
this chapter about risky predictions, testing competing theories, the strength of derivation chains
and proposing principled theories and‘deeper lying entities’. In a sense the endeavour will concern
steps of increasing theory speciﬁcation by increasing the credibility hurdle each time, by producing
predictions about the interaction-dominant structure that aremore risky than previous predictions.
In doing so, the ‘similitude’ of competing theories can be identiﬁed. This is, in my opinion, the only
way to deal with theoretical diversity in a science of human nature.
Box 1.4 list a number of steps in theory speciﬁcation that allow assessment of the similitude of
theories in explain the same phenomena, ultimately leading to a decision on their verisimilitude.
I believe it is warranted to claim that a proper decision on verisimilitude of theories, either under
conditions of strong inference or during evaluation of precision and accuracy of predictions, cannot
be achieved in Stage A and Stage B.
Stage A has been the subject of the last paragraphs in which I declared the theoretical entities
of the framework that I will use to study developmental dyslexia, the perspective of inter-
action dominant dynamics, or the complex systems approach to impaired behaviour. What
also became clear in previous paragraphs is that simply declaring the formalism, nomologi-
cal framework, or theory, even if it is based on convincing and logically consistent derivation
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Box 1.4: Three diﬀerent stages can be identiﬁed in degree of theory speciﬁcation. The steps that
allow assessment of the similitude of theories are adapted from Meehl (1990a; 1990b; 1990c;
1997).
Three Degrees of Theory Separation
A Scientiﬁc claim, either by construction, or by declaring conjectures to principles:
I Type of entity postulated (substance, structure, event, state, disposition, ﬁeld)
II Compositional, developmental, or eﬃcient-causal connections between the entities in I
B Tests of associations between entities (VI is the common FactorXCovariate interaction)
III Signs of ﬁrst derivatives of functional dynamic laws of connections II
IV Signs of second derivatives of functional dynamic laws of connections II
V Signs of mixed second order partial derivatives (Fisher “interactions”) of connections in II
VI Ordering relationships among the derivatives in III, IV, V
C Prediction of functional form and parameter values, tests of universality:
VII Function forms (e. g., linear? logarithmic? exponential?) of connections in II
VIII Trans-situationality (Context relativity) of parameters in VII
IX Quantitative relations among parameters in VII
X Numerical values of parameters in VII
chains of truth-like postulates found in the literature, other scientists can to some degree
choose to raise a brow and proceed with business as usual.
Stage B reﬂects the swamp of unstructured empirical facts and therefore theoretical diversity in
which the majority of social science is currently ‘stuck’.
Theoretical diversity may now be redeﬁned as the indeterminacy of the degree of theoretical simil-
itude. Why is the ﬁeld stuck? Predominantly, linear models are used to test signs of associations
between ﬁrst and second order derivatives of observables (dependent variables). Step VII of Stage
C in which a functional form should be investigated is ﬁxed at ‘linear’. This does not provide enough
speciﬁcity of competing theories in order to decide how similar they are.
‘Derivative’ in the context of an observational constraint as introduced in paragraph 1.3, really
just means that diﬀerent levels of the variables that make up the constraint have been measured
and that the diﬀerences between those values with reveal something about their systematic co-
variation: Taking a derivative = taking the diﬀerence between values that are ordered according to
some principle. If the ordering principle is time, that is, measurement occasions reﬂect temporal
order, a time derivative is obtained. Time takes on the role as a variable to which change can be
compared, so time can be one of the variables in the observational constraint. The best-known
example is the time derivative of displacement, being velocity, and change in velocity is the second
order time derivative of displacement, acceleration. If time is not the variable to which variation
is compared, physically speaking, it must be space. This can be interpreted very generally and a
sample of participants measured at ‘one’ occasion, is a ‘sample space’. Note that frequency distri-
butions of real-valued random variables have ‘moments’ of a certain order. The ﬁrst moment is the
expected value of the random variable, often estimated by the arithmetic mean of a ﬁnite sample
of diﬀerent values of the variable. The variation in the mean is the second moment, the variance
(or standard deviation); third and fourth moments are skewness and kurtosis-like properties, all
indicators of change of higher order moments.
The analogy is somewhat more complicated in reality (in addition, the analogy only holds when
the ergodic condition applies (Kievit, Frankenhuis, Waldorp, & Borsboom, 2013; Molenaar & Camp-
bell, 2009;Molenaar, 2008; Petersen, 1996), which ensures the timeand space averages of variables
measured fromphysical systemswill be equal (given inﬁnite time). For current intents andpurposes,
any linear statistical model that tries to evaluate whether unique changes in one variable are asso-
ciated with unique changes in another variable, measured at the same point in time, is taking the
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derivative of a linear function of the values in the sample space. In addition, evaluation of unique
variation when the model contains more than two variables means that co-variation of some vari-
ables is evaluated at ﬁxed levels of the other variables. This is what is meant in VI by taking a partial
derivative: The derivative of the dependent variable with respect to the unique predictor, with the
other predictors held constant. Held constant usually means with respect to the expected value of
the other variables in the model (this will depend on the modelling strategy). The same holds for
simple FactorXContinuous interactions in which the co-variation of a continuous predictor with the
dependent variable is evaluated for the levels of the factor. The interaction between Age and Gen-
der when predicting Reading Performance is a second order partial derivative of a linear function.
It is evaluated as a diﬀerence between cov(Reading,Age) ﬁxed at ‘Boys’ and cov(Reading,Age) ﬁxed
at ‘Girls’. A ﬁrst order partial derivative of a linear function between Y and Gender is a simple t-test
of the variation of Y over the sample space, with values ﬁxed at the levels deﬁned in Gender. A
diﬀerence between group means.
The point is, under assumption of the linear form of the functional relationship between random
variables, many partial derivatives, even though they are of second order, come down to predicting
the sign the diﬀerence: mean(Sample1)-mean(Sample2). The fact that this does not suﬃce to end
theoretical diversity is reﬂected by the dearth of instances of degreeVI in empirical social science: It
seems often to ﬁnd out which one out of several corroborated derivatives (let’s call them eﬀects), is
more important. Many historical examples exist, for instance in deciding on the primacy of diﬀerent
fundamental Gestalts in visual perception, but a more recent example is contextual dependency of
the observation of the highly corroborated word frequency eﬀect in reading (Bosman et al., 2013;
Van Orden, 1987). In a recent study, 13 well-known eﬀects were replicated in more than 60 in-
dependent laboratories around the globe (Klein et al., 2014). Interestingly, the eﬀects that were
successfully ‘replicated’ (that is, the sign of the eﬀect was greater than 0), were the ones with high-
est variability between diﬀerent samples in terms of the estimate of their magnitude. The only
relatively uniform eﬀect size magnitude that was recovered was 0, the eﬀects that did not repli-
cate. From the perspective of nonlinear functional forms, more speciﬁc nonlinear dynamics, such
variability would likely be part of the prediction (cf. Farrar & Van Orden, 2001).
The progressive step to take, to get out of Stage B into Stage C, would be to deﬁne a functional
form (VII) for the hypothesised connections between entities and test its predictions. The most
problematic aspect about ﬁxing linearity for practically the entire spectrum of phenomena associ-
ated with human nature, is that scientist are not aware, or, know why, they assume this functional
form by default. That is, they do not know other options are available, or do not wish to explore
other options due to perceived diﬃculty of those options. This practice of limited theory speci-
ﬁcation of an entire ﬁeld of science does not qualify as a progressive research program from the
perspective of a natural science, or any other measure of comparison. In general, when the as-
sumption of independent measurements is found to be invalid, there will be interaction dynamics
at work. There might still be linear dynamics behind the derivatives, but even changing the focus of
empirical inquiry to answering that question would be advancement out of the swamp that is stage
B.
Stage C is the degree of speciﬁcation at which for instance the physical sciences currently oper-
ate. The example I gave of corroborated measurement outcomes predicted by QED, but also the
measurements at the Large Hadron Collider that evidenced the Higgs Boson, they are all numerical
predictions of parameters (step X) of functional forms (or large assemblies of functional forms, i.e.,
models) of dynamical or compositional lawful relations between theoretical entities. Another way
to distinguish between Stage B and Stage C is that Stage B is about ﬁttingmodel parameters to data,
but stage C is about investigating whether reality ﬁts with model parameters, or, simulating reality
as speciﬁed by the theory.
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1.7 Beyond the boundary: The role of speech perception in develop-
mental dyslexia
The chapters that follow can be categorised with respect to the degree of speciﬁcation with which
theoretical constructs are put to the test. Most of these concern an inquiry into the speciﬁcation
of linearity (VII), a test of the validity of the assumption of the linear functional form. Inquiries
will be about the relationships between theoretical constructs posited by theories and the ob-
served impaired reading performance in developmental dyslexia (e.g., phoneme representations,
constituents of the speech signal, theoretical processes and components assumed to play a role in
reading and emerging literacy). Whether or not behaviour is observed as impaired depends, sta-
tistically, on the negative sign prediction of the diﬀerence between samples AVERAGE – IMPAIRED.
I will use δ < 0 to denote an ‘impairment eﬀect’. This test may be biased if a crud factor, or am-
bient correlation exists, in combination with selection in the lower tail of a population distribution
(Figure 1.5). There are several ways to claim, theoretically, a predicted observation of association
corroborates a posited causal structure rather than the crud factor:
Prospective prediction of the impairment δ < 0 from a state in which the impaired variable is not
an observable of the system. This is a speciﬁcation of mixed derivative of time, reading, and
the variable used to make the prediction (VII).
Control over Context Relativity: Coherent explanation or control over context relativity of eﬀect
corroboration. That is, the appearance and disappearance of an association among variables,
or, eﬀect (VIII). The necessity for taking this step in speciﬁcation may be due to the inability
to establish a rank order of eﬀects that are associated with δ < 0 (VI).
Strong Inference achieves the same as gaining control over context relativity of the inference of an
eﬀect. The inability to decide between diﬀerent theories predicting eﬀects in one or more
diﬀerent contexts, but not all, can be solved by ﬁxing the context such that the variation in
what the theories predict is maximised. If it is not possible to create a context that achieves at
least some divergence of prediction, then the theories are similar for all intents and purposes.
Principled Prediction Simulation of principles in which the (system of) functions, parameters and
formalised entities are cast into a computational model or other formal system (calculus) that
can produce numerical predictions that should be related to observables. This is at present
the closest empirical social science can get to produce Einstein’s principled theories. The
goal is to test whether the parameters of the model can be assumed to be a part of reality by
evaluating the empirical precision and accuracy of simulated reality.
Thus categorised, the chapters constitute a speciﬁcation of the observables derived to play a
role in the co-variation of speech perception ability, reading ability and the state ‘developmental
dyslexia’, from theoretical entities that are based on interaction-dominant dynamics as an ontology
for behaviour and the methods and metaphors that describe the dynamics of complex systems and
networks.
Chapter 2 - Context relativity of ordering relationships and prospective prediction:
PredictingReading Performance fromPre-Literate SpeechPerception in Children at-risk forDyslexia
Chapter 2 reports of a longitudinal study of children at risk for dyslexia and examines how their
speech perception performance under diﬀerent levels of perturbation (according to the auditory
temporal processing deﬁcit hypothesis) is related to their reading ability one year later (prospective
prediction). Results are explained in terms of measurement contextuality (Barrett & Kent, 2004;
Hermens, 2011) and (multi-)stability of observed performance (Farrar & Van Orden, 2001).
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Chapter 3 - Principled simulation of context relativity:
When opposites attract, repel and deceive: Using Recurrent Neural Computation toModelMulti-
stable States.
The results obtained in Chapter 2 are modelled using a recurrent neural network based on the prin-
ciple of behaviour emerging from the interactions of processes on diﬀerent spatial and temporal
scales. This is the metaphor of the state space of a complex dynamical system and it is suggested
that the empirical results of participants of which δ < 0 was established in Chapter 2 can be ex-
plained as attractor dynamics in a destabilized state space.
Chapter 4 - Strong Inference:
Classifying Complex Dynamic Patterns Into Phoneme Categories
Oneof the critiques emerging from themeta-theoretical and historical analysis so far is that theories
do not confront each other under conditions of strong inference (Hasselman, 2013; Platt, 1964). In
addition, deeper-lying entities are not posited, and not tested. Often each theoretical account con-
ﬁrms its own predictions as if a direct comparison were conducted. Chapter 4 examines claims of
two‘temporal’ auditory processing theories, one claiming information encoded in spectral features
of the speech signal change too fast to be perceived, one stating the amplitude envelope changes
too slow to be perceived by dyslexic readers. The third claim tested is based on an interaction-
dominant account of speech perception that states the features of the speech signal listeners use
to categorise sounds are collective variables, like those described in synergetics (Akhromeeva &
Malinetskii, 2009; Haken, Kelso, & Bunz, 1985; Turvey, 2007). Here these collective variables are
extracted from the speech signal as the dynamical invariants of a reconstructed phase space that is
assumed to represent the interaction between perception and action cues in the speech signal.
To keep the context ﬁxed and vary the predictions, the variables deemed important by the other
theoretical accounts were extracted from the same set of stimuli; there were no diﬀerent datasets,
for diﬀerent theoretical predictions. The ability of a simple classiﬁer to recover the classiﬁcations
of speech stimuli by average and dyslexic readers, based on the diﬀerent theoretical features that
were extracted was evaluated as corroboration of a prediction by a theory.
Chapter 5 - Principled simulation of posited entities and strong inference:
Beyond the Static Phoneme Boundary: The Nonlinear Dynamics of Emerging Literacy
The results from previous chapters are interpreted in terms of an interaction dominant coupling hy-
pothesis of the emergence of δ < 0 over time. A general model is proposed that represents the po-
tential landscape of two interacting, coupled collective variables. The coupling strength deﬁnes the
interaction dynamics and is proposed to co-vary with age. The model predicts nonlinear dynamics
that question the existence of static phoneme boundaries posited as entities by several competing
ætiologies. Also, destabilised internal structure of phoneme categories due to reduced coupling
strength in dyslexic readers is predicted to have an eﬀect on the observed dynamical patterns. Cou-
pling strength is also hypothesised to increase with age, in average readers as well as dyslexic read-
ers. In addition, the model explains how a recently proposed speech perception ætiology of de-
velopmental dyslexia (allophonic perception hypothesis) may have erroneously inferred additional
speech sound categories to exist as discrete structures, or perceptual boundaries. The coupled po-
tential model provides an explanation that does not include positing additional entities to explain
the same phenomenon.
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Chapter 6 - A General Discussion of Principles
The Role of Internal Representations in Ætiologies of Developmental Dyslexia
The ﬁnal chapter will provide an integrative discussion of the results and suggest directions for
future empirical inquiries based on the development of a formalism based on the principles and
physical laws of the adaptive behaviour of complex systems. This formalism will allow a concep-
tion of computation and re-presentation of behavioural modes as the result of an order generating
process. The diﬀerence between meaning and information is discussed and it is concluded that
the component-dominant and interaction-dominant causal ontologies both describe changes in the
amount of information necessary to describe the states of the complex living system (or: increase of
entropy). These changes are due to the emergence of order in a complex system and current plausi-
ble physical and biological explanations of this phenomenon are provided by the sciences that study
the adaptive behaviour of open complex systems that exist far-from-thermodynamic equilibrium.
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Notes Chapter 2: Ordering Relationships & Prospective Prediction
Chapter 2
PREDICTING READING PERFORMANCE FROM
PRE-LITERATE SPEECH PERCEPTION IN
CHILDREN AT-RISK FOR DYSLEXIA
Context Relativity of Ordering Relationships
An important notion that needs to be introduced in support of the plea for an evaluation
of interaction dominant dynamics as ontology of (impaired) behaviour introduced in the
previous chapter is the difference between the stability of a performance and its accuracy.
Although performance may be accurate, for example, a word is read aloud correctly on a
reading test, a distinction can and should be made between stable, proficient, coordinated
performance and unstable performance leading to that response (see Farrar & Van Orden,
2001; Van Orden, Kloos, &Wallot, 2009; Wijnants, Bosman, Hasselman, Cox, & Van Orden,
2009). The analogy of a path may be useful here: Some paths are easily traversed and get
you straight to where you want be (the correct answer), other paths will get you there as
well, but may take more time or more effort. In a similar fashion different paths may lead
to erroneous answers as well. Exactly which path will be traversed is dependent on the
context in which someone is asked to choose a path in the first place. In the context of
psychological measurements, the one being asked to choose a path, that is, the participant is
a context as well. A theory about both proficient and impaired performance pertaining to a
skill like reading should take into account the fact that a scientific theory only makes definite
predictions relative to well-defined measurement contexts (see Box 1.1). Such a theory of
measurement is not readily available in psychological science as it is in the physical sciences
(see e.g., Cox, Hasselman, & Seevinck, 2011). Therefore, in the present chapter we will
focus on a detailed task analysis of variables that are hypothesised to be causally related by
the speech perception deficit hypotheses of developmental dyslexia. This analysis will show
just how well such contexts need to be defined.
2.1 There is a diﬀerence between knowing the path and walking it
When comparing empirical results from systems that may be organised in fundamentally diﬀer-
ent ways, as may be the case when comparing average readers to dyslexic readers, being aware
of measurement contextuality becomes rather important. For one, the system on which measure-
ments are performed is part of that context and ﬁnding diﬀerences in proﬁcient behaviour between
healthy- and patient-groups can be expected a priori and may thus be theoretically less informative
than currently believed (cf. Farrar&VanOrden, 2001; VanOrden, Pennington&Stone, 2001; VanOr-
den & Kloos, 2003). What may be more informative as a test of the predictive power of a theory
is to experimentally create theoretically prescribed measurement conditions in which behaviour of
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healthy participants becomes less proﬁcient and more like patient behaviour. This is rarely done,
sometimes because of obvious ethical considerations. Contrariwise, attempting to make the be-
haviour of patient-groups become more proﬁcient, is of course much more common and often a
goal of research programs. In the context of developmental dyslexia this would refer to an inter-
vention study with a pre- and post-treatment measurement of reading and spelling performance.
Many intervention programs are based on the idea of impaired, inaccessible or fuzzy phonological
representations or codes as the primary cause of impaired reading. Indeed, some try to ameliorate
reading performance by making these sound representations better accessible or less fuzzy (e.g.,
Elbro, Børstrom& Petersen, 1998; Tallal, 2004). One important and still hotly debated consequence
of this supposed cause is that dyslexic children must show some form of deﬁcit in speech percep-
tion (see Serniclaes, 2006 for an extensive discussion of the speech perception deﬁcit hypothesis).
In the study presented in this chapter, I will explore the theoretical claims about the relation be-
tween speech perception of pre-literate children with a familial risk for dyslexia and their reading
performance one year later. The context I will use is the controversial auditory temporal processing
deﬁcit hypothesis that attributes to the supposed impaired speech perception of dyslexic readers
an underlying impairment of low-level auditory processes (Farmer & Klein, 1995 is a review of this
hypothesis). I explicitly note that it is not my purpose to seek empirical support for, or for that
matter against, this account as a viable explanation of developmental dyslexia. What this chapter
will hopefully show is that measurement contextuality needs to be taken into consideration when
evaluating tests of (cognitive) performance (see Holden, Choi, Amazeen&VanOrden, 2010; VanOr-
den, Kello &Holden, 2010) andmore speciﬁcally, when theorising about and directing experimental
attention towards the causes of impaired reading performance.
The auditory temporal processing deﬁcit hypothesis suggests speech stimuli with rapid transi-
tional elements are processed less accurately because such elements occur too fast to be perceived
by those aﬄicted with the processing impairment. In this context, it has been claimed that acous-
tic manipulations of the speech signal may facilitate speech perception. Tallal and Piercy (1973,
1974, 1975), who attempted to facilitate speech perception in children with Speech Language Im-
pairments (SLI), introduced such manipulations. The results of these and other experiments led
to the auditory “temporal processing” deﬁcit hypothesis, which was subsequently expanded from
a theory of SLI to account for the reading and spelling impairments of developmental dyslexia as
well (Farmer & Klein, 1995; Habib, 2000; Stein, 1993; Tallal, et al., 1993). The rationale behind the
acoustic manipulations is that if dyslexic readers cannot process the rapid spectral transitions in
speech, they may therefore beneﬁt from not only a slowing of the speech signal (Tallal & Piercy,
1975) but also ampliﬁcation of the fast transients (Nagarajan, et al., 1998) or both manipulations
(Tallal, et al., 1996; Tallal & Patterson, 2000). Nevertheless, the facilitative eﬀects of these manip-
ulations are highly debated. According to Ramus (2003), the initial studies were not double-blind
placebo controlled. The results of more recent studies, including RCT designs have shown that the
training program is not any more eﬀective than traditional intervention programs for both dyslexic
readers and speech language impaired children (Cohen, et al., 2005; Friel-Patti, Loeb, & Gillam,
2001; Gillam, Loeb, & Friel-Patti, 2001; Gillam, et al., 2008; Hook, Macaruso, & Jones, 2001; Loeb,
Gillam, Hoﬀman, Brandel, & Marquis, 2009). In several studies using manipulated stimuli, Habib
and colleagues nevertheless report positive eﬀects on the auditory, phonological, and literacy skills
of dyslexic readers of French (Habib, 2003; Habib, et al., 1999; Rey, De Martino, Espesser, & Habib,
2002). In yet another training study with manipulated stimuli, Agnew, Dorn and Eden (2004) found
only eﬀects on the speech discrimination of children with dyslexia and no generalisation to their
phonological awareness or pseudo-word reading.
Moreover, there is also evidence, however, that it is not just the rapidity of the stimulus or stimu-
lus elements that causes poor perception. When speech sounds are compared to sine-wave speech
analogues, perception deﬁcits in dyslexic readers are only found in response to the speech stimuli,
not the sine waves (Mody, Studdert-Kennedy & Brady, 1997). Moreover, when synthetic speech is
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compared to natural speech, impairment is only found for the perception of the synthetic stimuli
(Blomert & Mitterer, 2004).
In the present study, the question of the existence of a speech perception deﬁcit in develop-
mental dyslexia is approached in terms of the ability of the system to generate stable patterns of
behaviour. The hypothesis is very general in terms of neurobiology as the assumption is made
that anomalies such as perisylvian ectopias, planum temporale asymmetry, mycrogyria and thala-
mic distortions (e.g. Eckert, 2004; Eckert & Leonard, 2000; Galaburda, Menard, & Rosen, 1994;
Stein & Talcott, 1999) may destabilise the activation patterns necessary for proﬁcient, ﬂuent, well-
coordinated performance of speech perception, phonological awareness tasks, reading aloud, etc.,
but not necessarily the accuracy of that performance. The speciﬁcs of the measurement context,
such as the need for a speeded response, the type of stimulus presented and the diﬃculty of the
task itself, serve as constraints that inﬂuence the ability to generate stable performance. They de-
cide which paths will lead to the correct answer, which paths are blocked how many detours need
to be taken. Such contexts determine whether impaired performance will emerge as unstable yet
accurate, or unstable and inaccurate behaviour.
2.2 How to Study Stability?
Colangelo, Holden, Buchanan and Van Orden (2004), introduced a way to analyse response-time
dispersions as a measure of stability of performance. In their study aphasic patients and students
performed word-naming and lexical-decision tasks (i.e., decide whether a word presented on the
screen is an existing word or a pseudo-word). The dispersion of response times was found to be
indicative of the quality of performance on these tasks. The correlation patterns of the standard
deviations of the response times on the lexical decision task and the word-naming task with the
measures of lexical-decision accuracy and word-naming accuracy, respectively, were found to be
virtually the opposite of each other for the student and patient groups. In unimpaired individuals,
a stability of performance, which resulted in consistent relations between lexical-decision accuracy
andword-naming accuracy, occurred. No relationship between the dispersion of the responsetimes
(SD) and accuracy was found. In patients with major language problems, instability of performance
did not yield consistent relations between the two accuracymeasures, whereas consistent relations
occurred between SD and the accuracy measures. This ﬁnding strongly suggests that there is more
to performance than just its accuracy. In a group that does not show any impairments of behaviour
we observe that higher stability and consistency with which the correct answer is reported (ex-
pressed as a low dispersion of response times) reveals proﬁcient and well-coordinated behaviour
by means of a lack of correlation between the two measures. The opposite is true for the group
of participants with impaired behaviour: Individual diﬀerences in proﬁciency of performance are
expressed by systematic relations between response-time dispersion and accuracy. This relation
between proﬁcient (accuracy) and well-coordinated behaviour (stability, speed) has been shown to
exist across many tasks, modalities and (time)scales (see e.g., Wijnants, Bosman, Cox, Hasselman,
& Van Orden, 2011).
To explore similar hypotheses in the context of development of impaired reading and speech per-
ception, simple speech-perception experiments were conducted. Normal and manipulated stimuli
were presented to Dutch kindergarteners with a familial risk for dyslexia and typically developing
peers in an identiﬁcation and a discrimination paradigm. System instability may then be quantiﬁed
as the observation of correlations between response-time dispersion and the accuracy of perfor-
mance, whereas the absence of such a correlation would be indicative of stable, proﬁcient perfor-
mance. An additional hypothesis concerns the relation between stability of performance in speech
perception and reading ﬂuency. Since inmost transparent orthographies reading performance (and
thus diagnosis of reading delay or impairment) is measured using a timed reading test (i.e., number
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of words read aloud accurately within one minute), reading performance on such ﬂuency tests is
expected to be associated with the stability of speech perception performance, in dyslexic read-
ers, but not in average readers. However, if a measurement context in a speech-perception task
allows for dyslexic readers to generate stable performance (i.e., by being a very easy task) it may be
expected that associations disappear for that particular (easy) context.
To evaluate the relations between the speech perception skills of children and their reading
performance (as reading ﬂuency), speech perception was assessed when the participants were in
kindergarten (i.e., pre-literate) and they were measured again after they had received one year of
reading instruction. The diﬀerent groups (familial risk vs. no risk in kindergarten; reading impaired
vs. average reader one year later), the stimuli (acoustic manipulations of /bAk/ vs. /dAk/) and
speech perception tasks (identiﬁcation vs. discrimination) were treated as diﬀerent measurement
contexts in which diﬀerent correlation patterns between response-time dispersion and accuracy of
performance are expected. As for the diﬀerent groups, the familial-risk group is expected to dis-
play most unstable speech-perception performance as indicated by a larger dispersion of response
times. Due to the rather simple task, a group diﬀerence in the accuracy of performance is unlikely
to be observed. An obvious diﬀerence between the two perception tasks is that speech discrimi-
nation requires a speech sound to be kept in memory for a short while for comparison purposes
whereas identiﬁcation does not. Short-term memory load has been identiﬁed as a task demand
that elicits impaired performance on the part of dyslexic readers (Ramus & Szenkovits, 2008), a
speech-discrimination task may elicit more unstable performance on the part of such respondents
than a speech-identiﬁcation task. As for diﬀerential eﬀects of the acousticmanipulations on speech-
perception performance (i.e., not as an intervention), the empirical support for facilitation appears
inconclusive, though some authors report phoneme lengthening to be beneﬁcial (e.g., Rey, et al.,
2002; Segers &Verhoeven, 2005; Verhoeven& Segers, 2004). Therefore speciﬁc predictionswill not
be made, but it is expected that the diﬀerent manipulations will reveal diﬀerences in performance
stability. Finally, the relation between performance stability of speech perception in kindergarten
and reading ﬂuency one year later is expected to be aﬀected by context (group, task, stimulus) as
well. The general prediction is that the dyslexic readers as a group (as identiﬁed by reading ﬂuency
measures)will turn out to, in retrospect, display themost unstable speech-perceptionperformance.
Moreover, task and stimulus contexts are predicted to inﬂuence the observation of these associa-
tions.
2.3 Method
2.3.1 Participants
Participantswere 38 children in kindergarten (mean age = 5.3, SD = 0.9); 19were identiﬁed as having
a familial risk of developmental dyslexia (mean age = 5.3, SD = 0.9) and 19 had no known history
of dyslexia in the family (mean age = 5.5, SD = 0.7). The criterion for being at risk for dyslexia was
having at least one parent who was dyslexic. This was tested using the criteria set by Kuijpers et
al. (2003) for the identiﬁcation of adult dyslexia and included a timed word-reading task (Brus &
Voeten, 1973), a timed non-word reading task (van den Bos, Lutje Spelberg, Scheepstra, & de Vries,
1994) and the verbal-competence task from the WISC (Wechsler, 1955). All of the participating
children had a normal vocabulary measured by a passive-vocabulary test (Verhoeven & Vermeer,
2001). Records showed none of the children to have auditory or visual impairments according to
standard screening tests conducted at the school. All of the participants were followed until they
had received one year of reading instruction and thus reached the end of ﬁrst grade. Two reading
tests were then administered: A timed-reading task for regular words (Verhoeven, 1995) and a
timed pseudo-word reading task (van den Bos, et al., 1994). When the child’s scores on both tests
were within the 25th percentile, the child was considered to have severe reading problems. This
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resulted in a group of nine children with reading problems, all of whom came from the group of
children with a familial risk of developmental dyslexia.
2.3.2 Speech Stimuli
The stimuli were based upon natural speech recordings for the words /bAk/ [container] and /dAk/
[roof]. The stimuli were created to represent the end points of a ten-step /bAk/ to /dAk/ contin-
uum (Schwippert & Koopmans-van Beinum, 1998; van Beinum, Schwippert, Been, van Leeuwen, &
Kuijpers, 2005) using the Praat program (Boersma &Weenink, 2001) and have been used in several
studies (Been & Zwarts, 2003; Been & Zwarts, 2004). The two stimuli diﬀer only with respect to
the second formant transition. The two stimuli were manipulated in three manners using the Praat
program (Boersma & Weenink, 2001). First, ampliﬁcation of all fast transitional elements by 20dB
was undertaken. The algorithm used to do this in Praat was similar to the one used by Nagarajan
(1998), who conﬁrmed this in personal communication with Segers and Verhoeven (2002). Second,
the speech signal was slowed to 150% of its original length (see e.g., Segers & Verhoeven, 2005).
Third, both manipulations were applied as in the FastForWord program (Merzenich, et al., 1996;
Tallal, et al., 1996): the speech signal was slowed to 150% of its original length and all of the fast
transitional elements were then ampliﬁed by 20dB.
2.4 Procedure
2.4.1 Speech perception experiments
Identiﬁcation and speech-discrimination taskswere presented on a laptop computer in a quiet room
at the children’s school. The order of presentation for the two tasks was balanced across the two
groups. In the identiﬁcation task, the participantswere presented a smiley face on the screen, which
then uttered a word. After utterance of the word, two frames with a picture in each appeared
on the left and right of the screen. The picture in one of the frames corresponded to the word
that was just uttered. The child’s task was to identify the correct picture by pressing a designated
button on the left or right of the computer keyboard. The pictures presented in the frames were
randomly interchanged for each presentation. Prior to the experimental trials, 10 practice trials
were presented inwhich the participants received feedback. During the experimental condition, the
three types of manipulated /bAk/ and /dAk/ stimuli and the unmanipulated stimuli were presented
in a randomorder. Eachwordwas presented a total of 8 times resulting in 64 stimulus presentations.
In the discrimination task, two smiley faces appeared on the laptop screen. First one face uttered
a word and then, after 500ms, the second face uttered a similar or dissimilar word. The children
were told that the second face was trying to say the sameword as the ﬁrst face had said. They were
then asked to listen very carefully and decide whether the second word was the same or not. After
the utterance of the two words by the smiley faces, two frames with pictures in them appeared on
the left and the right of the screen. One of the frames contained a picture of two green smiling
faces. The other frame contained a picture with a green smiling face and a red frowning face. The
children were told to press a designated key on the keyboard corresponding to the left or right
frame: When the two words were the same they had to press the button corresponding to the two
green smiling faces and when the two words were not the same the button with the mismatched
faces. The pictures in the frames were randomly interchanged upon each presentation. Prior to the
experimental trials, 10 practice trials were presented in which the participants received feedback.
During the experimental condition, the three types of manipulated /bAk/ and /dAk/ stimuli and the
unmanipulated stimuli were presented in same and diﬀerent pairs (pairs were always of the same
stimulus category) with the diﬀerent pairs presented as both /bAk/ and /dAk/ and /dAk/ and /bAk/.
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Each pair type was presented, just as in the identiﬁcation task, a total of 8 times in a random order,
which resulted in 64 presentations.
2.4.2 Computation of Sensitivity and Bias Indices
Hits, misses, false alarms and correct rejections were calculated for each stimulus. In the identiﬁ-
cation task, it was assumed that the goal was to detect the transient formant transition present in
/dAk/. This creates a somewhat artiﬁcial classiﬁcation of responses necessary for the computation
of sensitivity and bias indices, but we are assuming here that the problems of dyslexic readers lie
with identifying fast formant transitions. Pressing the picture “dak” in response to the sound of
/dAk/ would constitute a hit while pressing the picture of “bak” in response to the sound of /dAk/
would constitute a miss. When the sound of /bAk/ is presented, a false alarm would be pressing
the picture of “dak” and a “correct rejection” would be pressing the picture of “bak.”
In the discrimination task the aim of the task is assumed to be the detection of a diﬀerence
between the stimuli. This meant that responding “diﬀerent” to a diﬀerent-pair constituted a hit, re-
sponding “same” to a diﬀerent pair constituted amiss, responding “diﬀerent” to a same pair consti-
tuted a false alarmand responding “same” to a samepair constituted a correct rejection.False-alarm
rates, hit rates and proportion correct responses were calculated for each participant and each con-
dition. Based on these scores, the sensitivity index A’ (Aaronson & Watts, 1987; Donaldson, 1992;
Grier, 1971) was calculated, which is a nonparametric analogue to the more common d’ statistic. A’
ranges from 0 to 1, where .5 means chance performance and 1 means perfect discrimination. The
formula for calculating A’ is given by equation 2.1:
A′ =
1
2
+
[Hits− FalseAlarms) ∗ (1 +Hits− FalseAlarms)]
[4 ∗Hits ∗ (1− FalseAlarms)] (2.1)
To evaluate response bias theB′′D (Donaldson, 1992) measure was calculated which is a nonpara-
metric analogue to the c bias statistic (equation refBD).B′′D ranges from -1 to 1, a value of 0 means
no bias a value of -1 or 1 an extreme bias for either response option. B′′D is calculated as follows:
B′′D =
[1−Hits) ∗ (1− FalseAlarms)−Hits− FalseAlarms]
[1−Hits) ∗ (1− FalseAlarms) +Hits− FalseAlarms] (2.2)
I chose to use nonparametric measure of discriminability and bias (in fact, they are logistic ana-
logues) given the relatively low number of trials in each condition. The inclusion of more trials
would have increased the risk of confounded results due to fatigue and/or loss of attention on the
part of the children in the present study.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Comparing children at-risk to children not-at-risk for developmental dyslexia
A. Speech-identiﬁcation task
The proportions correct, A’ (discrimination indices), B′′D (bias indices) and response times (see Ta-
ble 2.1) were entered in a repeated measures 2x4 multivariate analysis of variance with a within-
subjects manipulation factor of four levels (No Manipulation, Ampliﬁed, Slowed Down, Both) and
a between-subjects group factor of two levels (Familial Risk, No Risk). Polynomial linear contrasts
were deﬁned to explore trends in the repeated data. For the proportion correct responses, a sig-
niﬁcant main eﬀect of manipulation was found (Pillai’s trace = 0.40, F(3,34) = 7.45, p < 0.01, partial
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η2 = 0.40). Neither a main eﬀect of group nor an interaction between manipulation and group was
found. To further explore the origins of the main eﬀect of manipulation paired samples t tests were
conducted with Bonferroni adjustment of the alpha level. The results showed the manipulation in
which the speech stimuli were slowed down and ampliﬁed to elicit fewer correct responses than
the other manipulations and no manipulation whatsoever (No Manipulation vs. Both: t(37) = 4.14,
p < .01, Cohen’s d = .98; Ampliﬁed vs. Both: t(37) = 4.09, p < .01, Cohen’s d = .71; Slowed Down vs.
Both: t(37) = 4.09, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 1.03).
For the sensitivity index A’, a signiﬁcantmain eﬀect ofmanipulationwas again found (Pillia’s trace
= 0.34, F(3,34) = 5.90, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.34). There was again no main eﬀect of group, and the
interaction between manipulation and group was nonsigniﬁcant. When paired samples t tests with
Bonferroni adjustment of the alpha level were undertaken, the same pattern of results was found
as for the proportion correct responses: The double manipulation caused the stimulus to become
less discriminable for all of the children in the study when compared to the other manipulations
or no manipulation whatsoever (No Manipulation vs. Both: t(37) = 3.22, p < .01, Cohen’s d = .72;
Ampliﬁed vs. Both: t(37) = 3.17, p < .01, Cohen’s d = .56; Slowed Down vs. Both: t(37) = 3.61, p <
.01, Cohen’s d = .79).
For the response bias index B′′D, a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of manipulation was found once again
(Pillai’s trace = 0.22, F(3,34) = 3.24, p < 0.05, partial η2 = 0.22). All other eﬀects were nonsigniﬁcant.
When paired samples t tests were conducted with Bonferroni adjustment of the alpha level, again
only one signiﬁcant diﬀerence emerged: The double manipulation predisposed all of the children
towards a responsebias in the directionof the detectionof a fast transitional element in the stimulus
when no such element occurred (e.g., a response of /dAk/ occurs when /bAk/ is presented). This
was, however, only the case relative to themanipulation involving a slowing of the stimulus (Slowed
Down vs. Both: t(37) = -3.11, p < .01, Cohen’s d = .66) . Whether or not the bias indexB′′D deviated
signiﬁcantly from zero was next examined for the entire group and for each manipulation. This is
of interest as it indicates the direction of any response bias with a B′′D value of zero indicating no
bias whatsoever. This results showed only a signiﬁcant deviation from zero for the eﬀects of double
manipulation on the bias index (t(37) = 3.39, p < 0.01).
The analyses of the response times for the identiﬁcation task showed only a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of Group, F(1,36) = 9.31, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.21. In general, the No-Risk group responded
faster to the stimuli than the Familial-Risk group. No signiﬁcant correlations were found between
the measures of the children’s speech perception in kindergarten and their grade one reading per-
formance.
B. Speech-discrimination task
The proportions correct, discrimination indices A′, response bias indices B′′D and response times
(see Table 2.2) were entered into a repeated measures 2x4 multivariate analysis of variance with a
within-subjects manipulation factor of 4 levels (No Manipulation, Ampliﬁed, Slowed Down, Both)
and a between-subjects group factor of 2 levels (Familial Risk, No Risk).
For the proportion correct, a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of manipulation was found (Pillai’s trace =
.33, F(3,34) = 5.61, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.33). Neither a signiﬁcant eﬀect of group nor a signiﬁcant
interaction between manipulation and group were found. To further explore the origins of the sig-
niﬁcant main eﬀect of manipulation paired-samples t tests were conducted with Bonferroni adjust-
ment of the alpha level. Two signiﬁcant diﬀerences emerged: The double manipulation produced
fewer correct responding than the ampliﬁed and slowing manipulations separately (Ampliﬁed vs.
Both: t(37) = 2.82, p < .01, Cohen’s d = .49; Slowed Down vs. Both: t(37) = 3.71, p < .01, Cohen’s d
= .64).
The sensitivity index A′ showed again a main eﬀect of manipulation (Pillai’s trace = .36, F(3,34)
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= 6.33, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.36). There was neither a main eﬀect of group nor a signiﬁcant
interaction between manipulation and group. Paired-samples t tests with Bonferroni adjustment
of the alpha level revealed only one signiﬁcant comparison: Those stimuli which were slowed down
were more discriminable than those stimuli which were both slowed and ampliﬁed (t(37) = 3.61, p
< .01, Cohen’s d = .73).
No signiﬁcant diﬀerenceswere found for themeasures of response bias,B′′D. When the response
bias was tested for deviation from 0, a signiﬁcant diﬀerence was found for the double manipulation
only, (t(37) = 2.24, p < .05). The response times on the discrimination task showed a main eﬀect of
Group (F(1,36) = 5.79, p<.05, partial η2 = .14) with the No-Risk group responding faster in general
than the Familial-Risk group. No other signiﬁcant diﬀerences were found. No signiﬁcant correla-
tions were found between the measures of the children’s speech perception in kindergarten and
their grade one reading performance.
C. Response-time dispersion
Spearman correlations were calculated between the Standard Deviations for the response times
to each type of speech stimulus (i.e., three types of speech manipulation and no manipulation) in
kindergarten and the children’s timed word-reading and pseudoword-reading performance in ﬁrst
grade (i.e., severity of reading problems). This was done for the Familial-Risk and No-Risk Groups,
separately. The identiﬁcation task produced no signiﬁcant correlations for either group of children.
The discrimination task, however, produced high negative correlations for the unmanipulated stim-
uli and ampliﬁed stimuli with both the children’s word-reading and pseudoword-reading perfor-
mance in ﬁrst grade but only for the Familial-Risk group (see Table 2.3). More speciﬁcally, greater
response-time stability (i.e., lower SDs) for both the unmanipulated and ampliﬁed stimuli in kinder-
garten was associated with better reading performance in ﬁrst grade.
2.5.2 Comparing average readers to dyslexic readers
The participants in the present study were next divided into a group showing serious reading prob-
lems at the end of ﬁrst grade (n = 9) versus a group showing no such problems (n = 29) (see Meth-
ods). A procedure to analyse the dispersion of the response times for the children with reading
problems versus those without such problems as introduced by Colangelo et al. (2004) was applied.
A nonparametric variance ratio, which resembles a standard ANOVA, was computed. For each par-
ticipant and each experimental condition the variance in the response times was computed. These
variances were then summed within each group or condition and divided by n-1 to produce a vari-
ance statistic similar to the mean square in an ANOVA. For the participants with reading problems,
the n-1 was 8; for the group without reading problems, the n-1 was 28. An F ratio was obtained
by dividing the two statistics. To decide whether the variance distribution for the group of children
with reading problems diﬀered signiﬁcantly from the variance distribution for the group of children
without reading problems, a nonparametric bootstrapping procedure was used (Efron & Tibshirani,
1998).
This procedure had to be followed because the group of children with reading problems proved
much smaller than the group without reading problems and the assumption of normality could not
be met. The objective of the bootstrap procedure is to determine if the obtained F ratios could
possibly be found by chance alone by repeatedly selecting 9 and 29 variances on a random basis
from the total of 38 variances and calculating an F ratio as described above after each randomi-
sation. The number of randomly sampled F ratios that equalled or exceeded the F ratios for the
non-randomised samples was then divided by the total number of randomised samples. The result
is a probability estimate similar to a p-value. The data were re-sampled a total of 10,000 times for
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each speech perception task and type of manipulation. The obtained p-values for all but the double
manipulation fell below .05 (see Table 2.4).
Table 2.4 shows the dispersion of the response times in both the identiﬁcation and discrimination
tasks for those kindergarten childrenwho turned out to have serious reading problems in ﬁrst grade
to be greater than the dispersion of the response times for those kindergarten children who turned
out to be average readers in ﬁrst grade.
2.6 Conclusions and Discussion
The results from the speech perception tasks show diﬀerences in the accuracy and discriminabil-
ity measures of the entire group of children depending upon the type of stimulus presented (i.e.,
measurement context). Therewere no signiﬁcant group diﬀerences for thesemeasures. Most strik-
ing is the ﬁnding that the manipulation used in the FastForWord intervention program, namely the
double manipulation involving both the slowing of the acoustic signal and ampliﬁcation of the fast
transitional elements, yielded signiﬁcantly fewer correct responses than all of the other conditions
in both experiments. The sensitivity index A’ showed signiﬁcantly less discriminability of the speech
stimulus which underwent both manipulations. The main eﬀect of manipulation found for the re-
sponse bias index B′′D and the fact that the stimuli which underwent a double manipulation devi-
ated signiﬁcantly from zero revealed a bias to respond with /dAk/ which could be interpreted as
the detection of a fast formant transition even when none was present in the speech signal. This
is remarkable in light of the fact that the intensive FastForWord training program is supposed to
ameliorate reading problems using such a double manipulation bymaking speech sounds more dis-
criminable (Merzenich et al., 1996; Tallal, 2004; Tallal et al., 1996). On the basis of these results, I
therefore tentatively conclude that there is no diﬀerence in the accuracy of the speech perception
of the kindergarten children with a familial risk of developmental dyslexia versus no such risk. From
a component dominant view, employing a decompositional strategy, I would hence conclude that
speech perception, as a possible component process is not impaired!
The dispersion of response times, however, yielded quite diﬀerent results. Although the mean
response timeswere found to be the same across diﬀerent stimulus types in both experiments, they
clearly diﬀered between groups, with the Familial-Risk group generally showing slower responding
than the No-Risk group, although the eﬀect sizes were fairly small (identiﬁcation: .21; discrimina-
tion: .14). The stability of the children’s early speech perception was next examined in relation to
their later reading performance by correlating the standard deviations for their kindergarten re-
sponse times to their ﬁrst-grade reading performance. As expected, the identiﬁcation task was eas-
ier and — probably due to the relatively light memory load — yielded more stable responses than
the discrimination task and no signiﬁcant correlations with the children’s later reading performance
were found. The standard deviations from the discrimination task, however, showed strongly neg-
ative correlations for the unmanipulated and ampliﬁed stimuli with the accuracy of performance
on the word reading and pseudo-word reading tests for particularly the children with a familial risk
of dyslexia. No signiﬁcant correlations were found for the group of children with no such familial
risk. This set of ﬁndings suggests that instability of responding to certain types of speech stim-
uli in kindergarten is systematically related to impaired reading performance in ﬁrst grade. Those
children within the Familial-Risk group with more stable response times as indicated by a lower
response time standard deviation performed better on the reading ﬂuency tests in ﬁrst grade. No
diﬀerences between the groups of children in the correlations (which were not signiﬁcant) of their
reading performance with the kindergarten measures of correct responding, discrimination or re-
sponse bias were found.
The questionwhich now arises is why the systematic association between speech perception and
reading performance disappears in the context of speech stimuli that have simply been slowed or
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undergone a double manipulation. One explanation is that these manipulations reduce the con-
straints on processing and thereby produce more stable performance on the part of the children at
risk for dyslexia; the rate of the frequency changes in the speech signal is slowed considerably. This
explanation is insuﬃcient as the stimuli that underwent both manipulations were also responded
to less accurately by both groups of children. I will address this ﬁnding by discussing the results
from the analysis of distributions of the response time dispersion based on reading performance.
The results of the reading performance tests in ﬁrst grade showed 9 out of the 19 children ini-
tially at risk for dyslexia to indeed have serious reading problems. This is 47%, which is somewhat
higher but consistent with other studies of familial risk for dyslexia. Elbro and Børstrom (1997), for
instance, reported that 40% of their much larger sample turned out to be dyslexic. The nine chil-
dren found to have dyslexia also generally showed a larger dispersion of response times than the
group of 29 children with no reading problems in ﬁrst grade; their kindergarten performance on
the speech stimuli which were both slowed and ampliﬁed constituted an exception to this pattern,
however, and were more uniform with respect to the stability of the response times. The analy-
ses showed relatively more errors to be made on these stimuli by all of the kindergarten children
but also revealed a larger response bias (i.e., tendency to respond with /dAk/ when the stimulus
was /bAk/) and a tendency to respond “diﬀerent” when there was, in fact, no diﬀerence between
the stimuli. When viewed in terms of added constraints to the ability to generate stable perfor-
mance, one could argue that the response options available to the children were possibly reduced
by the double manipulation to a single response option, namely /dAk/ or “diﬀerent.” This would
explain the lack of a correlation between the reading performance of both groups of children and
the standard deviations for their perception of these stimuli: Their responding was stable, due to
the reduced number of options, but nevertheless erroneous. This pattern of responding occurred
independent of whether the children showed later reading problems or not, which clearly suggests
that impaired performance on a task need not entail impaired underlying components or cognitive
processes such as phonological representations in this case.
When the dispersion of the response times were examined to the stimuli that were only slowed,
the diﬀerences between the children with later reading problems and those without were found
to be the largest compared to the other stimuli. In other words, the lack of a correlation with the
reading tests for the Familial Risk versus No Risk division appears to have a diﬀerent cause in this
case when compared to the double manipulation. While the means for correct responding and the
discrimination index A’ for the slowed stimuli did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from themeans of the other
stimuli, those means for the slowed stimuli were nevertheless highest for both groups in both the
identiﬁcation and discrimination tasks. Thus, I have shown a complex interplay of inﬂuences ofmea-
surement contexts on the observed emergence of impaired performance in speech perception and
the observation of associations between impaired-speech perception and reading ﬂuency. In terms
of causation I interpret these results as originating from a system in which interactions between
components dominate behaviour, not the components themselves.
2.6.1 Context Sensitivity = Stability
To summarise, two new insights have been provided into the relations between speech percep-
tion and impaired reading. First, although the accuracy of the kindergarten speech perception of
later dyslexic readers did not diﬀer from that of later average readers, the stability of kindergarten
speech perception as expressed by the dispersion of response times was strongly and signiﬁcantly
related to reading performance one year later. The higher dispersion of response times associated
with impaired reading performance is taken to indicate an unstable system. For proﬁcient reading
performance, no relation to the dispersion of kindergarten response times was found. Future re-
search should certainly pursue the possibility of observing such a relation for other deﬁcits such as
the visual ormotormagnocellular deﬁcits as well. Second, amicroanalysis of the speech perception
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results showed that the speech manipulations within the brief trial time frame of the identiﬁcation
and discrimination tasks imposed additional constraints upon the children’s speech perception and
thereby allow impaired performance to emerge for both no-risk and familial-risk groups.
The ﬁndings presented here involve a dissociation of kinds between accuracy of performance
(and therefore also impaired performance) and stability of performance which is gauged by spe-
ciﬁc constraints interacting on diﬀerent levels of analysis and measurement context: The acoustic
manipulation of the stimulus, the task demands and the genetic and environmental background of
the participants. Deliberately adopted, was a speech-perception task that would elicit considerable
correct responding on the part of kindergarten children: To test the hypothesis that the diﬀerences
in accuracy of speech perception found for various types of tasks in previous research can be ex-
plained by measurement contexts which may allow more stable performance to emerge at times
(e.g. Ramus, 2004). When the problems identiﬁed earlier, with ﬁnding a single causal chain of
impaired components that always leads to impaired or dyslexic reading, the results presented here
suggest such an attemptmay be diﬃcult at best and futile at worst. A concise task analysis is usually
not conducted and measures of central tendency are the main explanatory variables used in analy-
ses. This is why I choose context relativity instead of context sensitivity: It is not the case that there
is a component causing an eﬀect that may be ampliﬁed or weakened by a context, the eﬀect itself is
the result of the context and should thus be interpreted in relation to this context. Adopting an in-
teraction dominant view of cognitive performance that focuses on intra-individual variation rather
than between group variationmay loosen the almost preformistic claims found in contemporary lit-
erature about biological causes of impaired behaviour, particularly when developmental processes
such as literacy acquisition are considered (Molenaar, 2008; Molenaar & Campbell, 2009).
It is beyond the scope of this study to provide a deﬁnite answer tomy interpretationof the data on
developmental dyslexia. In any case, some fundamental doubts about the causal relations hypoth-
esised in component-dominant interpretations of the data on developmental dyslexia have been
raised. The utility of an interaction-dominant interpretation of the data on developmental dyslexia
and (impaired) cognitive processes in general has been demonstrated in this study.
• This chapter may be cited as:
Hasselman, F. (2014). When opposites attract, repel and deceive: Using Recurrent Neural
Computation to Model Multi-stable States. In Beyond the boundary. An analysis of verisimilitude
and causal ontology of scientific claims: Ætiologies of developmental dyslexia as a case in point.
figshare. http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.928518
• The supplemental materials to this chapter may be cited as:
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Notes Chapter 3: Principled Simulation
Chapter 3
WHEN OPPOSITES ATTRACT, REPEL AND
DECEIVE
Using Recurrent Neural Computation to Model Multi-stable States
To understand the dynamics between speed and accuracy of a classification performance
in stable and unstable systems suggested by the previous chapter, this chapter explores the
attractor dynamics of a recurrent neural network (Hopfield) between two opposing basins of
attraction. These attractors represent the classification of a stimulus as either /bAk/ or /dAk/
based on exemplar values along two arbitrary dimensions, here representing features of the
speech signal (F2 salience and F2 rate of frequency change). The accuracy of performance
is assessed by looking at the classification response after presenting the network with stimuli
that vary along the two dimensions. The stability of network performance is examined by
its energy state. System instability is introduced as (but not limited to) the presence of a
third, weak basin of attraction that will never receive a categorisation response. In fact, what
is simulated is the constraining of the degrees of freedom available to the network to arrive
at a stable and accurate solution.
3.1 Energy State & Classiﬁcation Accuracy in Recurrent Neural Networks
The theoretical framework for understanding speech perception performance in the previous chap-
ter assumes an unstable complex dynamical system as an explanation for the behaviour of dyslexic
readers. Instability was revealed by the dispersion of the children’s response times in a speech
discrimination task, but not by the accuracy of their phonemic categorisation or their speech iden-
tiﬁcation. Several suggestions for a cause of this instability can be made based on the available
literature: It may be a general instability caused by one of the many observed structural cortical
anomalies (e.g. Eckert, 2004), leading to dynamical instabilities (Schöner & Dineva, 2007). It may
also be due to the presence of a rudimentary phoneme category or allophone (Serniclaes, 2004,
2006). The allophone which supposedly leads to unstable response times on a discrimination task
in this particular example, would lie somewhere along the continuum between /bAk/ and /dAk/. In
order to provide additional evidence for my unstable complex dynamical system hypothesis, neural
network simulations were conducted. It was not a goal to construct a realistic model of speech
perception (e.g. see Hopﬁeld & Brody, 2001).
The simulations are intended, rather, to show how the state space of a dynamic system can be-
come unstable when more degrees of freedom available to the network are constrained (struc-
tural anomalies hypothesis) or when an attractor state is added (allophone hypothesis). Technically
these two modelling options are identical. One modelling outcome has to be of course that the
categorisation performance of the network should not be grossly damaged. The model used in
3.2. Method and Procedure
Figure 3.1 – Hypothetical state space spanned by the two parameters manipulated in the speech per-
ception tasks: F2 Salience and F2 rate of change (panels A and C). The state space in panel A has two
stable solutions (black squares) and represents average readers. Panel C was created using three stable
solutions (black squares) and represents dyslexic readers. The ﬁgures show the “routes” through the
state space (grey lines) for input varying with respect to the two parameters (grey dots). Panels B and
D show the change of network energy for each of the grey dots in panels A and C, respectively.
the simulation is thus intended to characterise the dynamics of the behaviour observed in experi-
ments described in Chapter 2 and not necessarily how the central nervous system processes speech
sounds. In previous research, Been and Zwarts (2003, 2004) showedmodiﬁcation of the ARTPHONE
model (Grossberg & Schmajuk, 1989) dubbed SWEEP to successfully explain a great deal of dyslexic
speech perception data. I consider the level of description used in the model (i.e., brain regions
detecting frequency sweeps or formant transitions) untenable, because as the current ﬁndings and
that of others (see for instance Tuller, Case, Ding, & Kelso, 1994) have shown speech perception
to not merely depend upon the detection of speciﬁc formant transitions or particular voice onset
times (also see chapters 4 and 5). Been and Zwarts (2004, Appendix B) also report that their modi-
ﬁcations to the ARTPHONEmodel made it lose its resonant properties which are the most essential
part of Adaptive Resonance Theory (Grossberg, 2003).
3.2 Method and Procedure
3.2.1 Network Architecture: An Example by Principle
The model used was a two-neuron Hopﬁeld network (Hopﬁeld, 1982) as implemented in the MAT-
LAB software (version R2008b, The Mathworks, Inc.), which uses a design method based on linear
diﬀerential equations deﬁned on the edges of a closed hypercube (Li, Michel, & Porod, 1989). The
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edges of the hypercube deﬁne the state space of the system. Hopﬁeld networks are recurrent net-
works in the sense that network output is fed back as input obeying Hebb’s law of associativemem-
ory. The purpose of the network is to store information in memory as stable points and thereby
allow lightly distorted input to be recognised and categorised as a variation on that information
previously stored in memory. This allows creating a state space deﬁned by the two parameters
manipulated in the experiments in Chapter 2, being the salience of the second formant transition
and the rate of frequency change of the second formant transition. Of course, for the model these
interpretations are arbitrary and may be anything.
In Figure 3.1 Panel A, a graphic depiction of the hypothetical state space is shown. The squares
in the bottom left corner and top right corner show the locations of the stored dynamic memory
representing /bAk/-like and /dAk/-like stimuli, respectively. The grey points show input to the net-
work, which varies with respect to the two parameters. The grey lines depict the path the network
chooses to categorise such input. Clearly two basins of attraction can be distinguished and seem
to divide the state space into two equally large parts. The oblique line in the centre represents a
special series of points that fall exactly between the two attracting forces and may thus cause them
to be categorised at a location, which is not a predeﬁned memory state. These special states are
called spurious states. In dynamic systems terms, this line is called a repellor (i.e., the opposite of
an attractor) and, within the context of speech perception, it can be associated with a phoneme
boundary. A very interesting property of the network is that its state at each evaluation step can
be described by an energy function that belongs to a class of functions called Lyapunov functions.
Such functions “seek” stable states by minimising their value according to a dynamic rule. This can
be seen in Figure 3.1, Panel B, which is the plotted change in energy for each point in panel A. Most
points reach a stable state before 20 evaluation steps when the energy change equals zero.
3.3 Simulation of Results
Using the concepts of attractors and energy states, I can attempt to ﬁnd parallels to the proposed
framework. Figure 3.1, Panel C, shows a state space to which an extra memory location has been
added in the lower right corner (dubbed: 3MEM). This could represent the natural allophone cat-
egory that has been assumed to still exist in dyslexic readers. It could also and equally likely imply
that not enough degrees of freedom are available as recurrent connections between the neurons,
to yield a three-category solution. The attracting forces within the state space have changed as
a result of the addition of this extra memory location and additional repellor, or in the context
of speech perception; a phoneme boundary has emerged (represented by the horizontal line at 0).
The spurious points that existed in the network with only twomemory locations (2MEM) have been
given greater attractive force. The exact location of the third memory point for such a pattern to
emerge is not of particular importance provided it is proximal to at least one of the spurious points
that existed in the 2MEM network. Serniclaes et al. (2004) argue that the allophone category is, in
principle, present in average readers but not as strongly as in dyslexic readers.
The energy state has also been altered as can be seen in Figure 3.1, panel D; there are far more
unique initial energy states compared to the 2MEM network of Figure 3.1, Panel B. In this view, the
3MEM network is shown to be less stable than the 2MEM network. It should be noted, however,
that the two networks are basically the same system, and obey the same dynamic rules of associa-
tive memory. I have just added an extra response option, which is in keeping with how other au-
thors have handled the impaired stability/plasticity problem (Colangelo, Holden, Buchanan, & Van
Orden, 2004; Farrar & Van Orden, 2001). That is, response options that are basically not available
during unimpaired performance may be available during impaired performance. Stated diﬀerently,
in cases of impaired performance, there are not enough constraints to make the system converge
upon a single stable state. In recurrent neural networks, the connection weights between neurons
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are viewed as constraints upon the state space for the system. In a dynamic process, the weights
change to bring the network into a stable state and eﬀectively decrease the degrees of freedom that
characterise the system. So what is actually manipulated here are the degrees of freedom available
to the network by adding another memory state. Again, the interpretation is quite arbitrary, what
is important are the dynamics being modelled.
It must also be assumed that the state space and hence the parameter values corresponding to
the speech stimuli in the model being simulated is completely deﬁned by the stimuli themselves. It
is not assumed that the memory locations within the network represent static, symbolic represen-
tations of speech sounds but, rather, that the memory locations are the dynamic representations
of the poles of an artiﬁcial continuum created by the tasks in the study described in Chapter 2.
When the salience of F2 is considered then, the highest value corresponds to the ampliﬁed stim-
uli. Stimuli not ampliﬁed but with a formant transition (i.e., the slowed version of /dAk/ and the
unmanipulated /dAk/ stimulus) receive a lower value for this salience parameter. And lowest are
the unmanipulated /bAk/ stimulus and the slowed version of /bAk/. The parameter rate of F2 fre-
quency change has also been used in the simulations by Been and Zwarts (2003, 2004). The rate
of change becomes smaller when a stimulus is slowed because the frequency decreases across a
larger time frame. To simulate this, those stimuli that were slowed downwere placed closer to each
other.
3.3.1 Simulation of Response Time SD diﬀerences
An energy change of 25 points was next sampled for each stimulus type from the regions marked
in Panels A and C of Figure 3.2 (the contours show the values of energy change). The same points
were used for both networks. For each type of stimulus, the mean of these points was calculated.
In light of the fact that a categorisation task was being simulated, the diﬀerence between the /bAk/
and /dAk/ stimuli of these averages for each stimulus type was taken as a measure corresponding
to the dispersion of response times (Energy SD). In order to compare their relative value, all values
were transformed to the unit scale by subtracting the minimum value and dividing the result by the
maximum value for the result. The results are shown in Panels B and C of Figure 3.2. For the 2MEM
network, the order is almost identical to the actual SD data. For the 3MEM network, the ampliﬁed
stimuli reached the same value as the unampliﬁed stimuli, which was theminimum and thus 0. The
relative order for the ampliﬁed stimuli and stimuli with both manipulations is preserved, however.
3.3.2 Simulation of Discrimination Performance (A’)
A straightforward measure of discriminability for the points deﬁned representing the stimuli is the
distance of a point froma stablememory location at a particular evaluation step. The same25points
per stimulus type were sampled as in the SD simulation and stopped the 2MEM network again at 5
evaluation steps and the 3MEM network again at 10 evaluation steps (Figure 3.3, panels A and C).
For /bAk/-like stimuli, the distance to the memory in the lower left corner location was calculated.
These distance values are shownas the contours in Figure 3.3; for the /dAk/-like stimuli, the distance
to the memory location in the upper right corner was calculated (values not shown inFigure 3.3).
Then simply the average of the /bAk/-like stimuli and the /dAk/-like stimuli was taken for each
stimulus type. A value close to zero meant good discriminability because the /bAk/-like stimulus
was close to the lower left memory state and the /dAk/-like stimulus was close to the upper right
memory state. Given that the direction of this measure is the opposite of the discrimination index
A’ with higher values associated with greater discriminability, it was decided to invert the values
obtained from the network. Given that the A’ values did not diﬀer much within the diﬀerent groups
of readers per stimulus type, comparison of the relative orders for the stimuli was not informative.
In order to examine the possible diﬀerences between the simulated and observed data in terms of
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the magnitude of discriminability, max scaling was applied (i.e., division by the maximum value in
the data).
Both sets of data now have a maximum value of 1 with all other points deviating in magnitude
relative to this value. Panels B and C in Figure 3.3 show the results with the A’ data coming from
the 29 average readers and 9 dyslexic readers. The mean solution distance does not vary greatly
across the stimuli, as expected.
3.4 Conclusion and Discussion
The results from the network simulations show it is possible to understand these experimental re-
sults in terms of the state space of a dynamic systemwith enough constraints to provide an accurate
categorisation of the diﬀerent stimuli, while the stability of the categorisation does diﬀer per stimu-
lus type as observed in the empirical results. More importantly, diﬀerent patterns of stability can be
seen for the two networks, which show that the addition of an extra response category in the case
of the 3MEM network could well be a plausible cause for the destabilisation in dyslexic readers’
speech perception.
It is important to note that the 3MEM network has fewer constraints relative to the 2MEM net-
work in terms of network connections available to decide which category should be chosen and is
therefore less stable. It is entirely possible that these limited constraints are the actual mechanism
driving both this simulation results and Serniclaes et al.’s (2004) ﬁndings instead of the actual ex-
istence of a rudimentary phoneme category (i.e., the dynamic instability may have a more general
origin as proposed by Schöner & Dineva, 2007). This notion is more in line with what other au-
thors have suggested about the dynamic emergence of categories in speech perception (Tuller et
al., 1994).
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In the most modern theories of physics probability seems to have replaced aether as the 
nominative of the verb ‘to undulate’. 
- Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington (1935 New Pathways in Science, p.110).
The classical elements have an alchemical form (triangular). The quintessence in 
alchemy was the Æther, often discarded and re-introduced as is evident from this 
quote:
The aether: Invented by Isaac Newton, reinvented by James Clerk Maxwell. This is the stuff 
that fills up the empty space of the universe. Discredited and discarded by Einstein, the 
aether is now making a Nixonian comeback. It’s really the vacuum, but burdened by 
theoretical, ghostly particles.
- Leon Lederman
Apocrypha
Lederman, L.M., and Teresi,  D. (2006). The God Particle: If the Universe is the Answer, 
What is the Question.
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Notes Chapter 4: Strong Inference
Chapter 4
CLASSIFYING ACOUSTIC SIGNALS INTO
PHONEME CATEGORIES
Average and dyslexic readers make use of complex dynamical patterns and multifractal scaling
properties of the speech signal
In Chapters 2 and 3 the distinction between the accuracy and the stability of performance
was introduced and related to the classification and discrimination of two phoneme category
exemplars, /bAk/ and /dAk/. As was shown, manipulations of the ratio with which spectral
features change over time and/or manipulations of the relative power of dynamically chang-
ing features in the spectrum were associated with the stability of the classification perfor-
mance. This was especially the case for those children who turned out to have standardised
reading fluency scores in the lowest 25% of the population one year later. This instability
in terms of response times was found to be extremely dependent on the measurement
context, that is the particular stimulus type presented in the experiment, whereas classifi-
cation and discrimination performance remained similar and consistent between and within
the two groups of children. In Chapter 3, recurrent neural network simulations showed that
this distinction might be understood as the attractor dynamics in a two-dimensional phase
space governed by recurrent neural dynamics, when typical exemplars of the phoneme cat-
egories are considered. I hypothesised this phase space was spanned by the dimensions rate
of F2 change and F2 salience The choice to interpret the two dimensions as frequency char-
acteristics of the speech signal is arbitrary and inspired by the acoustic manipulations based
on the auditory temporal processing hypothesis. There are, as stated earlier, many more
features of the speech signal that authors believe to be of importance for speech percep-
tion in dyslexic readers. Nothing in the architecture of the model prefers one interpretation
to another; the dynamics in the phase space stay the same irrespective of interpretation.
The network architecture thus very much represents a theoretical structure as implied in
Chapter 1.
This Chapter will examine three types of measures that represent different distinguishing
features of the speech signal and attempt to uncover which features are actually used by par-
ticipants to classify the stimuli into speech sounds. I will not construct stimuli that exclusively
represent these measures as is common in speech and auditory perception studies (see
e.g. Boets, Ghesquière, van Wieringen, & Wouters, 2007; Pasquini, Corriveau, & Goswami,
2007). Instead, I will extract all measures from one and the same set of stimuli and analyse
which measures enable a classification response (by a simple classifier algorithm) that is most
similar to that observed in the participants. The text is taken from the article published in
PeerJ (See Chapter Notes).
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4.1. Abstract
4.1 Abstract
Several competing aetiologies of developmental dyslexia suggest the problemswith acquiring literacy
skills are causally entailed by low-level auditory and/or speech perception processes. The purpose of this
study is to evaluate the diverging claims about the speciﬁc deﬁcient perceptual processes under conditions
of strong inference. Theoretically relevant acoustic features were extracted from a set of artiﬁcial speech
stimuli that lie on a /bAk/-/dAk/ continuum. The features were tested on their ability to enable a simple
classiﬁer (Quadratic Discriminant Analysis) to reproduce the observed classiﬁcation performance of aver-
age and dyslexic readers in a speech perception experiment. The ‘classical’ features examinedwere based
on component process accounts of developmental dyslexia such as the supposed deﬁcit in Envelope Rise
Time detection and the deﬁcit in the detection of rapid changes in the distribution of energy in the fre-
quency spectrum (formant transitions). Studies examining these temporal processing deﬁcit hypotheses
do not employ measures that quantify the temporal dynamics of stimuli. It is shown that measures based
on quantiﬁcation of the dynamics of complex, interaction-dominant systems (Recurrence Quantiﬁcation
Analysis and themultifractal spectrum) enable QDA to classify the stimuli almost identically as observed in
dyslexic and average reading participants. It seems unlikely that participants used any of the features that
are traditionally associated with accounts of (impaired) speech perception. The nature of the variables
quantifying the temporal dynamics of the speech stimuli imply that that classiﬁcation of speech stimuli
cannot be regarded as a linear aggregate of component processes that each parse the acoustic signal in-
dependent of one another, as is assumed by the ’classical’ aetiologies of developmental dyslexia. It is
suggested the results imply that the diﬀerences in speech perception performance between average and
dyslexic readers represent a scaled continuum rather than being caused by a speciﬁc deﬁcient component.
4.2 Introduction
Many aetiologies of developmental dyslexia assume some deﬁcit in auditory processing may be
causally entailed in the diﬃculty with acquiring proﬁcient levels of reading and spelling ability ex-
perienced by a small percentage of the population (see e.g., Ramus, 2004). The nature of the fea-
tures of the acoustic signal that are assumed to be able to evidence such deﬁcient components
(e.g., phoneme representations, allophones) or component processes (e.g., frequency sweepdetec-
tion, rise time perception) varies greatly between aetiologies (cf. Serniclaes and Sprenger-Charolles,
2003). The purpose of this study is to compare a number of such features under conditions of strong
inference (cf. Platt, 1964). The goal is to examine whether average and dyslexic readers actually use
these features to arrive at a particular classiﬁcation of a speech stimulus, a ﬁrst and necessary step
to take before their causal entailment in dyslexic reading can be claimed. Three types of measures
will be examined that represent diﬀerent distinguishing features of the speech signal, however, not
by constructing stimuli that exclusively represent these measures as is common in auditory and
speech perception studies (see e.g., Boets et al., 2007; Pasquini et al., 2007). Instead, all measures
will be extracted from one and the same set of stimuli and measures will be evaluated on their
ability to enable a simple classiﬁer to yield a response that is similar to classiﬁcation responses by
participants.
The measures used in this study can be extracted from any continuous signal (sampled, synthe-
sised, or generated otherwise), but are very diﬀerent in the type of information they are thought to
capture, or more suitably: represent. The ﬁrst are Component Process Measures, derived from the
signal because of their supposed importance in contemporary theoretical assumptions about de-
ﬁcient components of cognitive or sensorimotor processes related to developmental dyslexia and
speech perception. They represent the Component Dominant family of dyslexia ontology. The sec-
ond type of measure are Periodicity Measures, derived from (linear) transforms or decompositions
of the signal used in other contexts to express the average periodicity, harmonicity or regularity of
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the ‘true’ signal (see e.g., Guiard, 1993, for an application to harmonic movements). These mea-
sures quantify periodic changes of the variable in question over time. The third are Complex Dy-
namic Pattern Measures derived from nonlinear time series analyses and multi-scale analyses that
have a wide range of applications in the general study of the behaviour of complex dynamical sys-
tems. The interaction-dominant perspective on explaining complex behaviour assumes it emerges
out of the interactions of many processes ﬂuctuating on diﬀerent spatiotemporal scales. The Com-
plexity Matching or Complexity Control hypothesis posits that humans make use of the invariant
structure of such complex dynamical patterns to coordinate their behaviour in ways that are com-
parable to principles for optimal and maximal information transport between complex systems as
posited by formal ﬂuctuation dissipation theorems (e.g., the ‘1/f resonance hypothesis’ Aquino
et al., 2011). Complexity science has developed a number of analyses that allow a quantiﬁcation of
complex temporal patterns and self-aﬃne structure in empirical time-series. Such measures often
concern a quantiﬁcation of dynamics in a phase-space representation of the signal, reconstructed
by means of delay embedding methods (cf. Kantz and Schreiber, 2003), or, the assessments of scal-
ing relations between signal variability and the temporal resolution at which the variability is as-
sessed (cf. Kantelhardt, 2011). The techniques used in this article to quantify phase-space dynamics
and scaling relations in the speech signal are Recurrence Quantiﬁcation analysis (RQA, cf. Marwan
et al., 2007) and Multifractal Detrended Fluctuation Analysis (MF-DFA, see Kantelhardt et al., 2002;
Ihlen, 2012).
The latter two types of measure (Periodicity and Complex Dynamic Pattern measures) have not
been the focus of studies on dyslexia and speech perception, even though these measures seem
tailor made to test claims of deﬁcits in detecting complex dynamic frequency or amplitude patterns
present in the speech signal.The association between speech perception and non-linear behavioural
phenomena (e.g. hysteresis, enhanced contrasts) has been established in a number of studies (see
e.g., Case et al., 1995; Porter and Hogue, 1998; Tuller et al., 1994; van Lieshout et al., 2004; Hassel-
man, 2014a). Recent studies have shown that quantiﬁcation of recurrent patterns (RQA) and the
presence of power-law scaling in trial series of word-naming latencies of dyslexic readers are diﬀer-
ent (more random, less ﬂuent) from average readers and are correlated to reading performance
on standardised tests. The correlation only appears in dyslexic readers (Wijnants et al., 2012b). A
comparison of response latency distributions in diﬀerent tasks (word-naming, colour-naming, arith-
metic, ﬂanker tasks), suggests dyslexic readers’ response distributions are a scaled versions of av-
erage readers, in which the relatively larger ‘heavy tails’ account for more variable, more random
behaviour (Holden et al., 2014). This would indicate a general scaled continuum account of dyslexia
and not, as component dominant aetiology suggests, a localised speciﬁc deﬁcit. This is reﬂected in
how the temporal evolution and change processes (i.e. continuous dynamics) are studied: Compo-
nent process measures quantify change over time as a nominal variable that can be ‘on’ or ‘oﬀ’ in a
stimulus (F2 rate of frequency change is high or low; Rate of change of envelope modulation is high
or low). This is not the same as quantifying the dynamics of a continuous signal (RQA), or the full
range of temporal correlations present in a signal (multifractal spectrum).
Figure ?? displays six diﬀerent representations of a single speech stimulus (Stimulus 1) that was
used to extract measures that have been suggested to be important for understanding the role of
speech perception in the aetiology of developmental dyslexia. Each stimulus representation can
be ordered with respect to the component versus interaction dominant causal ontology used in
hypotheses about the origins of impaired performance associated with developmental dyslexia.
What follows will be an introduction to the diﬀerent measures used in this study and an analysis of
their ability to serve as the features that enable classiﬁcation of speech stimuli as observed in the
performance of average and dyslexic readers in simple labelling experiments of those stimuli.
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4.3 Component Process Measures: What does Temporal refer to?
The “temporal” auditory processing deﬁcit hypotheses concern properties or information content
in auditory stimuli that cannot, due to the rate with which the information changes over time, be
properly perceived by the person aﬄicted with the deﬁcit. There are two major deﬁcit hypotheses
of this kind: The auditory temporal processing deﬁcit hypothesis (ATPDH: Farmer and Klein, 1995;
Tallal, 2004) and the rise time perception deﬁcit hypothesis (RTPDH) proposed by Goswami and
colleagues (see e.g., Goswami et al., 2010a, 2002)
The ATPDH states that speech stimuli with rapid transient spectral elements are processed less
accurately because such elements occur too fast to be perceived by people with the processing
impairment. In fact, the claim is not limited to spectral features, but pertains to any sequence of
auditory stimuli presented in rapid succession.
Tests that havebeenemployed to reveal this deﬁcit are for instance temporal order judgements (e.g.,
Pasquini et al., 2007) and auditory gap (or threshold) detection (Boets et al., 2007; Corriveau et al.,
2007). There is also evidence from neuroscience that seems to point to anomalous functional re-
sponses to rapid auditory stimuli (Temple et al., 2000) or an “asynchrony” in the speed of processing
between auditory and visual modalities (Breznitz, 2003). Note that essentially, these are two diﬀer-
ent deﬁcits:
1. An auditory stimulus with rapidly changing elements is not detected / processed adequately.
2. The speed with which processing of auditory stimuli takes place is not adequate (out of sync).
From the literature it is unclear which of these two temporal deﬁcits the ATPDH actually refers to,
in fact both can be true at the same time. The early work by Tallal and co-workers suggests the ﬁrst
option (see e.g., Tallal, 1976; Tallal et al., 1993; Tallal and Piercy, 1974). However, since the ATPDH
has been “adopted” by the magnocellular theory of dyslexia (Stein, 2001; Stein and Walsh, 1997),
option seems more appropriate. This magnocellular theory states that the sensorimotor deﬁcits
observed in dyslexic readers may be explained by the anomalies found in the magnocellular neural
pathways responsible for fast information transferral. It is thus not exactly clear what the “tem-
poral” in temporal processing refers to. A similar problem plays a role in the rise time perception
deﬁcit (e.g., Livingstone et al., 1991).
The RTPDH states that there are problems with the perception of the slow changing amplitude
modulation cues, or rise times of the amplitude envelope of the speech signal. Temporal here thus
refers to the opposite of ATPDH in terms of the rate of change involved.
The hypothesis has recently been placed in a temporal sampling framework (Goswami, 2011) that
provides a neurocognitive basis for the deﬁcit. The main explanatory work in the theory is done
by the fact that perceiving changes in amplitude envelopes is essential for segmenting the speech
stream into smaller units, for perceiving prosody to mark boundaries of sentences, words and
syllables (Ziegler and Goswami, 2005). In one of the ﬁrst publications presenting this hypothe-
sis (Goswami et al., 2002), it is suggested that the deﬁcit concerns the processing of the acoustic
structure of the syllable, which is best described as rhythm detection. This was tested by asking
children to distinguish between stimuli on a continuum from smaller (15 ms) to larger (300 ms) en-
velope rise times of the modulating wave. The slope of the psychometric categorisation function
of the dyslexic readers was smaller than that of typically developing children (compared to chrono-
logical age and reading age). The conclusion was that the dyslexic readers were not detecting the
envelope onsets that make up the beat of the signal. Performance on the envelope onset detec-
tion task explained more variance in reading and spelling performance than the temporal order
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judgement tasks and rapid frequency discrimination tasks associatedwith ATPDH. This deﬁcit is also
thought to have broader consequences for meter and beat perception in music by dyslexic read-
ers (Goswami, 2006; Huss et al., 2010). It is suggested that a deﬁcit in beat perception may also
explain why dyslexic readers have problems producing speech, or tapping to a metronome (Cor-
riveau and Goswami, 2009). The causal connection to reading is however still through a deﬁcient
representation of a phoneme-like structure due to poor beat perception. This is why the hypothesis
belongs in the arena of the component dominant ontology.
The question remains, what exactly is the process that is deﬁcient here? The authors (Goswami
et al., 2002; Goswami, 2006; Goswami et al., 2010a; Goswami, 2011) use “rise time perception
deﬁcit”, “envelope amplitude onset detection deﬁcit”, “perceptual insensitivity to amplitude mod-
ulation”, “beat perception deﬁcit” and “p-centre detection deﬁcit”. Recently, the perception of fast
spectral changes in formants was directly compared to rise time perception in a /bA/-/wA/ contin-
uumonwhich stimuli diﬀered either by frequency rate of changeor envelope rate of change (Goswami
et al., 2010a). The frequency onsets of the formants were kept equal in both conditions. It was
concluded that dyslexic children were poor at discriminating between sounds based on the rate of
change of the envelope, whereas discrimination based on formant transition duration (the rate of
change of frequency) yielded normal performance. The authors interpreted the results as a failure
to detect envelope cues by dyslexic readers, not rapid frequency changes. What does this imply?
Are there too many, or too few rise time onsets in the signal to be perceived. Or, if the deﬁcit is
indeed also responsible for anomalous rhythm production, is it a matter of a deﬁcient coupling be-
tween an internal clock and an externally perceived rhythm as suggested in the temporal sampling
framework (Goswami, 2011)? If those rise time onsets were made more salient, would they lead
to better beat perception? Is it a deﬁcit in perceiving the rate with which the amplitude envelope
changes in the signal instead of the actual detection of the onset of the envelope? This is what
is suggested by the stimuli used in (Goswami et al., 2010a) and seems a diﬀerent, more speciﬁc
auditory processing deﬁcit than the more general deﬁcit the same authors proposed to detect the
occurrence of envelope onsets as a beat or rhythm.
Confusion about the speciﬁcs of the characteristics of the stimuli to which the deﬁcits pertain
seems to occur in both hypotheses: Periodicity or pattern detection versus rate of change detec-
tion. The measures that will be extracted from the speech signal in this study will address both
features of the complex speech signal. The measures that seem to relate most to a deﬁcient com-
ponent process appear to be the rate of change of the formant frequency and the rate of change
of the amplitude envelope. The periodicity, or pattern measures will be discussed in the next para-
graph. To obtain the rate of change of the formant frequency of a stimulus, the Fourier transform
of the speech signal is taken and formant tracks are extracted from the spectrum. The slope of the
second formant (F2) in the spectrogram is calculated as a measure of rate of frequency change. For
RTPDH there are several options to quantify the rate of change of the amplitude envelope. Here,
the stimuli used in (Goswami et al., 2010b) are considered an appropriate measure, because in that
study several of the options mentioned above (rise time duration, envelope onset, tempo, etc.) are
contrasted against one another. Diﬀerences between dyslexic readers and typical readers (chrono-
logical age controls) in that studywere signiﬁcantwhendiscriminating between two types of stimuli:
a) Stimuli with single ramp envelope onsets (with random steady states and rise times varying from
15 to 300ms); and b) composite stimuli consisting of a standard rise time (15 ms) alternated with a
longer rise time (up to 192 ms). The study showed that performance on discrimination tasks with
these stimuli was correlated with rhyme detection and reading and had a unique contribution to
explained variance in these variables in a regression model. A sensible measure then seems to be
the time it takes for the amplitude envelope to rise to its maximal value, which alsomarks the onset
of the rhyme (b-Ak). To obtain the measure, ﬁrst the absolute value of the Hilbert transform of the
signal is taken (c.f. Feldman, 2008; Smith et al., 2002), which yields the immediate envelope. The
slope of the line one can draw from the amplitude envelope at the start of the signal to itsmaximum
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value is considered an estimate of the most important slow rise time that needs to be detected in
order to distinguish between speech stimuli.
Acousticmanipulations of the speech signal, based on the ATPDH refer to ampliﬁcation or slowing
down (or both) of the fast spectral changes present in the speech signal. These manipulations are
expected to also aﬀect the amplitude envelope, which is important for RTPDH. Ampliﬁcation may
lead to steeper rise time slopes whereas slowing down the signal is expected to lead to (relatively)
slower rise times. (Been and Zwarts, 2003) presented simulations of the eﬀect of ampliﬁcation of
the fast formant transitions using their SWEEPmodel. The SWEEPmodel is a dynamical model built
around the assumption that speech perception involves detection of frequency sweeps. They pre-
dicted that the ampliﬁcation manipulation would indeed lead to a better performance on behalf of
the dyslexic readers. Following this line of reasoning, wemay expect ameasure that indexes the rate
of change of a formant transition in a speech signal to be a measure of which ATPDH would agree
dyslexic readers cannot maximally exploit to identify and discriminate between speech sounds.
In Figure 4.2 the spectrograms of the stimuli used in the present study are plotted. The rate of
change of the formant transition calculated as the slope of F2 in the spectrum is given for each of
the 40 stimuli. Figure 4.3 shows the smoothed amplitude envelopes of all the stimuli and the rise
time is calculated as the slope from the start of the stimulus to the maximum amplitude. As shown
in the ﬁgure, these measures diﬀer between the stimuli and are thus candidate features that may
actually be used by participants.
4.4 Periodicity Measures: Harmony of Frequency and Amplitude
Theperiodicitymeasures used are Rise- and Fall-Time Entropy (RFTe) and Inharmonicity (also known
as Harmonics-to-Noise-Ratio, HNR). In theory these measures should be connected to RTPDH and
ATPDH respectively. Quite remarkably, tomy knowledge they have never been used in studies in the
context of speech perception and developmental dyslexia. RFTe represents the entropy (disorder)
in the distribution of rise and fall times estimated present in the envelope. It is calculated by taking
the ﬁrst derivative of the immediate amplitude envelope (obtained by taking the absolute value of
the Hilbert transform of the signal), which represents the rate of change of the amplitude. When
the diﬀerenced amplitude envelope changes sign, that is crosses the x-axis, there is a peak in the
amplitude (rate of change is zero) after which the amplitude rises or falls. Quantifying the time
between peaks in the envelope by subtracting the time stamp of subsequent zero-crossings in the
derivative thus yields a distribution of durations; the time it takes for the amplitude to rise or fall.
The entropy of this distribution of discrete durations of size n can be calculated as the chance of
observing a particular rise or fall time pRFTi (equation 4.1) and inserting it into the regular formula
for Shannon entropy (equation 4.2).
pRFTi& =
RTFi∑n
i=1RFTi
(4.1)
RFTe = −
n∑
i=1
pRFTi ∗ log2(pRFTi) (4.2)
RTFe may be considered an estimate of the harmony of the perceptual rhythm invoked by am-
plitude changes. High entropy means that there is disorder or noisiness in the amplitude envelope
of the signal. Another way to interpret entropy is in terms of information: The value of the entropy
denotes how many bits of information (due to log2) would be needed to predict the rate of change
of the envelope. More bits needed means less regularity and more disorder in the curve. The RTFe
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values for each stimulus are shown in Figure 4.4. The ﬁgure reveals RFTe takes on diﬀerent values
for diﬀerent steps on the continuum, but also across diﬀerent acoustic manipulations.
Inharmonicity, or HNR measures how much energy in the spectrum is outside of the ideal har-
monic sequence. To calculate this measure we assume the signal may be decomposed into a large
number of partials, or sine waves that oscillate at a particular frequency. We also assume there
is a fundamental frequency F0. The more harmonious the signal, the more it consists of partials
that are multiples of F0. The Formants discussed earlier, can be considered such multiples. In an
ideal situation, the second formant frequency F2 should be 2n ∗ F0, with n = 2. For the calcu-
lations presented here, the exact correspondence of the value of n to the order of the formant is
not important as long as it is a multiple. Inharmonicity then represents howmany of the partials in
the signal are not multiples of F0, how much the signal deviates from an ideal harmonic sequence.
This measure captures information about the impact of the changes in formant frequency with re-
spect to the other formant frequencies present in the signal and might be a more accurate index
of spectral changes than the absolute change in one formant such as the F2 slope. Table 4.1 lists
the inharmonicity values of the stimuli as the percentage energy in non-harmonic partials. Again,
there are clear diﬀerences between stimuli on the continuum and between the acoustic manipula-
tions. The stimuli used were synthesised ((but based on actual recordings of utterances, see van
van Beinum et al., 2005) to create a continuum in which the F2 onset frequency is the only major
spectral change. F2 is constant at 1100 Hz in /bAk/ but the onset increases in ten steps to 1800
Hz in /dAk/. In the table it can be seen that /bAk/ is more inharmonious than /dAk/, which might
seem counter-intuitive since in /bAk/ there is no change in F2 onset. However the fundamental
frequency F0 of most of the stimuli is about 220 Hz, which yields about 1800 Hz with n = 3. The
closest harmonic partial to 1100 Hz is 880 with n = 2.
Table 4.1
Inharmonicity of the 40 Stimuli Used in the Experiment. The Numbers Represent Percentage of Energy
in the Signal that is Outside of the Harmonic Sequence.
Acoustic Manipulation
Stimulus None Slowed Down Ampliﬁed Both
/bAk/ 39.87 42.52 43.81 48.79
2 38.99 42.50 42.80 48.57
3 38.40 41.09 42.38 46.26
4 37.46 41.01 42.32 47.30
5 37.09 40.58 42.24 46.45
6 36.95 40.37 42.14 46.05
7 36.81 40.13 42.00 45.13
8 36.85 39.67 40.70 44.14
9 36.71 39.57 40.59 43.84
/dAk/ 36.20 38.89 40.91 43.35
4.5 Complex Dynamic Pattern Measures: A Complexity Matching Hy-
pothesis
A spectrogram representation of a speech sound (see Figure 4.2) reveals the complexity of the
speech signal by displaying how much the energy at diﬀerent frequency bands changes over time.
The spectrograms presented in Figure 4.2 are less noisy than recordings of actual speech produced
by a human, they are partially synthetic. When trying to understand how humans perceive such
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4.5. Complex Dynamic Pattern Measures: A Complexity Matching Hypothesis
a signal as a meaningful word or sentence it is tempting to focus on mechanisms that analyse fre-
quencies or amplitudes and loose sight of the fact that the energy distribution in the spectrogram
is a representation of a complex gesture, a motor action. In fact, there are at least 70 muscles in-
volved in producing a simple syllable like /pa/ ranging from muscles that control respiration to the
ones that control the tongue (Galantucci et al., 2006; Turvey, 2007). Producing speech sounds is
very much a matter of sophisticated aerodynamic control by changing the shape of cavities air is
forced to ﬂow through (Porter and Hogue, 1998). The speech signal indeed appears to resemble the
most complex dynamic motion known to physics, spatio-temporal chaos, or, turbulence: Models of
human aspiration have been successfully validated against real turbulent airﬂow induced sounds
generated in acoustic duct experiments (cf. Little and McSharry, 2007).
Perhaps the words of Horace Lamb, the author of the 1910 book: The Dynamic Theory of Sound,
which is still in print today as an exact copy of the 1925 2nd edition (Lamb, 2004), should carry some
weight. He was more famous for his work in hydrodynamics and is reported to have said:”I am an
old man now, and when I die and go to heaven there are two matters on which I hope for enlighten-
ment. One is quantum electrodynamics, and the other is the turbulent motion of ﬂuids. And about
the former I am rather optimistic.” (Moin and Kim, 1997). Indeed, the scientist who brought en-
lightenment on the subject of quantum electrodynamics, Richard Feynman, called turbulence:”the
most important unsolved problem of classical physics” (cf. Moin and Kim, 1997). Lamb’s dynamic
theory of sound makes clear that a speech signal cannot be regarded as the vibration of a violin
string propagating harmonic waves through the air (see Table 4.1). A substantial part of the signal
cannot be described as a harmonic sequence. The sound wave produced by a string is to the sound
wave produced by a human speaker as a gentle summer breeze is to a hurricane.
Several authors have suggested aggregate, or collective levels of control that enable coordina-
tion of tasks with mind-boggling numbers of degrees of freedom such as speech perception and
production. The uncontrolled manifold (Scholz and Schöner, 1999) and synergies (Turvey, 2007)
are examples of such higher order mechanisms of control. They represent theoretical constructs
based on a causal ontology in which interactions between components do the explanatory work for
the theory, not the components themselves. The most sophisticated theoretical frameworks treat
action andperception as a coupling of levels in a single complex systemwhose behaviour can only be
explained as an inseparable whole (e.g., Chemero, 2009; Chemero and Turvey, 2007; Gibson, 1979;
Michaels and Carello, 1981; Schoner and Kelso, 1988). Evidence is accumulating that humans are
able to coordinate their behaviour by exploiting speciﬁc invariant properties of complex dynami-
cal patterns either due to ‘attraction to criticality’ or ‘complexity matching’. Attraction to criticality
refers to the ubiquitous observation of 1/f scaling (pink noise) in time-series of human physiology
and performance, which is associated with health and well being (cf. Goldberger et al., 2002), pro-
ﬁciency and ﬂuency of performance (for example in motor learning (Wijnants et al., 2009), or as
nested constraints on performance (Wijnants et al., 2012a)). Complexity matching is a remarkable
synchronisation and coordination phenomenon in which participants are able match the complex
scaling properties of an external stimulus in a record of their responses (e.g., ﬁnger tapping to a
‘fractal’ metronome Coey et al., 2014).
Formally, the terms fractal, power-law and scaling refer to diﬀerent, related properties of mathe-
matical objects, but in general fractal dynamics, power-law or 1/f scaling all refer to the observation
of self-aﬃne structure in empirical time series (cf. Van Orden et al., 2003; Kantelhardt, 2011). As
shown in equation 4.3, self-aﬃnity is diﬀerent from self-similarity in that the similarity between
small and large scale structures in time-series can only be observed by asymmetric scaling of the
time axis t and value axis x(t) by a factor aH (cf. Kantelhardt, 2011). The scaling exponent H (or
Hurst exponent) indicates factor that allows the self-aﬃne structure to be observed as self-similar
structure:
x(t)→ aHx(at) (4.3)
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The scaling exponent can be associated to the fractal dimension of the signal or its generating pro-
cess (see Hasselman, 2013, for a discussion of diﬀerent scaling exponents and how they are related
to fractal dimension). It is the invariant structure that is hypothesised to be exploited as a ‘global’
control variable, as if it were a complex resonance frequency (Aquino et al., 2011, ; Hasselman
(2015)). Evidence of selective matching of dynamical behaviour to scaling exponents in diﬀerent
observables measured simultaneously throughout the body, suggests a complex multi-scale cou-
pling relationship between physiological and psychological processes may exist (Rigoli et al., 2014).
Complexity matching has also been reported for dyadic interactions, for example interpersonal co-
ordination of coupled movements (Marmelat and Delignières, 2012) and overt behaviour during
joint problem solving (Abney et al., 2014).
The important question for the present context of speech perception in average and dyslexic
readers is whether the speech signal can be considered to reveal the invariant patterns and tempo-
ral complexity of which it is hypothesised listeners could exploit. The methods used in the studies
that evidenced complexity matching as a phenomenon of perception, action and behaviour coor-
dination were (Cross-) Recurrence Quantiﬁcation Analysis (see e.g., Coey et al., 2014; Abney et al.,
2014) and fractal analyses such as Detrended Fluctuation Analysis (see e.g., Marmelat and Delig-
nières, 2012; Rigoli et al., 2014). RQA measures as well as the Hurst exponent have been applied
to analyse naturally produced speech with the goal of detecting abnormal speech due to pathology
or disease (Little and McSharry, 2007). These measures were successful in distinguishing between
pathological and healthy origins of the recorded signal and were hypothesised to represent infor-
mation at the level of non-linear and turbulent airﬂows generated by complex gestures of the hu-
man speech apparatus. Naturally produced speech sounds have also been shown to reveal ‘attrac-
tion to criticality’ at diﬀerent levels of analysis and across many repeated productions of the same
sound (Kello et al., 2008). As indicated in the introduction, studies have shown that a characteri-
sation of response latencies is associated to dyslexic reading, Moreover, multifractal spectrum of
reading times in connected text reading has been found to distinguish between reading ﬂuency
and proﬁciency in literate adults (see, e.g., Wallot et al., 2013). Based on these studies a Complex-
ity Matching Hypothesis (CMH) can be formulated with regard to speech perception and reading
ability.
Given few studies on scaling and ﬂuency in developmental dyslexia have been conducted so
far (Wijnants et al., 2012a; Holden et al., 2014), it would be premature to attempt to formulate
a ‘complexity matching’ aetiology suﬃcient for explaining the many empirical phenomena associ-
ated with developmental dyslexia. Moreover, in the present study, the objects of complex signal
analyses are not trial series of response latencies generated by participants, but the stimuli used in
the experiment. Another diﬀerence is the diﬀerence in constraint on available response options,
a binary choice versus pronunciation of a word. A modest conjecture would be to adopt the ‘pro-
portional continuum’ assumption and suggest that any diﬀerences between dyslexic and average
readers in labelling the stimuli should be the result of less stable, more variable continuous pro-
cesses that lead up to the choice for one of the two options. From that perspective one would
assume diﬀerences on labelling to be small, rather than large, but that is a common expectation of
many competing claims (cf. Serniclaes and Sprenger-Charolles, 2003). One speciﬁcation
The CMH states that listenerswill use the dynamically invariant, self-aﬃne structure of the speech
signal to categorise and label speech sounds.
The relative novelty of employing these techniques to study the role of speech perception in proﬁ-
cient and impaired reading warrants a more elaborate explanation and discussion of the analyses
used in this study.
83
4.5. Complex Dynamic Pattern Measures: A Complexity Matching Hypothesis
4.5.1 Phase Space Reconstruction and Recurrence Quantiﬁcation Analysis
Turbulence can be observed in any propagating medium and may be (partially) described as spa-
tiotemporal chaos, or deterministic randomness in time and space simultaneously. As a conse-
quence it is very diﬃcult to accuratelymeasure, model, forecast, or control turbulence in amedium.
Even so, applying so-called embedding theorems allows for a reconstruction of the dynamics based
on a record of the complex behavior. A well known theorem is Takens’ theorem (after Dutchmathe-
matician Floris Takens, see Takens, 1981) and it states that them-dimensional attractor of a dynam-
ical system may be reconstructed from a measured time series of a single observable dimension
of that system. Due to the fact that the behaviour of the system is governed by interactions on
many diﬀerent spatial and temporal scales (interaction dominant dynamics), information about the
dynamics of the whole system must be present in the dynamics of its parts. By using m delayed
copies of the observed time series as surrogate dimensions one can reconstruct the phase space of
the system and analyse an approximation of the attractor dynamics of the entire system. Takens’
theoremensures that the reconstructed attractor is topologically equivalent to the original attractor
when all of the m dimensions of the system would have been observed (see Marwan et al., 2007,
for a detailed explanation).
After phase space reconstruction analyses usually focus on quantiﬁcation of the dynamics of
the reconstructed attractor. A method commonly used for this purpose is Recurrence Quantiﬁ-
cation Analysis, (RQA, Marwan et al., 2007; Webber Jr. et al., 2009; Zbilut et al., 1998; Webber Jr.
et al., 2005). RQA is a non-linear time series analysis technique that can quantify complex temporal
patterns by means of analysing trajectories through state space and noting when trajectory coordi-
nates are in each other’s vicinity, when they can be said to be a state that is recurrent. In Figure 4.5
the attractor of the ﬁrst 1024 samples of the transition part of the amplitude time series of stimu-
lus 10 (/dAk/) is reconstructed in three dimensions. The time series for surrogate dimension m is
shifted by τ samples for each extra surrogate dimension m. The values for τ andm are chosen so
that the reconstructed attractor will represent maximal information in the measured series, but its
exact value is in principle not relevant (mutual information is used to choose τ and a false nearest
neighbour analysis to choose m, see Riley and Van Orden, 2005, for details). The coordinates in
reconstructed state space in Figure 4.5 are not randomly jumping from one region to another, but
trace periodic orbits through speciﬁc locations in the state space. When two coordinates fall within
a radius  the two coordinates are said to be recurrent. Sequences of multiple coordinates that are
recurrent signify a trajectory in phase space that is being revisited by the system. It is a trajectory
or a location in the state space the system is attracted to and these recurrent coordinates and the
structures they form are the objects of analysis in RQA.
In Figure 4.5 trajectories are clearly visible as orbits around the denser centre of the state space.
It is also apparent that the choice for a radius size will greatly inﬂuence which coordinates will be
recurrent (see Schinkel et al., 2008). In general the radius, or threshold used in RQA is set to a
number that yields 1-5% recurring coordinates (out of all theoretically possible recurring points
given the size of the state space). The recurrent coordinates are recorded in a recurrence matrix
visualised by a recurrence plot of which an example is shown in Figure 5. Since we are looking
at recurrent trajectories of one system the time series of m-dimensional coordinates is evaluated
against itself (auto-recurrence). For each coordinate pair a distance can be established and if that
distance is smaller than the radius a black dot is plotted. The dot represents the fact that at some
point in time the coordinate under considerationwill be revisited by the system, approximately that
is. This yields a recurrence plot that can contain horizontal and vertical line structures as well as
individual recurrent points. Diagonal line structures represent a sequence of diﬀerent coordinates
(a trajectory through state space) that is revisited by the system, the proportion of recurrent points
that form a diagonal line is quantiﬁed as determinism (DET). A vertical line structure signiﬁes that
system dynamics are attracted to a speciﬁc location in state space where it remains for a longer
period of time. The proportion recurrent points that form a vertical line is called laminarity (LAM)
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3
Figure 4.5 – A reconstruction of the 3D phase space of stimulus 10 (ﬁrst 1096 samples) by the method
of delay embedding. The planes show 2D projections of the time course of the surrogate dimensions
created with an embedding delay τ = 6. Points that fall within a distance  (represented by the grey
box for presentation purposes) will be plotted as recurrent points in the recurrence plot.
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Figure 4.6 – A recurrence plot of the transition part of stimulus 10 (4.6a) and a randomly shuﬄed version
(4.6b). Next to the recurrence plot axes are the surrogate dimensions m that span the phase space in
which recurrent points are evaluated. They are oﬀset by just (m− 1) ∗ 6 samples.
and the mean vertical line length is called trapping time. One could say it quantiﬁes whether the
dynamics get ‘trapped’ in some region of the state space for a while. The plot is symmetrical about
its diagonal, which represents the line of identity, or line of temporal incidence. By deﬁnition this
is the longest line structure in the plot and is excluded from calculations.
The diﬀerent line structures are clearly visible in the left pane of Figure 4.6 that is the recurrence
plot of the entire reconstructed phase space of the transition part of stimulus 10, resampled to a
length of 4096 datapoints of which the ﬁrst 1096 are shown as a 3D reconstruction in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.6b is a randomised version of stimulus 10, the temporal order of the samples was ran-
domised, destroying all the correlations that are in the data but retaining the same distributional
properties (mean, variance, etc.). From the recurrence measures it can be seen that the recurrence
rate in both panes (the number of recurrent points) is exactly the same. However, the measures
that are calculated from the line structures that quantify the higher order recurrent patterns are
very diﬀerent. In the randomised plot all the DET and LAM disappeared, the temporal structure
was destroyed even though the central tendency measures are exactly the same. This is a very ba-
sic test of whether the line structures are just accidental temporal alignments. Amore sophisticated
test would be to create spectral surrogates of the speech stimuli, or to do a bootstrap resampling on
all the recurrence measures in order to create a conﬁdence interval (cf. Schinkel et al., 2009). Fig-
ure 4.7 shows the recurrence plots for all the stimuli used in the present study. The threshold was
varied in order to keep the recurrence rate exactly the same (at 10%) for all stimuli under consider-
ation. Since we are looking at recurrences in reconstructed phase space, the assumption is that the
ﬁgures represent the dynamical behaviour of the complex system that produced the speech signal.
RQA is used in an increasing number of studies across the diﬀerent sub-disciplines the social
and life sciences, such as motor development in infants (Aßmann et al., 2007), parent-child inter-
action (de Graag et al., 2012; Lichtwarck-Aschoﬀ et al., 2012), syntactic coordination between child
and caregiver (Dale and Spivey, 2006), dynamics of motor control (Wijnants et al., 2009, 2012a),
cognitive constraints on postural stability (Shockley et al., 2003, 2007), eye-movements during con-
versation (Richardson et al., 2007), insight in problem solving (Stephen et al., 2009), and as a novel
analysis tool in cognitive neuroscience (Bianciardi et al., 2007; Schinkel et al., 2007, 2009).
These quantiﬁcations are hypothesized to provide the best characterisationof the individual stim-
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uli thatwere artiﬁcially constructed to constitute an acoustic dimension and are therefore perceived
to be mostly very similar. The relevant diﬀerences between the transition parts of the stimuli are
expected to concern relative diﬀerences in patterns of sustained values (/bAk/) versus patterns of
changing values (/dAk/). This is exactly what the non-redundant structures quantiﬁed by LAM and
DET represent. Other measures calculated by RQA are mostly averages or maxima of the diagonal
and vertical line structures (e.g., maximum diagonal line length or average diagonal or vertical line
lengths) and were considered too homogeneous to characterise the individual stimuli.
Values used for reconstruction werem = 3 and τ = 6 and the recurrence rate was kept constant
at 0.1 (10%) by varying the radius  (radius values are shown in Figure 4.7; DET and LAM values
are shown in Table 4.2). As explained above, DET quantiﬁes recurring trajectories through phase
space and a high DET signiﬁes a system that behaves very periodic and predictable. LAM quantiﬁes
recurrences of the system displaying the same type of behaviour, visiting the same region in phase
space and staying there for a while. Some portion of the recurrent points quantiﬁed by DET will be
representing laminar behaviour, so using a combination of these two measures in a classiﬁcation
analysis yields a description of the stimulus in terms of whether the dynamics are characterised by
changing temporal patterns or patterns that stay relatively constant for some time.
Table 4.2
Determinism and Laminarity of the 40 Stimuli Used in the Experiment. The Numbers Represent Propor-
tion of Recurrent Points That Lie on Diagonal Lines (DET) or on Vertical Lines (LAM).
Acoustic Manipulation
None Slowed Down Ampliﬁed Both
Stimulus DET LAM DET LAM DET LAM DET LAM
/bAk/ 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.83 0.95 0.90 0.86 0.78
2 0.95 0.91 0.89 0.82 0.95 0.91 0.86 0.78
3 0.95 0.92 0.89 0.83 0.95 0.91 0.85 0.78
4 0.94 0.91 0.88 0.82 0.94 0.91 0.84 0.77
5 0.94 0.92 0.87 0.81 0.94 0.91 0.83 0.77
6 0.94 0.91 0.86 0.81 0.94 0.91 0.82 0.77
7 0.94 0.92 0.85 0.81 0.94 0.91 0.81 0.78
8 0.94 0.92 0.84 0.81 0.93 0.91 0.80 0.78
9 0.93 0.92 0.83 0.81 0.93 0.91 0.79 0.77
/dAk/ 0.93 0.92 0.82 0.81 0.94 0.91 0.77 0.76
4.5.2 The Multifractal Spectrum
Fractal analyses are so-called variability analyses (cf. Bravi et al., 2011) that assess a scaling of ‘bulk’
with ‘size’ (Theiler, 1990). Expressed in terms of time-series it concerns the ‘amount of ﬂuctuation
in a signal’ ≈ ‘scale at which ﬂuctuation is quantiﬁed’. Figure 4.8 displays the steps in Detrended
FluctuationAnalysis (DFA) inwhich theHurst exponent is estimated by assessing a scaling of residual
ﬂuctuation (Root Mean Square variation) with bin size after detrending the binned signal. The top
row of Figure 7 shows the envelope of the signal (black) and its ‘proﬁle’ (grey). The proﬁle is the
cumulative sum of the signal after the mean has been subtracted. The following steps are applied
to the proﬁle (numbers refer to Figure 4.8):
1. Divide the proﬁle of lengthN intoNs non-overlapping segments v of size s (scale).
2. For each segment v of size s: Remove linear (or higher order) trend and calculate the RMS
variation (residual variance).
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3. The RMS variation of the variances calculated in step 2 represents a value of the ﬂuctuation
function F 2(s, v) for the scale of size s.
4. Repeat 1-3 for increasing values of s (in the present study the minimum scale was 64, the
maximum 4096). The slope of the ﬂuctuation functionF 2(s, v) is the global scaling exponent
H
In many empirical time series the scaling behaviour is multifractal rather than monofractal, that
is, the signal is better characterised by a spectrum of local scaling exponents than a single global
exponent (cf. Kantelhardt, 2011). Multifractal Detrended Fluctuation Analysis (Kantelhardt et al.,
2002) is a generalisation of DFA that quantiﬁes diﬀerent orders of ﬂuctuation, the q-order ﬂuctua-
tion of generalized moments. Standard DFA calculates the ﬂuctuation function of the variance σ2,
which the second-order moment of a distribution of values (q=2). The standard deviation σ1 is the
ﬁrst-order moment (q=1). Rewriting the familiar formulas for the standard deviation (root mean
square deviation) and the variance (mean squared deviation) of a sample of observations, their
relation to q-order ﬂuctuation analysis is as follows:
root mean squared deviation: σ1 = 2
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2 → F 1(s, v) =
[
1
Ns
Ns∑
v=1
σ2v
] 1
2
(4.4)
mean squared deviation: σ2 = 1
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2 → F 2(s, v) =
[
1
Ns
Ns∑
v=1
σ2v
] 2
2
(4.5)
q-order deviation: σq = q
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2 → F q(s, v) =
[
F 2(s, v)
] q
2 (4.6)
q-order ﬂuctuation: Fq(s) =
{
1
Ns
Ns∑
v=1
[
F 2(s, v)
] q
2
} 1
q
(4.7)
Using q=2 in equation 4.7, will yield the RMS deviation of the variance. The q-order takes on
the role of a zoom-lens for ﬂuctuations: By increasing q to more positive values, large residual
variances will be given more weight than smaller ones when establishing the scale dependency of
the ﬂuctuations in the signal. On the other hand, decreasing q to lower negative values has the
opposite eﬀect and will zoom in on the scale dependency of small residual variances.
To obtain a spectrum of scaling exponents for each q-order, the 4 steps of standard DFA are
repeated for a q-continuum, which typically ranges from -10 to 10. The left column of Figure 4.9
shows for the 4 x 10 stimuli their ﬂuctuation functions of order q = [-5, -2, 0, 2, 5]. The black dotted
power law at q = 2 represent the ﬂuctuation function of stimulus 1 that is show in the bottom
row of Figure 4.9. For each of the 40 stimuli, a 101 step q-continuum was estimated ranging from
q=-10 to q=10 (including q=0). The scaling exponents H(q) are the slopes of those 101 ﬂuctuation
functions (Table S1 lists for each stimulus the average and SD of the norm of the residual after
regression). Those slopes are plotted against q in the middle column of Figure 4.9. If the stimuli
were monofractals, there would have been no dependence of the scaling exponent H(q) on the
q-order forwhich it was calculated. The plots in themiddle columnof Figure 4.9would all have been
horizontal lines (see e.g., Figure 1d in Kantelhardt et al., 2002, p. 94). Here, it is clearly the case that
all the stimuli used in the study should be consideredmultifractal signals. Themultifractal spectrum
(right column of Figure 4.9) is a representation of the generalized scaling exponents (now called
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singularity, Hölder, or generalized Hurst exponents) againstD(q), the q-order singularity dimension
(the calculation ofD(q) is not shown here, see Ihlen, 2012, for details).
The multifractal spectrum does not need to be symmetrical and Figure 4.9 reveals that the dis-
crepancy between stimuli may be revealed by considering the dispersion of h(q) separately for
q-orders < 0 and q-orders > 0. As noted by Kuznetsov and Wallot (2011), each half of the singu-
larity spectrum conveys diﬀerent information about scaling properties of the signal. The measures
of interest will be for the Coeﬃcient of Variation for each half-spectrum:
CVhq+ =
sh(q>0)
h(q > 0)
(4.8)
CVhq- =
sh(q<0)
h(q < 0)
(4.9)
For q < 0 (CVhq-) and q > 0 (CVhq+). Table 4.3 shows the values of the multifractal CV for each
stimulus.
Table 4.3
Coeﬃcient of Variation of Local Scaling Exponents Calculated for q < 0 (Zooming in on the Scale De-
pendency of Smaller Residual Variation) and q > 0 (Zooming in on Scale Dependency of Larger Residual
Variation)
Acoustic Manipulation
None Slowed Down Ampliﬁed Both
Stimulus CVhq- CVhq+ CVhq- CVhq+ CVhq- CVhq+ CVhq- CVhq+
bAk/ 0.118 0.308 0.112 0.385 0.135 0.170 0.116 0.124
2 0.131 0.330 0.135 0.387 0.149 0.180 0.144 0.142
3 0.142 0.341 0.146 0.421 0.165 0.184 0.161 0.162
4 0.152 0.348 0.156 0.441 0.179 0.192 0.176 0.192
5 0.162 0.354 0.164 0.452 0.190 0.211 0.191 0.204
6 0.170 0.359 0.170 0.434 0.200 0.208 0.194 0.204
7 0.176 0.363 0.172 0.449 0.205 0.212 0.195 0.199
8 0.182 0.365 0.174 0.417 0.208 0.226 0.195 0.161
9 0.185 0.366 0.176 0.449 0.210 0.220 0.189 0.166
/dAk/ 0.185 0.366 0.176 0.399 0.210 0.218 0.188 0.182
4.5.3 Which measure do participants use to identify /bAk/ and /dAk/?
A recent successful application of RQA and other complexity measures to speech sound classiﬁ-
cation was done in the context of voice disorder detection (Little and McSharry, 2007). Natural
recordings from a database of more or less clear examples of voice disorders were analysed on the
classiﬁcation ability of several measures thought to be theoretically important to detect the voice
disorders (jitter, shimmer, amplitude irregularity, and HNR). These classical measures, together with
the complexity measures Recurrence Period Density Entropy (RDPE, a measure derived from the
recurrence times in the plot) and a normalised scaling exponent (Hnorm, derived from Detrended
FluctuationAnalysis; DFA)were evaluated for their classiﬁcationperformance in a quadratic discrim-
inant analysis (QDA). The complexitymeasures were superior in distinguishing between normal and
voice disorder recordings (overall classiﬁcation 91.8% correct for RDPE/Hnorm with other measure
pairs ranging from 76.4% to 81.4%; see Table 1 in Little and McSharry, 2007).
In this study I will use a similar approach to categorise the speech signals as Little et al. (2007)
did, but the targets for the quadratic discriminant analysis (QDA) will not be disordered speech vs.
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healthy speech, but the observed labelling of the stimuli by average and dyslexic readers as either
/bAk/ or /dAk/. The labelling patterns will be experimentally assessed by administering a labelling
task of four versions of a 10 step /bAk/ to /dAk/ continuum (None, Slowed Down, Ampliﬁed and
Both). A ﬁrst research question is whether there are diﬀerences in labelling between experimental
groups and stimulus types. This could potentially yield eight diﬀerent labelling patterns. If there is
a diﬀerence between experimental groups, QDA will be performed for each group separately. The
features used by QDA to classify the stimuli will be the measures discussed above. These measures
are extracted from one and the same set of stimuli, but represent diﬀerent theoretical perspectives
on (impaired) speech perception. Figure ?? and Table 4.4 summarise the diﬀerent hypotheses (AT-
PDH, RTPDH, CMH) and associated measures extracted from diﬀerent representations and quan-
tiﬁcations of the temporal patterns in the speech signal. The simple main hypothesis is that the
combination of measures that yield the best classiﬁcation performance is the most likely source of
information used by the participants in this study to label the stimuli.
Table 4.4
A Summary of Hypotheses about Important Elements of the Speech Signal for Speech Perception and
Associated Measures.
Signal Measure QDA
Hypothesis Representation Transform Name Type Acronym
RTPDH Time-frequency Short-time Fourier 2nd formant slope Component Process F2
Short-time Fourier Inharmonicity Periodicity NHR
ATPDH Analytic signal Hilbert transform Slope to max. envelope Component Process maxENV
Hilbert transform Rise fall time entropy Periodicity RFTe
CMH State space Delay embedding Recurrent trajectory Complex Pattern LAM / DET
Scale space Multifractal spectrum Multifractal CV Complex Pattern CVhq+ / CVhq-
4.6 Method
4.6.1 Data Sharing and Reproducibility of Results
The raw and aggregated data, stimulus ﬁles and Matlab code (The MathWorks, 2012) to reproduce
the analyses and ﬁgures in this article are available at theOpen Science Framework: https://osf.
io/a8g32. The ﬁles are annotated and demonstrate how to extract the stimulus features from the
audio ﬁles, how to create ﬁgures and perform theQDAanalysis. In addition, the rawdata is available
in spreadsheet format.
4.6.2 Participants
Children could enter the study as participants after their caregivers signed an informed consent
form (equivalent to “Consent Form 4 - Under 12” issued by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty
of Social Sciences of the Radboud University Nijmegen. An English translation is available in the
supplementary materials). There were 80 participants (age range 101.2 to 159.3 months) from 9
diﬀerent schools in the south-east of the Netherlands. Half of the subjects (40) were dyslexic read-
ers as indicated by two reading tests: A timed-reading task for regular words “Drie-Minuten-Toets”;
Verhoeven, 1995 and a timed pseudo-word reading task (“KLEPEL”; Van den Bos et al., 1994). When
the child’s scores on both tests were within the 25th percentile (norm score by age), the child was
considered to have severe reading problems. For one participant who completed the study, no data
was recorded in the output ﬁle and could not be included. Table 4.5 displays the information for
the participants whose data were analysed (all data are available in the supplementary materials).
93
4.7. Procedure
Table 4.5
Results For the Two Groups of Children Participating in the Experiment. The DMT Scores Represent
Words Read Correctly in One Minute. Level Of Diﬃculty Increases From DMT1 to DMT3. KLEPEL Repre-
sent Correctly Read Pseudowords In Two Minutes.
Average Readers Dyslexic Readers
Mean SD Mean SD
Age (months) 127.2 12.3 133.5 14.9
DMT1 100.0 15.5 72.1 15.7
DMT2 94.6 18.2 60.05 15.7
DMT3 84.3 16.7 48.0 16.2
KLEPEL 74.1 17.4 32.4 12.7
Gender 22 Boys 18 Girls 19 Boys 20 Girls
N 40 39
4.6.3 Stimuli and Acoustic Manipulations
The stimuli were based upon natural speech recordings for the words /bAk/ [container] and /dAk/
[roof] and transformed to create a 10-step /bAk/ to /dAk/ continuum (van Beinum et al., 2005)
using the Praat program (Boersma and Weenink, 2002). The stimuli diﬀered only with respect to
the second formant transition of which the onset frequency was gradually increased from /bAk/
to /dAk/ (see Table 4.6 for exact values). All the stimuli on this F2 continuum were manipulated in
three manners using the Praat program (Boersma andWeenink, 2002). First, the speech signal was
Slowed Down to 150% of its original length. This was achieved by a Pitch Synchronous Overlap and
Add (PSOLA) algorithm (see e.g.. Segers and Verhoeven, 2005). Second, the signal was Ampliﬁed by
20 dB, for the fast changing spectral elements. The algorithm used to do this in Praat was similar
to the one used by (Nagarajan et al., 1998), who conﬁrmed this in a personal communication with
Segers andVerhoeven (2005). Third, Bothmanipulationswere applied as is done in the FastForWord
program (Merzenich et al., 1996; Tallal et al., 1996): the speech signal was slowed to 150% of its
original length and all the fast transitional elements were then ampliﬁed by 20 dB. There was of
course also a continuumwhich hadNone of themanipulations applied to it. This yielded 40 diﬀerent
stimuli in total.
4.7 Procedure
4.7.1 Speech Perception Experiments
The speech identiﬁcation task (labelling task) was presented on a laptop computer in a quiet room
at the children’s school. There were two tasks conducted in two sessions; an identiﬁcation task (re-
ported in this article) and a discrimination task (reported in Hasselman, 2014b). In the identiﬁcation
task, the participants were asked to rest their left and right index ﬁngers on a coloured key on the
left side [z] and right side [/] of the keyboard. After an attentional beep and ﬁxation cross a smiley
face appeared on the screen, which then uttered a word, one of the stimuli. The cover story was
that the smiley face could not speak very well and the child had to help ﬁnd out which out of two
possible words (/bAk/ [roof] or /dAk/ [container]) it had just said. After the utterance of the word
two frames appeared on the screen, one on the left, one on the right with either a picture of a roof
or a container inside (positions were randomised). The child had to press the button corresponding
to the position of the picture named by the smiley face. Prior to the experimental trials, 10 prac-
tice trials were presented using diﬀerent pictures and pronunciations that were all clear exemplars.
Feedback was given on the responses during these practice trials and no child made more than 3
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errors during practice. During the experimental condition, the unmanipulated and the three types
of manipulated /bAk/ and /dAk/ stimuli were presented in a random order. Each stimulus was pre-
sented twice resulting in 80 stimulus presentations (2 x 4 manipulations x 10 stimuli). The stimulus
materials (audio ﬁles and pictures) are available in the on-line supplemental information.
4.7.2 Extracting the Stimulus Characteristics
The 40 stimuli were 16 bit digital audio ﬁles in .WAV format, with a sample rate of 44.1 KHz. These
were always used as the basis for extracting the following measures:1 The slope of the second for-
mant transition (F2 slope, Figure 4.2), the time it took for the envelope to reach its maximal value
(mxENV Slope, Figure 4.3), the entropy of rise and fall times (RFTe, Figure 4.4). Settings were used
in Matlab that mimic the default behaviour of the Praat program (Boersma and Weenink, 2002)
so the output of this script should be similar to output generated by Praat. For the Inharmonic-
ity measure (HNR; Table 4.1) and the measures obtained from recurrence quantiﬁcation analysis
(Figure 4.7) only the transition part of the stimulus was considered. Following Little and McSharry
(2007), to assure that the RQA is performed on time series of equal length, all ﬁles were resampled
to 4096 samples (waveforms shown under the RP plots in Figure 4.7). The Multifractal spectrum
was obtained by Multifractal Detrended Fluctuation Analysis based on the entire stimulus signal,
using Matlab code by Ihlen (2012).
4.7.3 Statistical Analysis
For each participant there were 80 responses of either /bAk/ or /dAk/. These data were entered in
a logistic multilevel model (using MLwiN version 2.2 Rabash et al., 2009) with the 80 measurement
occasions representing responses to a random permutation of the ordered F2 continuum at level1.
The responses at the level of the measurement occasions were considered binomially distributed
as 0 and 1 and a logit link function was used. The repeated measurements can be thought of as
clustered within the participant, who represent a second level of random variation in the model
(level2). Themodelling strategy was as follows: First it was examined whether the multilevel model
gave a better ﬁt than a single level model with just measurement occasion deﬁned as a level. Then,
the empty multilevel model for change was ﬁtted (M0), which in the present case means that a zero
inﬂated ﬁxed eﬀect predictor was added representing the stimulus rank order on the continuum
(0-9). In a subsequent model (M2) it was examined whether stimulus rank could explain random
variation in the slopes of the curve at the level of the participants (level2). If so, this means the vari-
ation in labelling of the continuum between participants can be understood as random variation
with respect to the average labelling curve of the entire sample. In the next step (M3) level1 and
level2 covariates were added: A dummy variable that represents the four stimulus types (level1),
and a dummy variable that represents whether subjects are dyslexic or average readers (level2).
In the ﬁnal modelling step (M4) various interactions were tested including cross-level interactions
between participant type and stimulus type. The models were ﬁtted using a Monte Carlo Markov
Chain simulation with 150,000 iterations (Browne et al., 2009). This number was chosen after in-
specting the Raferty-Lewis diagnostic for each parameter estimate at each modelling step and was
found to yield a very safe margin for all predicted parameters.
The predictions of the logistic multilevel model for each stimulus were used as targets for the
quadratic discriminant analysis (QDA). If the lower 95% conﬁdence bound predicted by the logistic
multilevel model exceeded the chance level of 0.5 it was noted for that stimulus that /dAk/ was
1Extraction of these measures is described in detail in the supplementary materials. Many functions are based on
freely availableMatlab scripts, all of which are documented in the ﬁleHasselman2014-extractmeasures.m available here:
https://osf.io/a8g32/files
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Table 4.6
Model Evaluation With Identiﬁcation Label (idL) As Dependent Variable. The Bayesian Deviance Infor-
mation Criterion Was Used For All Consecutive Models Estimated with MCMC (150,000 iterations). D =
Posterior Mean Deviance, D(φ) = Deviance of Posterior Means, pD(D −D(φ)) = Eﬀective Number of
Parameters,DIC = Deviance Information Criterion. See Text For An Explanation of theModelling Steps.
Msingle M0 M1 M2 M3 M4
idLij = β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E.
Fixed Part
Intercept 0.51 0.03 0.53 0.04 -2.04 0.10 -2.39 0.15 -2.77 0.19 -2.59 0.20
stimulus 0.66 0.02 0.77 0.04 0.8 0.05 0.78 0.04
Slowed Down (D1) 0.29 0.10 0.16 0.14
Ampliﬁed (D1) 0.63 0.10 0.37 0.14
Both (D1) 0.36 0.10 0.01 0.14
Dyslexic (D2) -0.33 0.20
Slowed Down X
Dyslexic
0.25 0.21
Ampliﬁed X
Dyslexic
0.53 0.21
Both X Dyslexic 0.73 0.20
Random Part
Level 2
Intercept variance 0.11 0.03 0.36 0.08 1.79 0.38 1.81 0.39 1.83 0.38
Slope variance 0.42 0.09 0.42 0.10 0.42 0.09
Intercept-Slope
covariance
0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03
Level 1
Binomial variance var(idLij |piij) = piij(1−piij)1
D 8360.07 8220.42 5335.96 4958.18 4920.15 4907.22
D(φ) 8359.09 8167.94 5271.46 4835.14 4793.9 4777.51
pD(D −D(φ)) 0.98 52.47 64.5 123.04 126.24 129.71
DIC 8361.06 8272.89 5400.45 5081.22 5046.39 5036.93
perceived. Otherwise the target for the discriminant analysis was /bAk/ for that stimulus. This re-
sulted in a string of 40 zeroes and ones. The objective of the discriminant analysis was to replicate
the classiﬁcation in zeroes and ones based on pairs of the measures discussed above. The following
pairs were tested mxENV Slope / F2 Slope; HNR / F2 Slope; RFTe / mxENV Slope; RFTe / HNR; LAM /
DET. The pairs were all converted to the unit scale before analysis. The algorithm used to perform
QDA was the same as described in Little and McSharry (2007). This procedure allows for calcu-
lation of 95% Conﬁdence Intervals around the percentage correctly classiﬁed stimuli by bootstrap
resampling. All QDA analyses were based on 15,000 bootstrap replications.
4.8 Results
4.8.1 Multilevel Logistic Model
The results of multilevel modelling taking the individual trials of the identiﬁcation experiment as
the dependent variable at level1 and subjects at level2 are shown in Table 4.7. A graphical repre-
sentation of the predictions by the ﬁnal model is shown in Figure 4.10. In the ﬁnal model, there
was no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of experimental group (dyslexic reader vs. average reader), but there
was a signiﬁcant cross-level interaction between experimental group and acoustic manipulation.
This interaction is revealed in Figure 4.10where in Panel C (Ampliﬁed) and D (Both) there two clear
examples of non-overlapping CI between the labelling curves of average and dyslexic readers for
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Table 4.7
Predicted Probability (pi) for Perceiving /dAk/ for all Participants fromMCMCModel Estimation (Median
of 150,000 iterations yielding 95% CI) for each stimulus and Acoustic Manipulation (M3 of Table 4.6).
When the Lower CI Limit Exceeded 0.5 the Target for QDA was /dAk/, Otherwise it was /bAk/.
Formant Onset (Hz) Predicted Probability (pi) for Perceiving /dAk/ per Acoustic Manipulation
Stimulus F1 F2 F3 None 95% CI Slowed 95% CI Ampliﬁed 95% CI Both 95% CI
/bAk/ 440 1100 2700 0.06 (0.04, 0.08) 0.08 (0.05, 0.12) 0.13 (0.07, 0.24) 0.18 (0.08, 0.35)
2 | 1178 | 0.12 (0.08, 0.17) 0.15 (0.09, 0.25) 0.25 (0.13, 0.43) 0.32 (0.15, 0.57)U
3 | 1255 | 0.23 (0.16, 0.33) 0.28 (0.17, 0.44) 0.43 (0.24, 0.64)U 0.51 (0.27, 0.76)pi
4 | 1333 | 0.40 (0.28, 0.54)U 0.47 (0.29, 0.66 )U 0.62 (0.38, 0.81)pi 0.70 (0.42, 0.88)
5 | 1411 | 0.60 (0.44, 0.74)pi 0.66 (0.45, 0.82)pi 0.78 (0.56, 0.91)L 0.84 (0.60, 0.95)L
6 | 1489 | 0.77 (0.61, 0.87)L 0.81 (0.63, 0.92)L 0.89 (0.72, 0.96) 0.92 (0.75, 0.98)
7 | 1567 | 0.88 (0.76, 0.94) 0.91 (0.77, 0.96) 0.95 (0.84, 0.98) 0.96 (0.86, 0.99)
8 | 1644 | 0.94 (0.86, 0.98) 0.95 (0.87, 0.98) 0.98 (0.91, 0.99) 0.98 (0.92, 1.00)
9 | 1722 | 0.97 (0.93, 0.99) 0.98 (0.93, 0.99) 0.99 (0.96, 1.00) 0.99 (0.96, 1.00)
/dAk/ 440 1800 2700 0.99 (0.96, 1.00) 0.99 (0.97, 1.00) 0.99 (0.98, 1.00) 1.00 (0.98, 1.00)
L Lower CI limit≥ 0.5 threshold (used as observed classiﬁcation boundary)
pi Predicted Median Probability≥ 0.5 threshold
U Upper CI limit≥ 0.5 threshold
stimulus 6 in Panel C and stimulus 5 in Panel D.
In both cases the dyslexic readers have a higher odds for perceiving /dAk/. Another diﬀerence
between the groupsmay be observedwhen evaluating at which stimuli the lower conﬁdence bound
of the odds for perceiving /dAk/ exceeds the chance level of 0.5. Again the diﬀerence between the
groups is observed with stimuli of category Ampliﬁed and Both (Panel C and D in Figure 4.10). The
dyslexic readers’ odds for perceiving /dAk/ is with 95% certainty higher than chance at stimulus 4
for these manipulations, whereas for normal and Slowed Down manipulations it is at stimulus 5.
For average readers this boundary is always at stimulus 5 irrespective of the acoustic manipulation.
In Table 4.7 the signiﬁcant parameter estimates of the ﬁnal model (M4) corroborate this: At each
unit step increase in F2 frequency (stimulus number) there is an increase in the odds of perceiving
/bAk/. Ampliﬁed stimuli also increase the odds of perceiving /dAk/ and for the group of dyslexic
readers Ampliﬁed and Both stimulus types add even more to those odds. The random intercept
and slope variance indicate that labelling curves vary across participants. Adding predictors and
cross-level interactions did however not noticeably decrease, or explain this variance (changes are
in 3rd decimal of estimated parameters). The DIC statistic did decrease with each consecutive
model indicating a better model ﬁt.
4.8.2 Quadratic Discriminant Analysis
Because the outcomes of the multilevel logistic model yield diﬀerent boundaries at which dyslexic
and average readers switch from /bAk/ to /dAk/ for stimuli of type Ampliﬁed and Both, the QDAwas
performed for each group separately using these labels as the target for the classiﬁcation. At the
same time, there was no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of group and the boundaries for the entire sample
as predicted byM3 (see Table 4.6) deviated from the boundaries predicted byM4 for each group. To
investigate the impact of these diﬀerences an additional QDA classiﬁcationwas performed using the
predicted labels on the level of the sample. The results for the sample are shown in Figure 4.11 and
Table 4.7 that also includes the results for the predicted labels of M4 for each group of participants.
What becomes apparent is that the Complexitymeasures outperform the othermeasures nomatter
which sequence of target labels is used.
4.9 Conclusion and Discussion
There are three clear and novel results to be discussed:
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Table 4.8
QuadraticDiscriminant Analysis for Diﬀerent stimulus Feature Combinations Based onAverage Labelling
by the Entire Sample, the Average Readers Group and the Dyslexic Readers Group. Numbers Represent
Percentage Correctly Classiﬁed with 95% CI obtained from 15,000 Bootstrap Replications.
Group Feature combination Correct as /bAk/ Correct as /dAk/ Overall correct
Median CI.95 Median CI.95 Median CI.95
Sample
CVhq+ / CVhq- 94.5% 6.2% 98.2% 8.1% 96.6% 4.5%
LAM / DET 96.1% 10.8% 85.4% 13.6% 90.2% 6.8%
HNR / RFTe 70.8% 19.0% 74.2% 15.3% 72.7% 8.1%
maxENV / RFTe 76.8% 17.0% 77.8% 19.4% 77.4% 7.1%
F2 / HNR 72.4% 17.6% 88.0% 15.2% 81.0% 9.7%
F2 / maxENV 74.8% 18.2% 81.8% 20.9% 78.6% 8.9%
Average readers
CVhq+ / CVhq- 96.0% 8.6% 95.5% 5.2% 95.7% 4.0%
LAM / DET 96.2% 13.4% 88.2% 13.8% 91.4% 8.8%
HNR / RFTe 75.8% 17.8% 72.1% 11.2% 73.6% 6.2%
maxENV / RFTe 84.3% 18.7% 81.2% 17.5% 82.4% 6.5%
F2 / HNR 66.8% 19.4% 86.1% 16.4% 78.3% 9.7%
F2 / maxENV 69.4% 22.2% 75.8% 25.4% 73.2% 11.3%
Dyslexic readers
CVhq+ / CVhq- 97.4% 7.1% 96.0% 6.7% 96.5% 4.3%
LAM / DET 94.9% 15.4% 87.4% 13.6% 90.1% 9.0%
HNR / RFTe 77.2% 19.2% 72.1% 11.9% 73.9% 4.4%
maxENV / RFTe 84.4% 18.0% 80.9% 18.9% 82.1% 8.7%
F2 / HNR 64.1% 17.7% 86.6% 14.4% 78.7% 9.1%
F2 / maxENV 73.5% 20.0% 78.5% 23.1% 76.8% 11.3%
1. A diﬀerence between dyslexic and average readers in labelling some of themanipulated stim-
uli on the continuum is observed.
2. The Complex Dynamical Pattern measures outperform the other measures when used by a
simple classiﬁer assigning one out of two possible target labels to an observed response. This
holds for the sample level as well as for each group separately, even though the sequences
of target labels diﬀer between the groups for two sets of acoustically manipulated stimuli
(Ampliﬁed and Both).
3. The accuracy of stimulus classiﬁcation by measures derived from diﬀerent theoretical posi-
tions on the relationship between speech perception and reading appears to be ordered along
a continuum (see Figure ?? and Table 4.4). On one extreme, causal primacy is attributed to
component processes (lower classiﬁcation accuracy), on the other extreme, causal primacy is
attributed to the interactions between component processes (higher classiﬁcation accuracy).
The ﬁrst result entails the dyslexic readers identifying stimulus 4 as /dAk/ with 95% conﬁdence
above chance when the stimulus is either ampliﬁed or slowed down and subsequently ampliﬁed. It
is thus not the case that dyslexic readers “beneﬁt” from the manipulations in terms of their speech
perception becoming more like that of average readers, instead, they perceive the boundary one
continuum step earlier than average readers do whenever ampliﬁcation is applied to the stimuli. It
should be noted though that this ‘earlier’ boundary perception is not the origin of the signiﬁcant
interaction eﬀects between stimulus type and experimental group: the conﬁdence intervals of the
groups overlapped at these stimuli. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences in odds for perceiving /dAk/ between the
groups were observed for stimulus 6 (Ampliﬁed) and stimulus 5 (Both). This interaction is not likely
to inﬂuence the actual labelling of the stimulus since both groups would label it /dAk/ above chance
with 95% conﬁdence. This diﬀerence would be noticed when the stimuli were presented to the
same person many times in which case a dyslexic reader would label stimulus 5 (Both) about 9/10
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times as /dAk/ and an average reader about 7/10 times. A similar result was found in Hasselman
(2014b)where it was suggested that applying somemanipulationsmay actually reduce the accuracy
of identiﬁcation and discrimination of stimuli because it biases perception towards /dAk/.
The second result concerns the performance of a simple classiﬁer (QDA) employed to label the
stimuli as participants in the experiment using several diﬀerentmeasures extracted from those stim-
uli. The classiﬁer performed best when the Complex Temporal Pattern measures (Coeﬃcients of
Variation of local scaling exponents of the multifractal spectrum, Determinism and Laminarity of
the recurrence analysis) were used. In fact, the classiﬁcation was almost perfect when the mul-
tifractal features were used. Upon examination, the only stimuli misclassiﬁed by the complexity
measures were stimulus 4 (once) and 5 (six times), in both groups taken together (see Figure 4.12
and Figure 4.13). These stimuli lie on the perceptual boundary (Stimulus 4-6) where the target label
changes from 0 to 1. Misclassiﬁcation may be expected for these stimuli, but classiﬁcation should
be relatively accurate outside of this transition region. However, this expected pattern is not what is
observed for the other feature combinations. There were many additional misclassiﬁcation outside
the region of the label transition yielding classiﬁcation curves that are clearly false (see Figure 4.12
and Figure 4.13).
The third result concerns the condition of strong inference: What is the implication of these
ﬁndings for the two deﬁcit hypotheses associated with the F2 Slope / HNR measures (ATPDH) and
mxENV Slope / RFTe measures (RTPDH)? First, all measures yield diﬀerent values that appear to
diﬀerentiate the stimuli in a sensible way (see Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and Table 4.2). In other words
they have the potential to be used for identiﬁcation by a classiﬁer. In fact, the classiﬁcation results,
expressed as % correct are not disastrous when these measures are used and at the sample level
many stimuli are indeed labelled as human participants would label them. Some of these correct
classiﬁcations may be expected from the way the stimuli are constructed. After all, this was done
by manipulating the onset of the F2 while keeping everything else constant. Relative to that fact,
their low rank in the accuracy results is surprising and should have consequences for the perceived
validity of the role these features play in speech perception in general and developmental dyslexia
in speciﬁc.
The measures used in this study to reveal invariant structure across scales of ﬂuctuation, were
inspired by Little and McSharry (2007) who showed RQA and scaling exponent based measures
yielded the best classiﬁcation of healthy and disordered speech. In such a clinical context the ben-
eﬁt of roughly 10% more accurate detection of disordered speech is immediately apparent. In the
present study stimuli were classiﬁed, not participants and it is unlikely that the current diﬀerence in
labelling between average and dyslexic readers would provide a gain in diagnostic capabilities over
standardised reading tests. The diﬀerence between the groups of readers observed in Figure 4.10
are reﬂected in the QDA analysis by an earlier label change (at stimulus 4) for dyslexic readers la-
belling the Ampliﬁed and Both stimulusmanipulations. Themultifractal spectrummeasures enable
the classiﬁer tomodel this early jump correctly, the RQAmeasures fail for the Ampliﬁed stimuli (but
also in the Average Readers group). The other measures fail for both stimulus types producing ear-
lier jumps (Stimulus 3 or earlier) or later jumps (Stimulus 5 or later) in dyslexic readers, for average
readers these patterns are shifted up the continuum (Stimulus 4 or earlier and Stimulus 6 or later).
Apparently, there are invariant temporal structures in all the audio ﬁles that are insensitive to any
disruption (e.g., the acoustic manipulations) or absolute diﬀerences in physical characteristics as-
sociated with articulatory cues (e.g. due to the changing F2 onset): Their relative rank order on the
labelling curve remains approximately the same.
Recent studies in speech signal analysis and animal vocalizations have indeed shown the fre-
quency domain obtained by Fourier decomposition may not be the information used by the neu-
ral systems of mammals to perceive sounds, whereas the Hilbert decomposition in slow varying
envelope and fast varying ﬁne time structure (the analytic signal), may be the more likely candi-
date (Smith et al., 2002). The Rise-Time Perception Deﬁcit Hypothesis of dyslexia (cf. Goswami
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et al., 2002) is partially based on these ﬁndings. However, the fact that the speech signal is the
product (i.e., multiplicative temporal interactions) of the fast analytic signal and the slow changing
envelope is not considered by the theory. In any case, the claim that speech sounds are being stored
in memory as strings of abstract symbols that represent speech components such as formants and
phonemes, becomes untenable when they are directly compared to features that quantify dynam-
ical invariants presents in the signal (see Port, 2007, for a review of arguments against positing
‘phone’ components). Many of the traditional problems with the scientiﬁc explanation of speech
perception and production appear to be related to the use of a causal ontology that posits indepen-
dent components whose additive interactions generate complex behaviour such as communication
by means of spoken language.
The claim is not that humans use a neurological equivalent of QDA to identify speech sounds,
the present study shows that it is very unlikely that participants simply analyse (relative) frequency
changes or amplitude envelopes and somehowmatch them to collections of frequencies and ampli-
tude patterns stored in the brain. It also seems unlikely that a failure tomatch those stored features
can constitute an aetiology for observed reading and spelling problems in developmental dyslexia.
Instead, based on the complexity measures QDA assigns a correct classiﬁcation curve to each ex-
perimental group, even when the curves diﬀer between the groups. Compared to average readers,
the category switches are ‘early’ for dyslexic readers which could indicate a lower threshold for
perceiving /dAk/ or an enhanced contrast (see e.g., Case et al., 1995; Tuller et al., 1994) compared
to the average readers. A comparison of the classiﬁcation curves in Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13
reveals that the multifractal and RQA measures which does not appear in any systematic way for
other measures. This suggests that the processes underlying the small observed labelling diﬀer-
ences between average and dyslexic readers may indeed reﬂect a scaled continuum rather than a
speciﬁc impairment, a deﬁcient component.
4.9.1 The classical information processing problems: Lack of invariance?
Recently, Kleinschmidt and Jaeger, 2014described an ‘ideal adapter framework’ basedon (Bayesian)
belief updating to model three challenging aspects of speech perception: 1) Recognize the famil-
iar, 2) Generalize to the similar, and 3) Adapt to the novel (Kleinschmidt and Jaeger, 2014, p.4).
These well known problems in the scientiﬁc study of speech perception are related to the lack of
invariance between speech signals that are perceived to be similar, when in fact they diﬀer substan-
tially with respect to one or more physical characteristics of the produced signal (Liberman et al.,
1967). The F2 manipulation in combination with the acoustic manipulations applied in this article
can be considered a modest example of such variants, in reality the diﬀerences between speakers
in the production of an F2 onset may be much more extreme than represented by the stimulus set
used in the current study (see e.g., Kleinschmidt and Jaeger, 2014). The similarity recognition prob-
lems (point 1 and 2 above) emerge due to the conception of perception and recognition memory
as a database search prompted by an ‘incoming’ query (the signal). Speciﬁc values of perceptual
cues are hypothesized to lay dormant, stored inside the brain, waiting to be constructed into a
larger whole by accumulating matching stimulus features. Due to the lack of invariance, these fea-
turesmust somehowbe collected into aggregate sets of features that overlap considerably between
diﬀerent categories.
To illustrate how the similarity recognition problem arises from its conception of a search and
match operation, consider the mechanism behind a popular application for smartphones called
Shazam (Wang and Chen, 2003). It is capable of analysing music being played in the environment
and after a few seconds it provides the name of the song and the artist who performed it. Inter-
esting features are that it does not matter which part of the song is analysed and that as long as
the recording being played exceeds background noise and is in the Shazam database, a few sec-
onds of analysis are enough to yield almost 100% accuracy. The search and match time is reported
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to be between 5-500 milliseconds. Based on a sound recording a unique time-coded ﬁngerprint
is extracted from the spectrum and is stored in a database. If a song needs to be recognised, a
smart search algorithm can quickly ﬁnd likely candidates for the origin of the small sample of the
ﬁngerprint (Wang and Chen, 2003). The ﬁngerprints are so unique any song in the database can
be quickly identiﬁed, irrespective of the sample being taken from the begin, middle or end of the
song. This is exactly the reason why the database query metaphor is an unlikely model for speech
perception: Humans are generally not very good at accurately reconstructing a word or sentence
when just one or two parts (phones, words) are presented. The requirement of uniqueness in this
type of database search is the main cause of the apparent similarity recognition problem in speech
perception. A song of which the original studio recording is in the database will not be recognised
when a sample of a live recording of the same song performed by the same artist is the source of
the query. This is a failure to recognize the familiar, because the system cannot generalize to the
similar. Even a studio recording of the same song by the same artist, but with a diﬀerent audio mix
(e.g., older recordings that were ‘remastered’) will not be recognised if the actual recording is not
stored in the database.
This problem of generalisation is one of many problems identiﬁed with the notion of perception
as constructing meaningful information from incoming perceptual cues by matching it to stored
meaningful information (see e.g., Chemero, 2009; Haselager et al., 2003). Even if one wants to
propose that we just store everything we hear from the day we are capable of doing so and dis-
regard the fact that the amount of meaningful information to be stored would become inﬁnitely
large, it means we cannot understand someone the ﬁrst time we meet him or her. We ﬁrst have
to store into a database the ﬁngerprint of his or her utterances, using diﬀerent speaking voices!
Merleau-Ponty described it as follows: “An impression can never by itself be associated with an-
other impression. Nor has it the power to arouse others. It does so only provided that it is already
understood in the light of the past experience in which it co-existed with those which we are con-
cerned to arouse.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.14). The internal representation of experienced real-
ity is an unnecessary assumption in understanding intelligent behaviour when one examines how
human perception and action is constrained by the physical features of the body and the environ-
ment (Dreyfus, 2002).
Biological information processing: Abundant self-aﬃne invariance?
The interaction dynamics that give rise to a constraining of the degrees of freedom in human speech
perception and production were lucidly described by Stetson: “Speech is rather a set of movements
made audible than a set of sounds produced bymovements” 1951, p.33. So the ‘set of features’ that
should reveal the invariance used in categorical perception should be related to the complex system
that produces the speech signal. There is evidence that a close bi-directional perception-action
coupling exists when speech perception and production are concerned. In a series of experiments
Perkell et al. (2004b,a) have shown that the distinctness, or quality of a produced vowel contrast
by a speaker, is related to the quality of the perception of that contrast by the same speaker. In
other words, speech production will constrain speech perception and vice versa. Some of these
notions have been incorporated in the DIVA (Directions Into Velocities of Articulators) model of
speech production (Guenther and Perkell, 2004). In short, this model learns to produce speech
by tuning, or constraining its motor output to auditory targets it is presented with (like an infant
would attune to the often very repetitive speech-like utterances produced by its parents). This is in
principle the same ‘mechanism’ suggested by the complexity matching hypothesis.
In the present context of self-aﬃne scaling, the recognition of familiarity and generalization to
similarity are represented by the diﬀerent scaling relations estimated to constitute the spectrum
of generalized Hurst exponents. That is, the local scaling exponents quantify the magnitude of ‘fa-
miliar similarity’ (right part of Figure 4.9) relative to the signal itself, observed at diﬀerent scales of
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Figure 4.14 – A scaleogram representing a Continuous Wavelet Transform of the amplitude envelope of
Stimulus 1 (grey line). On the right, the top ﬁgure displays the wavelet singularity extrema as coloured
traces that connect the diﬀerent scales at which the wavelet is associated. and the singularity spectrum.
See text for details.
ﬂuctuation (left part of Figure 4.9). Figure 4.14 reveals the full multi-scale, self-aﬃne structure of
temporal patterns present in the signal by means of a Continuous Wavelet Transform of the signal.
The x-axis in the scaleogram represents time and the y-axis represents scales of ﬂuctuation (ex-
pressed in seconds). The colour-coding represents the goodness-of-ﬁt of the shape of continuously
scaled versions of a ‘mother’ wavelet (the Mexican hat) with the shape of the observed signal. The
scaled shape is shifted across the time axis and this causes the change in colour from left to right.
The process is repeated for diﬀerent scaled versions of the wavelet and this causes the change in
colour from top to bottom. If the wavelet is scaled to cover large portions of the time-series, the
ﬂuctuation frequencies it can detect will be slow ﬂuctuations and vice versa. In Figure 4.14 the
largest scale is about 0.6 seconds and the dark colour indicates the expected low association be-
tween the stretched wavelet with the entire signal. The large light coloured branching structures
that extend across many scales reveal how patterns recorded at the smallest scales are nested as
self-aﬃne scaled copies within the larger structures.
By following the vertical extrema of cross-scale associations (the vertical line structures), so called
temporal singularities can be found, that occur when the structure at a larger scales branches into
two smaller vertical structures (see Figure 4.14, inset on the right). These singularities constitute a
spectrum that is equal to the generalized Hurst spectrum. The coloured lines in Figure 4.14 trace
a path that provides information about the signal that is invariant across many scales. Some paths
yield predictive information (a larger scale version of the current waveform is yet to come), oth-
ers constrain (or conﬁrm) what has already occurred (the current waveform is a scaled version of
larger wave form that just occurred). The entire spectrum can be considered a complex resonance
frequency for self-aﬃne structure. The adaptation to novelty achieved by QDA (i.e., adaptation of
the classiﬁcation solution based on slightly diﬀerent empirical curves) is ‘simple’ enough to consider
physically realizable in a biological system. A self-tuning resonator (Collins et al., 1995; Gammaitoni,
1995) could be an interesting metaphor.
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4.9.2 General Conclusion
Whether participants actually matched, or resonated the complex dynamical pattern remains a
topic of future studies: To evidence such matching at the scale at which the speech sound unfolds
would require (neuro-)physiological measurements. The global convergence of the classiﬁer accu-
racy on the scale of component-dominant to interaction-dominant causal ontologies of behaviour
is non-trivial. The former perspective looks for components as eﬃcient causes of behaviour (e.g. %
of variance in one variable that is uniquely attributable to the levels of another variable) whereas
the latter looks for dynamical invariants and correlations across lags time that may be exploited to
coordinate behaviour (e.g.,long range anti-persistent correlations or self-organised critical states,
cf. Van Orden et al., 2003). Although it is important to note that this does not mean an interaction-
dominant perspective denies that components exist, it does imply that components (fromphoneme
representations to ‘cues’) should be assigned a diﬀerent causal role in production and perception
of human speech. It follows that components and component processes proposed by RTDH and
ATPDH should be reconsidered as a factor in the aetiology of developmental dyslexia. The current
results do not provide a readily available alternative, but they do provide strong cause for the de-
velopment of an aetiology based on an interaction-dominant causal ontology, for example based on
the scaled continuum hypothesis (Hasselman, 2014a; Holden et al., 2014; Wijnants et al., 2012b)
and complexity matching.
It is of course important to replicate these ﬁndings with other stimuli and other samples of par-
ticipants. Interestingly, the analysis presented here can be performed post-hoc on any speech iden-
tiﬁcation study already published. The measures can be extracted from any signal and the QDA can
be applied using the observed labels found in the study as targets for the classiﬁcation.
4.10 Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Anna Bosman and Ludo Verhoeven for their comments on a previous draft
of this article. I am also very grateful to the anonymous reviewer who suggested inclusion of
(multi)fractal measures would provide a stronger case for the Complexity Matching Hypothesis.
107

“What I call the void is where nothing exists. It is about things outside man's knowledge. 
Of course the void does not exist. 
[Of course the void is nothingness]
By knowing what exists, you can know that which does not exist.
 That is the void.”
- Shinmen Musashi (1645, The Book of the Void)
In the fifth chapter of “A Book of Five Rings”, completed just weeks before his death, 
the legendary Samurai Miyamoto Musashi explains the inexplicable.
Apocrypha
Miyamoto, Musashi (1974). A Book of Five Rings, translated by Victor Harris. 
London: Allison & Busby; Woodstock, New York: The Overlook Press.
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Chapter 5
BEYOND THE STATIC PHONEME BOUNDARY
The Nonlinear Dynamics of Emerging Literacy
A common misconception about learning to read is that it requires of the aspiring literate
to be aware of spoken words being composed of smaller sound units called phonemes
(Port & Leary, 2005; Port, 2007). It is indeed the case that preliterate children and illiterate
adults can often segment words into onsets and rhymes, but manipulating individual speech
sounds like identifying, adding or omitting a sound turns out to be a skill very few posses
before receiving some literacy training (de Graaff, Hasselman, Bosman, & Verhoeven, 2008;
de Graaff, Hasselman, Verhoeven, & Bosman, 2011; Goswami, Ziegler, Dalton, & Schnei-
der, 2003; Morais, Cary, Alegria, & Bertelson, 1979; Rayner, Foorman, Perfetti, Pesetsky, &
Seidenberg, 2001). This is a phenomenon that is observed across languages, but especially
in languages with alphabetic writing systems. In fact, one could argue that the phoneme is
a cultural phenomenon rather than a perceptual reality of body and brain (Port, 2010a).
Even in an almost entirely transparent language (i.e. the spelling of a word maps almost
exactly to the way it is pronounced) like Finnish there is no pre-literate phoneme aware-
ness. In Finland formal reading instruction starts quite late compared to other countries, a
recent study revealed that the most basic phonological awareness and early reading skills
develop simultaneously in that language (Silvén, Poskiparta, Niemi, & Voeten, 2007). That
is, exposure to the alphabetic writing system was likely the driving force behind the ability to
segregate speech into phonemes. The authors concluded that language- and culture- spe-
cific influences on literacy development must be considered in models and theories instead
of assuming innate perceptual boundaries.
5.1 Phoneme Awareness & Emerging Literacy: Two Sides of the Same
Coin?
The component dominant dynamics accounts of developmental dyslexia leans heavily on the as-
sumption that phonological deﬁcits are the core deﬁcit in dyslexic readers (Landerl & Wimmer,
2000). This might be consistent with results from studies done in the English language (a rather
opaque orthography), but seems to be only partly true for languages with more transparent or-
thographies. In German for instance phonological abilities seem to play only a marginal role in (pre-
dicting) developmental dyslexia (Wimmer & Schurz, 2010). Goswami (2000) and Vellutino, Fletcher,
Snowling and Scanlon (2004) reviewed several prospective studies conducted in diﬀerent countries
and both studies concluded that for instance rhyming skill is a good predictor of reading diﬃcul-
ties in English, but not in German and Dutch. In countries with transparent orthographies, rapid
automatised naming (RAN) seems to explain more variance than phonological ability. A study on
the precursors of literacy in Finnish by Puolakanaho et al. (2007) reports that measurements of
letter naming, phonological awareness tasks and rapid automatized naming among kindergartners
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taken together correctly categorize 80% of children who turn out to develop reading problems in
2nd grade. Similar results have been reported in prospective studies on the acquisition of reading
in Dutch (Eleveld, 2005; van den Bos, lutje Spelberg, & Eleveld, 2004). The exact role of rapid nam-
ing in literacy development remains a matter of debate (Moll, Fussenegger, Willburger, & Landerl,
2009; Vaessen, Gerretsen, & Blomert, 2009). The point here is that the assumption that learning to
read requires awareness of phonemes before the connections between letters and sounds can be
learned is too simple. The strong claim I will defend in this chapter is that awareness of phonemes
is caused by exposure to an alphabetic system of symbols used to represent (a small part of) the
sounds used by speakers of a language (Linell, 2005; Port, 2007, 2010a, 2010b).
It has been repeatedly shown that systematic phonics training for kindergarteners increases their
phonological awareness (e.g. in Dutch: de Graaﬀ, Bosman, Hasselman, & Verhoeven, 2009; de
Graaﬀ, Verhoeven, Bosman, & Hasselman, 2007), also in children at risk for dyslexia and speech-
language impairment (Segers, Hasselman, Verhoeven, & De Graaﬀ, 2004). Even if an adult poor
reader has received only rudimentary phonics instruction in childhood, this is noticeable as better
performance in phonemic awareness tasks when compared to illiterate peers (Morais et al., 1979).
A crucial ﬁnding that shows the impact of exposure to an alphabetic writing system involved two
groups of Chinese adults. One group was literate in characters and alphabetic spelling (Hanyu
pinyin) and could manipulate consonants by adding or omitting them from Chinese spoken words.
A group of adults literate only in characters could not perform these simple speech-sound manipu-
lations (Read, Zhang, Nie, & Ding, 1986).
This is a problem for the role of the deﬁcient phoneme representation as a cause of develop-
mental dyslexia. If there is no pre-literate sound representation at the level of the phoneme, its
impaired-ness or non-distinctiveness (e.g. Elbro, Borstrøm, & Petersen, 1998; Snowling, 2001) can-
not be the explanation behind the diﬃculty of acquiring grapheme to phoneme correspondence
rules. The only thing one could argue for is that there must be some process that prevents the
representation of phonemes from being formed properly during the time in which children receive
literacy training in an alphabetic writing system. If the radical position is taken seriously and one
wants to dispense with abstract phonological codes that refer to segments of speech, the causes
of the reading impairment must be sought in other acoustic features of the speech signal that al-
low segmentation, categorisation, and association to the categories of written language (Goswami,
Fosker, Huss, Mead, & Szűcs, 2010; Ramus, Nespor, & Mehler, 2000).
5.2 A Speech Perception Deﬁcit Without Impaired Representations
What are the consequences of taking the radical position on the reality of phoneme representations
for the speech perception deﬁcit hypotheses of dyslexia? A logical deduction based on the impaired
phoneme representation hypothesis is that the categorisation and discrimination of speech sounds
by dyslexic readers should be impaired (Bradley & Bryant, 1983). If phoneme representations or
the awareness of sound segments indeed emerged only during or after exposure to an alphabetic
writing system, could there be a literacy exposure eﬀect on perception of speech sounds? There
are some studies that certainly seem to point in that direction; a comparison of dyslexic readers
and illiterate adults for instance seems to point to similar deviations in classiﬁcation curves of those
groups compared to typical readers (Serniclaes, Ventura, Morais, & Kolinsky, 2005). Another study
included reading age and chronological age control groups in a comparison of speech perception
ability with a group of dyslexic readers and observed a literacy exposure eﬀect on speech percep-
tion. The authors concluded however that discrimination curves of dyslexic readers could not be
fully explained due to a lack of reading experience alone (Bogliotti, Serniclaes, Messaoud-Galusi, &
Sprenger-Charolles, 2008).
Many of the arguments against a mental alphabet of discrete speech sound representations are
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based on the lack of invariance and discreteness of the acoustic features supposedly associatedwith
these abstract representations. Speech is a continuous signal not discrete; speech gestures over-
lap (co-articulation) and acoustic features like formants are perceived depending on the context of
other features present in the signal. In other words, speech perception and production are highly
context sensitive. The variations in the hypothesised speech units like phones and phonemes pro-
duced by diﬀerent speakers with respect to pitch, voice onset, and formant frequencies are almost
inﬁnite (Hay & Drager, 2007 is a review). Concerns about the nature and prevalence of a speech
perception deﬁcit in developmental dyslexia have their origin in such lack of invariance across con-
texts, that is context sensitivity of study outcomes (e.g. Serniclaes, 2006). As was shown in Chapter
2 there are obvious and less-obvious contextual factors that appear to inﬂuencewhether a deﬁcit in
speech perception is found. In Chapter 4, I suggested that the higher order dynamics of the speech
signal might be the invariant feature humans use to identify speech sounds. In the literature many
other factors are reported that inﬂuencewhether a speech perception deﬁcit is found; the nature of
the stimuli used in experiments (natural vs. synthetic speech: Blomert &Mitterer, 2004), whether a
speciﬁc subgroup of dyslexic readers is examined (deﬁcit foundmainly in language impaired dyslexic
readers: Manis & Keating, 2005), or speciﬁc task constraints (impaired phoneme representations
only found under time pressure: Ramus & Szenkovits, 2008).
Causation, everywhere!
As mentioned in previous chapters, there is also much debate about the underlying causes of the
impaired phoneme representations (Ramus, 2003, 2004), there are two main views both backed
by neuroanatomical evidence that diﬀer in the localisation of the cause, being peripheral (percep-
tual) or cognitive (language related). The peripheral view states that the impairment is caused by a
deﬁcit in low-level auditory processes caused by magnocellular disruptions in the thalamus and the
cerebellum (see for instance Farmer & Klein, 1995; Stein, 2001; Stein & Walsh, 1997). The cogni-
tive view states that the cause is speech and language speciﬁc (Mody, Studdert-Kennedy, & Brady,
1997) and is caused by neuroanatomical anomalies in the perisylvian cortex (Ramus, 2004). Re-
cent evidence suggests this apparent clear-cut distinction between auditory and ‘speech-language’
accounts that are each backed by considerable empirical record, may prove to be the result of a
subtle instruction eﬀect. When the same set of sine wave stimuli are in one occasion presented
as being electronic whistling sounds that need to be discriminated and later as speech-like sounds,
the second instruction causes participants to perceive a phoneme boundary that is not observed
when the ﬁrst instruction is given (Serniclaes, Sprenger-Charolles, Carre, & Demonet, 2001).
This eﬀect has been interpreted as a so-called ‘speech mode’ in which a non-speech stimulus
is interpreted as a speech sound. The speech mode has been shown to have neural correlates
(Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2005). Several experiments are reported in the brain-imaging study that
basically uses the same instruction variation as mentioned above, adapted for measurements using
EEG, MEG, and fMRI. The authors report threemain conclusions, of which the ﬁrst is a conﬁrmation
of the instruction eﬀect found by Serniclaes et al. (2001). As an example of the problems that arise
when these subtle contextual eﬀects are interpreted in terms of discrete abstract representations of
invariant acoustic features, I take a moment to analyse in some detail the way the authors interpret
their results:
``First, the same auditory stimuli are processed differentially depending on whether they are
perceived as speech or as nonsense electronic whistles. Second, the posterior part of the
superior temporal sulcus and the supramarginal gyrus are crucial areas for syllable processing
but are not involved in the processing of the same physical dimension when the stimuli
are not perceived as speech. Third, non-phonemic auditory representation and phonemic
representation are computed in parallel, but the phonemic network is more efficient and its
activation may have an inhibitory effect on the acoustical network.’’ (Dehaene-Lambertz et
al., 2005, pp. 32).
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The ﬁrst conclusion seems straightforward, but is circular: The same stimuli are processed diﬀer-
ently depending on how they are perceived. Howdoes the brain of a speaker knowwhether a sound
will be perceived as a tone or as speech before it is even processed? Of course, in the context of the
experiment the participant is primed by instruction, but how does this generalise to real life situa-
tions? The same problem applies to the second conclusion: How are the brain regions that process
the signal informed by the percept? That is, isn’t the purpose of the entire perceptual process to
ﬁgure out what the acoustic pattern may represent in the ﬁrst place? As a pure description of the
experimental ﬁndings these conclusionsmight be acceptablewhen interpreted as reporting a corre-
lation: This is what we observe when a stimulus is perceived as speech rather than as a sound. The
circularity emerges due to the suggestion that diﬀerent brain regions are involved in the processing
of the same physical dimension of an auditory signal dependant on the outcome of this process.
That’s time travel.
The third conclusion seems to conﬁrm the assumption that the authors are not just reporting a
correlation, but are interpreting the diﬀerence due to instruction they observed as the causal power
of the phonemic representation to suppress an acoustic pattern to be registered as an auditory per-
cept (before the perceptual process is completed). They also inﬂate the amount of representing
being done by the brain. Apparently the same auditory stimulus has two diﬀerent representations,
one is non-phonemic and is processed by the auditory network, whereas the other is phonemic and
processed by the phonemic network. The consequence must be that all auditory stimuli of which
the physical dimensions may be perceived as non-speech as well as speech -but are not speech
sounds- take up storage space as a speech-sound representation as well as an auditory representa-
tion in the brain. It is almost impossible to break out of the circular reasoning: When a non-speech
stimulus is perceived as a speech sound, the phonemic network, which is much more eﬃcient, sup-
presses the auditory network causing a speech sound to be perceived.
Note that this problem arises due to the assumption that simple linear eﬃcient causes indepen-
dently add up to coordinate behaviour. Each qualitatively diﬀerent outcome must have a diﬀerent
composition of causes attached to it. In this chapter I will discuss a model that allows an alternative
interpretation of these and similar results in which the (phoneme) representation is invoked into
existence as an explanatory vehicle that is suggested to be identiﬁable as a physiological trace or a
structural component of the nervous system. The only thing that is in fact observed on the level of
behaviour is a transition of one stable perceptual state into another. To introduce the model I will
ﬁrst discuss an interesting hypothesis recently suggested to explain some surprising characteristics
of speech perception by dyslexic readers. No surprise, a new neurophysiological component repre-
sentation of patterns in the acoustic signal is invoked into existence as to explanation the observed
behaviour.
5.3 The Elementary Particles of Speech Sounds: Phones, Allophones and
Phonemes
A remarkable and quite recent ﬁnding is that dyslexic readers outperform average readers in within
category discriminationof speech sounds (Serniclaes, VanHeghe,Mousty, Carré, & Sprenger-Charolles,
2004; Serniclaes, 2006; Werker & Tees, 1987). The explanation is that in dyslexic readers rudimen-
tary pre-linguistic phoneme categories, or allophones, still exist as separate categories along a con-
tinuum. An allophone is a speech sound or phone that is not perceived as a distinct speech sound
or phoneme in a particular language by adult listeners. Thus, a phoneme can be a collection of
allophones or similar sounding speech sounds that are categorised under one label, the label of
the phoneme. Exchanging one allophone for another in a word may sound awkward, but does not
change it’s meaning. Whether a phone is an allophone may diﬀer for diﬀerent languages.
To illustrate this, the voice onset time (VOT) continuum from /d/ to /th/ is divided into two cate-
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gories in for example, French, Spanish and Dutch whereas in Thai it is divided into three categories
(Abramson & Lisker, 1970; Lisker & Abramson, 1971; Serniclaes, 2006). This categorization of the
diﬀerent allophones along the VOT continuum into three phoneme categories in the Thai language
is considered the “natural” division and is thought to arise from a predisposition to categorise cer-
tain features into categories by pre-linguistic children (Lasky, Syrdal-Lasky, & Klein, 1975; Serniclaes,
2006;Werker& Tees, 1984). Hence, in three category languages the perception of phonemebound-
aries along the voicing continuum in pre-linguistic children will be roughly the same as in adults. In
two-category languages a child has to merge or couple allophones that naturally would be per-
ceived as three distinct phonemes into two distinct phoneme categories; this is called the coupling
hypothesis (Serniclaes, 2006). Speech perception of adults in such languages diﬀers from that of
pre-linguistic children, at least in the ﬁrst year of life (Werker & Tees, 1984). Dyslexic readers in such
a language, according to this account, have failed to successfully couple these voicing allophones
to the two phoneme categories used in their native language and their speech perception will re-
semble that of the pre-linguistic child. Their better discrimination ability of stimuli that vary along
a speciﬁc acoustic continuum but within the same phoneme category is thus considered to be due
to an allophonic mode of speech perception (Serniclaes, 2006; Serniclaes et al., 2004). Serniclaes
and colleagues note that these pre-linguistic boundaries can still be found in non-dyslexic readers,
but to a much lesser extent.
5.3.1 Beyond Explanatory Boundary?
Here we encounter the limits of the theory of elementary speech particles. Why do pre-linguistic
children categorise a certain physical continuum related to speech sounds into three categories at
speciﬁc values of that continuum? “Because they were created to do so”, is the uncomfortable
translation of predisposition in this context. If we were indeed created to do so and evolution
spent a lot of time and energy to encode these boundaries into our genes, then why are not all the
languages of the world using these innate boundaries to segment speech? And is not it strange
that Thai appears to be the only language that uses these predisposed category divisions? Careful
examination of the older studies upon which much of the allophone perception argument is based,
reveals that the data are not at all consistent in their support for the existence of exact universal
phoneme boundaries in infants. Nor do they point at the existence of exact acquired boundaries in
adults.
Three key assumptions of the allophone perception hypothesis can be disputed based on studies
that go back some 50 years:
1. Adults cannot discriminate between speech stimuli within a native phoneme category.
2. Infants perceive speech categorically, indicating innate phone-like representationsmore ﬁne-
grained than phoneme contrasts of a language. This is why infants can discriminate between
all non-native language phoneme contrasts.
3. Speech perception, in general, is categorical, not continuous.
Assumption 1. Adults can’t discriminate within categories [incorrect]
Concerning the ﬁrst assumption, Abramson and Lisker (1970) reported that the pooled discrimi-
nation curves of a VOT continuum by English speakers showed one discrimination peak and the
curve of Thai speakers indeed showed two peaks (indicating three categories). There were how-
ever many (consistent) individual diﬀerences between speakers of the same language, who per-
ceived the boundaries at completely diﬀerent VOT values from other native speakers (Abramson
& Lisker, 1970). Also, when the production of VOTs is studied for diﬀerent languages as reported
by Lisker and Abramson (1971), there is much variability in the exact location of the produced VOT
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values along the continuum. Abramson and Lisker (1973) indeed found Spanish phoneme bound-
aries at VOT values that were expected based on production of word-initial stops in Spanish. That
is, on the aggregate level. There were many individual diﬀerences in produced VOT. Surprisingly,
and contrary to claim 1, adult Spanish speakers were able to discriminate between stimuli within a
native Spanish phoneme category.
Based on these and other observations Lisker and Abramson (1971) argued in favour of the con-
tinuous control of voice onset time by speakers and rejected the notion by Chomsky and Halle
(1968) that arrangements of speech segments with ﬁxed feature values are able to explain their
VOT timing data. Continuous, adaptive control instead of a pre-programmed set of gestures is in-
deed what studies suggest that examined eﬀects of the perturbation of the jaw, lips, and tongue
during speech production (Houde & Jordan, 1998; Kelso, Tuller, Vatikiotis-Bateson, & Fowler, 1984;
Munhall, Löfqvist, & Kelso, 1994; Nittrouer, Munhall, Kelso, Tuller, & Harris, 1988). Results show
that speakers recover within milliseconds after unexpected movements of the jaw, lips or tongue
caused by amechanical device speciﬁcally created to disrupt the speech production of participants.
Such ultrafast recovery cannot be explained by ballistic execution of motor programs (cf., Van Or-
den, Hollis & Wallott, 2012).
Assumption 2. Innate phones develop into categories [incorrect]
The second assumption concerns speech perception by infants, who, according to a well-known sci-
ence fact are supposed to be able to discriminate between all the speech sound categories of the
languages of theworld, up to a certain age. Some older studies are often quoted to support categor-
ical perception by infants as young as twomonths old. In one case this turns out to be discontinuous
perception (perceptual change or identiﬁcation of sounds along a continuumwithout clear category
boundaries) rather than exact categorical perception (Eimas &Miller, 1980). As a whole, the actual
empirical evidence is more complex than the popular fact implies: Spanish 6-8 month old infants
were able to discriminate boundaries on both Spanish and English continua, but English infants of
the same age only perceived the boundary native adult English speakers perceive (Eilers, Gavin, &
Wilson, 1979). Much like the contemporary discussion about auditory versus speech speciﬁc per-
ception, studies have been published showing 2 month old infants can also perceive non-speech
sounds as categories, casting doubts on the special perceptual status of speech sounds and speech
sound categories (Jusczyk, Rosner, & Cutting, 1977). More recent results show that infants are in-
deed able to discriminate between stimuli within an adult phoneme category (McMurray & Aslin,
2005). The second claim should not be seen as a corroborated fact.
Assumption 3. Perception is discrete [incorrect]
The ﬁnal assumption, categorical versus continuous perception has been, and still is a subject of
many studies. It has been known for some time that there are important features of the speech
signal that are used for identiﬁcation of sounds, but that do not yield a discrimination peak when
placed on a continuum, such as the non-categorical perception of tonal categories in Thai (Abram-
son, 1979). Non-categorical perception of speech sounds can also be induced by experimental ma-
nipulation (Carney, Widin, & Viemeister, 1977; Pisoni & Lazarus, 1974). In a study where subjects
were asked to give continuous rating responses about how well they thought a speech stimulus
belonged to a category instead of discrete labels (e.g. 1-100 /bAk/ or /dAk/), the distribution of
ratings was more consistent with a model of continuous perception (Massaro & Cohen, 1983). In
fact, the eﬀect of the instruction manipulation mentioned earlier, in which prompting participants
to perceive the same stimuli as either speech or whistle sounds has been in the empirical record
for a long time, at least since the early 1960s (reports of this eﬀect can be found in Lane, 1965;
Mattingly, Liberman, Syrdal, & Halwes, 1971; Pisoni & Lazarus, 1974; M. E. H. Schouten, 1980). In
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a more recent paper B. Schouten, Gerrits and van Hessen (2003) argue for “The end of categorical
perception as we know it”. Their data show that categorical perception of speech sounds depends
on speciﬁcs of the discrimination task used (see also Gerrits & Schouten, 2004). Many factors like
inter-stimulus interval, “naturalness” of the stimuli and task induced response bias were found to
determine whether categorical perception and phoneme boundaries were observed.
The origin of these divergent results and their interpretations are due to the following apparent
contradiction: We know the universe we perceive is continuous, but our perception of the universe
appears to be discrete and not a continuum of “blooming, buzzing confusion” as William James
(1890) called it. We perceive objects, people, words, and colours. It is no surprise then that the
issue of whether perception is discrete or continuous, categorical or not, is by no means resolved
since James argued in favour of continuous perception (see Spivey & Dale, 2006 who argue for the
continuity of mind, whereas VanRullen & Koch, 2003 suggest discreteness of perception is a neuro-
logical reality). The idea that speech exists in our nervous system as static segmental building blocks
that represent collections of discrete phonetic features that serve perception as well as articulatory
gestures by sequential alignment, is an attempt to shape a scientiﬁc theory about the “linguistic
world” in the way certain humans who are literate in alphabetic writing systems experience that
linguistic world (Port & Leary, 2005; Port, 2010a). This is an example of the conjectures in Chapter 1
in which I suggested that theoretical constructs are often confused for constituents of reality. Lisker
and Abramson gave an excellent description of this biased view of reality some 40 years ago when
discussing the Chomsky and Halle –linguist– theory of speech:
“Their concern is not how an articulatory sequence and its associated acoustic signal, both
of them physically neither purely continuous nor purely digital in nature, are related to a
linguistic expression, but rather to impose digitalization on the physical description in such
a way that it will necessarily be a description of the segments in the linguist’s spelling of the
expression.” (Lisker & Abramson, 1971, p. 781).
5.3.2 Reprise: Causation
The developmental perspective, how speech production and perception emerge in the develop-
ing child is usually conceived of as suppressing certain predispositions and attuning others in order
to achieve adult performance. What these predispositions are varies; some authors suggest that
innate feature detectors for complex phonetic segments are activated and deactivated during de-
velopment (Werker & Tees, 1984). Others argue that phoneme categories emerge as perceptual
magnet eﬀects caused by innate speech sound prototypes (Iverson & Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl, 1991). The
fact that the examples given so far reveal strong context sensitivity undermines the ‘nativist’ ex-
planations that have been put forward. Why imagine biological and neurological structures into
existence that turn out to be used only under some special experimental conditions? The logic
from the point of view of a theory may be understandable: Elementary particles, the phonemes
most literate adults intuit to exist, must be constructed from smaller elementary particles in the
pre-linguistic child. That way the object of development is to construct the larger particles from the
smaller ones, and the diﬀerences between infants and adults are explained:
“What the child will need to acquire with experience is the appropriate criterion for classifi-
cation (i.e., the appropriate boundary value) and the ability to ignore, at least under some cir-
cumstances, acoustic differences that signal variants of the same phonemic category” (Eimas
& Miller, 1980). “Choke on that causality!” (Farnsworth, 2001).
To summarise, there are problemswith theoriesmaintaining that speech sounds are represented
as discrete components of invariant static acoustic features. These problems arise because the
speech signal is predominantly a continuous physical signal, because the complex gestures that
generate the signal appear to be under continuous control by the speaker and because it is likely
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that the segments appear in scientiﬁc theories due to scientists being literate in alphabetic writing
systems. Although perception along a physical continuum may appear to be categorical in most
cases, perception of discrete category boundaries is highly context dependent and under exper-
imental control. A listener, depending on subtle contextual variations, may report of the same
physical features of a signal that they cause diﬀerent sensory experiences. Moreover, there are
clearly substantial individual diﬀerences in perceived and produced phoneme boundaries by native
speakers of the same language, which contests the assumption that static possibly innate phoneme
boundaries exist.
5.4 Critical Phoneme Boundaries vs. Coordination Dynamics
There are several contemporary theories and models that provide a dynamical, continuous and
interaction-dominant account of speech perception and production that deal with some of the
problems with component based theories mentioned above (van Lieshout, 2004 is a review). In
the present study I will expand an existing nonlinear dynamical model of speech perception (Case,
Tuller, Ding, & Kelso, 1995; Tuller, Case, Ding, & Kelso, 1994; Tuller, 2004) to account for the emer-
gence of perceptual boundaries and categories along a physical continuum without the need to
invoke abstract segmental components to represent each perceived perceptual category.1 Another
motivation to consider this model was to ﬁnd an alternative to the allophone coupling hypothesis
of the pre-verbal to verbal to literate development argued for by Serniclaes and colleagues in order
to explain better within phoneme category discrimination by dyslexic readers.
Tuller et al. (1994) have shown that critical phoneme boundaries in the perception of a VOT
contrast are actually rare. In a classical speech categorisation experiment the stimuli that make up
a synthetic continuumare presented in a randomorder and a category switch or phonemeboundary
is usually found somewhere in the middle of the continuum. When the stimuli are presented in a
sequential order up and down the continuum however (e.g., going gradually from /bAk/ [container]
to /dAk/ [roof] and back) three phenomena are typically observed: Hysteresis, which is a delayed
category switch, enhanced contrast, which is an early category switch (the reverse of hysteresis), or
a critical boundary, which is a category switch at the same point along the continuum irrespective
of the direction it was traversed. If speech perception were the mere detection of a collection of
acoustic feature values, one would expect to always see a critical phoneme boundary. However,
hysteresis and enhanced contrast are observed more frequently with sequential presentation of
the stimuli (Case et al., 1995; Tuller et al., 1994).
To account for these phenomena Tuller et al. (1994) introduced a potential model that can ex-
plain the diﬀerences between individuals and contexts that decide when participants switch from
hearing one speech sound category to another one. The mathematical form of the model is shown
in equation 5.1 and 5.2.
dx
dt
= −dV (x)
dx
(5.1)
V (x) = kx− αx
2
2
+ β
x4
4
(5.2)
It is derived from a class of models used to understand the emergence of and switching between
behavioural patterns or perceived categories known as the HKB-model of coordination dynamics
(Haken, Kelso, & Bunz, 1985; Kelso & Schöner, 1988; Schöner, Haken, & Kelso, 1986).
1Many thanks to Ralf Cox who provided the mathematical description and initial MATLAB implementation of the
model.
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Recently the HKB-model has been implemented in the task dynamics framework (Saltzman &
Byrd, 2000; Saltzman &Munhall, 1989) as part of a coupled oscillator model of speech gesture tim-
ing that was used to model the self-organization of syllable structures (Goldstein, Nam, Saltzman,
& Chitoran, 2008; Nam, Goldstein, & Saltzman, 2009). This model is a so-called potential function
describing which regions of a state space a dynamical system is attracted to given certain parame-
ter settings. The minima of the potential function given in equation 5.2 represent the stable states
of the diﬀerential equation given in 5.1. In other words, the potential model represents the po-
tential outcomes of a dynamical continuous process as a discrete number of states. This is exactly
the question that needs to be addressed by a model of speech perception according to Lisker and
Abramson quoted above: How do dynamical, continuous signals relate to apparent static discrete
outcomes of those processes? Another way to deﬁne the goal of a speech perception model is to
understand how the graded internal structure of speech sound categories depend on themultitude
of acoustical features generated by articulatory gestures (Case et al., 1995).
A potential model, when applied to speech perception, describes a dynamically changing land-
scape of attractor states, corresponding to a perceivable speech sound category (see Figure 5.1).
The number of available categories and their relative strength of attraction, or stability (reﬂected
by the deepness of the wells) emerge dynamically during the task and are governed by a control
parameter k. This is a collective variable that will be discussed in more detail below. Figure 5.1
shows what the potential landscape looks like for ﬁve diﬀerent values of k. Suppose this is a model
of the perception of a /bAk/ - /dAk/ continuum like the one discussed in Chapter 4. The two end
points of the continuum are represented by the parameter values of k = −1 (/bAk/) and k = 1
(/dAk/). For these values there is one stable basin of attraction or one perceivable category. As
k increases from -1 to 1 the stability of the perceived category /bAk/ (indicated by the ball in the
potential well) decreases and a second trough emerges in the landscape. At some critical value of
k the stability of the percept /bAk/ has decreased by such an amount that a category switch occurs
as the ball settles into the more stable state representing the perception of /dAk/.
When k = 0 the potential wells associated with the two observable categories are both avail-
able, but very unstable. In this so-called bi-stable statemany factorsmay inﬂuencewhich of the two
attractors the system eventually settles into. One such factor is which category was perceived on
the previous trial and it is this feature that Tuller et al. (1994) were able to conﬁrm experimentally
by showing that sequential traversal of the continuum results in hysteresis and enhanced contrast
eﬀects. Random presentation results in the observation of a critical boundary because, if randomi-
sation was accurate, there is a 50% chance of having perceived either one of the categories on a
previous trial.
The shape of the potential landscape does, however, not depend exclusively on the value of the
acoustic parameter that is being manipulated to create the continuum. When exactly the system
enters into this bi-stable state depends on the collective variable k. This variable depends on the
number of previously perceived stimuli and certain participant characteristics. The equation for k
is given by equation 5.3:
k(λ) = k0 + λ+
ε
2
+ εθ(n− nc)(λ− λf ) (5.3)
In this equation, k0 is the value of k for the stimulus at one end of the continuum, usually set
at -1. In the case of a VOT continuum λ represents the voice onset times of a stimulus and λf
would correspond to the VOT of the last stimulus on the continuum (the stimulus at the opposite
end of the continuum from the one represented by k0). For a standard VOT continuum λ is linearly
equivalent to the acoustic feature that is manipulated, but this is not a prerequisite and nonlinear
manipulations are in principle also possible (Case et al., 1995).
The parameter ε is described by Tuller et al. (1994) as summarising cognitive characteristics of
the perceiver, like attention, linguistic experience, and learning. For the remainder of this Chapter,
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I will interpret this parameter as explaining random or otherwise unexplained variation between
individuals. The terms n and nc are related to the number of stimulus presentations in the exper-
iment: n just counts how many stimuli have been presented and nc represent a critical number of
stimulus presentations such that when n−nc ≥ 0 the step function θ changes from 0 to 1. In other
words, when the number of presented stimuli reaches a certain number and θ = 1, the value of
k will be determined by an extra term ε ∗ (λ − λ) that regulates the impact of individual charac-
teristics on k depending on how far the feature of the current stimulus is separated from its most
extreme value along the continuum. This dependency of k on λ, ε and n results in an asymmetrical
distribution of attractor stability once the number of presentations accumulates beyond nc.
A hypothetical example of a sequential traversal of a continuum is shown in Figure 5.2. Here nc is
set to 7, so when the continuum is traversed back from stimulus 7 to 1 the relative stability of per-
cepts has increased. Stimulus 1 at the end of the run is more stable than stimulus 1 at the beginning
of the run as indicated by the deeper potential well. This eﬀect has been experimentally veriﬁed
by Case et al. (1995), who asked subjects to rate to what extent a stimulus was representative of a
category label. They found that a stimulus at the beginning of a sequence was rated less exemplary
for a phoneme category compared to the exact same stimulus presented at the end of a sequence.
Figure 5.2 also shows the eﬀect of sequential presentation on the location of the category switch;
going up the continuum from 1 to 7 the switch occurs between 5 and 6. Going back down the
continuum the switch occurs between 5 and 4. There are several other interesting features of the
model that may help understand the current empirical record of data related to speech perception
by dyslexic readers. I will discuss them after I have introduced an extension of the model to two
dimensions.
5.5 Interlude: Coupling of Higher Order Variables
A notion that is common in competing theories of language acquisition is consistent with contem-
porary interaction dominant theories of human development: An infant somehow has to couple
information it acquires about the structure of the environment through diﬀerent sensory modal-
ities in order to act upon that environment (Bates, Thal, Finlay, & Clancy, 2002; Smith & Gasser,
2005). For speech perception and production a narrow view of this developmental task involves
attributing meaning to the sounds caregivers use to communicate, as well as to acquire the neces-
sarymotor control to produce sounds that are similar to those of the caregivers. This is envisioned in
the quote by Eimas andMiller cited above and the coupling hypothesis in the allophone perception
theory of speech perception as mostly biologically determined. In dynamical theories of develop-
ment, there is no developmental task, no blueprint or goal (e.g. Smith & Thelen, 2003). The infant
is immersed in a world of multimodal sensory experience and through soft-assembled mechanisms
gains knowledge about the structure of the environment (e.g. Kloos & Van Orden, 2009; Thelen,
Kelso, & Fogel, 1987). Sensory systems overlap and are time-locked (correlated sensations) which
is how they inform each other about the structure of the physical world without a supervisor, or
blueprint. These are the concepts of degeneracy and re-entry associated with neural networks that
receive multimodal input (Edelman, 1987; Tononi, Edelman, & Sporns, 1998). Degeneracy refers to
the fact that any function can be carried out by more than one conﬁguration of a neural system and
that the same clusters of neurons participate in diﬀerent functions (i.e., in contrast with static com-
ponents that serve one purpose). Re-entry refers to the fact that activation of sensory experience
by one modality can activate other modalities through the time-locked coupling between sensory
and action systems (Smith, 2005).
121
5.5. Interlude: Coupling of Higher Order Variables
	  
/bAk/
x
V(x)
1⇒
/bAk/
x
V(x)
2⇒
/bAk/
x
V(x)
3⇒
/bAk/
x
V(x)
4⇒
/bAk/
x
V(x)
5⇒
/dAk/
x
V(x)
6⇒
/bAk/
/dAk/
x
V(x)
7⇒
/bAk/
x
V(x)
1⇐
/bAk/
x
V(x)
2⇐
/bAk/
x
V(x)
3⇐
/bAk/
x
V(x)
4⇐
/dAk/
/dAk/
x
V(x)
5⇐
/dAk/
x
V(x)
6⇐
/dAk/
x
V(x)
7⇐
Figure
5.2
–
A
hypotheti
calsequenti
alrun
across
a
conti
nuum
from
/bA
k/
to
/dA
k/
and
back
to
/bA
k/.
The
eﬀ
ect
ofa
delayed
category
sw
itch
can
be
seen,as
w
ellas
the
increased
stability
ofthe
perceptualcategory
for
presented
sti
m
uliat
the
end
ofthe
sequence.
See
text
for
details.
122
PRINCIPLED SIMULATION OF POSITED ENTITIES & STRONG INFERENCE
5.5.1 Multimodal Language and Literacy Acquisition
Speech perception is multimodal from the very beginning, but involves not just auditory percep-
tion and speech gestures (e.g. Bates & Dick, 2002). Imagine an infants’ early sensory experiences
related to speech: Whether or not eye contact is established, many adults will spontaneously start
to utter sequences of syllable-like sounds (or other forms of motherese), accompanied by exagger-
ated pitch and prosody and gestures of the lips. Often the rhythm of the sequence of utterances is
accentuated by tapping or by rocking the infant. Self-initiated rhythmic movements to sounds aid
infants’ perception of beat (Phillips-Silver & Trainor, 2005) and several lines of research suggest per-
ception of rhythm may actually underlie speech segmentation (Nazzi, 2003; Ramus, Hauser, Miller,
Morris, & Mehler, 2000; Ramus, Nespor, et al., 2000; Thomson & Goswami, 2008; Tincoﬀ et al.,
2005). Three months after birth infants start to babble and after 7 months they can imitate sounds
with consonants (Bates et al., 2002). This self-assembled ‘tuning’ to the environment (adaptive
behaviour) has been modelled in the DIVA model of speech production. It mimics development
of native speech sound production by coupling information from diﬀerent modalities: A babbling
mode that produces random speech-like sounds which can be ‘tuned’ by feedback from the audi-
tory input to the model, for example a ‘caregiver’ repeating a native sound over and over (Callan,
Kent, Guenther, & Vorperian, 2000; Guenther & Perkell, 2004).
After 8 months infants reportedly start to loose the ability to discriminate between non-native
speech contrasts, a process of which the allophonicmode of speech perception hypothesis suggests
it does not unfold as it is supposed to, due to a failed coupling of allophones to native phoneme
contrasts in dyslexic readers (Serniclaes et al., 2004; Serniclaes, 2006). This is, however, not a de-
scription of a multimodal coupling and appears to be purely a coupling of auditory categories, men-
tal representations. What is missing from the hypothesis is the role of speech production. Infants
will establish perception-action couplings when they start to babble and produce consonants. In
most theories of development these perception-action couplings are thought to be the driving force
behind achieving developmental milestones and they may involve coupling between basic sensory
experiences or concern more complex, higher-order variables (Adolph, 1997, 2008; Camaioni, Au-
reli, Bellagamba, & Fogel, 2003; Hsu, Fogel, & Cooper, 2000; Thelen, 1996, 2000; von Hofsten,
2004).
5.5.2 Multimodal Language and Literacy Production
Ever since the ﬁrst experimental results were published that showed that speech perceptionmay be
related to speech production (Cooper, Delattre, Liberman, Borst, & Gerstman, 1952; Liberman, De-
lattre, & Cooper, 1952), the motor theory of speech perception has gone through several revisions.
An extensive recent review concludes that the empirical record shows strong evidence that perceiv-
ing speech is perceiving speech gestures involving the motor system (Galantucci, Fowler, & Turvey,
2006). Of course, infants have already been learning about the structure of rhythmic sounds and
speech sounds in the womb (DeCasper & Spence, 1986; Smotherman & Robinson, 1988), some
time before being able to produce sounds. Given the radical view on phoneme representations
as perceptual ghosts of letters (Port, 2008a, 2008b), by analogy one might argue that perceiving
phonemes is perceiving letters and involves an alphabetic writing system. It would be odd to have
the writing system internalised as a collection of representations, letters are visual structures in
the environment, and sounds are audible structures in the environment. Reframed in this way
pre-verbal to verbal development and pre-literate to literate development both require coupling
between structural regularities of the world accumulated in diﬀerent biophysical subsystems and
these should be bi-directionally coupled. Correlates of speech gestures are indeed found in studies
of reading. There are for instance eﬀects of the way a word is pronounced on the way a word is
read in terms of speed, accuracy or semantic categorisation (Bosman & De Groot, 1995; Bosman &
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de Groot, 1996; Bosman, van Leerdam, & de Gelder, 2000; Dijkstra, Grainger, & van Heuven, 1999;
Van Orden, 1987).
To summarise, speech gestures are embodied and therefore by deﬁnition in some way biologi-
cally coupled to perception within an individual. Acquisition of speech sound production appears
to occur relatively unsupervised, or at least there are computational models using feedbackmecha-
nisms that give a plausible account of how such a bi-directional couplingmay give rise to production
of native speech sounds. At ﬁrst glance learning to read an alphabetic writing system seems more
like acquiring an abstract set of correspondence rules, something artiﬁcial, cultural and disembod-
ied. Learning to read, however, is as multimodal and action driven as learning to speak; it involves
perception of visual regularities as (sequences of) letters, coordination of eyemovements to speech
gestures when reading aloud and ﬁnemotor control for speech symbol production (writing). Some-
how ‘learning grapheme to phoneme correspondence rules’ does not quite capture the full com-
plexity of the developmental process of becoming literate.
5.6 A Multi Dimensional Potential Landscape
The notion that coupling of dynamical systems gives rise to new joint patterns and behaviours is
a well known and well studied phenomenon in physics and mathematics, but has also been ap-
plied in neuroscience and behavioural science as synchronisation and coordination of physiological
processes and behaviour (e.g. Glass, 2001; Nam et al., 2009; Nowak & Vallacher, 2003; Schöner
& Kelso, 1988; Shockley, Baker, Richardson, & Fowler, 2007). The key property that is interesting
for the purpose of understanding speech perception by dyslexic readers is that coupled dynamics
constrain the degrees of freedom of the coupled systems, depending on the strength and nature of
the coupling. This also means that less coupling means more degrees of freedom, or more stable
states the system might settle in.
Consider a coupling of two potential models that represent higher-order perceptual variables;
one describes the observed auditory categorical perception of stimuli on a certain physical dimen-
sion (e.g. Jusczyk et al., 1977), whereas the other describes a similar continuum, but by self-
produced speech gestures. It has been shown that transitions between stable articulatory gestures
can be described by coordination dynamics in terms of self-organisation, control parameters, criti-
cal values, and bi-stable states (Kelso, 1986; Tuller & Kelso, 1991). In fact, the value of the control
parameter at which an individual switches from producing one stable articulatory state to another
(e.g., pronouncing /ip/ at increasing rates until it becomes /pi/), occurs at the same control parame-
ter value as a switch in the perceptual state indicating strong coupling between the perceptual and
motor systems (Kelso, 1995; Munhall et al., 1994). More recently, a formal notion of multimodal
coordination dynamics has been put forward (Lagarde & Kelso, 2006). For the purpose of this chap-
ter it is suﬃcient to consider coupling between two higher order variables as discussed above. The
assumption is that the coupling of these two models of coordination dynamics are indicative of the
quality of integration between speech perception and production of a particular physical descrip-
tion of the speech signal as evidenced by Perkell et al. (2004).
The result is a two-dimensional potential landscape whose shape is now also governed by the
way the two functions are coupled. The set of two ordinary diﬀerential equations that describe this
system is:
dx
dt
= −∂V
∂x
dy
dt
= −∂V
∂y
(5.4)
Equation 5.5 is the two-dimensional potential model written in (multivariate) polynomial form,
which may be more familiar to the behavioural scientist.
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V (x, y) = a10x+ a01y + a11xy + a20x
2 + a02y
2 + a40x
4 + a04y
4 (5.5)
The model as used in this study is given in equation 5.6. Several terms have been rearranged and
some of the parameters that remain constant have been ﬁlled in.
V (x, y) = k(x− y) + γcs(x ∗ y)− (x
2 + y2)
2
+
x4 + y4)
10
(5.6)
The parameter k has the same function as in the original model; it is a collective variable that rep-
resents the value of an acoustic parameter of a speech sound combined with a weighted average of
previously perceived stimuli and characteristics of the individual. It is in principle possible to have
one k parameter for each dimension. A high coupling strength (γcs) means the joint dynamics of
the two models will yield two major stable states or categories that will follow roughly the same
dynamics under the inﬂuence of k as in the one dimensional potential model. The potential land-
scape for k = 0 (the bi-stable state) is shown for diﬀerent values of γcs in Figure 5.3. It represents
a coupling hypothesis for speech perception in developmental dyslexia that does not presume in-
nate detectors of complex stimuli. It does have the potential (pun intended) to explain the same
phenomena the allophonic mode of speech perception hypothesis seeks to explain.
When there is no coupling between the perceptual system that perceives a physical dimension of
a complex speech signal and the action system that can produce the complex signal, as is the case in
the prelinguistic or preverbal child, there are four basins of attraction for k = 0. The bi-stable state
is thus rather a multi-stable state in this context. Suppose a preverbal infant was examined for the
discrimination of stimuli with diﬀerent values for this particular physical dimension, it would very
likely result in three -not four- diﬀerent switches between stable percepts. This can be explained
by examining Figure 5.4, which shows a decoupled model for diﬀerent values of k. The middle
row shows a projection of the line x = y, a cross-section through the potential landscape. The
bottom row shows a contour plot of the potential landscape, the arrows follow the local decreasing
potential gradient. Imagine again a ball representing the percept the system settled into, starting
at /bAk/ with k = −1 (left column of Figure 5.4).
Under inﬂuence of the changing control parameter k themulti-stable state is approached (k = 0)
and eventually the critical value of k where a category switch will occur. This is shown in the fourth
column (k > kc). There are three possible gradient paths to follow leading to a new stable state.
The ball could follow the line x=y and end up in the deepest well (/dAk/). Figure 5.4 shows a sit-
uation where the system settles in a stable state in the upper right corner of the contour plot. As
k increases, another category switch will occur when the state becomes too unstable and just one
stable state remains (k = 1). For high coupling strengths the relative strength of the twomajor sta-
ble states exceed the less stable states by such an amount that the probability of the system settling
in in one of them is very low. This probability is not zero however, which would correspond to data
that point towards very weak within category discrimination by adults interpreted as evidence for
“natural” innate allophone boundaries (Serniclaes, 2006).
Based on this model the hypothesis is that a coupling of perception and action systems decreases
the degrees of freedom available to the joint system to discriminate between values along the phys-
ical continuum. This explains how in uncoupled, or loosely coupled systems, more category bound-
aries may be observed. These categories are not “things”, components that are stored somewhere,
nor do they represent static values of the physical dimension. They emerge as more or less stable
states from the interaction dynamics. When andwhere category switches are observed depends on
many contextual factors, such as how many stimuli have been perceived, cognitive characteristics
of the individual and the strength and nature of the coupling. The nature of the coupling as imple-
mented here is just one of many possible ways to achieve joint dynamics. In the present model it
results in a symmetrical, orthogonal 2D landscape.
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The uncoupled two-dimensional potential model for diﬀerent values of k (columns). The top row
shows the potential surface. The middle row shows the projection of the potential surface along
the line x = y. The bottom row shows contour and quiver plots. The orientation of the arrows
may be interpreted as the direction a ball would roll towards were it dropped into this landscape.
The length of the arrows may be taken as representative of the velocity with which the ball would
depart in that direction.
5.7 Hypotheses: Testing Model Predictions for Dyslexic Readers
Is it reasonable to assume that dyslexic readers may have a problem coupling motor and sensory
systems? There is a large body of work, including neuroscientiﬁc evidence, suggesting a cerebel-
lar deﬁcit that might play a role in developmental dyslexia (Nicolson & Fawcett, 2006). This deﬁcit
is thought to aﬀect motor skills (Nicolson, Fawcett, & Dean, 2001; Thomson & Goswami, 2008),
procedural learning (Nicolson, Fawcett, Brookes, & Needle, 2010) and balance (Brookes, Tinkler,
Nicolson, & Fawcett, 2010; Stoodley, Fawcett, Nicolson, & Stein, 2005). For now let us interpret
these results as supporting the plausibility of the coupling hypothesis for developmental dyslexia,
given the contemporary view on the role of the cerebellum in coordination and control of move-
ment and its densely connected sensory-motor circuit (Balsters et al., 2010; Gowen &Miall, 2007).
More particularly, because of the recent ﬁnding that reveals the important role of the cerebel-
lum plays in speech perception and production, such as the planning and temporal organisation
of speech gestures (Ackermann, Mathiak, & Riecker, 2007). Based on the potential model at least
two hypotheses can be derived that predict eﬀects on the speech perception of dyslexic readers
that would be very diﬃcult to understand from the perspective of theories based on innate feature
detectors, or feature values like the allophonic mode of perception hypothesis.
The ﬁrst hypothesis is that the better within-category discrimination ability of dyslexic readers,
interpreted as perception of a rudimentary allophone boundary, may also be caused by perturba-
tions of the system other than evaluating whether the acoustic features of a stimulus are smaller
or larger than values that make up this innate boundary. Because one perceptual category looses
stability and others gain stability, adding ‘noise’ to the systemmight cause it to organise into a new
stable state. One way Tuller et al. (1994) established such a noise induced category switch was by
sequentially approaching the multi-stable state and repeatedly presenting the same stimulus at a
point along the continuum where a category switch might be expected. They found that partici-
pants were inclined to report perception of the other category after 2-6 repetitions of the exact
same stimulus, representing one and the same value of the physical dimension under study. When
this eﬀect is translated to discrimination of values of the continuum as ‘same’ or ‘diﬀerent’ stimuli,
one might expect an additional discrimination peak in a system with more than two stable states
(as explained in Figure 5.4) in noisy conditions.
In previous chapters it was shown that the acoustic manipulations of stimuli, especially the am-
pliﬁcation of fast changing spectral components and both slowing down and ampliﬁcation of the
stimuli acted as a reduction of discriminability of stimuli and an increased bias of perception of one
category over the other. The ﬁrst hypothesis will be tested by an experiment in which stimulus pairs
from the same /bAk/ to /dAk/ continuum as discussed in Chapter 4 will be discriminated by aver-
age and dyslexic readers using the four conditions of acoustic manipulation: None, Slowed Down,
Ampliﬁed and Both. The prediction is that the dyslexic readers will show within category discrimi-
nation peaks not observed in average readers. The discrimination peaks are expected for acoustic
manipulations that have previously been shown to disrupt, or destabilise perception: Ampliﬁcation
and Both.
The second hypothesis concerns the eﬀect of coupling strength on the internal structure of the
perceived categories. First, it may be deduced from the multimodal coupling hypothesis that cou-
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pling strength will increase during development due to gained linguistic experience, including lit-
eracy training. This suggests the within-category discrimination ability by dyslexic readers should
decrease with age and experience and this is in fact not contradictory to the allophone coupling
hypothesis (Bogliotti, Serniclaes, Messaoud-Galusi, & Sprenger-Charolles, 2008; Serniclaes, 2006).
Predictions based on the potential model are more precise and concern a decrease in the occur-
rence and/or size of hysteresis and enhanced contrast due to an increase in the stability of two
states at the cost of less stable states. In other words, the internal structure of the categories will
becomemore homogeneous as the coupling strength increases. This trend should be observable in
both dyslexic and average readers. The change in internal structure will be examined by looking at
the distribution of transitions for three diﬀerent age groups. Dyslexic and average readers labelled
a 20 step continuum in three conditions: (i) Sequential /bAk/ » /dAk/ » /bAk/; (ii) Sequential /dAk/
» /bAk/ » /dAk/ and (iii) Random. The predictions are that within the dyslexic and average reader
groups, homogeneity of the distributionwill increase with age as suggested by the coupling hypoth-
esis. Between those groups, the youngest children are expected to show the clearest diﬀerences
in transition distributions between dyslexic and average readers. The distributions of older dyslexic
readers should, however, resemble the distribution of the younger average readers.
The third and ﬁnal hypothesis concerns a test of the 2D potential model as a tool for statistical
inference. Can model parameters be inferred from observed data and will the ﬁtted values be in
accordancewith the hypotheses and predictions formulated so far? Themethod used to ﬁt the data
will be described andwill concern of course the coupling strength (γcs), but also the parameters that
are associated with individual diﬀerences and may vary within participants during the course of an
experiment. These parameters are the critical number of stimuli (nc) that governs when the step
function changes from 0 to 1. This causes an asymmetric slope of the potential across the entire
sequence of presented stimuli such that stimuli presented at the end of the sequence will have
deeper potential wells than those presented at the beginning of the sequence.
How large this eﬀect will be, which basically involves the size of hysteresis and enhanced contrast
jumps, is based on individual diﬀerences and is captured by the parameter ε. This suggests that the
location of any perceptual boundary, allophonic or otherwise, is expected to change within a par-
ticipant, most notably under inﬂuence of the way in which the continuum is traversed (sequentially
or in a random order). Moreover, in a loosely coupled system there should bemore evidence of un-
stable categories than in a strongly coupled system. And ﬁnally, coupling strength estimated from
the data should be related to age and reading ability analogous to Experiment 2. In order to test
this, the data from Experiment 2 will be used to estimate the parameters for each trial sequence
separately. Subsequent analyses on the parameter estimates must reveal whether the parameter
estimates are in accordance with the predictions so far.
5.8 Test 1: Allophonic boundary perception or noise perturbation?
5.8.1 Method
Participants
The participants2 in this study were the same as described in Chapter 4. The data were collected in
a two sessions on the same day. There were 78 children with valid data3 (age range 101.2 to 159.3
months) from 9 diﬀerent schools in the southeast of the Netherlands. Half of the participants (39)
2I would like to thank the students who participated in the Research Seminar 2004 of the School of Pedagogical and
Educational Science for their aid in data collection.
3One participant who completed both the identiﬁcation and discrimination studies was removed from the present
analysis (ID 804 in the data ﬁle, available here https://osf.io/a8g32). The data that was recorded in the output ﬁle for the
speech discrimination experiment was partially missing.
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were dyslexic readers as indicated by two reading tests: A timed-reading task for regular words
(“Drie-Minuten-Toets”; Verhoeven, 1995) and a timed pseudo-word reading task (“KLEPEL”; van
den Bos et al., 1994). When the child’s scores on both tests were within the 25th percentile (norm
score by age), the child was considered to have severe reading problems (see Table 4.5).
Stimuli and Acoustic Manipulations
The stimuli were based upon natural speech recordings for the words /bAk/ [container] and /dAk/
[roof] and transformed to create a 10-step /bAk/ to /dAk/ continuum (Van Beinum, Schwippert,
Been, Van Leeuwen, & Kuijpers, 2005) using the Praat program (Boersma & Weenink, 2005). The
stimuli diﬀered only with respect to the second formant transition of which the onset frequency is
gradually increased from /bAk/ to /dAk/ (see Table ref for exact values)
All the stimuli of this F2 continuum were manipulated in three manners using the Praat program
(Boersma&Weenink, 2005). First, the speech signalwas SlowedDown to 150%of its original length.
This was achieved by a Pitch Synchronous Overlap and Add (PSOLA) algorithm (see e.g., Segers &
Verhoeven, 2005). Second, the signal was Ampliﬁed by 20dB, but only the fast changing spectral
elements. The algorithm used to do this in Praat was similar to the one used by (Nagarajan et al.,
1998), who conﬁrmed this in a personal communication with Segers and Verhoeven (2002). Third,
Both manipulations were applied as is done in the FastForWord program (Nagarajan et al., 1998;
Tallal, 2004): The speech signal was slowed to 150% of its original length and all the fast transitional
elements were then ampliﬁed by 20dB. There was of course also a continuum that had None of the
manipulations applied to it. This yielded 40 diﬀerent stimuli in total.
5.8.2 Procedure
Speech perception experiment
The speech discrimination taskwas presented on a laptop computer in a quiet roomat the children’s
school. In the discrimination task, two smiley faces appeared on the laptop screen. First one face
uttered a word and then, after 500ms, the second face uttered a similar or dissimilar word. The
children were told that the second face was trying to say the same word as the ﬁrst face had said.
They were then asked to listen very carefully and decide whether the second word was the same
or not. After the utterance of the two words by the smiley faces, two frames with pictures in them
appeared on the left and the right of the screen. One of the frames contained a picture of two green
smiling faces. The other frame contained a picturewith a green smiling face and a red frowning face.
The children were told to press a designated key on the keyboard corresponding to the left or right
frame: When the two words were the same they had to press the button corresponding to the two
green smiling faces and when the two words were not the same the button with the mismatched
faces. The pictures in the frames were randomly interchanged upon each presentation. Prior to the
experimental trials, 10 practice trials were presented in which the participants received feedback.
During the experimental trials, the three types of manipulated /bAk/ and /dAk/ stimuli and the
unmanipulated stimuli were presented in same and diﬀerent pairs (pairs were always separated
three steps n the continuum). The order of the stimuli of the diﬀerent pairs was randomly varied.
Each stimulus pair was presented a total of 2 times resulting in 100 stimulus presentations (2 x 4
manipulations x 10 same/diﬀerent pairs).
Statistical Analysis
For each participant there were 80 responses of either same or diﬀerent. These data were en-
tered in a logistic multilevel model (using MLwiN version 2.1; Rasbash, Charlton, Browne, Healy, &
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Box 5.1: Measures extracted from a confusion matrix. They are used to construct the ROC and PR
curves.
Expected
diﬀerent same True Positive Rate (Sensitivity, Recall) = TPTP+FN
Observed
diﬀerent TP FP True Negative Rate (Speciﬁcity) = TNTN+FP
same FN TN Positive Predictive Value (Precision) = TPTP+FP
Cameron, 2009) with the 80 measurement occasions representing responses to a random permu-
tation of the pairs on the ordered F2 continuum at level1. The stimuli were coded in such a way that
all the same-pairs were 0, the ﬁrst diﬀerent pair (stimulus 1-3) was 1 and the last diﬀerent pair was
7 (stimulus 7-10). This means the model is evaluated relative to the same-pair responses located at
the intercept. The responses at the level of the measurement occasions were considered binomi-
ally distributed as 0 and 1 and a logit link function was used. The repeated measurements can be
thought of as clustered within the participant, who represent a second level of random variation in
the model (level2). The modelling strategy was as follows: First it was examined whether the mul-
tilevel model gave a better ﬁt than a single level model with just measurement occasion deﬁned
as a level. Then, the empty multilevel model for change was ﬁtted (M0), which in the present case
means that the zero inﬂated ﬁxed eﬀect predictor as described above was added representing the
rank order of the stimulus pair on the continuum (0-7). In a subsequentmodel (M2) it was examined
whether stimulus rank could explain random variation in the slopes of the curve at the level of the
participants (level2). If so, this means that the variation in discriminating between stimulus pairs
between participants, can be understood as random variation with respect to the average discrim-
ination curve of the entire sample. In the next step (M3) level1 and level2 covariates were added:
a dummy variable that represents the four manipulation types (level1), and a dummy variable that
represents whether participants are dyslexic or average readers (level2). In the ﬁnal modelling step
(M4) various interactions were tested including cross-level interactions between participant type
and (Browne, 2009) stimulus type. Themodels were ﬁtted usingMonte CarloMarkov Chain simula-
tion with 150,000 iterations. This number was chosen after inspecting the Raferty-Lewis diagnostic
for each parameter estimate at each modelling step and was found to yield a very safe margin for
all predicted parameters.
Classiﬁer performance: Threshold averaged ROC analysis
The predictions from the multilevel model will be analysed in the context of classiﬁer performance
by generating Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curves and Precision-Recall (PR) curves (Davis
& Goadrich, 2006; T. Fawcett, 2004 are tutorials). These analyses are based on a confusion matrix
containing hits and misses of a classiﬁer detecting the “true” or expected class of a stimulus (binary
decision problem). In the context of the present experiment the classiﬁer types are the two groups
of participants (average and dyslexic readers) who need to detect whether a stimulus pair is “same”
or “diﬀerent” for several values of the diﬀerence in acoustic parameter. The predicted responses of
the multilevel logistic model for each participant to each stimulus are considered diﬀerent thresh-
olds of classiﬁer performance. Their averaged classiﬁcation curves (hence: threshold averaged ROC
analysis) will be used to investigatewhether some stimulus type x classiﬁer type combinations show
evidence of within category discrimination. The sample averaged observed responses to each stim-
ulus pair serve as the targets in the analysis.
Box 5.1 displays a confusion matrix that can be constructed from the predicted responses of the
multilevel model for each participant and “diﬀerent” (or in ROC terminology: positive) stimulus pair
by calculating true positives (TP), true negatives (TN), false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN)
(Tripepi, Jager, Dekker, & Zoccali, 2009 contains an example of the use of logistic model predictions
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as classiﬁer outcomes in ROC analysis). Each participant or threshold generates a series of coordi-
nates in ROC space for each stimulus pair. These coordinates represent the True Positive Rate (also
known as Sensitivity or Recall) and the False Positive Rate (1-Speciﬁcity). The interpolated curve
through these coordinates is the ROC curve for a particular threshold. Imagine for example a med-
ical diagnostic procedure that uses results from a blood protein test to make a decision about the
presence of a certain medical condition. It might require Sensitivity greater than 70% (TPR > .7)
and Speciﬁcity greater than 30% (FPR > .7) to detect the medical condition. ROC curves could help
decide for which thresholds of the blood protein test results the diagnostic procedure achieves the
required sensitivity and speciﬁcity (Duca, 2005; Tripepi et al., 2009).
The Precision-Recall space is diﬀerent from ROC space in that the True Positive Rate (now dubbed
Recall) is spanned against the Positive Predictive Value (also known as Precision). In many cases,
curves in PR space provide extra information about the classiﬁer performance when dealing with
highly skewed distributions of positive and negative responses (Davis & Goadrich, 2006). This is
likely to be the case in the present study where many of the pairs that physically diﬀer from each
other are expected to be perceived as “same” due to the categorical nature of speech perception.
Based on studies in Dutch using the same (unmanipulated) stimuli as in the present study it may be
expected that just one or two stimulus pairs will be judged as diﬀerent on the level of the sample
(Van Beinum et al., 2005).
Several statistics can be obtained from the curves, the most important one being the Area Under
the Curve (AUC). A higher AUC means a better classiﬁer performance. Moreover, each stimulus
pair may be represented by a coordinate pair on the threshold averaged curve in ROC or PR space
(Fawcett, 2004). This way the curves also allow direct comparisons of stimuli with respect to their
location in ROC or PR space. The hypothesis is that the diﬀerent acoustic manipulations will yield
diﬀerent curves, possibly in interaction with experimental group. Moreover, it is expected that
the Ampliﬁed or Both stimuli will trigger a change in discriminability of some stimulus pairs, not
observed with None and Slowed Down stimuli, especially in the group of dyslexic readers. This may
manifest in discontinuities in the ROC of PR curves, or in the relative order of the stimulus pairs on
the curves. In order to make comparisons between stimuli and experimental groups the statistics
are bootstrapped to get conﬁdence intervals around the estimates (based on 1500 resamples).
5.8.3 Results
Multilevel Logistic Model & Threshold Averaged ROC Analysis
The multilevel modelling strategy converged to the ﬁnal logistic model M4 described above under
Statistical Analysis. The model contains all the main ﬁxed eﬀects and their interactions: Pair(7) x
Type(4) x Group(2). Due to the large number of ﬁxed eﬀects in the model Table 5.1 just shows the
values of the Bayesian Deviance Criterion (DIC) for models M0-M4 described above (the steps are
the same as in Table tab:6, but the rows reporting eﬀects aremore numerous). The predictions from
M4 and the results from threshold averaged ROC analyses are shown in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6
. The line graphs represent the predicted probabilities for perceiving a stimulus pair as “diﬀerent”.
The 95% conﬁdence intervals between average and dyslexic readers overlap for all stimuli in condi-
tions None and Slowed Down (Figure 5.5). There are no signiﬁcant ROC and PR space diﬀerences in
the areas under the curve (Table 5.1). The ROC and PR plots in Figure 5.5 show that pair 6 (None)
and pairs 1,6 and 7 (Slowed Down) in general trigger most unbiased responses from the average
and dyslexic readers (as they are closest to the diagonal line labelled “unbiased”). This is expected
as these stimuli are on the end-points of the stimuli.
The pattern looks rather diﬀerent in Figure 5.6b. There are now non-overlapping conﬁdence
intervals in the predicted probability plot at stimulus Pair 4 (Ampliﬁed and Both) and Pair 5 (Both).
Dyslexic readers categorize these pairs more often as the same than average readers do. At Pair 6
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Table 5.1
Model Evaluation With Discrimination Response (idD) As Dependent Variable. The Bayesian Deviance
Information Criterion Was Used For All Consecutive Models Estimated with MCMC (150,000 iterations).
D = Posterior Mean Deviance,D(φ) = Deviance of Posterior Means, pD(D−D(φ)) = Eﬀective Number
of Parameters, DIC = Deviance Information Criterion. See Text For An Explanation of the Modelling
Steps.
Mulitlevel Logistic Model
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4
D 8041.88 7985.5 7019.02 6914.24 6789.17
D(φ) 8040.8 7951.01 6965.41 6852.88 6708.45
(D −D(φ)) 1.08 34.49 53.6 61.36 80.72
DIC 8042.96 8019.98 7072.62 6975.6 6869.9
(Both) the dyslexic readers show a small increase in diﬀerent responses compared to stimulus pair 5
and 7. The conﬁdence intervals overlap (within the group, between the pairs as well as between the
groups) and these diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant. In ROC and PR space, however, Table 5.2 shows
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent AUCs between average and dyslexic readers for Ampliﬁed and Both stimulus
types. Pair 6 (Both) of the dyslexic readers has switched rank with stimulus pair 4 and in ROC space
occupies the point of completely random discrimination (0.5 TPR and 0.5 FPR). In PR space there is
a sudden drop in PPV after Pair 6. This pair no longer yields unbiased responses and in terms of TPR
ranks between Pairs 3 and 4. The rank order switch and sudden discontinuity in the curve does not
occur for average readers.
5.8.4 Conclusion & Discussion
The hypothesis under investigation was that “noise” (a noise perturbation) might yield a category
switch when stimuli on a physical continuum are evaluated. This could result in the emergence of
perceptual boundaries at values of the acoustic parameter where none would be perceived when
the noise perturbation was absent. This eﬀect was expected based on the 2D potential model in
dyslexic readers under the assumption that their speech perception may be described by a loosely
coupled system. The results provide support for the hypothesis in two ways: First, a peak in the
predicted discrimination curve of dyslexic readers was observed for stimuli of type Both. The very
same stimulus pair in the other manipulation conditions was the best, most unbiased discriminable
stimulus pair. Second, the ROC and PR curves showdiscontinuities around pair 6 and the rank orders
of the stimuli along the curve change when compared to the other types of acoustic manipulation.
This indicates the stimulus pair changed from a reliable “same” pair into a pair that is sometimes
perceived as “same” but equally often as “diﬀerent”.
Table 5.2
The Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves and Precision Recall Curves For the Four
Stimulus Types. The 95% Conﬁdence Bounds Between Parenthesis are Based on 1,500 resamples.
Manipulation Average readers Dyslexic readers
AUC (CI.95) - ROC AUC (CI.95) - PR AUC (CI.95) - ROC AUC (CI.95) - PR
None 0.85 (0.83, 0.88) 0.85 (0.83, 0.88) 0.93 (0.92, 0.95) 0.93 (0.92, 0.95)
Slowed Down 0.85 (0.82, 0.88) 0.82 (0.79, 0.85) 0.93 (0.92, 0.95) 0.93 (0.91, 0.94)
Ampliﬁed* 0.85 (0.82, 0.87) 0.65 (0.61, 0.69) 0.93 (0.92, 0.95) 0.84 (0.81, 0.87)
Both* 0.85 (0.82, 0.88) 0.61 (0.57, 0.65) 0.93 (0.92, 0.95) 0.82 (0.79, 0.85)
*Non-overlapping CI.95 between average and dyslexic readers
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It is unclear how these results can be interpreted in terms of an allophonic mode of speech per-
ception. One could make the ad-hoc hypothesis, that ampliﬁcation of fast changing spectral ele-
ments in the signal ampliﬁes the native allophonic boundary, but only in interaction with the slow-
ing down operation. Interpreting the subsequentmanipulations as an increasing noise perturbation
that destabilises the percepts as indicated by the ROC and PR curves and the results in Chapter 2,
seems the more parsimonious interpretation.
Granted, the eﬀects are small and in order to claim the 2Dpotentialmodel underlies these results,
more evidence is warranted. Experiment 2 explores the hypothesis that the internal structure of
speech sound categories changes as a function of age and reading proﬁciency. Hypothesis 3will be a
test of the validity of themodel parameters as γcs, ε and nc will be estimated from the observations
in Experiment 2.
5.9 Test 2: Internal Structure of Speech Categories is Related to Age
5.9.1 Method
Participants
The data for this study were collected over a period of two years and out of a total of 196 partici-
pants4 10 had to be excluded due to instrument failure. The data reported here are based on 186
Dutch children from 20 diﬀerent primary schools and 2 secondary schools. The group consisted of
68 girls and 127 boys, with a mean age of 132.5 months (SE = 1.0; range = 106-181 months). The
dyslexic reader group consisted of 92 children and the average or above average reader group con-
tained 94 children. The dyslexic readers diﬀered signiﬁcantly from the average readers with regard
to their reading abilities (see Table 5.3) on two reading tasks also used in the previous experiments
(the Drie-Minuten-Toets and the Klepel).
Table 5.3
Summary statistics (Mean and SE of Mean) of the 186 Participants
Average Reader Dyslexic Reader
M (SE) M (SE)
Age 132 (1.3) 133 (1.6)
DMT1 92 (2.4) 65 (2.6)
DMT2 88 (2.2) 58 (2.4)
DMT3 78 (1.9) 49 (2.0)
KLEPEL 68 (2.1) 37 (1.7)
N 94 92
Materials
As in previous studies, the stimuli were based upon natural speech recordings for the words /bAk/
[container] and /dAk/ [roof] and have been used to create a 10-step /bAk/ to /dAk/ continuum
(Van Beinum et al., 2005) using the Praat program (Boersma & Weenink, 2005). In the present
study however, the continuum was expanded to a 20-step continuum (using the Praat program)
by manipulating not only the F2 transition onset, but the F3 transition onset as well. Table 5.4
4I would like to thank the students who participated in the Research Seminar 2005 and 2006 of the School of Peda-
gogical and Educational Science fort heir aid in data collection.
134
PRINCIPLED SIMULATION OF POSITED ENTITIES & STRONG INFERENCE
Fi
gu
re
5.
5
–
Pr
ed
ic
te
d
pr
ob
ab
ili
ti
es
fo
r
pe
rc
ei
vi
ng
a
sti
m
ul
us
pa
ir
as
“d
iﬀ
er
en
t”
by
av
er
ag
e
an
d
dy
sl
ex
ic
re
ad
er
s
(le
ft
):
N
on
e
an
d
Sl
ow
ed
D
ow
n.
Th
e
gr
ap
hs
on
th
e
ri
gh
t
sh
ow
th
e
RO
C
an
d
PR
cu
rv
es
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
Se
e
te
xt
fo
r
de
ta
ils
	  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91
St
im
ulu
s P
air
Predicted Probability for Perceiving DIFFERENT
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 pr
ob
ab
ilit
y −
 N
on
e
 
 
Av
er
ag
e r
ea
de
r
Dy
sle
xic
 re
ad
er
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91
1 2 34
5
6
7
1
2 345
6
7
Fa
lse
 P
os
itiv
e R
ate
 (1
−S
pe
cif
ici
ty)
True Positive Rate (Sensitivity)
RO
C 
− N
on
e
 
 
Ra
nd
om
Un
bia
se
d
Av
er
ag
e R
ea
de
r
Dy
sle
xic
 R
ea
de
r
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Tr
ue
 P
os
itiv
e R
ate
 (R
ec
all
)
Positive Predictive Value (Precision)
PR
 − 
No
ne
 
 
Ra
nd
om
Un
bia
se
d
Av
er
ag
e R
ea
de
r
Dy
sle
xic
 R
ea
de
r
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91
St
im
ulu
s P
air
Predicted Probability for Perceiving DIFFERENT
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 pr
ob
ab
ilit
y −
 S
low
ed
 D
ow
n
 
 
Av
er
ag
e r
ea
de
r
Dy
sle
xic
 re
ad
er
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91
1 23 4
5
6
7
1
23 45
6
7
Fa
lse
 P
os
itiv
e R
ate
 (1
−S
pe
cif
ici
ty)
True Positive Rate (Sensitivity)
RO
C 
− S
low
ed
 D
ow
n
 
 
Ra
nd
om
Un
bia
se
d
Av
er
ag
e R
ea
de
r
Dy
sle
xic
 R
ea
de
r
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Tr
ue
 P
os
itiv
e R
ate
 (R
ec
all
)
Positive Predictive Value (Precision)
PR
 − 
Sl
ow
ed
 D
ow
n
 
 
Ra
nd
om
Un
bia
se
d
Av
er
ag
e R
ea
de
r
Dy
sle
xic
 R
ea
de
r
135
5.9. Test 2: Internal Structure of Speech Categories is Related to Age
Figure
5.6
–
Predicted
probabiliti
es
for
perceiving
a
sti
m
ulus
pair
as
“diﬀ
erent”
by
average
and
dyslexic
readers
(left
):
A
m
pliﬁed
and
Both.
The
graphs
on
the
right
show
the
RO
C
and
PR
curves
respecti
vely.
See
text
for
details
	  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Stimulus Pair
Predicted Probability for Perceiving DIFFERENT
Predicted probability − Amplified
 
 
Average reader
Dyslexic reader
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
12 3
4
5
6
7
12 3
4
5
6
7
False Positive Rate (1−Specificity)
True Positive Rate (Sensitivity)
ROC − Amplified
 
 
Random
Unbiased
Average Reader
Dyslexic Reader
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
3
4
5 6 7
3
4
5
6
7
True Positive Rate (Recall)
Positive Predictive Value (Precision)
PR − Amplified
 
 
Random
Unbiased
Average Reader
Dyslexic Reader
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Stimulus Pair
Predicted Probability for Perceiving DIFFERENT
Predicted probability − Both
 
 
Average reader
Dyslexic reader
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
12 3
4
5
6 7
12 3
4
5
6
7
False Positive Rate (1−Specificity)
True Positive Rate (Sensitivity)
ROC − Both
 
 
Random
Unbiased
Average Reader
Dyslexic Reader
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1
3
4
5 67
3
4
5
6
7
True Positive Rate (Recall)
Positive Predictive Value (Precision)
PR − Both
 
 
Random
Unbiased
Average Reader
Dyslexic Reader
136
PRINCIPLED SIMULATION OF POSITED ENTITIES & STRONG INFERENCE
Table 5.4
Formant Frequencies of the 20-step /bAk/-/dAk/ Continuum Used in Experiment 2.
Stimulus F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
1 500 1080 2225 3870 4500
2 | 1117 2272 | |
3 | 1154 2330 | |
4 | 1191 2383 | |
5 | 1227 2436 | |
6 | 1264 2488 | |
7 | 1301 2541 | |
8 | 1338 2593 | |
9 | 1375 2646 | |
10 | 1412 2699 | |
11 | 1448 2751 | |
12 | 1485 2804 | |
13 | 1522 2857 | |
14 | 1559 2909 | |
15 | 1596 2962 | |
16 | 1633 3015 | |
17 | 1669 3067 | |
18 | 1706 3120 | |
19 | 1743 3172 | |
20 500 1780 3225 3870 4500
shows the frequencies used for the formant transition onset at each step along the continuum. The
main reason for increasing the number of steps along the continuum is the increased information
about internal structure of the perceptual categories that could be interpreted as “hidden” stable
states, or rudimentary allophone boundaries. The decision to traverse the F2-F3 acoustic space
in an oblique, rather than in an orthogonal fashion is that the allophonic perception hypothesis
expects the allophone boundaries at speciﬁc frequency ranges in F2-F3 space (e.g., Noordenbos,
Segers, Serniclaes, Mitterer, & Verhoeven, 2012).
5.9.2 Procedure
Speech perception experiment
The speech identiﬁcation task was presented on a laptop computer in a quiet room at the children’s
school and was similar to the task used in Chapter 4. The participants were presented a smiley face
on the screen, which then uttered a word. After utterance of the word, two frames with a picture in
each appeared on the left and right of the screen. The pictures in the frames were either a roof or a
container. The pictures presented in the frames were randomly interchanged at each presentation.
Prior to the experimental trials, 10 practice trials were presented using diﬀerentwords and pictures,
whichwere al, clear exemplars, so the participants could receive feedback on their response. During
the experimental condition, there were three diﬀerent orders of presentation: (i) Sequential /bAk/
» /dAk/ » /bAk/; (ii) Sequential /dAk/ » /bAk/ » /dAk/ and (iii) Random. Each order thus consisted
of 40 trials. The random order was randomised such that both halves of twenty trials contained
stimuli 1-20. The orders were counterbalanced across participants, but a session always started
with a sequential presentation and a sequential presentation was always followed by a random
order presentation. Each order was presented twice so one participant evaluated 6 x 40 = 240
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stimuli; the 20-step continuum as a whole was thus labelled 12 times by each participant.
Statistical Analysis
The hypothesis under investigation is the change of the internal structure of the perceptual cat-
egories as a function of age and reading proﬁciency. The participants were divided into three
age groups such that the number of participants in each group was about equal. The ﬁrst group
ranged from 106 – 125, the second from 126 – 134 and the third from 135 – 181 months. What
researchers usually present in speech perception experiments is a classiﬁcation or discrimination
curve like those presented in Experiment 1 of this chapter (also see Chapter 4). The procedure used
to infer the existence of an allophone boundary is somewhat diﬀerent and involves transforming a
labelling (identiﬁcation) curve into an expected discrimination curve, which is then compared to an
observed discrimination curve (e.g. Bogliotti, Serniclaes, Messaoud-galusi, & Sprenger-charolles,
2008).
For the present study a diﬀerent analysis strategy was developed in order to better capture the
nonlinear dynamics expected by the sequential traversal of the continuum. The aim is to construct
a 2D space that represents the density of transition points along the continuum, depending on the
direction the continuum is traversed. A coordinate in this space with a high density could be for
instance (12,9) for the sequential order /bAk/ » /dAk/ » /bAk/. This indicates many participants
switch at stimulus 12 going from 1 (/bAk/) to 20 (/dAk/) and at stimulus 9 going from 20 to 1.
Parameter Space
The space is constructed in two simple steps:
1. The observed trial series of each presentation order were coded such that the starting end
of the continuumwas 0 and the opposite end was 1. The two random order sequences mea-
sured for each participant were sorted post hoc as if they were presented as one of the se-
quential orders.
2. The series were copied and (if necessary) rotated into a square matrix in such a way that
one axis represented the direction of the continuum that was traversed. The series was just
copied 20 times along the other axis. Each sequence order yields two matrices and thus four
matrices in total were created:
/dAk/ » /bAk/ » /dAk/
(i) left axis, top to bottom 20->1
(ii) bottom axis, left to right 1->20
/bAk/ » /dAk/ » /bAk/
(iii) top axis, left to right 1->20
(iv) right axis, top to bottom 20->1
The matrices were summed over participants (by age group and reader group) in order to ob-
tain the category switch density. The distributions of switch points were compared between age
groups and reading groups using the Kullback-Leibler Divergence (Kullback & Leibler, 1951) or rela-
tive entropy. K-L divergence is a non-symmetric measure of the diﬀerence between two probability
distributions and can be calculated according to equation 5.7
DKL[p(x)‖q(x)] = 〈log p(x)
q(x)
〉p =
∑
x∈X
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
(5.7)
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The K-L divergence can be understood as the information that is lostwhen one distribution is used
to estimate the other. Small divergence indicates highly similar distributions, large divergence dis-
similar distributions. The algorithm used to calculate the divergence does not require actual prob-
ability estimates, but computes divergence from observed values as long as all values occur in both
distributions (Goni, 2007). To achieve this, the frequencies at each coordinate were transformed
to the unit scale and rounded to the numbers 0.0 through 1.0 in steps of 0.1. A 95% Conﬁdence
Interval was estimated around the divergence statistic using 15,000 bootstrap replications.
5.9.3 Results
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 display the distribution densities as contour plots for each age group (3 columns)
and reader group (2 rows). To understand the ﬁgure recall how they were constructed: The left y-
axis and bottom x-axis represent the sequential presentation of /dAk/ to /bAk/ (y-axis top to bottom
20 » 1) and /bAk/ back to /dAk/ (x-axis left to right 1 » 20). For these trial series a /dAk/ response
was coded 0 and /bAk/ was coded 1, therefore the light grey area in left lower corner represents
/bAk/. The opposite coding scheme was used for /bAk/ to /dAk/ (top x-axis left to right 1 » 20) and
/dAk/ back to /bAk/ (right y-axis top to bottom 20 » 1). The light grey area in the top right corner
represents /dAk/ for these trial series. The iso lines connect the regions of the same density and are
therefore indicative of the structure of the perceptual categories: Iso lines close together indicate
a sharp transition boundary whereas interrupted or jagged iso lines represent an area which is not
smoothly deﬁned and indicate regions of greater instability. Another indicator of smoothness and
stability presented only for illustration purposes are the quiver plots overlaid on the contour plots.
The direction of the arrows was arbitrarily chosen to be in the direction of higher values. What is
more informative to note however is whether the direction they point towards is jittered from one
arrow to the next or neatly aligned. A jittered pattern is again indicative of an unstable transition
region.
Evaluated qualitatively, there appears to be a tendency for the transition point densities to con-
verge to more homogeneous areas in the older age groups. This appears to be especially the case
for the average reading group. The same holds for the smoothness of the quiver directions. The
K-L divergence statistics conﬁrm this tendency as shown in Table 5.5 In order to get a sense of the
signiﬁcance of the divergence diﬀerences between the groups, the 95% Conﬁdence Intervals can be
compared and should be non-overlapping to give a signiﬁcant diﬀerence at p < .05 (CIs can overlap
partially as long the interquartile range is not included in the interval). The ﬁrst prediction was that
the density distributions of average and dyslexic readers would become more alike as a function of
age (i.e. a “main” eﬀect of age). The youngest group (1A1D = 1.81 / 2.28) has a higher divergence
than the middle group (2A2D = 1.01 / 1.14), which is again higher than the older group (3A3D =
0.03 / 0.12). For the sequential presentation the relation is: A3D3 < A2D2 = A1D1 and for ran-
dom presentation: A3D3 < A2D2 < A1D1. This means that the response distribution of transition
points for the older age group is signiﬁcantly more similar between dyslexic and average readers
than between the younger groups.
The second prediction was that the older dyslexic readers would diverge less and less from the
younger average readers. This eﬀect is clearly present as A1D1 > A1D2 = A1D3 for both sequen-
tial and random presentation orders. The response distributions of the middle and older group of
dyslexic readers are signiﬁcantly more similar to the response distribution of the youngest average
reader group. It is possible to quantify these diﬀerences by looking at the “size” of the contour area
that encloses the light grey areas (representing either /bAk/ or /dAk/).
Finally, ﬁgure 5.8 displays a cross-section of the landscape along the diagonal running from the
lower left corner to the upper right corner. The y-axis displays the value of the contour lines encoun-
tered at each step along the continuum. There appear to be diﬀerent dips for average and dyslexic
readers along the diagonal; none of these represent a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the groups.
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Table 5.5
Formant Frequencies of the 20-step /bAk/-/dAk/ Continuum Used in Experiment 2.
K-L Divergence (CI.95)
Sequential presentation
D1 D2 D3
A1 1.81 (1.40, 2.55) 0.03 (0.01, 0.05) 0.01 (0.00, 0.03)
A2 2.02 (1.79, 2.62) 1.01 (0.73, 1.60) 0.97 (0.69, 1.48)
A3 1.15 (0.85, 1.77) 0.08 (0.05, 0.11) 0.03 (0.01, 0.06)
Random presentation
D1 D2 D3
A1 2.28 (1.79, 2.99) 0.02 (0.01, 0.03) 0.08 (0.04, 0.13)
A2 2.74 (2.49, 3.43) 1.14 (0.82, 1.68) 1.18 (0.86, 1.72)
A3 1.72 (1.32, 2.37) 0.04 (0.01, 0.08) 0.12 (0.06, 0.20)
5.9.4 Conclusion & Discussion
The aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate the age dependence of the internal structure of per-
ceptual categories as predicted by the coupling hypotheses under investigation. It was shown that
such an internal structure indeed exists and somewhat resembles a potential landscape when it
is constructed as shown in Figure 5.7and 5.8. More importantly the structure reveals diﬀerences
between average and dyslexic readers in accordance with the predictions.
The age eﬀect was previously established in kindergarteners at risk for developmental dyslexia
the context of the allophonic mode of perception (see Noordenbos et al., 2012). An important
diﬀerence with the present study is that the allophonic mode of speech perception appeared to
have been replaced by a phonemic mode of speech perception (i.e. categorical perception) in ﬁrst
grade, due to reading instruction. The age groups presented here represent children who are much
older and still, the diﬀerences in their labelling of the 20-step continuum could be quantiﬁed. Pro-
ponents of the allophonic mode of speech perception may object that no evidence of actual ‘ad-
ditional’ perceptual boundaries was presented, and they would be right. One might embark on
an endeavour to quantify the width of the contour bands or contour areas in order to ﬁnd such
boundaries, but that it not the intention of this chapter. As said earlier, the loose coupling hy-
pothesis predicts instabilities of perceptual categories that may be inferred from category switches
that emerge dynamically and are under experimental control (see Experiment 1; Case et al., 1995),
rather than static boundaries that must be uncovered in an exploratory fashion as innate formant
frequencies.
The ultimate test of the validity of the potentialmodel is of course to estimate its parameters from
the data and analyse whether these parameters are in accordance with the predictionsmade so far.
The next section introduces a novel estimation procedure for potential models and subsequently
applies this procedure to the data presented in this section.
5.10 Test 3: Parameter Estimates Must Conﬁrm Predictions
5.10.1 Method
Participants, Materials, Stimuli
The data obtained in Experiment 2 were used.
143
5.10. Test 3: Parameter Estimates Must Conﬁrm Predictions
Estimating model parameters from data: A time-dependent Hidden Markov Model
Estimating model parameters like coupling strength of two potential models from observed se-
quences of /bAk/ and /dAk/ responses is not straightforward, nor readily available as a fully de-
veloped modelling technique. A noteworthy exception is the stochastic version of the Cusp Catas-
trophe that can be ﬁtted to observed data by a maximum likelihood procedure (Grasman, Van der
Maas, & Wagenmakers, 2007). The framework of Catastrophe theory is tightly related to Potential
theory, but the 2D potential model presented here is in a way a “double” cusp, or a multivariate
catastrophe of the umbilical kind. The current form does not exist as a known Catastrophe. More-
over, the parameters ε andnc that need to be estimated are not easily translated to “regression”-like
weights like k, γcs and the “ﬁxed” parameters (1/2 and 1/10, see eq. 5.6).
In this section I will therefore propose a novel method that combines two well-known frame-
works: Hidden Markov Models (HMM) and so called brute force Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(bf-MLE). The HMM approach is used to model observed sequences of binary or multinomial ran-
dom variables in which the observations are considered emissions generated by unobservable (hid-
den) states (cf., Durbin, Eddy, Krogh, & Mitchison, 1998). Suppose we use a biased coin to decide
to roll 1 die on heads (80% of tosses) or roll 2 dice on tails (20% tosses). Then the hidden states
of this system are Heads and Tails and its observable emissions are 1 through 12. The transition
matrix T contains the probabilities of changing from heads to tails at each toss and the emission
matrix E contains the probabilities of an observed emission being generated by a hidden state. In
this example T and E are:
T =
[
PH→H PH→T
PT→H PT→T
]
=
[
0.80 0.20
0.80 0.20
]
E =
[
1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1/36 2/36 3/36 4/36 5/36 6/36 5/36 4/36 3/36 2/36 1/36
]
Suppose an observed sequence Y consists of three emissions {1, 6, 9}, then the posterior state
probabilities of each emission in the sequence are:
λ =
[
1 0.83 0
0 0.17 1
]
Based on these probabilities the most probable path through this HMM resulting in the observed
emissions is the state sequence {H,H, T}. There is also a less probable path through states {H,T, T}.
Figure ?? shows the paths through the HMM as a Trellis diagram and reports how to calculate the
likelihood of the sequence given a speciﬁc path (1), or all possible paths (2) through the HMMwith
parameter set Lambda = {pi, T,E}.
An HMM is memory-less in the sense that previous states do not inﬂuence the probabilities of
future states and this is of course quite contrary to the purpose of the potential model presented in
this chapter. The framework of transitions between hidden states that can generate emissions how-
ever appears rather appropriate: There are hidden stable states, wells in the potential landscape
that can generate one of two emissions: /bAk/ or /dAk/. The diﬀerence with the HMM is that the
potential landscape changes as the k parameter changes with each stimulus presentation. This im-
plies that a transition and emission matrix should be constructed for each stimulus presentation
that somehow reﬂect the probability of a transition from one state to another based on a previous
trial and the probability of a response being emitted by a state given the current trial. Deﬁned as
such this model may be described as an HMM with time-dependent emission and probability ma-
trices. Box 5.2 gives a mathematical description of the model setup as a simulation of the present
experiment in which 40 trials of a 20-step /bAk/-/dAk/ continuum are presented in sequential or
random order to average and dyslexic readers.
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πH=.80 H=.17 H=.17 H=0.0 . . . q
(n)
i
πT =.20 T=0.0 T=.14 T=.11 . . . q
(n)
j
1 6 9 . . . Y (n)k
n=0 n=1 n=2 n=3 . . . n = N
.80
.20.20
.20
Time
1. Joint likelihood of Y
(n)
k and a path Q = {q(n)i→j} (e.g. dotted lines) through HMM (Λ):
L = P (Y,Q|Λ) = P (Q|Λ) ∗ P (Y |Q,Λ) (Bayes)
L = (.80) ∗ (.20 ∗ .20) ∗ (.17 ∗ .14 ∗ .11) = .00008
2. Likelihood of Y
(n)
k given this HMM with parameters Λ:
L =
∑
all Q
P (Y,Q|Λ)
L = (.80) ∗ (.20 ∗ .20) ∗ (.17 ∗ .14 ∗ .11) + (.80) ∗ (.80 ∗ .20) ∗ (.17 ∗ .17 ∗ .11) = .0005
Figure 5.10 – A Trellis diagram of the HMM in which the outcomes of a biased coin toss represent the
hidden states of the model (qi). The states are associated with observable emissions Yk in this example
the numbers 1 to 12. The diagram shows the prior probabilities pi (at n = 0), the probability that a
state emitted the observation Yk at time=n and the state transition probabilities (above the arrows).
Assumewedivide the potential landscape into four quadrants that represent four possible hidden
states qi. More precisely, a hidden state qi is deﬁned as the quadrant of the potential landscape
where an imaginary ball settle, should it be dropped from an arbitrary location above the landscape.
The transition probabilities from state q1 to state q2 can then be deﬁned as the number of balls
ending up in q2 that were initially released over q1. If q2 happens to be a deep potential well, for
instance in the case of k = −1 or k = 1, all the balls dropped over q1 would end up in q2 and
the probability to switch from q1 to q2 would be 1. For other parameter settings things could be
very diﬀerent, for instance when k = kc the balls dropped over q1 are likely to remain in q1 and
a transition to another state has a low probability. The transition matrix is thus a 4x4 matrix, its
rows represent the quadrant the balls were dropped from and its columns represent the quadrants
the balls end up in. In the ﬁrst situation sketched above cell 1,2 of the matrix would contain a 1,
denoting that all balls dropped above q1 end up in q2. In the second situation cell 1,2would probably
contain a 0, indicating none of the balls dropped in q1 ended up in q2. In the estimation procedure
a total of 16 balls will be dropped above each quadrant, 64 in total.
Figure 5.11 is an example of this procedure and contains the two situations just discussed. The
ﬁgure shows 10 trials that are simulated for parameter settings γcs = 0, ε = 0.5 and nc = 10, the
simulation starts at k = -1. Shown are the potential landscapes with drop points and the path an
imaginary ball would follow through the landscape were it dropped at that point. The bar graph
below the landscape displays where balls dropped over each quadrant eventually settle. For the
ﬁrst stimulus the result is very clear and resemble the ﬁrst situation described above: All balls end
up in q4 whichwe associatewith either /bAk/ or /dAk/ as the end-points of the continuum. Stimuli 8
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Box 5.2: Deﬁnition of the Hidden Markov Model with time-dependent transition and emission
probabilities used to simulate the experiments. See text for details.
Given an observed response sequence Y
(t)
k , and simulated Λ〈ε,nc,γCS〉 :
L
(
Λ〈ε,nc,γCS〉‖Y (t)k
)
=
|Y (t)|∏
t=1
f
(
Y
(t)
k ‖Λ〈ε,nc,γCS〉
)
let

N = 40
ε = −.5, . . . , .5
nc = 10, . . . , 30
γCS = 0, . . . , 1
Λ〈ε,nc,γCS〉 = {Φ,Θ,Π}
λ
(t=1)
pi = P
(
θ(t=1) = θ
(t=1)
pi |Y (t=1)k
)
= pii
λ
(t)
i = P
(
θ(t) = θ
(t)
i |Y (t)k
)
λ
(t+1)
j = P
(
θ(t+1) = θ
(t+1)
j |Y (t+1)k
)
Assume :
∀ Y (t)k ∈ {/bAk/, /dAk/} : V (x, y)〈ε,nc,γCS〉 ` λ(t)piij ∴
θ(t) = argmax
piij
λ
(t)
piij
Then the Maximum Likelihood Estimate of the tuple 〈ε, nc, γCS〉 given Y (t)k is defined as :
L
(
Λ〈ε,nc,γCS〉‖Y (1)k ,…, Y (N)k
)
=
N−1
m=1
∏N
n=2
(
φ
λ
(m)
j →λ
(n)
j
θ
(n)
λj
pii
)
ln L
(
Λ〈ε,nc,γCS〉‖Y (1)k ,…, Y (N)k
)
=
N−1
m=1
∑N
n=2
ln
(
φ
λ
(m)
j →λ
(n)
j
θ
(n)
λj
pii
)
∴
〈ε, nc, γCS〉MLE = argmax
ε,nc,γCS
ln L
(
Λ〈ε,nc,γCS〉‖Y (1)k ,…, Y (N)k
)
〈ε, nc, γCS〉MLE = argmax
ε,nc,γCS
N∑
n=1
ln P
(
Y
(1)
k ,…, Y
(N)
k |Λ〈ε,nc,γCS〉
)
and 9 show a diﬀerent pattern, akin to the second example described above: now all the balls settle
in the same quadrant they were dropped over. These parameter settings should yield Enhanced
Contrast behaviour (because ε = 0.5), which is indeed likely as the multi-stable landscape presents
itself early in the trial series.
Apart from transition probabilities there are also emission probabilities that link the transition
matrix to actual observations. The emission matrix in the present case is 4 rows by 2 columns; the
latter represent the observable states (/bAk/ and /dAk/). Its rows represent the probability that
the /bAk/ or /dAk/ can be observed, given that the model is in the state represented by the row
(q1 to q4). Due to the way the potential model is constructed, there are two hidden states that will
represent either the observable sates most often. These quadrants are q2 and q4, the only stable
minima that exist at the extremes of the continuum. The other two hidden states are the spurious
states, by-products of the coupling of the two potential landscapes. It is however possible, and this
was the reason for choosing this estimation scheme, that a switch from /bAk/ to /dAk/ was caused
by hidden state q3 or q1. In the case of stimulus 1 in Figure 5.11, the entire second column will
contain a 1 because no matter in which state the model is, we will always observe emission 2. For
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stimulus 8 in the same ﬁgure the emission matrix looks a bit diﬀerent. Given that the system is in q2
or q4 the likelihood of observing the associated observation is 1. However, by deﬁnition q1 and q3
cannot emit an observable state by themselves, so the other cells in the matrix are 0. Another way
to say this is that at each trial the model’s initial state probability is always the observed label on
the previous trial and q1 and q3 are not associated with any category labels. The only occasions in
which q1 and q3 appear with probabilities in the emission matrix are when a ball was dropped over
q2 or q4 and settled in q1 or q3. This signals a transition of states and perhaps of perceived category,
as is for instance the case with stimulus 10 in Figure 5.11. Several balls dropped over q4 end up in
q1 and q3, this contributes to the likelihood of observing emission state associated with q2.
The clue to adding a “memory” to this HMMmodel is pretty straightforward. As the initial state
probabilities we can use the probabilities associated with previously observed emission. Obviously
this can only be done for trials > 1 and the starting state probabilities just represent the ﬁrst observa-
tion at probability 1. There is onemajor diﬀerence to the context of regular HMMmodel ﬁtting that
makes this possible; the potential model can be simulated for a large range of parameter settings
so that the matrices for each trial sequence, for each parameter setting are known in advance. The
algorithm enumerates through all the simulated parameter values and calculates the likelihood of
an observed trial series using the transition and emission matrices. After all the parameter settings
have been evaluated, the parameter tuple that yielded the highest likelihood for the trial series is
selected. Box 5.3 explains how the maximum likelihood of an observed sequence was obtained
(Myung, 2003 is a tutorial).
5.10.2 Procedure
Parameter Estimation and Hypotheses
The potential model was simulated using Matlab R2012a (The MathWorks, 2012). First let’s con-
sider which parameters to include in the simulation. The value of parameter ε governs the slope of
the potential landscape through its eﬀect on k and therefore is decisive in observing hysteresis or
enhanced contrast behaviour (cf. Tuller et al., 1994). The parameternc aﬀects at which stimulus the
eﬀect of ε on the slope of the potential becomes noticeable and is therefore indicative of the size
of the diﬀerence between category switches up and down the continuum. If we were to estimate
“just” the parameter ε and ﬁx nc at 20 (i.e. after which the continuum is traversed in the opposite
direction) valuable information might be lost. Therefore ε was estimated as a restricted parameter
taking on three values in order to grossly capture the nonlinear behaviour: at -.5 we observe hys-
teresis, at 0 we observe something akin to a critical boundary at .5 we observe enhanced contrast.
The parameter nc was ﬁtted for values 10 to 30 in steps of 1 (21 values). If ε = 0, the value of nc
cannot be estimated because after nc there is no change in slope by the extra term ε ∗ (λ − λf )
added to k (see eq. refeq53). So for ε = 0, nc was set ﬁxed to 20. The coupling strength γcs was
simulated for parameter values 0 (no coupling) to 1 (full coupling) in steps of .05 (21 parameter
values). For these parameter ranges the experiment needs to be simulated 2x21x21 + 1x21x1 =
903 times. Each simulation starts at k = −1 and concerns 40 stimuli of a 20 step continuum. The
20 step values for λ representing the location in F2-F3 space are linearly equivalent to the values
reported in Table Step over a range of 0 to 2 (with λf ﬁxed at 2). These values for λ give a value for
the slope that varies from kλ = 0, n = 1 = −1 to kλ = 2,n = 20 = 0 to kλ = 0, n = 40 = −1.
For other parameter settings the value of k depends on ε and nc.
For each of the 903 parameter combinations, the transition and emission matrices of 40 trials
needed to be calculated. A total of 36,120 potential landscapes were generated). The parameters
obtained by maximum likelihood for each observed trial series were subsequently analysed in a
linear mixed eﬀects model using γcs and nc in separate analyses as the dependent variable. In both
models ε (as a three level factor), age (as a continuous covariate), presentation order (as a three
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Box 5.3: Deﬁnition of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator used to estimate parameters ε and γcs
of the 2D potential model for each observed experimental trial sequence. See text for details.
Number of simulated stimuli − N = {40}
Trial indices − m = 1, . . . , (N − 1) and n = 2, . . . , N
Hidden states − Q = {qi}, i = 1, . . . , 4 :
qi ∈ {I(+,+),II(-,+),III(-,-),IV(+,-)} of V (x, y)〈ε,nc,γCS〉
Transition probabilities − Φ =
{
φi→j = P (q
(n)
j |q(m)i )
}
Φqi(m,n)−−−−→qj =

P
(m,n)
q1,q1 · · · P (m,n)q1,qj
...
. . .
...
P
(m,n)
qi,q1 · · · P (m,n)qi,qj
 : |Q|∑
qj=1
P (m,n)qi,qj = 1
Observable emissions − O = {ok}, k = 1, . . . , 2 : ok ∈ {/bAk/, /dAk/}
Emission probabilities − Θ =
{
θjk = θj(ok) = P (o
(n)
k |q(n)j )
}
Θ(n)ok,qj =

P
(n)
o1,q1 · · · P (n)ok,q1
...
. . .
...
P
(n)
o1,qj · · · P (n)ok,qj
 : |O|∑
ok=1
P (n)ok,qj = 1
Initial state probabilities − Π = {pii = P (q(m=1)i )}
Time− dependent HMM − Λ = {Φ,Θ,Π}
level factor) and reading group (as a two level factor) were used as predictors. The random eﬀects
structure contained two unrelated sources of random variation around the intercept: participant ID
and response label (0-1) nested within stimulus number (1-20). To ﬁt these models the R statistical
software (R Core Team, 2012) was used with the nlme package for (non)linear mixed eﬀect models
(Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Core Team, 2012) and the multcomp package (Hothorn, Bretz,
&Westfall, 2008) to conduct themultiple comparisons after lmemodelling. The general strategy for
modelling experiments with crossed random eﬀects was followed (see Baayen, Davidson, & Bates,
2008 for details).
The most important hypothesis to be tested is the coupling hypothesis: Examine whether the
ﬁtted values for γcs are related to age and reading group. Based on the model, but also on the
results from Experiments 1 and 2, the average readers were expected to show a stronger positive
relationship between γcs and age than the dyslexic readers. Also, coupling strength was considered
as a structural variable that should be rather consistent within a participant and within levels of
age. More speciﬁc, the general eﬀect of age on coupling strength should not be very diﬀerent
when conditioned on covariates like the order of presentation or the type of nonlinear behaviour.
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Figure 5.12 – The results of parameter estimation. Parameters γcs and nc are shown for levels of ε in
separate ﬁgures. The top row pertains to sequentially presented trial series, the bottom row to series
presented in random order. The bins are colour coded to represent the frequency of occurrence of a
certain γcs, nc tuple. See text for details.
If the parameters for coupling strength would greatly diﬀer in range when evaluated within these
groups, this would pose a serious problem for the model assumptions so far.
The critical number of stimuli nc beyondwhich the eﬀects of ε start to dominate the behaviour of
themodel by adjusting the slope of the potential landscape, is expected to vary within a participant,
probably even taking on rather diﬀerent values for each sequence of trials observed within one par-
ticipant. Especially when nc would be conditioned on the covariates for which γcs is supposed to
stay rather constant. More speciﬁcally: A relation between age and nc is expected for sequentially
presented stimuli, but with a diﬀerent sign of slope for Hysteresis and Enhanced Contrast. Trial
series classiﬁed as Hysteresis (ε = .05) should show a high nc at a young age signifying a large gap
along the continuum for the delayed switch. The size of this gap should decrease with age under
inﬂuence of the increasing coupling strength. The opposite pattern should be observed for sequen-
tial trial series classiﬁed as Enhanced Contrast (ε = −.05). Now nc should start at a low value and
should increase with age. The general expected eﬀect of reading group is that irrespective of the
sign of the slope, the average readers slopes are larger. In the case of no bias (ε = 0) there should
be no relation between nc and age as this value was ﬁxed at 20. Due to the random eﬀects in the
lme model, we could observe some ﬂuctuations around this value.
For trial series presented in random order there is, contrary to the case of γcs estimation, no
reason to expect a relation between nc and age. The random order series were all put back in
sequential order before they were submitted to the ﬁtting procedure. There are a large number
of stimuli along the continuum (20) and the randomisation was done within each half of the 40
trial sequences, so nonlinear categorisation behaviour is indeed expected. In principle though, any
nonlinear categorisation behaviour should be regarded as partially accidental, partially due to ran-
dom participant characteristics interacting with the experimental procedure (e.g., Cox, Hasselman,
& Seevinck, 2011) and partially due to γcs.
5.10.3 Results
The results of the estimation procedure are graphically displayed in Figure 5.12. Each bin in the
graphs represents a (γcs, nc) parameter tuple that was observed at least once, the colour codes the
frequency with which the tuple occurs. Overall, a wide range of parameter values was estimated.
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Figure 5.13 – The most relevant interaction eﬀects predicted for Coupling Strength by the model sum-
marised in Table The two sequential orders used in the experiment were merged to present the eﬀects
for all sequential order trial series in the data set (top row).
An unexpected result is the large diﬀerence in amount of trial series estimated for diﬀerent lev-
els of ε: The majority of trial series are estimated as ε = 0.5. What was expected is that the trial
series estimated to show Hysteresis (ε = - 0.5) appear to coincide with positive nc, or ‘late’ jumps.
Enhanced Contrast (ε = 0.5) more frequently co-occurs with negative values for nc indicating ‘early’
jumps. Remember though that nc does not designate the actual category switch, it indicates when
the inﬂuence of ε will be noticeable.
The results of the interactions predicted by the linear mixed eﬀect model with coupling strength
as a dependent variable and age, reading group, presentation order and ε as covariates are shown
in Table 5.7. The 95% Highest Posterior Density Intervals (also known as the Bayesian Credible
Interval), together with the covariate estimates (MCMC mean) and posterior p-values (pMCMC)
were obtained using 15,000 MCMC replications. In Figure 5.13 the model predictions of the most
important interactions are displayed. For presentation convenience, the two sequential orders of
presentation were merged together and are displayed as a separate SEQUENTIAL subset of Trial
Series (top row of Figure 5.13). The coloured bands around the prediction lines represent the 95%
HPD interval estimated from the posterior MCMC distribution. Analogously to γcs Table 5.8 and
Figure 5.14 show the results of the lme model ﬁt with nc as the dependent variable.
It is of course possible that the ﬁt results were obtained purely based on the dynamics between
the two most stable states. Figure ?? shows the posterior state probabilities (log transformed and
summed) for the three age groups (A/D1, A/D2, A/D3) as used in Experiment 2. The ﬁgures show
participant group (rows) and presentation order (columns) for each age group. The posterior prob-
abilities were obtained for each trial using the results from the ﬁtting procedure (i.e. the most
likely parameters). Each graph shows the 40 trials of each experiment on the x-axis and the rows
represent states of quadrant Q2, Q1+Q3 and Q4 (see Figure 5.11) of the potential landscape. The
colouring indicates the likelihood that an observed response /bAk/ or /dAk/ was emitted from state
Q1-Q4 (with Q1 andQ3 representing the spurious states). What can be seen is that as age increases,
the row of the spurious states becomes lighter especially for the average readers. This indicates the
observed trial series are less likely to have been generated by a hidden state for older participants,
whereas for the dyslexic readers this likelihood is higher. This is in accordance with the reported
eﬀects of increase in coupling strength with age, which should lead to less relative stability of the
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Figure 5.14 – The most relevant interaction eﬀects predicted for Coupling Strength by the model sum-
marised in Table 5.7. The two sequential orders used in the experiment were merged to present the
eﬀects for all sequential order trial series in the data set (top row).
spurious states Q1 and Q3.
This eﬀect is quantiﬁed in Table 5.9 by correlating the likelihood for each group in the graph with
the reading test outcome measures (Klepel, DMT1, DMT2, DMT3). Negative correlations indicate
a relation between higher reading test performance and less likelihood that the trial series was
generated based on spurious, or hidden states. Correlations are signiﬁcant only for A3.
5.11 Conclusion & Discussion
The novel method for estimating the parameters of a 2D potential model introduced in this section
was successful on several accounts: 1) The time dependent HMM framework yielded unambiguous
maximum likelihood estimates for the observed trial series. 2) The obtained estimates were mean-
ingful and in accordance with previous empirical ﬁndings and predictions based on the coupling
hypothesis.
The most important ﬁnding was the conﬁrmation that age is positively associated with coupling
strength, and that this association is stronger for average readers than for dyslexic readers. A second
important result is that the speciﬁc role hypothesised for the parameters in the model seems to be
accurate: Coupling strength is a structural parameter, relatively constant within a participant or par-
ticipant group. The other parameters do vary within participants and participant groups grossly in
the direction that was expected. Figure 5.13 shows the speciﬁc predictions for the relation between
age and nc seem to be conﬁrmed for the sequential trial series, although the Enhanced Contrast
series show no association with age for dyslexic readers. These results also showed that the diﬀer-
ences between average and dyslexic readers in the size of early or delayed category switches are
expected to be lager for older children. These diﬀerences can only be revealed to exist however
when presentation order is sequential, not random.
Finally, the ﬁtted results were used to obtain state probabilities. This is an important clue to
whether the hypothesised spurious states actually play a role in generating the observed sequence.
When subjects were aggregated at the level of the trials in the experiment (Figure ??) there was
152
PRINCIPLED SIMULATION OF POSITED ENTITIES & STRONG INFERENCE
indeed a visible trend of decreasing likelihood of states Q1 and Q3 emitting the responses with
age. This trend was corroborated when the responses of each individual participant were corre-
lated with reading test performance. This ﬁnal test provides the link to the symptoms associated
with developmental dyslexia: The global trend is that a low likelihood of spurious states inﬂuencing
speech perception performance is associated with age (i.e. coupling strength). In average readers
this trend is statistically signiﬁcant, not so for the dyslexic readers where this trend is however vis-
ible as the correlations clearly increase with age. These results appear to mimic the results from
Experiment 2 where dyslexic readers lag behind with respect to the average readers increase in
variables associated with coupling strength.
An unexpected result was the distribution of trial series over values for ε. The majority of trial
series, irrespective of presentation order, was classiﬁed as Enhanced Contrast. The most plausible
reason for this is that the values atwhich εwas ﬁxedwere not chosen correctly. Figure 5.13hints this
might be the case as there are a considerable number of Enhanced Contrast trial series estimated at
nc values one would expect for Hysteresis trial series. The reason for a ”wrong choice” for εmight
be that presentation order /bAk/ » /dAk/ was considered symmetrical to /dAk/ » /bAk/. Table 5.7
and 5.8 reveal this might not be the case; themain eﬀect of B > D > B on γcs and nc is not signiﬁcant,
but D > B > D is signiﬁcant in both cases. Generating a parameter library with a larger range of ε
values may solve this.
The suggestion to create a larger library lays bare an important practical drawback of this estima-
tion method: It is computationally heavy. Finding the parameter estimates for the entire sample
(including simulation and construction of the transition and emission matrices) can take more than
6 hours on a computerwith a 2.3Ghz Intel i6with 4GB of RAM. There ismuch room for improvement
and eﬃciency of the method. One can imagine using a smaller pre-generated parameter space to
get a gross estimate of initial parameter values which can be fed into a more commonminimisation
algorithm that can ﬁnd the best parameters by dynamically simulating and calculating the likelihood
of an observed series.
Another fact that may be seen as a shortcoming is that there was no model selection strategy.
What if a linear model were better ﬁtting? It should be possible to do some kind of model selection
if the potential landscape could be transferred into a stochastic version like was done for the Cusp
Catastrophe (Grasman et al., 2007;Wagenmakers,Molenaar, Grasman, Hartelman, & van derMaas,
2005) and the HKB model (Schöner, Haken, & Kelso, 1986). That is, however, beyond the scope of
this chapter.
5.12 General Discussion
Well established and more recent phenomena in the empirical record pertaining to the relation-
ship between speech perception and literacy development were re-evaluated and interpreted in
terms of coupled potential functions representing the categorisation of some physical continuum
by separatemodalities or processes operating on diﬀerent functional levels of the perception-action
system. This notion of a coupling factor controlling the interaction of several processes or sources
of information that is related to age is not new. Age often takes on the role of a collective variable
summarising developmental maturation, academic history, life experience, etc. For instance, the
cooperativity term used in the dynamic ﬁeld model of infant perservative reaching, is such an age
or maturation related term that governs whether the model behaves purely input driven (weak co-
operativity) or whether processes on diﬀerent timescales interact (high cooperativity) to deﬁne the
overall model behaviour (see Thelen, Schöner, & Scheier, 2001).
Studying the temporal dynamics of speech sound categorisation as was done in Experiment 2
lays bare these diﬀerences and may warrant investigation into targeted interventions at a later age
than is currently common. This explanation for the emergence of apparent discrete perceptual (or
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action) categories is very diﬀerent from accounts that represent them somewhere in the nervous
system or genes as a collection of perceptual codes of the boundaries of the categories. The re-
sults presented in this chapter seriously question both the discreteness and hardwired nature of
perceptual categories:
Adding “noise” to the perceptual process can induce category switches, such that for one and the
same value of a physical dimension, two diﬀerent categories can be perceived (Experiment 1). This
could be interpreted as within-category discrimination and evidence for a perceptual boundary.
The internal structure of perceptual categories, and the boundary between themmeasured along
a physical dimension is not static, but dynamic. The structure inside a category does not start out as
a smoothly deﬁned space, which could be expected if millions of years of evolutionary eﬀort were
put into storing such boundary codes in genes and the nervous system. Rather, categories become
smooth and well deﬁned under inﬂuence of learning and development. This processes is subtle
and continues over a wide age range (Experiment 2). Although previous studies acknowledged in-
ﬂuence of learning such as literacy training on the perception of speech sounds (e.g. Noordenbos
et al., 2012), a much shorter time range is assumed to cause disappearance of diﬀerences between
average and dyslexic readers with respect to subtle speech perception diﬀerences such as within
category discrimination. Studying the temporal dynamics of speech sound categorisation as was
done in Experiment 2 lays bare these diﬀerences and may warrant investigation into targeted inter-
ventions at a later age than is currently common.
An interaction dominant model with associated coupling hypothesis is able to predict and ex-
plain observed speech sound categorisation behaviour by average and dyslexic readers. The model
is based on a common class of potential functions frequently used to describe transitions between
behavioural modes of systems under study in the physical, chemical and biological disciplines of
science. The model predictions are made without invoking complex schemes of evolutionary in-
formation storage and retrieval. Its main assumption may be summarised as follows: Humans are
able to divide any perceivable physical dimension into apparent static and discrete categories (when
they are properly encouraged to do so by an experimenter).
What remains to be discussed is a larger theoretical framework for the interaction-dominant
coupling hypothesis. To claim phonemes are not innate entities stored somewhere as information
and even that they are not the higher order collective variable, by which humans perceive speech
sounds, demands an alternative perspective.
5.12.1 The Ugly Duckling strikes back
Human speech is a complex signal, especially when taking into account the meaning it may convey
as signal of communication. There are many parallels between human speech and bird vocalisa-
tions, including their use as a carrier of meaning: From the way chicks learn about local language
variations by listening to adult birds, to the neurobiology of the bird song (Doupe & Kuhl, 1999).
Especially interesting is the research into the phenomenon observed in ducklings who, after they
just hatched, will only follow a mother duck if she produces the calls made by its native species
(Gottlieb, 1991). Naturally, this has been interpreted as an innate ability, much like what has been
discussed is assumed for human speech perception: The ability to perceive a signal of such com-
plexity immediately after birth (hatching), must have been programmed by nature.
Careful studies show this is not the case at all. Duckling eggs were hatched in isolation, in or-
der to rule out any auditory stimulation from its environment. This increased the probability of
a duckling following the native call of another species somewhat, but not dramatically (Gottlieb,
1987). Further experiments with complete auditory deprivation yielded similar results. A remark-
able experimental procedure was employed to provide the deﬁnitive answer. While the duckling
was hatching inside the egg, its vocal cords were glued with temporary glue (devocalised) in order
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to prevent it from making any vocalisations while in the egg. This proved to be the causal factor
for the emergence of the native call perceptual category: A duckling has to produce and perceive
its own vocalisations while hatching in order to be able to recognise a call as its own (Dmitrieva &
Gottlieb, 1994; Gottlieb, 1987). The necessary coupling is one of speech production and speech
perception as alluded to in the description of the potential model presented in this chapter.
This phenomenon was studied in humans, yielding the famous result in which a speciﬁc text read
bymothers during pregnancywas preferred by infants over a novel text (DeCasper & Spence, 1986).
This result just concerns auditory experience (not production, which is more complicated in mam-
mals) and is not a test of speciﬁc speech sounds like phonemes. A recent study examined on aver-
age 33-hour-old infants from Sweden and the USA on their perception of native English and Swedish
vowels (Moon, Lagercrantz, & Kuhl, 2012). The infants had a preference for the non-native vow-
els or vowel prototypes indicating the native vowels were already familiar to them. These results
were interpreted in the context of the perceptual-magnet theory (Iverson & Kuhl, 2000), because
infants also preferred phonetic prototypes of non-native vowels over native vowel prototypes. The
perceptual magnet theory states there are innate speech sound prototypes that represent the “ini-
tial state” of the speech code (Kuhl, 1991), which will be changed by exposure to speech sounds
perceived in the environment.
The argument for innate exemplar speech sounds comes from the observation that perceptual
magnet eﬀects cannot be found in monkey (Kuhl, 1991). The little ducklings have shown however
that what is innate, is more likely form and shape, or structure rather than anticipation on the
outcomes of a perceptual process, or dynamical patterns. Because of the speciﬁcs of the body
of the duckling, because of the speciﬁcs of the egg its mother produced, because of the laws of
physics, the duckling develops the ability to recognise a complex auditory signal once it hatches.
This is an example of nonlinear causation (Gottlieb, 1991), that gives rise to emergent properties and
behavioural patterns in interaction-dominant systems. Nonlinear causation refers to the fact that
stable and consistent forms and behaviour can emerge (or disappear) without apparent eﬃcient
causes in complex living systems (e.g. through reproduction, during development or in real-time
interaction with others). Such dynamical patterns, like a speech sound category can only emerge
due to a structure. The suggestion that is implied by innate speech sounds is that the body somehow
contains within itself, those dynamical patterns as a structure as well. A mathematical equation
does not contain all the patterns it can produce, the equation is the structure and the pattern resides
in the interaction with time and other processes, but not as a separate entity. It seems to me that
a change process like the evolution of species by natural selection can only eﬃciently provide a
structure that allows dynamical patterns to emerge with a certain likelihood (e.g. development of
a physical body conﬁgured such that stable “initial states” can emerge in a controlled environment
like a womb or an egg). Storing patterns like speech sounds that are strongly emergent due to
nonlinear causation as separate entities within the very structure from which they can also emerge
dynamically seems… a highly improbable choice for a natural process.
5.12.2 Mismatched perseveration
In the introduction to this study I questioned the interpretation of the (sometimes decades old) em-
pirical evidence of infant speech perception on which the allophone-coupling hypothesis is based.
A recent physiological study of the brain provided evidence for allophone perception in children at-
risk for dyslexia (Noordenbos, Segers, Serniclaes, Mitterer, & Verhoeven, 2012b), using the so-called
mismatch negativity (MMN) paradigm, sometimes called error related negativity. This is a technique
that is widely used in neuroscience, but when viewed from the perspective of potential model like
the one presented in this chapter, its validity should be questioned. This can of course have grave
consequences for the interpretation of results obtained using the technique. The paradigm en-
tails the presentation of a stimulus that is repeated several times, after which a novel stimulus is
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presented. The novel stimulus is a mismatch with respect to the preceding sequence and elicits
a typical brain potential that may be observed as a negative peak in the ERP, hence the term mis-
match or error-related negativity. Speech perception may be studied in this paradigm by taking as
the repeated and novel stimuli, sounds that are very similar, or close with respect to their order-
ing on some auditory continuum as discussed throughout this dissertation (Cheour-Luhtanen et al.,
1995). Observation of a MMN related ERP would point towards a successful discrimination of the
speech sounds; its absence would be interpreted as the brain not recognising a novel stimulus was
presented.
The MMN response is measurable in infants even when they are asleep. Prospective studies
have reported associations between reading ability at various stages of literacy development and
infant speech discrimination measured in newborns to 17-month olds (Been, Van Leeuwen, & Van
Herten, 2008; Guttorm, Leppänen, Hämäläinen, Eklund, & Lyytinen, 2011; Lyytinen et al., 2005;
Molfese, 2000; Neuhoﬀ et al., 2012; Pihko et al., 1999; Richardson, Leppänen, Leiwo, & Lyytinen,
2003; Tsao, Liu, & Kuhl, 2004; van Alphen et al., 2004). Interestingly, van Leeuwen et al. (2008) and
other studies by this group (Been et al., 2008; Leeuwen, Been, Kuijpers, Zwarts, & Maassen, 2006;
van Herten et al., 2008) used the same speech contrast (/bAk/, /dAk/) based on the same stimuli
used throughout this dissertation (cf. Beinum, Schwippert, Been, Leeuwen, & Kuijpers, 2005). How
can this large body of empirical evidence be interpreted in terms of the potential model? Most
importantly, I question whether the paradigmmeasures a novelty response that can be interpreted
as the perception of a mismatch or an error with respect to the previous stimuli. I suggest the
paradigm is in fact a perseveration context that measures whether the novel stimulus is capable of
perturbing the state the system settled in due to repetition. Consider a potential function with two
possible states that represent perception of the repeated and the novel stimulus (Figure 5.16). The
potential landscape changes under inﬂuence of repetition of a stimulus such that the state gains
stability at each repeated presentation n (e.g. Equation 5.2). At some critical value nc the novel
stimulus is presented, changing the potential landscape in such a way that the other state becomes
a competing stable option. In Equation 5.2, the impact of the change in relative stability depends
on the parameter .
Repeated
x
V(x)
n = 1
Repeated
x
V(x)
n = 2
Repeated
x
V(x)
n = 3
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x
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n = 4
Novel
x
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Figure 5.16 – Shown is a sketch of perception according to a potential function in a hypothetical mis-
match negativity paradigm. There are four repetitions after which a novel stimulus is introduced. De-
pending on the parameters of the model, it is possible to simulate the nonlinear dynamics discussed in
this Chapter: Critical jump (MMN response at nc), Early jump (MMN response before nc ), Late jump
(MMN response after nc).
What is important is that the perseveration interpretation of the paradigm does not see the ab-
sence of an MMN wave as a failed discrimination of the repeated and novel stimuli. It means the
Hysteresis or Enhanced Contrast phenomenon may have occurred instead of the critical jump phe-
nomenon. What exactly shapes the potential landscape will not be very diﬀerent from what was
presented in this chapter: Coupling between continua of collective variables by which stimuli may
be ordered, possibly by diﬀerent modalities (γcs) and factors speciﬁc to the individual (ε) and the
task (nc, deﬁnition of V(x,y) and k(n)).
It is possible to re-analyse existing data and look for early or late jumps. This requires a diﬀer-
ent analysis approach than averaging to obtain ERPs however. In the study by Noordenbos et al.
(2012b) two blocks of 400 stimuli were presented, each block had a .12 chance of occurrence of a
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novel stimulus (48 deviant vs. 352 standard stimuli). This means a maximum of 2x96 (the standard
presented before the deviant is used for comparison) time series of about 700ms each were aver-
aged, just a fraction of the total data recorded. On the trial level presentation is pseudorandom,
ensuring the experiment starts with a reasonable number of standards and a number of standards
always needs to follow presentation of a deviant. On average about 3-6 standard stimuli “surround”
a deviant stimulus and this is quite similar to the number of stimuli used to represent a continuum in
a standard categorical perception experiment (10 stimuli). An alternative analysis strategy based on
a potential model could look for transitions in EEG recordings in a larger range around the deviant.
In order to look for transitions in time series data, Recurrence Quantiﬁcation Analysis is the
best tool to use (applications of RQA for this purpose, e.g. de Graag, Cox, Hasselman, Jansen, &
de Weerth, 2012; Lichtwarck-Aschoﬀ, Hasselman, Cox, Pepler, & Granic, 2012; Stephen, Dixon, &
Isenhower, 2009). RQA has been adapted for EEG analysis and even speciﬁcally to detect negativ-
ity waves in a mismatch paradigm (analysis based on the Order Pattern Recurrence Plot, OPRP).
Schinkel, Marwan and Kurths (2007) showed OPRP analysis was able to detect semantic mismatch
negativity (N400) reliably based on ERPs consisting of 10 averaged time series. They were also able
to detect the MMN in a single trial (Schinkel et al., 2007; Schinkel, Marwan, & Kurths, 2009). It
seems there are no methodological objections to test the perseveration hypothesis.
There even is empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis that was discussed earlier in the
context of Experiment 1 of this chapter. Tuller et al. (1994) induced category switches by repeatedly
presenting the same stimulus at a point along the continuum where a category switch might be
expected. They observed perception of the other category after 2-6 repetitions of the exact same
stimulus! This iswell within the range of sequences of standard stimuli presented before a deviant in
theMMNparadigm. Moreover, in a speech perceptionMMNexperiment the stimuli are usually not
the end-points of the continuum, but are chosenmore closely to the empirical phoneme boundary.
Van Leeuwen et al. (2008) use stimulus number 3 and 6 as standard and deviant respectively, of
the 10-step /bAk/-/dAk/ continuum used in Chapter 4 and Experiment 1 of this chapter (Been et al.,
2008; van Herten et al., 2008; van Leeuwen et al., 2006 use the same stimuli). These studies report
that discrimination diﬃculty was largest for dyslexic readers with stimuli between and including
3 and 6. This is indeed what was replicated in Experiment 1 (e.g. see Figure 5.6a and b), these
stimuli were also the stimuli that were most prone to perturbation by noise. The conjecture is as
follows: When encouraged to do so by ameasurement context, dyslexic readers, but also preliterate
children at risk for dyslexia, will reveal perception-action performance that may be characterised
by loosely coupled processes operating at the collective level of emergent coordination (cf. Turvey,
2007; Van Orden, Kloos, & Wallot, 2009; Wijnants, Hasselman, Cox, Bosman, & Van Orden, 2012).
In the measurement context of MMN, the observation of a novelty, or error response should be
seen as the result of nonlinear interaction-dominant dynamics, for example dynamics described by
(coupled) potential functions: Repetition of the same stimulus (the standard) that is only slightly
diﬀerent from its antagonist (the deviant) is known to cause a switch of states in speech perception
experiments after 2-6 repetitions of the same stimulus. On averageMMNspeech perception studies
repeat the standard (which is often indeed only slightly diﬀerent from the deviant) 3 to 6 times. This
habituation frequency is used in many studies and was established empirically for healthy subjects.
A low coupling strength can contribute to an increased likelihood of the occurrence of a jump
between states because in general, the states related to the standard and the deviant will be less
stable than states associated with a high coupling strength.
Absence of MMN may be due to hysteresis or enhanced contrast eﬀects, not an inability to per-
ceive the stimulus a deviant. LowerMMNamplitudemaybe indicativeof less stable states in general
(due to coupling strength). Analyses are available to test the current empirical record for early or
late jumps with respect to the deviant and low or high amplitudes of waveforms in single trials.
When an appropriate model has been deduced from existing data, model-based predictions
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about associations between variables like the ones presented in this chapter can be evaluated. Ob-
vious experimental manipulations pertain to number of repetitions, timing of stimuli and coupling
strength by comparing age across diﬀerent (patient) populations.
The MMN study reported by Noordenbos et al. (2012b) also examined a standard and a deviant
that belonged to the same phoneme category, but were opposites with respect to an allophone
boundary. The results were as follows: “Stimuli from diﬀerent phoneme categories elicited MMNs
in both the control and at-risk children while the stimuli from the allophonic contrast elicited an
MMN in only the children at risk for dyslexia.” (Noordenbos et al., 2012b, p. 6). The at-risk children
showed amplitude values of MMN for both types of stimuli that were quite similar in range (-2.5
to -1.5) whereas the control children had a much larger range (0.2 to 4.1) in amplitude. All the
amplitudes around zero were observed with the allophonic contrast. The authors do not explain
this result, but it is readily interpretable in terms of a weak coupling where the relative stability of
states is more equal than with strong coupling that can cause disappearance of states altogether
while boosting others.
The authors interpret the results as follows: “[…] the phonological representations needed for
eﬀective grapheme–phoneme mapping are not properly acquired by children at risk for dyslexia.
It can be concluded that the phonological representations of the control children in the present
study were more accurate, as reﬂected by their signiﬁcantly better performance on the skills rel-
evant for the development of reading, leading to more rapid selection of the relevant cues in the
auditory signal.” This is again a circular argument, much like the one discussed in the introduction.
The phonological representations of average readers aremore accurate, we know this because they
perform better on reading and associated tasks, and this causes them to be better at auditory pro-
cessing, which is why their phonological representations are more accurate.
To conclude, the time to peak amplitude of MMN was signiﬁcantly slower for children at risk
for dyslexia and this was interpreted as slower processing of auditory stimuli due to less accurate
phonological representations. The question is the same as for the amplitude, why was this latency
equally slow for the phoneme and the allophone deviant? If children at-risk for dyslexia have less
accurate phoneme representations, they must have more accurate allophone representations, why
do these natural categories not lead to faster peak amplitudes whereas the diﬃcult and learned
phoneme categories do in control subjects? Again the answer must be an unstable potential land-
scape, as was evidenced by the response time dispersion in Chapter 2 and 3.
Summarising, the current empirical record, theory evaluation, experimental results, and model
simulation can together provide an alternative perspective on component-dominant theories of
reading and dyslexia. Such theories often appear to take shortcuts around the big questions: How
did the phoneme representations get there? How can a dynamical pattern be part of a structure
that generates those dynamical patterns? Where does a cause begin and an eﬀect end? There
are many directions for future studies of the framework and the model presented here to explore.
The most interesting suggestion is perhaps a re-analysis of the MMN paradigm. If the conjecture
were validated, this would have substantial consequences for an entire ﬁeld of science. But that is
beyond the scope of this dissertation…
158


The Limitless produces the Delimited, and this is the Supreme Unity
[or : the Absolute]
    The Supreme Unity produces the two Forms, named Yin and Yang
    The 2 Forms produce four Phenomena, 
named Lesser Yin, Great Yin, Lesser Yang and Great Yang.
    The 4 Phenomena give rise to the 8 Fundamental principles of reality, [or trigrams], 
8 eights are 64 hexagrams.”
- Translated from ancient Chinese writing and ascribed to Fu Xi (± 2953-2838 B.C)
in The Book of Changes (Legge, 1963)
From left to right the 8 principles of reality are: Heaven, Lake, Fire, Thunder, 
Mountain, Water, Wind and Heaven. Fu Xi was the first of the 3 Sage Emperors of 
ancient China: A cultural hero, with mythological and god-like abilities (compare to 
Carolus Magnus, but roughly 4000 years earlier). He was said to be the survivor 
of a great flood together with his sister. With permission of the Emperor of 
Heaven they tried to re-populate the Earth with humans. To speed up the 
process and backed by divine powers they started to create humans from clay. 
He is thought to have created many things among which are the Ba Gua trigrams 
(Cammann, 1991).
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Chapter 6
A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF PRINCIPLES
The Role of Internal Representations in Ætiologies of Developmental Dyslexia
“So what if I can’t spell Armageddon, It’s not like… the End of the World”
—Stewart Francis
The general topic of this dissertation has been the evaluation of claims of scientiﬁc explanation
about a domain in reality, in the presence of a great diversity of competing theories. As a point
in case and due to the large amount of high quality data from various diﬀerent disciplines and
experimental paradigms, the evaluation concerned theorising about the causes of developmen-
tal dyslexia. More speciﬁcally, the component dominant ontology of phoneme representations and
their presumed anomalous composition that is used to explain impaired reading was compared to
an interaction dominant ontology of coupled dynamics of collective variables from which a land-
scape of potential perceptual events emerged. The main incentive for such a comparison is the
current state of paralysis that characterises the empirical record: A plethora of ideas, hypotheses,
and theories about what causes the impaired reading and spelling ability of a small and speciﬁc
subgroup of developing children are posited, without there being a clear “winner”. There is no the-
oretical account that can formally be shown to bemore “truth-like” than others. My claim through-
out this book has been that this is a general problem of the empirical social sciences and that one
of its causes is that the implicit causal ontology escapes falsiﬁcation because it is accepted as a part
of reality. Theory speciﬁcation does not evolve beyond Stage B of Box 1.4. In Stage C the functional
form of relationships between constructs is subject to empirical inquiry. Very rarely does the func-
tional form move beyond linear.1 This opinion I share with many other scientists (see e.g., Stepp,
Chemero, & Turvey, 2011), but is best expressed by Stephen and Van Orden (2012). They respond
to the “we want components” critique (see section 1.5.4 of Chapter 1) of the Complex Systems
Approach:
“Although we are told that the cognitive theorists have considered the interactions among
mind, body, and environment, at the end of the day the only factors that matter are latent
cognitive factors (Wagenmakers et al., this volume).
In other words, several commentators have decided what will count as a viable cognitive expla-
nation. If we or anyone else refuses to play by their rules, they threaten to take their ball and go
home, which might be OK if there were a strong tradition of successful empirical cognitive science,
arriving at reliable explanations that are widely recognized inside and outside of cognitive science.
Were that the case it would be prudent to remain skeptical of ‘’revolutions” or ‘’paradigm shifts.”
But over half a century, empirical cognitive science has had its own diﬃculties winning over hearts
1Note that the Fourier transform can be seen as a regression analysis with parameters of sine and cosine functions
as the linear predictor. A higher order polynomial regression (e.g., y = x + x2 + x3) can also model a nonlinear shape, but
both represent a linear functional form. Nonlinearity implies multiplicative interactions.
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and minds, even without our meddling” (Stephen & Van Orden, 2012, p. 97) This ﬁnal chapter is a
discussion about the principles behind the two causal ontologies that appear to some as diﬀerent
ball games altogether. It will be a retrospect to what was learned empirically and a prospect to
where future developments may head.
6.1 Results revisited
The conjectures put forward in the ﬁrst chapter were: 1) A theoretical account that could replace
current theories of developmental dyslexia should provide an explanation of the apparent lack of
authority of empirical evidence to decide between the veracity of competing theoretical claims; 2)
It is the kind of theorising practised in the soft empirical sciences that is responsible for the weak
knowledge base (also see the Preface). To justify these conjectures I providedmeta-theoretical, sta-
tistical and historical arguments, some of which will return in later sections of this chapter. Most of
the presented arguments continue to play an important role in contemporary discussions of scien-
tiﬁc practice in empirical social science (e.g., Asendorpf et al., 2013; Lebel et al., 2013; Open Science
Collaboration, 2012). I concluded Chapter 1 by announcing empirical tests of the interaction domi-
nant ontology that would attempt to move beyond ‘stage B’ and in this section I brieﬂy discuss the
extent to which the reported studies succeeded to achieve that goal.
Chapter 2 – Context relativity of ordering relationships and prospective prediction:
PredictingReading Performance fromPre-Literate SpeechPerception in Children at-risk forDyslexia
The second was a cautious attempt to readjust the quest for the ultimate eﬃcient cause towards
an eﬀort to understand what it is that makes multiple ætiologies appear as a scientiﬁcally plausi-
ble causal factor associated with developmental dyslexia. The design and analysis strategy of the
empirical study allow for a conclusion beyond the eﬀects of factors that obfuscate verisimilar asso-
ciations between variables identiﬁed in Chapter 1. The conclusions were based on: 1) Prospective
prediction, 2) coherent explanation and control of the appearance and disappearance of associa-
tions. The purpose of this chapter was to provide a diﬀerent perspective on the causes of impaired
performance as emerging in speciﬁc contexts from the interactions between hypothesised compo-
nents, rather than originating from (deﬁcient) components, in other words, the exquisite context
sensitivity associated with interaction dominant dynamics (Riley, Shockley, & Van Orden, 2012).
Context relativity was examined for the stability of speech perception as expressed by the disper-
sion of response times rather than the accuracy of the performance. In addition, the role of con-
text on speech perceptionwas investigated bymeasuring speech perception in diﬀerent participant
groups (familial risk vs. no risk) using diﬀerent tasks (identiﬁcation vs. discrimination) and diﬀerent
acoustic manipulations of the speech stimuli. The results showed a clear relation between Grade 1
reading performance and stability of kindergarten speech perception: Unstable speech perception
was associated with lower levels of later reading performance. The accuracy of performance did
not reveal such associations.
Chapter 3 - Principled simulation of context relativity:
When opposites attract, repel and deceive: Using Recurrent Neural Computation toModelMulti-
stable States.
In order to understand the dynamics between speed and accuracy of a classiﬁcation performance
in stable and unstable systems, Chapter 3 explored the attractor dynamics of a recurrent neural
network (Hopﬁeld, 1982) between two opposing basins of attraction. These attractors represent
the classiﬁcation of a stimulus as either /bAk/ or /dAk/ based on exemplar values along two dimen-
sions that were imagined to represent the features of the speech signal (F2 salience and F2 rate of
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frequency change) identiﬁed as important by the auditory temporal processing deﬁcit hypothesis
(cf., Tallal, 2004). In principle (and in the light of the results of Chapter 4), these dimensions can
be assigned any meaning. Classiﬁcation accuracy was examined by presenting the network with
stimuli that vary along the two dimensions. System instability was introduced as (but not limited
to) the presence of a third, weak basin of attraction that would never return a stable solution (i.e.,
no errors would be made), but still disrupted the energy landscape suﬃciently to increase the du-
ration with which stable solutions would occur. The latter was shown to be associated to the larger
dispersion in response times observed in some of the measurement contexts of Chapter 2.
Recently more sophisticated methods have been developed to analyse response time disper-
sion using distribution analyses (Holden, Van Orden, & Turvey, 2009; van Rooij, Nash, Rajaraman,
& Holden, 2013) and ﬂuctuation or fractal analyses (Holden, 2005). Overall the results obtained
in these studies conﬁrm that dispersion of measurements can characterise stable responses from
overly random or overly constrained responses. These techniques are nowwidely used to evidence
interaction-dominant dynamics in human physiology and performance (Hasselman, 2013; Ihlen,
2012; Ihlen & Vereijken, 2010; Kello, Beltz, Holden, & Van Orden, 2007; Van Orden, Kloos, Wallot,
& Orden, 2009; Wijnants, Cox, Hasselman, Bosman, & Van Orden, 2012; Wijnants, Hasselman, Cox,
Bosman, & Van Orden, 2012).
Chapter 4 - Strong Inference:
Classifying acoustic signals into phoneme categories
In this chapter several features of speech stimuli that lie on a /bAk/-/dAk/ continuum were tested
on their ability to enable a simple classiﬁer (Quadratic Discriminant Analysis) to reproduce the ob-
served classiﬁcation performance of average and dyslexic readers. It was attempted to create a test
of theoretical claims under conditions of strong inference, which requires the positing of deeper-
lying entities (Hasselman, 2013; Platt, 1964). The ‘classical’ or represented features were based on
component process accounts of developmental dyslexia such as the supposed deﬁcit in Envelope
Rise Time detection and the deﬁcit in the detection of rapid changes in the distribution of energy in
the frequency spectrum (formant transitions). Remarkably, studies examining these temporal pro-
cessing deﬁcit hypotheses do not employ measures that quantify the temporal dynamics of stim-
uli. It was shown that measures based on quantiﬁcation of the dynamics of complex, interaction-
dominant systems such recurrence analysis andmulti-fractal scaling enabled QDA to classify stimuli
almost exactly the same way as actual dyslexic and average reading participants did. It thus seems
unlikely that participants used the measures, associated theoretically with faulty representations
or component processes, when classifying the stimuli. Results were interpreted to support of the
Complexity Matching Hypothesis of perception and action.
Chapter 5 - Principled simulation of posited entities and strong inference:
Beyond the Static Phoneme Boundary: The Nonlinear Dynamics of Emerging Literacy
In Chapter 4 it was shown that higher order variables quantifying complex temporal patterns in the
speech signal weremost likely the characteristic properties of speech sounds that dyslexic and aver-
age readers use to categorize diﬀerent variations of /bAk/ or /dAk/ as such. I suggested that speech
perception should not be considered a matter of analysing frequencies or amplitude patterns in
order to match those patterns to exemplars of speech sounds stored in the brain, perhaps installed
there by evolution. Chapter 5 promoted the idea that the existence of separate speech sounds, such
as phonemes, are actually due to the use of an alphabetic script. Apparently, Chinese adults proﬁ-
cient only in the character script do not perceive any separate speech sounds at all. This prompted
a critical analysis of the decade old empirical ‘facts’ about speech perception and their use by con-
temporary theories of dyslexia. The interpretation of the facts by accounts such as the perceptual
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magnet theory and the allophonic mode of speech perception hypothesis seemed somewhat bi-
ased towards the respective theoretical claims. Both accounts claim innate phoneme prototypes
exist (either as boundaries or as perceptual categories) in the nervous system, but this is not an ex-
planation of the claim. However, the general theoretical idea put forward by these accounts about
the causes of developmental dyslexia conjectured as a deﬁcient coupling between diﬀerent sources
of perceptual information was taken as a sound suggestion to depart from.
In linewith the prescriptions of Chapter 1, a theory of principleswas constructed and amodelwas
suggested based on interaction dominant dynamics governing speech perception of dyslexic and
average readers. Themodel allowed for risky predictions of the kind that can be considered a “damn
strange coincidence” had they been observed absent the theory. The diﬀerences between dyslexic
and average readers, for instance, could be deﬁned as speciﬁc tests of the coupling hypothesis:
Coupling strength between two dimensions representing diﬀerent collective variables along which
diﬀerent speech sounds can be ordered. The model was conjectured to be able to explain a rich
variety of nonlinear phenomena such as hysteresis and enhanced contrast perception.
Results showed that it is able to provide a more parsimonious explanation of the better within
category perception by dyslexic readers that prompted the allophonic mode of speech perception
hypothesis (Serniclaes, 2006). Two empirical speech perception studies in which a large group of
children, varying in age and reading ability participated, reveal the nonlinear dynamics of speech
perception as predicted by the model. That is, the empirical results can be understood as resulting
from diﬀerent parameter settings of the model (by considering each trial in the experiment the
result of the emissions of a Hidden Markov Model whose probability matrices are based on the
stability of the potential landscape). An analysis of the ﬁtted parameters should be considered a
corroboration of the predictions by the interaction-dominant coupling hypothesis.
The principles on which the models of Chapters 3 and 5 are based remain a topic of study; espe-
cially the possibilities of inferring model parameters from empirical data. Recent studies explored
ﬁtting the parameters of the 1-dimensional potential model in the context of hysteresis in decision
making (van Rooij, Favela, Malone, & Richardson, 2013; van Rooij & Favela, 2010; van Rooij & Van
Orden, 2011). There have been advances in modelling and ﬁtting negative hysteresis or enhanced
contrast (Lopresti-Goodman, Turvey, & Frank, 2013) Studies of two dimensional neural networks
such as the one in Chapter 3 reveal there may exists a topological equivalence between the energy
ﬁeld of such networks and the potential ﬁeld of the two-dimensional potential model of Chapter 5
(Chartier, Renaud, & Boukadoum, 2008). Future directions could explore the connections between
these topologies of deterministic dynamics and those of critical state neural networks, such as the
critical branching network (Kello, 2013), or the Potts model with hidden states (Tanaka, Tamura, &
Kawashima, 2011).
6.2 Deﬁnitions revisited
“Here I have completed this bird’s-eye survey of the principles that govern the self-organizing
system. I hope I have given justification for my belief that these principles, based on the logic
of mechanism and on information theory, are now essentially complete, in the sense that
there is now no area that is grossly mysterious.” (Ashby, 1947)
In what way do the results evidence an interaction dominant ontology or question the viability
and veracity of the phoneme representation ontology? Has a theory of principles been tested and
can the conjectures of the ﬁrst chapter be raised to postulates? To try and answer these questions,
I will reconsider and elaborate on some deﬁnitions provided earlier, as well as strengthen some
claims with additional evidence.
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6.2.1 “How would we recognize it?”
Many theories claiming explanatory authority on the causes of developmental dyslexia are based
on an idea, a blueprint of the cognitivemechanism giving rise to human reading and spelling ability:
It must be some process that transforms letters into sounds via their abstract representation in the
nervous system. The representations are in this case the components, or entities of the ontology,
because the theory posits them to exist as constituents of reality. That is what scientiﬁc theories
are supposed to do of course, positing of deeper-lying entities. Curiously, what constitutes a rep-
resentation is not clearly deﬁned or operationalized in ﬁelds of psychology such as behavioural and
cognitive science (Haselager, de Groot, & van Rappard, 2003). Haselager et al., tried to answer the
question posed by Cliﬀ and Noble (1997, p. 1170): “if evolution did produce a design that used
internal representations, how would we recognize it?” Of course, the same can be asked of the
alternative ontology: “If evolution did produce a design that used coupled dynamics across many
time and spatial scales, howwouldwe recognize it?” Note that the latter deﬁnition does not exclude
the possibility of such systems’ internal states representing external physical states. There are sev-
eral crucial diﬀerences though, but before I discuss them, consider the deﬁnition of representation
provided by Haselager et al. (2003):
“We consider the issue of representation from a realist perspective. That is, “representation”
refers to an identifiable physical state within a system that stands in for another (internal or
external) state and that as such plays a causal role in (or is used by) the system generating
its behavior.” (Haselager et al., 2003, p. 6)
The speciﬁc claim related to dyslexia is often that representations of speech sounds that stand
in for the external sound/pressure waves generated by human vocal chords, must be a degenerate
or anomalous version of the actual external physical state in order to explain impaired acquisition
of reading ability. As shown in Chapter 1 it is a logical fallacy to infer that a structure exists based
on an observed phenomenon and this also applies if a modiﬁer like “impaired” is attached to the
phenomenon. Such inferences are driven by a perceived isomorphism (“is similar to”) between
the posited representation ontology and the observed behaviour. Detecting an isomorphism is not
a valid strategy for evidencing representations in a physical system and Haselager et al. (2003)
conclude there does not exists an operational deﬁnition of representation that is adequate to make
plausible their existence empirically.
I do believe questioning the representation ontology empirically is possible as long if it is done
in the context of strong inference (cf., Platt, 1964). Chapter 4 is an example of such an inquiry that
can be characterised as a test of the diﬀerent properties attributed to internal representations of
external states (stimuli) by diﬀerent theories. An explicit formal or operationalized deﬁnition is not
necessary if these features are directly compared to features that are based on a diﬀerent ontology.
In the light of the results presented in Chapter 4, it is quite clear that the measures laminarity and
determinism, quantifying the dynamics in the reconstructed phase space of an auditory stimulus, as
well as the multifractal spectrum, are of a diﬀerent nature than frequencies and amplitudes of the
physical signal. This does of course not prevent a promiscuous theorist like investigator James to
suggest it must be these dynamical properties, determinism and laminarity, these values of singu-
larity spectra, that are represented internally. To show how odd it is to suggest this, it would be the
identical to a theorist claiming the F value of his signiﬁcant General Linear Model was represented
internally.
A suggestionmore viable, would be that one ormore systemparameters are set in such away that
a perturbation of the system by the physical signals that can be characterised by these dynamics,
cause it to settle in the observed behavioural mode. The parameter settings are nothing more
than modelling abstractions, but they do “represent”, in the model, a composition of the system.
This kind of representation reﬂects dynamical variables (Spencer & Schöner, 2003), it suggests that
instead of a single ‘true parameter’, a larger parameter space can be explored by a system (Jacobs &
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Michaels, 2007; Michaels, Arzamarski, Isenhower, & Jacobs, 2008) and can be understood in terms
of the physical concept of a synergy (Akhromeeva &Malinetskii, 2009; Haken, Kelso, & Bunz, 1985;
Kugler & Shaw, 1990; Schöner, Jiang, & Kelso, 1990; Turvey, 2007).
How would we recognise a synergy? Synergies are large-scale organisations of system compo-
nents that solve the degrees of freedom problem: The degrees of freedom available to produce
speech sounds are fewer than those that would be possible by permutations of speech-sound com-
ponents (Galantucci, Fowler, & Turvey, 2006; van Lieshout, Kent, & Lieshout, 2004). The fact that
components of a system are physically coupled, by the neuromuscular structure of the speech
apparatus, the respiratory system and enslaved to the laws of thermodynamics that govern the
behaviour of gasses, the degrees of freedom available to the system to produce sounds are con-
strained. Synergetic coordination of behaviour is observed in systems that are characterised by
ultrafast action, ultrafast cognition, exquisite context sensitivity and scale-free variation (examples
of synergetic control in cognition and behaviour are given in Chapter 5 and Riley et al., 2012; Wallot
& Van Orden, 2012). Speciﬁc predictions can be formulated based on synergetic control context
sensitivity and scale-free variation that are divergent from causal component predictions (Diniz et
al., 2011).
In Chapter 5 the dynamical nature of such collective parameter settings that represent system
compositions were evidenced at the time scale of the experiment (settings of the ε parameter as-
sociated to hysteresis, enhanced contrast, or critical boundary) and at the scale of biological de-
velopment (the coupling strength parameter γCS). Chapter 2 evidenced the exquisite context sen-
sitivity. A recent study on reading ﬂuency in developmental dyslexia revealed strong evidence of
scale-free variation in response latencies of word-naming that was correlated with reading per-
formance measured on standard reading tasks, but only in dyslexic readers (Wijnants, Hasselman,
et al., 2012). Then, why do so many scientists observe components when they study behaviour
and cognition? Wagenmakers et al. (2012), critical of the complex systems approach, noted that
studies have shown that standard models of cognition could sometimes be seen as special cases
of nonlinear, models with many interacting components. They conjectured that the tension be-
tween old science and the complex systems perspective might only be apparent, as the latter justi-
ﬁes the former. This conjecture is not new however and has been known to psychological science
since the 1940s through the work of W. Ross Ashby published in the Journal of General Psychology
(Ashby, 1945, 1947). It covers exactly the problems with the complex systems approach reported
byWagenmakers et al. (2012) in Chapter 1. Ashby provides two arguments for the proposition that
mechanisms and components may be observed in complex systems that are actually self-organising
holistic structures.
The ﬁrst is what I have been arguing for throughout this book; organization is in the eye of the
beholder or themeasurement context for thatmatter. Two researchers observing the same beehive
may conclude diﬀerently about its organization. One sees the hive as the result of the interactions
of 50.000 bee-parts and concludes a high level of organization, while another who observes whole
states, such as activity and dormancy, may observe no organization at all (Ashby, 1962, p. 259).
The second argument is about the independence of dynamics and organization or composition. A
system, that appears an irreducible whole of interacting parts, can always be shown to consist of
separate parts by suggesting what a part might look like and assuming a similar (isomorphic) part
exists. If both parts are isomorphic to the whole, the parts will indeed be observed. Ashby provides
a formal example of this phenomenon (not provided here) and concludes:
“Thus, subject only to certain requirements (e.g. that equilibria map into equilibria), any
dynamic system can be made to show a variety of arbitrarily assigned “parts”, simply by a
change in the observer’s viewpoint.” (Ashby, 1947).
That about covers conjecture 1 of Chapter 1: Even if a complex interaction dominant ontology is
postulated, components and component dynamics (mechanisms) canbe identiﬁed, quite arbitrarily.
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It is important to note that this explanation of component mechanisms in terms of a feature of
complex systems is supported by the strongest criticasters of the Complex Systems Approach to
cognitive science (Wagenmakers et al., 2012).
I expand on this consensus explanation by suggesting the following: The default ontologies for
many theories in psychological science today arise due to the adoptionof the experimentalmethods
of classical physics intended to study classical systems, Newton’s Curse. A component conﬁgura-
tion is postulated based on a singular behavioural phenomenon and this is the observer’s viewpoint.
By experimentation, parts that are isomorphic to the postulated components can be identiﬁed as
“eﬀects” of an independent variable, thus evidencing the component as a part of the internal struc-
ture of the system bymeans of association. The only way to be certain that a structure in reality was
evidenced is by further theory speciﬁcation, by prediction of additional observational constraints
beyond the mere association. The ability to observe components at any level of analysis may be a
feature of interaction-dominant systems rather than an error of the experimenter (that is, the error
is in the interpretation, not in the data). Ashby explicitly mentions the self-organising systems he
has in mind are not restricted to classical mechanical systems governed by Newtonian dynamics
(Ashby, 1945, p. 14).
When Ashby’s theoretical work is combined with that of Lashley, who spent a lifetime searching
for the engram, the representation of memories by a physiological trace in the nervous system, it
seems that the stagewas set for a cognitive neuroscience based on self-organisation in complex sys-
tems in the early 1950s. It is striking howwell Lashley’s conclusions about representationof external
states by the nervous system ﬁt with the interaction dominant perspective, especially considering
the fact that in-vivo brain-imaging was not available at the time. Here I quote Lashley’s conclusions
of an entire scientiﬁc career spent searching for empirical evidence of internal representation:
1. It seems certain that the theory of well-defined conditioned reflex paths from sense organ via association
areas to the motor cortex is false. The motor areas are not necessary for the retention of sensory-motor
habits or even of skilled manipulative patterns. […]
2. It is not possible to demonstrate the isolated localization of a memory trace anywhere within the nervous
system. Limited regions may be essential for learning or retention of a particular activity, but within such
regions the parts are functionally equivalent. The engram is represented throughout the region. […]
3. The so-called associative areas are not storehouses for specific memories. […] The defects which occur
after their destruction are not amnesias but difficulties in the performance of tasks which involve abstrac-
tion and generalization, or conflict of purposes. […]
4. The trace of any activity is not an isolated connection between sensory and motor elements. It is tied in
with the whole complex of spatial and temporal axes of nervous activity which forms a constant substra-
tum of behaviour. Each association is oriented with respect to space and time. […]
5. Consideration of the numerical relations of sensory and other cells in the brain makes it certain, I believe,
that all of the cells of the brain must be in almost constant activity, either firing or actively inhibited. There
is no great excess of cells which can be reserved as the seat of special memories. […]
6. The equivalence of different regions of the cortex for retention of memories points to multiple repre-
sentation. Somehow, equivalent traces are established throughout the functional area. Analysis of the
sensory and motor aspects of habits shows that they are reducible only to relations among components
which have no constant position with respect to structural elements.”
(Lashley, 1950, pp. 26–27)
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Conclusion number 6 has been repeated throughout this book in one form or another. The ad-
vancement in fundamental scientiﬁc knowledge after 60+ years of research on understanding the
role of the nervous system in coordinating adaptive behaviour of living systems has been… disap-
pointing, to say the least. On a more positive note against the background of my plea for formal
theory evaluation in the social sciences, Lashley arrived at these conclusions by showing a rigorous
ontological commitment. That is, certain propositions were certainly false in his opinion, because
he actively explored the explanatory boundaries of the theoretical construct of internal represen-
tation of speciﬁc states. In doing so, he realised that the construct breaks down as an explanatory
vehicle when it is confronted with a crash-test against reality.
To summarise, the interaction-dominant ontology does posit components to exist, it does not
attribute any causal primacy to those components and it excludes internal representations of ex-
ternal physical states to be the structural components of the system. Observedmodes of behaviour
are due to the interactions between components conditional on the composition of those structural
components of the system. In otherwords, the structural composition of the system is permissive of
the modes of behaviour rather than causative. The objects of scientiﬁc inquiry based on this ontol-
ogy are always collective variables, ‘complexes’, that can be conceived of as synergies represented
in dynamic systems models by a conﬁguration of parameter values. This type of causal ontology is
not new; it originates from disequilibrium physics and chemistry, but has been successfully applied
by the sciences that study biological systems or agent-environment systems whose behaviour is
characterised as originating from many processes interacting on many diﬀerent temporal and spa-
tial scales (Ashby, 1947; Bak, Tang, &Wiesenfeld, 1987; Bunge, 1977, 2000; Heylighen, 1989; Oltvai
& Barabási, 2002; Tononi, Edelman, & Sporns, 1998; Van Orden et al., 2009).
6.2.2 Caught in a Nomological Net: What constitutes a disease entity?
Understanding, in general, how sensible scientists may infer component ontology does of course
not necessarily imply that such a mechanism must underlie the paralysis of the empirical record in
studies on the causes of developmental dyslexia. In Chapter 1, I suggested to theoretically consider
developmental dyslexia as a state, a complex INUS condition. I did not discuss, in terms of meta-
theory, how a speciﬁc ætiology may be deﬁned, a “disease entity” in a nomological net. Some very
insightful suggestions are provided by Meehl (1977) who concludes an article entitled “Speciﬁc Eti-
ology and Other Forms of Strong Inﬂuence: Some Quantitative Meanings” with the following four
sentences:
1. In summary, a disease entity is initially defined implicitly or contextually, loosely and not strictly “opera-
tionally,” by the researcher- clinician’s presenting a cluster of symptoms, complaints, and signs that covary
over the population of patients (and usually over time in the individual patient).
2. This observational finding suggests the conjecture that the cluster, usually called the “syndrome,” exhibits
its statistical togetherness because of a causal source shared in common by the several indicators. At this
early stage of knowledge, the disease entity is an “open concept,” in the philosopher’s sense.
3. The postulated causal relationships between the conjectured etiology and each of the fallible indicators
provide at one and the same time a set of synthetic factual claims about the way the world is and, para-
doxically, the implicit contextual definition of the entity.
4. Three aspects of the openness of these concepts are discussed, to wit, (1) the extensibility of the indicator
list, (2) the probabilistic rather than strictly nomological correlation between the indicators and the disease
entity, and (3) “Orphan Annie’s eyes,”2 that is, the to-be-researched inner nature of the entity (as we
expect it to be reduced to lower levels in the pyramid of sciences).”
2“OrphanAnnie’s eyes” refers to a cartoon characterMeehl (1977) used to explain this characteristic of open concepts.
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(Meehl, 1977, p. 51 numbers and paragraph format added)
These four sentences constitute valuable scientiﬁc observations to absorb for the researcher-
clinician, scientist-practitioner or anyone otherwise inclined to proclaim to have evidenced a dis-
ease, pathology, disorder or impairment of sorts. As for developmental dyslexia, the early stage of
knowledge, as an “open concept” (Meehl, 1986, 2001) is certainly at hand and perhaps surpassed
in that several causal sources have been identiﬁed that provide a “statistical togetherness” and at
the same time provide a contextual deﬁnition for the disease entity (this evidencing and deﬁning at
the same time is due to the “Ramsiﬁed upward seepage” discussed in Chapter 1 and the Preface).
This is one of the reasons why I opted out of the ætiological deﬁnition of developmental dyslexia
in Chapter 1 and remained close to an operational deﬁnition: Everything else being equal, these
children have diﬃculty acquiring proﬁcient spelling and reading ability.
The three characteristics mentioned in the fourth sentence fully apply to the state of conjectured
ætiologies: The indicator lists can be expanded, shortened, or changed; most indicators are proba-
bilistic associations to the disease entity and if they are nomological deductions, they are inspired by
what the “true” nature of the disease entity is imagined to be at the biological (physical) level. This
inner nature is reﬂected in Figure 1.1 of Chapter 1, where the factors at the biological level serve as
the ultimate eﬃcient causes. This resonates with the concept of the interpretation fallacy and the
identiﬁcation of mere isomorphism as discussed in the previous paragraph. The observed associa-
tions imagined as “true” ontological causes, guide empirical inquiries. This bias may have occurred
when I presented the graph networks of terms used in abstracts of articles in Chapter 1 (section
1.2). I categorised the terms into common factors used in the literature on developmental dyslexia
in order to reduce the size of the graphs. In the process I may have excluded important terms or
reduced variability to the extent that the network structure is no longer a good representation of
the nomological net as it may be identiﬁed in a scientiﬁc record. Moreover, this great reduction
in variability precluded me from conducting an analysis that could have directly tested the claim
of a weak knowledge system. As has been known for some time, networks with scale-free (small-
world) or small world structure are the common natural networks found in the physical, biological
and social sciences (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003; Bullmore & Sporns, 2009; Strogatz, 2001; Watts &
Strogatz, 1998). This is attributed to optimal information ﬂow (e.g., the “six-degrees of separation”
in the global social network) and resilience to node failures or disconnections between nodes in the
network (Stam, 2010).
Figure 6.1 is an adaptation of two ﬁgures originally published in the famous article by Watts and
Strogatz (1998): “Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks”. In this article they described net-
works that had nodeswhose local average degreewasmuch larger than that of randomly connected
networks of the same size (n) and neighbourhood (k), whereas the path lengths were similar or
larger to such randomly connected networks. Besides ubiquity in nature (the brain and central ner-
vous system are ‘small-world’ network structures see Bullmore & Sporns, 2009; Rubinov & Sporns,
2010; Stam, 2010), this composition of components has been shown to be an optimal information
carrying structure. For example, the spread of infectious disease occurs fastest in populations or-
ganised according to small-world structure (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). Should an eﬃcient scientiﬁc
record be structured according to a small-world architecture, forming a strong knowledge base? If
the goal of scientiﬁc explanation in the daily work of a researcher is exposing causal laws that should
ultimately lead to uniﬁcation as described in Chapter 1, it seems plausible that such a network of
connected facts should ultimately collapse into a structure in which several concepts receive many
connections through which most of the other nodes in the network can be derived. Also, if one sub
network representing a theoretical whole should be separated from the larger network, pruned
because it is falsiﬁed, this should not make the entire structure collapse. The parts that have not
been pruned by falsiﬁcation should still be reachable and this is one of the properties of small-world
networks (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003; Stam, 2010).
171
6.2. Deﬁnitions revisited
p = 0 p = 1
p = 0 p = 1
increasing randomness
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
10.10.010.0010.0001
p
A
ve
ra
ge
 n
or
m
al
is
ed
 m
ea
su
re
Normalised measure
C(p)/C(0)
L(p)/L(0)
Figure 6.1 – The relation between average path length (L) and the clustering coeﬃcient (C) of a network
is shown in the line graph. Each data point represents the average of 20 values for L and C, obtained
by randomly re-wiring the connections in the networks with probability p. Values were normalised on
p = 0, the number of nodes was n = 30 and the neighbourhood was k = 5. See text for details.
In order to testwhether the scientiﬁc record of terms used in associationwithætiologies of devel-
opmental dyslexia represent a network that is organised as an optimised knowledge base, a small-
world test was conducted (cf., Watts & Strogatz, 1998). The same corpus of 1407 abstracts reported
in Chapter 1 was used, now including the abstracts dating to 2013 (April), after removal of common
words and words with a frequency of occurrence of 1, words were stemmed and completed using
various text mining packages in the R software environment (see the online supplementary infor-
mation for details). Table 6.1 shows the resulting number of abstracts for each epoch, the sparsity
of the term-document matrix (number of zero elements on total elements in the term-document
matrix) as well as the number of terms (n, nodes or vertices), and the average degree of each node
(k, the mean number of edges of a node) in the networks. The networks are shown in Figure 6.2
and Figure 6.3.
The test for small-world structure concerns a comparison of the average path length (L) and the
average clustering coeﬃcient (C) of the actual network to a randomly rewired version of the network
with same number of nodes and average node degree. The probability of rewiring two connected
nodes was set to 1 and the values were normalised by dividing the values of L and C for re-wiring
with probability 0 (seeWatts & Strogatz, 1998 for details). Table 6.1 shows that the networks of the
decades 1970-1980 and 1980-1990 can be classiﬁed as small-world networks, the other networks
truly represent aweak knowledge base: Given the number of nodes and degree, the actual network
is identical to a network in which all the connections are randomly re-wired. The composition of
vertices and edges is irrelevant and could just as well have been any other random pattern of con-
nections. Importantly, it is not the number of terms that changes over the years, but the degreewith
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Figure 6.2 – The network of terms (n = 192) mentioned in abstracts (N = 298) on the ætiology of
developmental dyslexia in a period of 2.4 years since 2010. Each term has on average k = 117 connec-
tions to other terms in the network. The network does not reveal a small-world structure: Compared to
a randomly rewired version the clustering coeﬃcient C(p) and average path length L(p) are the same
as the original. See Table 6.1 and text for details
which nodes are connected to each other (around 200 nodes in all the networks, these numbers
ﬂuctuate because of the trade-oﬀ in trying to keep the sparsity level approximately equal). Most
striking perhaps is the network of Figure 6.2, representing just 2.4 years of the recent literature. It
is already almost fully connected.
6.3 Realism revisited
Some of the suggestions put forward, like exquisite context sensitivity, may be discomforting to an
empirical scientist. If notmeasurement outcomes, what should we be realist about in soft empirical
science?3 A scientiﬁc realist believes that our best scientiﬁc theories do not merely save the phe-
3This section contains excerpts from an unpublished manuscript: Hasselman, Seevinck, Cox (2011).
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1970−1980 1980−1990
1990−2000 2000−2010
1970−2013 (April)
Figure 6.3 –Networks constructed the sameway as Figure 6.2, but for diﬀerent timeperiods. The central
graph is based on the entire corpus of abstracts (N = 1407). See text and Table 6.1 for details.
nomena, but rather that it is reasonable to believe that they capture, in an approximate way, the
inner structure of the universe. It may have become clear that it should not be the measurement
outcomes or ontology we should be realist about. The history of science teaches us one certainty:
Ontology will be proven wrong, awkward, silly, or downright preposterous eventually (Humours;
Phlogiston; Gemmules; the Id, Ego and SuperEgo; Vis Nervosa; Heat and Cold Particles, etc.). There
is a way to reconcile the lessons from the history of science and the modesty about what scientiﬁc
theories tell us about reality. Worrall (1989) presented structural realism (SR) as: “the best of both
worlds”, as capturing the main pro-realist argument (the no miracles argument) while countering
adequately the main anti-realist argument (the pessimistic meta-induction, i.e., the argument from
the history of scientiﬁc revolutions). The no miracles argument runs as follows:
“[…] some scientific theories enjoy enormous empirical success; if these theories are not
even approximately true, their success is miraculous; on the other hand, if these theories are
approximately true, their success is not miraculous; we should thus infer that such theories
are approximately true.” (Ainsworth, 2010)
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At the basis of the pessimisticmeta-induction argument is the fact that there has been ontological
discontinuity across theory-change (French & Ladyman, 2003). The argument lists occurrences of
such changes in the history of science and concludes by induction that it is most likely that the
ontology of our currently accepted theorieswill also be radically revised sooner or later. This is taken
to undermine scientiﬁc realism. For example, Fresnel’s wave theory of light was, by any standards,
empirically successful: It correctly predicted various surprising results, for example, the existence
of a white spot at the centre of the shadow that is cast by an opaque disc that is held in light coming
from a point source. This theory presupposed that light is a wave transmitted by an all-pervading
mechanical medium, called the luminiferous Æther discussed earlier. Since physicists no longer
believe that such amediumexists the theory appears not to be even approximately true (Ainsworth,
2010).
Worrall (1989) proposed SR (in its epistemic form) as ameans of reconciling these two arguments
(early versions of structural realism can be found in theworks of Russell, Poincaré, and Carnap). The
idea is that 1) we should believe what scientiﬁc theories tell us about the structure of the unobserv-
able world, but 2) we should be sceptical about what they tell us about the posited ontology of the
unobservable world. Thus, for example, “[…] it seems right to say that Fresnel completely misiden-
tiﬁed the nature of light, but nonetheless it is no miracle that his theory enjoyed the empirical pre-
dictive success that it did; it is no miracle because Fresnel’s theory, as science later saw it, attributed
to light the right structure.” (Worrall, 1989, p. 117). Worrall claims that Fresnel’s theory attributes
to light the right structure because Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism (which succeeded Fres-
nel’s) retained Fresnel’s equations. Fresnel’s theory attributed to light the wrong nature because
the interpretation of these equations is altered. The alleged mechanical nature of light was indeed
replaced by the ﬁeld-theoretical one (i.e., electromagnetic). In general, Worall claims that with
respect to such revisions in ontology, “[t]here was continuity or accumulation in the shift, but the
continuity is one of form or structure, not of content” (Worrall, 1989, p. 117).
Interpretation is again shown to be irrelevant for theory evaluation. It is important that every-
thing happened according to Fresnel’s equations and not what scientists imagined those physical
quantities to represent in reality, as direct experience. But this history is not just about theory eval-
uation… this is uniﬁcation! There is a crucial role for interpretation here, not yet discussed. When
does one raise a conjecture to a postulate? It’s not just an intuitive leap; it is an inspired intuitive
leap. It happens when scientists start to notice that a particular interpretation of a theory seems
to generate new predictions or allows explanation of known anomalies to current theory. When
something like that happens, a change of formalism and ontology and indeed uniﬁcation is immi-
nent! Getting hung up on one version of reality certainly does not increase the chances of such a
leap ever occurring. Einstein prescribed the following. A scientist:
“[…] must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous opportunist:
he appears as a realist insofar as he seeks to describe a world independent of the acts of
perception; as idealist insofar as he looks upon the concepts and theories as free inventions
of the human spirit (not derivable from what is empirically given); as positivist insofar as he
considers his concepts and theories justified only to the extent to which they furnish a logical
representation of relations among sensory experiences. He may even appear as a Platonist
or Pythagorean insofar as he considers the viewpoint of logical simplicity as an indispensable
tool of research.” (Einstein, 1949, p. 684 emphasis added).
To build a theory of principles and raise a conjecture to a postulate, scientists must be unscrupulous
philosophical opportunists and stretch their mind and creativity to explore and be inspired by the
perspectives of the many diﬀerent interpretations of reality philosophers oﬀer them. That is why I
believe science is one of the arts studying the structure of reality and not an industry that produces
facts about reality.
This realism about structure allows for amodest scientiﬁc realism. Whatmakes structural realism
stand apart from other varieties of realism is that it is more cautious in its realist claims, so as not
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to fall prey to the pessimistic meta-induction over the history of science, yet at the same time, to
remain suﬃciently substantive to provide a basis for the no-miracle argument. The only explana-
tion for the fact that in sequences of successively accepted theories each theory is empirically and
technologically at least as, and generically more, successful than its predecessor is that they latch
onto the structure of the physical world better and better. Modern day versions of structural real-
ism assert that all we can know about the world is its structure (epistemic variety), or that structure
is all there is (ontic variety). For the purposes of this book it is not important to adopt one of these
two variants of structural realism (there are more!); the important take home message is that we
should focus on structure and not get hung up on ontology.
An Inﬂation Theory of Theory Inﬂation: Big Bang or Big Crunch?
“A difficulty of much psychological theorizing is vagueness in the terms employed. In this
work, the above ideas have been studied in mathematical form throughout, the definitions
and proofs being given corresponding precision.” (Ashby, 1945, p. 13)
The weak knowledge base of theories of developmental dyslexia is likely indicative of a more
general problem of soft empirical science. It illustrates the scientiﬁc cycle has turned into a vicious
cycle. It would require more detailed study, but perhaps the increasing saturation or paralysis of
the scientiﬁc record as evidenced by the network analyses could be used as a predictor of crises
of conﬁdence in a ﬁeld of science. The fact that such crises appear to recur with some frequency
could point to a mechanism in which a certain domain in reality speciﬁed by a ﬁnite set of com-
mon language terms such as the ±200 terms in the previous section become fully connected. The
number of possible theoretical accounts inﬂates as the number of connected nodes in the network
increases. At some point, there is just no ordered structure left in the network and this causes
indiﬀerence with respect to testing ontology, discontent with the apparent triviality of theoreti-
cal claims is expressed (Dunnette, 1966; Ferguson & Heene, 2012; Ioannidis, 2005; Meehl, 1990;
Ring, 1967) and quite possibly opportunities to be sloppy, either by accident, due to pressure, or on
purpose, arise (Fanelli, 2009; John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn,
2011; Simonsohn, 2013). There are three routes out of this predicament:
1. The Big Bang route - Allow theory inﬂation to continue by domain inﬂation
2. The Big Crunch route - Stop theory inﬂation temporarily by rigorous pruning
3. Eternal Chaotic Inﬂation route - Stop theory inﬂation temporarily by theory uniﬁcation.
Route 1 can be observed when new technologies are developed that allow connections to new
domains (e.g., availability of neuroimaging techniques or genetic sequencing). Attempts to weed
out the uninformative connections of route 2 can be seen in contemporary eﬀorts to drastically
reform scientiﬁc practice by imposing stricter rules for scientiﬁc inference including the imminent
replicability Apocalypse (e.g., Asendorpf et al., 2013; Open Science Collaboration, 2012). After the
pruning is done, if no formal system of theory evaluation is put in place, there will be a similar situ-
ation after a couple of years without having made much advancements in uncovering the structure
of reality. Route 3 appears to be reserved for the hard sciences, although uniﬁcation attempts are
sometimes announced, like the uniﬁcation of neural network models, dynamical models and the
complex system approach (e.g., Kloos & Van Orden, 2009), these appear to be local eﬀorts, in this
case even a subﬁeld within developmental psychology. Uniﬁcation does not get rid of theory inﬂa-
tion, which will just continue after a successful attempt, but it does promise to work in the service
of uncovering more of the structure of the universe.
Given this predicament, what work can SR do for the advancement of the soft empirical sci-
ences? Some authors would argue that the reductionist approaches of the physical sciences (route
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3) cannot be applied to psychological science and that the current theoretical diversity is funda-
mentally linked to the ﬁeld, something we should accept as inevitable (McCauley & Bechtel, 2001),
just like representationalism and mechanistic theories (Bechtel, 2009). This position is known as
explanatory pluralism ( Dale, 2008; Dale, Dietrich, & Chemero, 2009) and I interpret it to promote a
utilitarian approach to theory evaluationwhere there can be a peaceful coexistence of theories (on-
tological indiﬀerence) until one theory has proven to be more useful than others. I will not discuss
this position here, but kindly disagree with this program and promote the SR approach: Ontological
commitment, the kind that Lashley practiced, should be the driving force behind theory evaluation.
This can only invoke a fear of reductionist fundamentalism and blinding monism, if it were done
without the realization that ontology is only a temporary vehicle for understanding. The explicit
goal of ontological commitment is to crash-test theory and ontology against reality. We can only
learn about the quality of our explanatory vehicles, the structure in reality they may have latched
onto, when they break down. Then we should proceed to build new ontological vehicles, maybe
using the parts that survived the crash-test, or when they are fundamentally ﬂawed, design some-
thing that is completely new. The scientiﬁc cycle should be like a test bed for ontology, not a trench
war or a neutral zone.
The SR approach actually allows for a neutral monism (Stubenberg, 2010; Tully, 1999), which is
something very diﬀerent from ontological indiﬀerence. Our theories of psychological and social
phenomena need to be about compositional relations (Healey, 2010), not about a compositional
hierarchy implied by a strict monism. A number of scientists studying psychological phenomena
have argued to adopt this aim of science in the past, perhaps now is the time to review their pleas
(e.g., Chemero, 2003; J.J. Gibson, 1979; Kugler, Shaw, Vincente, & Kinsella-Shaw, 1990; Michaels
& Carello, 1981; Shaw & Turvey, 1999; Thelen, Kelso, & Fogel, 1987; Turvey & Shaw, 1999). The
number of revisions and uniﬁcations of theories of principles, not the number of individual conﬁr-
mations and replications of theories of construction, is what will eventually deﬁne the success of
the empirical soft sciences. Otherwise a Big Bang or Big Crunch event may wipe out the entire ﬁeld.
Physicist are already invading neuroscience with principled accounts of how order arises in neural
networks through random ﬂuctuations and emergent complex neural dynamics at the micro scale
(e.g., Chialvo, 2010; Orlandi, Soriano, Alvarez-Lacalle, Teller, & Casademunt, 2013; Tagliazucchi,
Balenzuela, Fraiman, & Chialvo, 2012). The dynamics at the meso-scale have already been studied
in more detail (Freeman, 2000, 2009; Tognoli & Kelso, 2009), so a statistical mechanics connecting
the levels is a conceivable avenue to pursue (Lebowitz, 1993; Schweitzer, Ebeling, & Tilch, 2001). In
the meantime the “inventors” have pretty much solved the automatized speech recognition prob-
lem (e.g., Google translate: Anusuya & Katti, 2009; Bikel & Zitouni, 2012; Chelba, Bikel, & Shugrina,
2012) and the inventors are creating their own campuses and labs to study human behaviour from
decision making, behaviour in social networks, to artiﬁcial agent interactions (e.g., Spector, Norvig,
& Petrov, 2012). What will be left to claim for social science when the dust settles?
6.4 Principles revisited
``An idea is not explained if we know that at the time of its occurrence a certain change
occurred in a certain part of the brain. […] It may be that at some future time an anatomist
can so accurately examine the brain with a microscope that he will be able to say with surety,
`This person had such and such sensations, such and such memories,' etc., but he can attach
meaning to these statements only by calling up the phenomena to which they correspond
in his own mind. […] The science of the changes of molecules which corresponds to ideas
is no more the science of ideas than the science of printed words is philology.''
-Scripture(1891, pp. 308-309)
Taking seriously the SR position on ontology, something might be gained if a commonly used
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observer’s perspective were identiﬁed and explicated and formally evaluated for its role in inca-
pacitating theory evaluation in empirical social science. One way to ﬁnd out about such a per-
spective is to ask what formalism is most commonly used in empirical social science. Perhaps the
least controversial answer is that it is a set of theorems and axioms that describe ergodic systems
( Molenaar, 2008; Molenaar & Campbell, 2009) and probabilities of random events. Assuming the
object of study is an ergodic system is rather convenient as it opens up the possibility to use the
laws of probability to the predict properties of the system: Ensemble statistics (central tendency
measures) represented as the expected values of random variables. Random processes describe
change in ergodic systems in which future states are not, or only slightly inﬂuenced by the history
of system states. Most models of change for complex living systems concern processes that are
essentially deterministic, where future states are completely deﬁned by the history of the system.
The dynamic system theorists and the proponents of the complex systems approach indeed argue
that the ergodic condition (Kalikow, 2011; Petersen, 1996) does not apply to living systems (Holden,
Choi, Amazeen, & Van Orden, 2011; Van Orden, Kello, & Holden, 2010).
The classical distinction of the statistician between randomness and order is the dimension of in-
determinism (Neyman, 1960). Assuming apparent indeterminate ﬂuctuations are independent and
random, means studying the change of ergodic systems over time is essentially not very diﬀerent
from observing many systems of diﬀerent ‘ages’ at one point in time. The same logic holds for the
repeatedmeasurements of one observable of an ergodic system: Throwing one die 100 subsequent
occasions gives the same expected measurement outcomes as throwing 100 dice on one occasion.
That is why social science, most of the time, collects data in samples of human beings and calcu-
lates properties of the sample that are generalized to reﬂect properties of the population. The ﬁrst
sentence in the quote by Meehl in section 6.1.2 reﬂects such an ergodic assumption for disease:
“[…] a cluster of symptoms, complaints, and signs that covary over the population of patients (and
usually over time in the individual patient)” (Meehl 1977, p. 51).
The term “usually” hints that things may be more complicated in reality. The ‘technology’ of So-
cial science applied to reality is about groups in a society, individuals in groups, a patient in a dyad,
a consumer in an economy, a student in a curriculum, an employee in an organisation, a developing
child in a family, or an aging grandmother in a home for the elderly. To be able to attribute prop-
erties of the ensemble (the population), to properties of the individual (= statistical syllogism), the
ergodic assumption is essential, but almost certainly false when applied to living systems that are
open to interactwith the dynamical environments just described (e.g., Kievit, Frankenhuis,Waldorp,
& Borsboom, 2013). Themathematics of random variables suggest that evenwhen the ergodic con-
ditions are met, property attribution to individuals may not be possible in principle (Ellis & Van den
Wollenberg, 1993).
6.4.1 What’s Higgs got to do with it?
It is likely that the component-dominant ontology of mechanical systems with Newtonian dynam-
ics, together with erroneous use of statistical syllogism based on the assumption of ergodicity has
caused the diﬀerences between ensemble properties of populations to be wrongly attributed as
actual deﬁcits in individual dyslexic readers. The meta-theoretical causes of this error were dis-
cussed in Chapter 1 and they are associated to the causes mentioned in this chapter. The statistical
syllogism is logically invalid if the ergodic condition does not apply and the presence of anything
remotely similar to a crud factor would invalidate the ergodic condition.
Nonetheless, the ontology of complex systems in which interactions dominate in dynamically
“causing” the behavioural state of the whole was suggested to be able to accommodate an ex-
planation of observed component-like behavioural modes in section 6.2.1. As shown in 6.4, there
seems to be a distinction between observed behavioural modes (or rather, their interpretation)
along the “dimensions” of component versus interaction dominance and indeterminate (random)
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Figure 6.4. Interpretation of behavioural modes. The component-dominant part (top) of 
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Figure 6.4 – Interpretation of behavioural modes. The component-dominant part (top) of the ﬁgure
may be due to static observation of behavioural modes of the same system whose modes are observed
dynamically in the interaction-dominant part (bottom) of the ﬁgure.
versus determinate behaviour (ordered) modes of behaviour. In the upper part of the ﬁgure, the
uniformity of the behavioural mode is the prime object of study. If a system is interpreted to behave
determinate component-like, sources of individual variation tend to be uniform, or attributable to
a source or a factor. The module mistake is often made in neuropsychological case studies and a
component architecture for cognition is inferred (Van Orden & Kloos, 2003; Van Orden, Penning-
ton, & Stone, 2001). If a behavioural mode is indeterminate component-like, individual variation is
substantial, but this nuisance noise can be “cancelled” by averaging, and the remaining variation at
the ensemble level can be attributed to a source or a design factor. The ergodic condition is often
incorrectly assumed and inferential statics are inappropriately used for induction of properties of
individuals in the ensemble, who are basically thought to be identical like an ensemble of particles.
In the interaction-dominant part of the ﬁgure the change of the behavioural modes over time
are the objects of study. This implies that the theories based on the component-dominant on-
tologies could be looking at snapshots of singular behavioural modes of the very same system the
interaction-dominant ontology studies (as suggested in paragraph 6.2.1). Interaction-dominant de-
terminate behaviour is symmetry breaking in the sense that many possible behavioural modes are
reduced to just a few. This symmetry breaking behaviour is what the potential models discussed
in Chapter 5 describe. In fact, spontaneous symmetry breaking behaviour is a fundamental prop-
erty of physical theories; the “Higgs mechanism”4 describes spontaneous symmetry breaking of a
so-called “Mexican hat potential” that emerges in a high-energy context. The potential state in the
middle (top) of the Mexican is unstable and a cross section looks exactly like the multi-stable po-
4An excellent explanation of this mechanism, including helpful illustrations can be found here: http://www.quantum-
diaries.org/2011/11/21/why-do-we-expect-a-higgs-boson-part-i-electroweak-symmetry-breaking/
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Box 6.1: A formalism is not a theory, but a set of postulates and axioms (not necessarily stated in
terms of a formal calculus).
A formalism deﬁnes:
1. An explanatory domain in reality
2. The relevant phenomena for scientiﬁc explanation
3. The systems in which the relevant phenomena may be observed
4. The scales at which degrees of freedom can be identiﬁed that are involved in generating phe-
nomena
5. Any rules for assigning properties to posited entities (measurement, or interpretation of mea-
surement)
The formalismmarks a speciﬁc slice of reality as the arena for scientiﬁc theories to compete for precision
and accuracy of their predictions about the phenomena of interest.
tential in Figure 5.4 (middle row, k = 0). In most explanations of this physical phenomenon a ball
metaphor is used, just like in Chapter 5. The ball rolls from the centre of the multi-stable potential
ﬁeld into the deeper potential well in the rim of the hat, due to random ﬂuctuations. In principle
this describes the same kind of behaviour as themodels discussed in Chapter 5, except of course for
the much more detailed connection of the parameters of the potential ﬁeld to theoretical entities
of particle physics corroborated by highly accurate measurements.
The dynamical behaviour in which symmetry is recovered andmore potential behavioural modes
become “available” is less known, or perhaps not used as often as ametaphor for complex adaptive
behaviour, but it is of course equally important in order to escape determinacy and get stuck in
a single behavioural mode. It is essential to understand development, intervention, learning and
plasticity. Many of themathematical dynamical systemsmodels that can display deterministic chaos
have been described to reveal symmetry conserving behaviour for certain parameter settings, in
other words a range of potential behavioural modes lost due to symmetry breaking are recovered
for those parameter settings (e.g., Chossat & Golubitsky, 1988; Kugler & Shaw, 1990; Lim & Kim,
2001). Simulations of complex networks show that only very speciﬁc topologies of organization
reveal a property called extended criticality; a hierarchical organization of clusters of interconnected
scale-free networks (Kaiser, Görner, & Hilgetag, 2007). Moreover, results show that increasing the
complexity of the network structure is associatedwith increase in optimality of performance (Kaiser
& Hilgetag, 2010).
6.5 Driven By Improbability: A Formalism For A Physical Science of Hu-
man Nature
“The Infinite Improbability Drive was invented following research into finite improbability
which was often used to break the ice at parties by making all the molecules in the hostess’
undergarments leap one foot simultaneously to the left in accordance with the theory of
indeterminacy. Many respectable physicists said they weren’t going to stand for that sort
of thing, partly because it was a debasement of science, but mostly because they didn’t get
invited to those sort of parties.”
-Douglas Adams, Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy
The lesson to be learned from the physical interpretation of potential ﬁelds, phase transitions,
and the dynamics of complex systems is that it is possible to go beyond the metaphor when apply-
ing these mathematical tools to theorise about human behaviour in the empirical social sciences
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Box 6.2: Terminology commonly used in empirical social science to describe complex human be-
haviour, deﬁned in terms of the behaviour and observable properties of open, complex dynami-
cal systems common in (statistical) thermodynamics and systems biology. This reconception can
provide the basis for a unifying formalism for order generation in biological systems, grounded in
physical law.
Behaviour: An observable response to changes in the external environment or constituent subsystems of a
complex system.
Information: A measurable quantity that resolves the improbability or uncertainty of an event or system state.
System states that are highly uncertain, improbable or rare, require more information to describe than probable
states. Information can only distinguish one thing from another within the context of uncertainty and proba-
bility deﬁnitions. Information theory cannot help distinguishmeaningful frommeaningless (biological) information.
Entropy: Expressed as a quantity of information, it is the amount that is needed to fully describe the system’s
micro-states, or the degrees of freedom it has available for behaviour. The entropy of a thermodynamical system
is maximal when there is a complete absence of order in the distribution of its energy, that is, its internal structure
will be in a state of maximal disorder and require maximal information to describe.
Order Generating Process (Computation): Any process or system conﬁguration that increases the order (=
decreases the entropy) of the internal structure of a system. An OGP changes the amount of information
needed to describe the states of the system. Applied to behaviour of biological systems, prediction, anticipation,
self-organisation, information-processing and adaptive behaviour all indicate an OGP, or order transitions between
stable modes of behaviour (Order Parameter Dynamics).
Representation: Either a physical record of the states of a system (e.g., state space trajectories visualised after a
measurement procedure; growth rings in a cross-section of a tree trunk), or, the reproduction of system states,
as a repeated presentation to an observer. A harmonic oscillator re-presents its amplitude peak at a speciﬁc
frequency, mammals re-present stable behavioural modes synchronised to changes in their external environment
caused by the celestial mechanics of sun, earth and moon.
‘Adaptive’ behaviour: Any behaviour that can be conceived of as resulting from the ‘after-eﬀects’ of an interaction
event, an order generating process.
in general, and to ætiologies of developmental dyslexia in speciﬁc. Based on principles of compo-
sition and dynamic interaction common to physical, chemical, and biological systems the empirical
social sciences have made an important theoretical advancement that is often overlooked due to
epistemic sloughing by hypothesis testing. The fact that predictions based on interaction-dominant
ontology concern shapes of functional relations and point-range predictions instead ofmere signs of
associations, that is, speciﬁcations that venture into Stage C of Box 1.4, is an important step towards
proposing theories of principles and testing theories in the context of strong inference (Hasselman,
2013). Chapter 4 provides strong arguments for a Complexity Matching Hypothesis of perception
and action that is based on the multifractal spectrum of speech sounds. Many of the studies de-
parting from the (multi-)fractal formalism of behaviour (Ihlen & Vereijken, 2013; Stephen, Anastas,
& Dixon, 2012) and the theoretical framework of fractal physiology of health and wellbeing (Eng et
al., 2002; Van Orden et al., 2009) predict a range of values for scaling parameters (or fractal dimen-
sion). For instance, predictions about proﬁcient and healthy performance based on power spectral
density reveal power-laws close to -1 (1/f noise). This is a very risky prediction; the measurement
outcomes cannot be 0 or -2 as this would indicate dynamics that are associated with impaired be-
haviour or disease. evidence for a role of framework has been shown to apply to developmental
dyslexia (Wijnants, Hasselman, et al., 2012; Holden et al., 2015) and the corroboration strength
of these point-range predictions should add considerably to the verisimilitude of the interaction-
dominant ontology.
In a similar fashion the physically inspired prediction of a speciﬁc functional relation, or “ﬁnger-
print” of a phase transition that should be observable in the entropy of measurement outcomes is
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a risky prediction that has been shown to be empirically accurate and precise (e.g., predicting bene-
ﬁts of behavioural intervention, Lichtwarck-Aschoﬀ, Hasselman, Cox, Pepler, & Granic, 2012; emer-
gence of insight in problem solving, Cox & Hasselman, 2009; Stephen, Dixon, & Isenhower, 2009).
Even so, there is nothing to prevent other researchers to demand their playground should be used
to uncover knowledge about the world, as indicated in the ﬁrst paragraph, by merely declaring the
ontology inappropriate for scientiﬁc explanation.
Therefore, a much more profound, and perhaps surprising uniﬁcation should be attempted be-
tween the ‘information’ theories and the complex systems approach: If the consensus deﬁnitions
of information, computation and adaptive behaviour are adopted from the physical sciences, a for-
malism can be proposed (see Box 6.2) that would place both perspectives in the same ballpark,
forcing them to compete to explain the same phenomena. Box 6.2 concerns a redeﬁnition of ter-
minology commonly used in the empirical social sciences in terms biology, information science and
physics. It should be noted that these deﬁnitions are not derived from consensus formalism for
all living systems, because such a thing does not exist. They do express a consensus categoriza-
tion of complex systems into thermodynamically probable and improbable entities. Living systems
appear to (locally) defy the second law of thermodynamics, which states that a closed system will
always evolve towards an internal state of maximal entropy (disorder). This attraction to the state
of thermodynamic equilibrium provides an entropic arrow of time.
Conversely, any process of biological development or learning and therefore, memory and ‘rep-
resentation’ as deﬁned earlier, implies an increase in the complexity of the internal structure of a
system. The biological arrow of time (Walker, 1972) runs opposite to the entropic arrow of time and
introduces a local violation of the second law of thermodynamics (see Figure 6.2). Living systems
are thermodynamically highly improbable entities (Schrödinger, 1944), they are often described as
dissipative systems (e.g., Lintern & Kugler, 1991; Prigogine & Nicolis, 1977; Prigogine & Stengers,
1984; Schweitzer et al., 2001). Dissipative systems extract matter or energy from their environment
in order to increase or maintain the complexity of their internal structure. When order is created in
a system using free energy, heat (energy in disorder), is dissipated back into the environment, thus
increasing the entropy of the universe.
As shown in Figure 6.6 living systems that defy the universal law of ever increasing entropy are
aggregations of broken symmetries, a nested causal structure (Hopﬁeld, 1994). The change in in-
ternal structure implies that the system becomes increasingly speciﬁed with respect to events in
the environment (compare the ontological descent described by Shaw & Turvey, 1999; Turvey &
Shaw, 1999). Living systems of the same kind loose their identity, whereas lifeless particles of the
same kind share identity. If the internal structure of one particle is known, all of them are known,
including their expected path through a ﬁeld. To know a living system and predict its future be-
haviour, one has to learn about its speciﬁcation to its environment, but also to past events that
changed the internal structure of the system and made it an increasingly improbable system from
the perspective of thermodynamics.
6.5.1 Order Generation And Information
Equating intelligent behavior to Computation as logical structure as is common in any science that
uses computationalmodels to simulate intelligent behavior can only be an interpretation of its func-
tion, to claim a computational architecture, virtual machinery for the mind, capable of simulating
some cognitive phenomenon must also be physically realized in the brain would be committing the
interpretation fallacy of chapter 1. Boyle lucidly explains the unrealistic goals of the ‘interpretative
view’ ofbiological computation:
``This interpretive view of computation is responsible for the widespread use of functional
models to understand cognition and computer programs to simulate mental behavior. Such
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Figure 6.5 – The Biological and the Entropic arrow of time. In Biological open complex systems the inter-
nal structure is increasingly speciﬁed due to Order Generating Processes. In general, order transitions
imply a change in entropy and information, relative to the previous state, a higher order state will be
less entropic, meaning less information is needed to describe its states. In non-biological open systems,
when no energy is added to the system, each change in structure, e.g., due to diﬀusion, will reﬂect a
loss of internal structure. In general Entropy will increase, therefore the information needed to describe
the states of the system will increase.
models, however, fail to tell us anything about physical characteristics of the brain's informa-
tion processing, only that we can interpret the brain as computing some class of functions.
Yet it is from those physical characteristics that minds emerge, underscoring the importance
of understanding the basis of this phenomenon. Certainly we won't understand it by iden-
tifying the class of functions the brain can be interpreted as computing, nor is that even a
remotely realistic goal given the complexity of the brain and our behaviors.'' (Boyle, 1994).
From a biophysical perspective, themost important false contradiction between the information-
based or constructive theories of human behaviour and the complex systems approach involves the
use of the words computation and information applied to adaptive behaviour (see Box 6.2). The
ability of living systems to defy a genuine universal law of physics, even if the insurgency is only
local and temporary, is an extraordinary phenomenon. At the heart of the matter is the realisation
that there are change processes and system conﬁgurations that increase the complexity or order of
the internal structure of a complex system. How such processes are modelled, formalized, or con-
ceived of in a scientiﬁc explanation, for example as the result of computation due to a self-organised
critical process (cf., Langton, 1990), information- ﬁeld computation (cf., MacLennan, 1999) or the
application of the sequential rules of an algorithm on abstract symbols, is irrelevant. What is impor-
tant to acknowledge is that all theoretical descriptions of cognition and adaptive behaviour concern
the same observable phenomenon: The increase of order in a system, the establishment or transi-
tion to a new order in a system, due to an interaction of system components with the order gener-
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Figure 6.6 – Nested causation as an accumulation of broken symmetries, driven by thermodynamic
improbability, or an increase in speciﬁcity of the system (compare to the ontological descent from pos-
sibility to actuality discussed in Shaw & Turvey, 1999; Turvey & Shaw, 1999).
ating process. Any process that changes the information needed to describe the states of a system
against the law of increasing entropy is an act of order generation. It doesn’t matter whether you
call it computation or self-organisation: The thermodynamic improbability of the system increases
as a consequence of the speciﬁcation of its internal structure to a change in the environment.
This is one of the primary functions of formalism: Generalization of the description of the phe-
nomena of interest, such that theories that may be based on diﬀerent ontology compete to explain
the same phenomena (See Box 6.1. If it is not possible to produce testable, diverging predictions
based on theoretical accounts of such diverse ontology their dissimilarity must be considered trivial
for all intents and purposes, nothing can be considered ‘vague’ or ‘exotic’ if all constructs can be
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shown to claim explanatory power over the same phenomena. This is what the quantum formalism
achieved for the description of light and matter in terms of either particles or waves: The descrip-
tions were found to be equivalent from the perspective of the quantum formalism (Heisenberg,
1971).
A ﬁrst step to achieve a unifying formalism for psychological science must be to introduce the
term order generating process (OGP) and demand it be deﬁned and speciﬁed by competing the-
ories. Whether the claim is that biological systems compute, construct, or self-organise order, a
local violation of a universal law of physics is implied that needs to be accounted for. One cannot
just conjure order into existence to explain a systematic pattern in the empirical record. The use
of self-organization (with or without criticality) as an OGP has a strong plausibility advantage over
computation as a logical structure, as it is known as an uncontroversial change process in physics,
biology, robotics and computer science (Aschwanden, 2011).
6.5.2 Re-Presentation = Re-Production
“Our understanding of biological computation and its origins must come through studying
the relation between computation and its underlying hardware, not computation as a logical
structure.”
—Hopfield (1994, p. 56)
When a comparison is made between representation in physical systems and all the varieties of
mental representation that are frequented in the literature, physical representation in fact simply
refers to adaptive behavior that can be re-presented by the system. This re-presentation concerns
the observed recurrence or reproduction of states or modes of behavior, structural conﬁgurations,
or complex temporal patterns observed in systemobservables. Re-presentation of behavior in phys-
ical systems does not require any trace of the temporal dynamics of the original behavior to be
stored in the internal structure of the system. For example, oscillators reproduce states without
retracing an internal record of change, celestial mechanics reproduce circadian and seasonal states
of the environment due to the laws of physics, to which most living systems adapt their behaviour.
A useful notion to understand how adaptive behavior of complex systems to events ﬂuctuating
on diﬀerent timescales is achieved is the adiabatic separation described in Box 6.2 (Hopﬁeld, 1994).
When the environment of a complex system changes over time (e.g., it is a dynamic environment)
a separation into fast and slow changing system observables can be made. The observables that
change on a time scale faster than the ﬂuctuations in the dynamic environment take the slower
changing observables as parameters settings. The slowvariableswill ﬂuctuate at the pace of changes
in the environment and upon such a change, the faster processes will adapt to a new parameter
setting that is global from their perspective and more or less static. This may prompt a shift to a
new behavioural regime or could go unnoticed as a sudden change of order, but register as slow
adaptation: Learning, growth, and development. This system property allows for adaptation of the
internal structure of the system with respect to time scales indicated by the recurrence of values
of system observables, in other words, the adaptation is relative to a certain scale of ﬂuctuation.
Themotion of a complex lifeless system that appears to adapt its internal structure due to adiabatic
separation is described as ‘adaptive motion’ (Hopﬁeld, 1994), to contrast it with the motion of a
classical particle in a ﬁeld that is completely determined by the laws of mechanics and the identity
of the particle. To know its classical path through a ﬁeld, we do not need to know about its internal
structure. Adaptive behavior is the behavior of a system that appears to be coordinated by events
in its interaction history with the environment.
Learning a new task, such as reading, is an adaptive behaviour that takes place relative to a scale
of ﬂuctuation of processes and changes in the environment that appear as slow changing parameter
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settings (collective variables, synergies) to the immediate and direct sensory experiences occurring
in the moment of trying to perform the new task. Adaptive behaviour concerns the exploration of
a parameter space for the most optimal conﬁguration. The scale of ﬂuctuation relative to which
species change identity occurs at such a slow rate, it cannot be observed directly unless a record
of changes is available (e.g., a fossil record). Nevertheless, both learning and evolution by natural
selection are order-generating processes that can be described as the adaptive behaviour of a com-
plex system leading to speciﬁcation of the system to changes in its environment that are reﬂected
by changes in the complexity of its internal structure.
As mentioned earlier, the concept of the mental representation as an information structure (a
structure whose description in terms of the amount of information needed to describe its states,
is subject to change) appears to be conﬂated with meaning. Information structures can encode for
meaning when they are part of a larger system of interacting components, but meaning does not
emerge out of information; weight does not emerge out of kilograms. Meaning emerges out of
connections between information structures that are diﬀerent in nature, or can be said to occupy
diﬀerent ‘worlds’, by means of a common code (Barbieri, 2006). For example, the behaviour of a
very common complex system of organic chemistry known as ‘read a genetic code’, refers to the
phenomenon in which a transfer RNA molecule connects the world of nucleotides (DNA) to the
world of amino acids, by means of two separate operations that are called ‘recognition’ processes
(Barbieri, 2003, p. 98). As such, meaning has three ingredients:
1. Information structures of dissimilar identity according to some criterion
2. A code, or codon / analogon pair (Walker, 1983), to connect the structures in 1) across the
identity divide
3. Processes of recognition that embody the ‘generation’ of meaning.
A better way to describe 3) is that codes give meaning to information structures by reproducing
similarity by analogy. Walker notes that in the context of reproduction, the following applies to
‘analogy’:
“Two separately identifiable patterns are related by analogy if the existence and frequency of
the one is correlated with the existence and frequency of the other in the absence of direct
forces between the two patterns that could cause the correlation. That is, correspondence
between codon and analogon came about, and is maintained, by reproduction of an initial
random event.” (Walker, 1983, p. 809)
The point here is that if a force would be responsible for the correlation to be captured by the
analogy, there would be no need to map the correspondence. The same holds for the arrangement
of code components, if some force dictates their order, they cannot eﬃciently code for anything,
except perhaps characteristics of the force itself. This deﬁnes organic memory or representation as
a very special natural phenomenon capable of accumulating accidental event occurrences (Walker,
1972; 1983). If the base-pair, tRNA, amino acid system is applied by analogy to the neural system,
then the brain would either be the base-pair or the tRNA (the analogon) facilitating recognition
of systematic correlations between two scales or ‘worlds’: Perception and action. The system re-
sponsible for re-presenting must be larger than the CNS, most likely the body cannot be excluded
from the whole, as argued in the chapters of this book. The observation of the re-presentation of
a phoneme by a child, for example, when asked to reproduce a letter-sound, concerns the recur-
rence of a highly speciﬁed state of the system that can bemodelled as a conﬁguration of parameter
settings of collective variables or synergies.
OGPs change the amount of information needed to describe the system, with respect to its pre-
vious state. This is not equivalent to meaning. Recognition of systematic patterns in the change of
information across lags of time by means of reproduction by analogon could certainly encode for
meaning, but the information itself is still meaningless! Both classical and quantum information
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theory, explicitly exclude meaning as a part of their explanatory domain (Desurvire, 2009). As an
example, the total number of possible base-pair sequences that could have constituted the genome
of E. coli is ≈ 102400000, an unimaginable large amount of information. Yet, much less than 1% of
the possible combinations, encode for anything biologically meaningful, that is, “– correspond to
an organism, and enable it to maintain its cellular structure by transforming energy from one form
to another, grow, adapt and reproduce” (Haynie, 2008, p. 347). Information does not specify what
it codes for and it cannot be used to distinguish between things that have meaning or not. Again,
we must conclude that the only meaningful reduction in the science of behaviour is to relations
between things.
Expressed in somewhat archaic but eﬀective language,Walker describes what biological memory
function deﬁned in terms of thermodynamic improbability or order generation implies:
“Memory creates complex structures by mapping complex accidentials, and it accumulates
repeats of these complex structures by irreversible copyreproduction.” (Walker, 1972, p.
227).
The conception of the brain as a storehouse for frozen information about experienced events begs
a plausible physical explanation (Gibson, 1966). Walker suggests that the fundamental property
of development and learning is not storage, but the prospective redundant reproduction of ther-
modynamically improbable states, order generation. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the brain might
be a self-tuning, self-aﬃne resonator, in which the multifractal spectrum can be regarded as an
anologon, the temporal singularities, the scaling exponent are the re-presentation of the temporal
structure of the whole.
6.6 Conclusion?
To summarise, the theoretical and empirical arguments presented in the preceding chapters should
encourage a programof empirical inquiry based on interaction dominance to study complex disease
entities such as developmental dyslexia. Theories and formalism should, as a ﬁrst sketch, be based
on the known principles and universal laws that govern the behaviour of complex dynamical sys-
tems. The focus on eﬃcient causes in the form of defective components or component processes
such as phoneme representations and phoneme-based auditory processing has been shown to be
an unviable direction to advance scientiﬁc understanding of such complex ætiology. Both the ‘im-
paired ‘and ‘normal’ phoneme representation concern a description of a highly improbable internal
order that accumulated as a history of symmetry breaking events. If each aggregate of nested eﬃ-
cient causes is allowed its own scientiﬁc theory, this can only lead to the kind of radical pluralism
recently suggested as a multitude of cognitive subtypes of developmental dyslexia related to indi-
vidual diﬀerences in brain structure (Jednoróg, Gawron, Marchewka, Heim, & Grabowska, 2013).
What should be studied is the entire history of speciﬁcation of the internal structure and this comes
down to studying adaptive behaviour to symmetry breaking events and symmetry recovering events
(or extended criticality) at diﬀerent temporal and spatial scales of analysis.
As such, this entire book is much more a beginning than a conclusion. Principled theories of
the kind produced by the natural sciences are within arms reach of the social sciences and the
prospect of being able to shed the qualiﬁcation of “soft” empirical science must be a motivation to
further develop research programs towards appraising and amending theories of principles. There
is nothing about human nature that would prohibit a natural science to become temporary realists
about its unobservable structure.
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The following search string was used to obtain records with a downloadable abstract from
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed :
Etiology/Broad[filter] AND ("developmental dyslexia"[All Fields] OR "dyslexia"[All Fields] OR
"reading impairment"[All Fields] OR "reading disability"[All Fields] OR "dysphasia"[All Fields]
OR "alexia"[All Fields] OR "word blindness"[All Fields] OR "word-blindness"[All Fields] OR
"developmental aphasia"[All Fields]) AND hasabstract[text]
After additional ﬁltering (e.g., studies of acquired dyslexia, empty or duplicate records) in a cor-
pus of 1407 documents was further parsed in R+ using the textmining package “tm” (available at
http://tm.r-forge.r-project.org). The text was ﬁrst cleaned from punctuation characters, numbers,
English stopwords and very common scientiﬁc jargon (e.g., signiﬁcant, outperformed, control group,
etc.). After stemming the remaining words, the stems were categorised into terms that are signiﬁ-
cant for the study of developmental dyslexia. The ﬁrst column of Table A.1 lists the terms, if a
context was available a term could be extended to be more speciﬁc, such as cns~pat to signify a
group of words that expressed a pathology of the CNS or per~aud to indicate auditory perception
(distinguishable from speech perception ~spp~).
Words that could not be assigned to a term category were deleted. A term-document matrix
was created for each decade, listing all the terms in the corpus in rows and documents (abstracts)
in columns; the cells are frequencies of occurrence. To create the graphs the term-documentmatrix
was transformed into a term-termmatrix, or adjacencymatrix. The cells now indicate howoften two
terms are used in conjunction in the documents of the corpus, this frequency count is the weight
that is assigned to the edges of the two connected vertices (terms) in the graph representation of
the matrix.
The R+ package“igraph” (http://igraph.sourceforge.net) was used to create the graphs in Figures
1.2 and 1.4 and calculated the degree distribution, co-citation coupling, and graph strength. An-
notated R-scripts and raw data necessary to recreate the graphs are available at the open science
framework project page for Chapter 1: https://osf.io/8y4sq/.
Table A.1
Meaning of Terms Displayed in Figures 1.2 and 1.3, Including the Normalised Degree for Each 
Decade.
Term Meaning 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010
~act~ Action 0.35 0.50 0.44 0.69
~att~ Attention 0.10 0.10 0.42 0.71
~bio~ Biology NA 0.35 0.52 0.67
~cns~ CNS 0.61 0.68 0.65 0.69
~cog~ Cognition 0.19 0.68 0.73 0.83
~com~ Comorbidity NA NA 0.17 0.35
~lan~ Language 0.68 0.75 0.75 0.90
~lit~ Literacy 0.65 0.85 0.83 0.90
~mem~ Memory NA 0.48 0.52 0.75
~scr~ Script NA 0.40 0.50 0.63
~spp~ Speech perception NA 0.35 0.44 0.44
~spr~ Speech production 0.58 0.80 0.79 0.77
~theo~ Theory NA NA 0.17 0.62
~trt~ Treatment 0.61 0.78 0.75 0.81
act~spr Action speech 0.16 0.18 0.10 0.35
bio~bod Biology body 0.16 0.70 0.60 0.85
bio~dev Biology development 0.94 0.90 0.96 0.98
bio~env Biology environment 0.61 0.78 0.88 0.88
bio~epi Biology epigenetic 0.61 0.50 0.79 0.73
bio~gen Biology genetic 0.52 0.75 0.75 0.81
cns~ana CNS anatomical NA 0.15 0.50 0.44
cns~fun CNS functional 0.77 0.85 0.90 0.96
cns~msr CNS measurement 0.29 0.43 0.69 0.83
cns~pat CNS pathology 0.45 0.70 0.79 0.87
cns~str CNS structural 0.77 0.98 0.94 0.94
com~aud Comorbidity auditory 0.19 0.35 0.35 0.46
com~beh Comorbidity behavioural 0.19 0.58 0.73 0.73
com~cog Comorbidity cognition 0.74 0.75 0.85 0.67
com~lng Comorbidity language 0.10 0.28 0.17 NA
com~mem Comorbidity memory NA NA NA 0.21
com~mot Comorbidity motor NA 0.28 0.35 0.38
Table A.1 (Continued)
Meaning of Terms Displayed in Figures 1.2 and 1.3, Including the Normalised Degree for Each 
Decade.
com~psy Comorbidity psychological 0.61 0.70 0.63 0.75
com~spp Comorbidity speech perception NA NA NA 0.23
com~spr Comorbidity speech production 0.23 NA 0.19 0.21
com~viz Comorbidity visual NA 0.30 0.23 0.29
lan~uni Language unit 0.23 0.38 0.56 0.71
lrn~mot Learning motor 0.52 0.78 0.71 0.85
per~aud Perception auditory 0.68 0.83 0.77 0.83
per~mlt Perception multimodal 0.26 0.40 0.42 0.58
per~scr Perception script NA NA NA 0.12
per~som Perception somatosensory NA NA 0.19 0.33
per~spp Perception speech NA 0.03 0.25 0.29
per~viz Perception visual 0.65 0.85 0.79 0.94
scr~tmp Script temporal NA NA NA 0.21
scr~uni Script unit 0.42 0.55 0.58 0.69
spr~lan Speech production language NA NA NA 0.12
spr~tmp Speech production temporal NA NA 0.27 0.02
theo~com Theory component 0.39 0.55 0.44 0.73
theo~eti Theory ætiology 0.45 0.40 0.63 0.65
theo~mlt Theory multi causal NA NA 0.27 0.48
theo~mod Theory model NA 0.38 0.23 0.38
theo~mon Theory mono causal NA NA 0.21 0.52
theo~sub Theory subtype NA 0.10 0.46 0.65
theo~tmp Theory temporal NA NA 0.21 0.60
Table A.2 
Meaning of Terms Displayed in Figure 1.4
Term Meaning
~act~ Ac#on:	  motor	  control,	  balance,	  speech	  produc#on,	  wri#ng,	  eye	  movements
~att~ A"en%on
~aud~ Auditory	  percep-on	  including	  speech
~beh~ Behaviour:	  Social	  development,	  voca5on,	  self-­‐esteem,	  personality
~bio~ Biological	  factors	  other	  than	  CNS	  and	  genes:	  Hormones,	  physiology,	  gender,	  development
~brain~ Structure,	  func+on	  and	  pathology	  of	  the	  brain
~cog~ Cogni&on
~com~ Comorbidity
~env~ Environmental	  factors:	  socio-­‐economic	  status,	  culture,	  family	  dynamics
~gen~ (epi-­‐)Gene)c	  factors
~lan~ Language
~lrn~ Learning
~mem~ Memory
~theo~ Theory	  words:	  Hypothesis,	  mechanism,	  model,	  theory
~tmp~ Temporal:	  Rapid	  naming,	  slow	  rise	  3mes,	  fast	  formants,	  ﬂuency
~trt~ Treatment:	  Interven,on,	  ameliorate,	  therapy,	  remedia,on
~viz~ Visual	  percep,on
NOTE
Terms	  removed	  from	  the	  graphs	  were	  highly	  associated	  with	  the	  abstract	  query:	  dyslexia,	  
development,	  reading,	  spelling,	  impaired,	  disorder,	  deﬁcit.	  Also	  some	  very	  low	  frequency	  categories	  
such	  as	  somatosensory	  percep/on	  were	  removed.
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Table B.1
Results for the Fixed Effects of the Linear Mixed Model with ϒcs as the Dependent Variable using 15,000 MCMC 
Resamples. Shown is the Mean across the MCMC Samples (i.e. an Estimate for the Covariate) with Lower and Upper 
95% Highest Posterior Density Intervals. The First p-value (pMCMC) is Based on the Posterior Distribution; the Second 
is Based on a t-distribution with an Upper Bound for the Degrees of Freedom. 
Covariate MCMC mean
HPD95 
lower
HPD95 
upper pMCMC Pr(>|t|)
(Mean Age, Average Reader, None, Random) 0.192 0.174 0.210 0.0001 0.0001
Age -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.0085 0.0148
Dyslexic Reader -0.009 -0.033 0.017 0.4820 0.5398
Hysteresis 0.021 0.004 0.037 0.0111 0.0132
Enhanced Contrast 0.057 0.046 0.069 0.0001 0.0001
B>D>B 0.010 -0.006 0.025 0.2084 0.2091
D>B>D 0.056 0.040 0.071 0.0001 0.0001
Age:Dyslexic Reader 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.0252 0.0417
Age:Hysteresis 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.0001 0.0001
Age:Enhanced Contrast 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.0001 0.0001
Dyslexic Reader:Hysteresis -0.062 -0.084 -0.039 0.0001 0.0001
Dyslexic Reader:Enhanced Contrast 0.007 -0.008 0.023 0.3364 0.3450
Age:B>D>B 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.0001 0.0001
Age:D>B>D 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.0001 0.0001
Dyslexic Reader:B>D>B 0.009 -0.013 0.030 0.4161 0.4092
Dyslexic Reader:D>B>D -0.065 -0.086 -0.045 0.0001 0.0001
Hysteresis:B>D>B 0.072 0.049 0.094 0.0001 0.0001
Enhanced Contrast:B>D>B 0.040 0.024 0.056 0.0001 0.0001
Hysteresis:D>B>D -0.044 -0.065 -0.023 0.0001 0.0001
Enhanced Contrast:D>B>D -0.051 -0.067 -0.034 0.0001 0.0001
Age:Dyslexic Reader:Hysteresis -0.009 -0.011 -0.007 0.0001 0.0001
Age:Dyslexic Reader:Enhanced Contrast -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 0.0001 0.0001
Age:Dyslexic Reader:B>D>B -0.012 -0.014 -0.009 0.0001 0.0001
Age:Dyslexic Reader:D>B>D -0.011 -0.013 -0.009 0.0001 0.0001
Age:Hysteresis:B>D>B -0.007 -0.009 -0.005 0.0001 0.0001
Age:Enhanced Contrast:B>D>B -0.011 -0.013 -0.010 0.0001 0.0001
Age:Hysteresis:D>B>D -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 0.0001 0.0001
Age:Enhanced Contrast:D>B>D -0.007 -0.009 -0.006 0.0001 0.0001
Dyslexic Reader:Hysteresis:B>D>B -0.016 -0.047 0.016 0.3269 0.3253
Dyslexic Reader:Enhanced Contrast:B>D>B -0.034 -0.057 -0.012 0.0028 0.0031
Dyslexic Reader:Hysteresis:D>B>D 0.209 0.179 0.238 0.0001 0.0001
Dyslexic Reader:Enhanced Contrast:D>B>D 0.074 0.052 0.096 0.0001 0.0001
Age:Dyslexic Reader:Hysteresis:B>D>B 0.012 0.010 0.015 0.0001 0.0001
Age:Dyslexic Reader:Enhanced Contrast:B>D>B 0.013 0.011 0.015 0.0001 0.0001
Age:Dyslexic Reader:Hysteresis:D>B>D 0.010 0.007 0.012 0.0001 0.0001
Age:Dyslexic Reader:Enhanced Contrast:D>B>D 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.0001 0.0001
Note: Number of observations = 44640, Groups: participant ID = 186; Stimulus number = 20
Table B.2
Results for the Fixed Effects of the Linear Mixed Model with nc as the Dependent Variable Using 15,000 MCMC Resamples. Shown is 
the Mean across the MCMC Samples (i.e. an Estimate for the Covariate) with Lower and Upper 95% Highest Posterior Density 
Intervals. The First p-value (pMCMC) is Based on the Posterior Distribution; the Second is Based on a t-distribution with an Upper 
Bound for the Degrees of Freedom. 
Covariate MCMC mean
HPD95 
lower
HPD95 
upper pMCMC Pr(>|t|)
(Mean Age, Average Reader, None, Random) -0.578 -1.210  0.059 0.0759 0.0957
Age  0.024 -0.037  0.084 0.4332 0.4440
Dyslexic Reader -0.006 -0.884  0.848 0.9875 0.9958
Hysteresis  8.347  7.693  9.027 0.0001 0.0000
Enhanced Contrast -6.941 -7.433 -6.486 0.0001 0.0000
B>D>B  0.480 -0.134  1.101 0.1249 0.1206
D>B>D  1.103  0.497  1.743 0.0004 0.0005
Age:Dyslexic Reader  0.001 -0.063  0.080 0.7747 0.8133
Age:Hysteresis -0.032 -0.095  0.025 0.2952 0.2880
Age:Enhanced Contrast -0.051 -0.101 -0.002 0.0439 0.0415
Dyslexic Reader:Hysteresis -0.309 -1.215  0.605 0.5007 0.5064
Dyslexic Reader:Enhanced Contrast  0.133 -0.466  0.756 0.6628 0.6863
Age:B>D>B -0.053 -0.113  0.004 0.0735 0.0717
Age:D>B>D -0.056 -0.115 -0.002 0.0545 0.0496
Dyslexic Reader:B>D>B  0.081 -0.811  0.891 0.8569 0.8612
Dyslexic Reader:D>B>D -0.108 -0.941  0.702 0.8085 0.7945
Hysteresis:B>D>B -4.103 -4.983 -3.240 0.0001 0.0000
Enhanced Contrast:B>D>B -0.572 -1.224  0.078 0.0863 0.0802
Hysteresis:D>B>D -4.925 -5.789 -4.091 0.0001 0.0000
Enhanced Contrast:D>B>D  1.910  1.315  2.638 0.0001 0.0000
Age:Dyslexic Reader:Hysteresis  0.008 -0.064  0.079 0.8132 0.7963
Age:Dyslexic Reader:Enhanced Contrast -0.028 -0.085  0.025 0.3188 0.3290
Age:Dyslexic Reader:B>D>B  0.093  0.003  0.174 0.0317 0.0315
Age:Dyslexic Reader:D>B>D  0.066 -0.014  0.140 0.0912 0.0953
Age:Hysteresis:B>D>B -0.133 -0.203 -0.061 0.0001 0.0003
Age:Enhanced Contrast:B>D>B  0.218  0.156  0.279 0.0001 0.0000
Age:Hysteresis:D>B>D -0.094 -0.163 -0.024 0.0073 0.0083
Age:Enhanced Contrast:D>B>D  0.136  0.077  0.196 0.0001 0.0000
Dyslexic Reader:Hysteresis:B>D>B  3.054  1.835  4.326 0.0001 0.0000
Dyslexic Reader:Enhanced Contrast:B>D>B -1.171 -2.091 -0.304 0.0103 0.0113
Dyslexic Reader:Hysteresis:D>B>D  1.386  0.146  2.527 0.0256 0.0232
Dyslexic Reader:Enhanced Contrast:D>B>D -0.712 -1.579  0.166 0.1096 0.1131
Age:Dyslexic Reader:Hysteresis:B>D>B -0.087 -0.190  0.017 0.0945 0.0885
Age:Dyslexic Reader:Enhanced Contrast:B>D>B -0.160 -0.246 -0.070 0.0009 0.0004
Age:Dyslexic Reader:Hysteresis:D>B>D  0.029 -0.067  0.123 0.5644 0.5771
Age:Dyslexic Reader:Enhanced Contrast:D>B>D -0.145 -0.225 -0.064 0.0004 0.0005
Note: Number of observations = 44640, Groups: participant ID = 186; Stimulus number = 20
Een korte samenvatting in het Nederlands.
Notes Summary [Dutch]
DE BEGRENZING VOORBIJ.
Een analyse van verisimilitude en causale ontologie van wetenschappelijke claims:
De etiologie van ontwikkelingsdyslexie als klinkend voorbeeld.
Stel dat bij uw kind de diagnose ‘ontwikkelingsdyslexie’ is vastgesteld. Als ouder wilt u natuurlijk
de beste behandeling voor de leesproblemen van uw kind en daarom raadpleegt u de recente
wetenschappelijke literatuur en selecteert alleen studies waarin de eﬀectiviteit van een behandel-
ing wordt onderzocht, en ook aangetoond. Een greep uit de eﬀectieve behandelingen die u zult
tegenkomen:
2001 Gekleurde lenzen en transparante overlays gebruiken omde visuele stress die uw kind ervaart
te verminderen.
2004 Intensieve training met toon en gemodiﬁceerde spraak om de beperking in de temporele
auditieve verwerking van uw kind te verhelpen.
2005 Visuele-, auditieve- en tastzintuigen stimuleren omde disfunctionele hersenhelft van uw kind
te te remediëren.
2007 Visolie (Omega--3 vetzuren) toevoegen aan het dieet om het tekort in de myelinisatie van de
zenuwcellen van uw kind op te heﬀen.
Trainen van motorische vaardigheden om de motorische beperkingen van uw kind te ver-
helpen.
2012 Muziek therapie, om de de beperking in ritme-perceptie van uw kind te behandelen.
2013 Laat uw kind actie-computerspelletjes spelen om zo het tekort in de visuo-spatiele, cross-
modale, temporele, aandacht op te heﬀen.
De merkwaardige situatie doet zich voor dat al deze behandelingen tegelijkertijd ‘werkzaam’ zijn,
waardoor de verklaringen voor hun werkzaamheid ook tegelijkertijd ‘waar’ zijn. De behandelingen
zijn gebaseerd op wetenschappelijke claims over de oorzaken van ontwikkelingsdyslexie die nog al-
tijd leiden tot nieuw, publicabel empirisch onderzoek.
Zou het niet zo moeten zijn dat het herhaaldelijk toepassen van de wetenschappelijke methode,
als ultieme test voor theoretische claims over hoe de werkelijkheid in elkaar zit, moeten leiden tot
een beperkt aantal theorieën die elkaar beconcurreren op hun waarachtigheid (verisimilitude)?
Omgaan met Theoretische Diversiteit
In het eerste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift wordt gesteld dat (i) de veelheid aan theorieën over
de oorzaken van dyslexie problematisch is, (ii) vrijwel alle onderzoeksvelden in de sociale en lev-
enswetenschappen met dit probleem te maken hebben, en (iii) dat een mogelijke oorzaak het
‘component-denken’ is.
In het component-denken, of, de component-dominante causale ontologie waarin het doel van
het verklaren van (intelligent) gedrag gereduceerd wordt tot het vinden van unieke oorzaken, door-
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gaans geïdentiﬁceerd op een ‘lagere’, of meer bio-fysische schaal van observatie (neuronen, genen,
aangeboren vaardigheden). De tegenhanger is het ‘interactie-denken’, of, de interactie-dominante
causale ontologie waarin het niet de componenten van een systeem zijn die (intelligent) gedrag
veroorzaken, maar juist de interacties tussen die componenten. Het aanwijzen van unieke oorza-
ken is volgens deze causale ontologie niet mogelijk, of zinvol.
Ter illustratie, de methoden en technieken die bij de component-dominante ontologie horen zijn
de lineaire statistiek en factor-designs, die latente bronnen van variantie proberen aan te tonen.
De technieken die bij de interactie-dominante ontologie horen zijn gebaseerd op de analyse van
de niet-lineaire dynamica van complex systemen zoals perturbatie analyse, schaal-invartiantie van
observabelen en de sensitieve afhankelijkheid van initiële condities.
Na uitgebreide analyse van mogelijke oorzaken en gevolgen van het component-denken wordt
gesuggereerd dat een interactie-dominante ontologie mogelijk een meer coherente verklaring van
een groot aantal gedragsfenomenen zou kunnen geven. Er worden een aantal principes opgesteld
die algemeen toepasbaar zouden kunnen zijn om theorieën die binnen de sociale en levensweten-
schappen geponeerd worden formeler te kunnen evalueren. Deze principes worden toegepast op
verklaringen voor ontwikkelingsdyslexie die gebaseerd zijn op een deﬁciet in de spraakperceptie.
Hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 5 doen verslag van resultaten en interpretatie van empirische studies naar
spraakperceptie bij dyslectische lezers, vanuit het perspectief van de interactie-dominante causale
ontologie
Hoofdstuk 2 - Context relativiteit van orde relaties en prospectieve predictie
In dit hoofdstukwordt onderzocht of de individuele variabiliteit in hetwaarnemen van spraak (besliss-
ingssnelheid), van kleutersmet een genetisch risico opdyslexie gerelateerd is aanhun leesvaardigheid
1 jaar later. De resultaten laten zien dat kinderen die tot 25% laagste lezers behoren inderdaad in
de kleuterleeftijd meer variabiliteit in hun reactietijden lieten zien.
Hoofdstuk 3 - Principiële simulatie van orde relaties.
De resultaten uit Hoofdstuk 2 worden gesimuleerdmet een recurrent neuraal netwerkmodel waar-
bij wordt verondersteld dat de dyslectische lezers een instabieler netwerk hebben dan de gemid-
delde lezer. De orde relaties uit Hoofdstuk 2 worden conceptueel gerepliceerd door de neurale
netwerken.
Hoofdstuk 4 - Sterke Inferentie
In hoofdstuk 4 worden zogenaamde ‘condities voor sterke inferentie’ gecreëerd waardoor een di-
recte evaluatie van drie hypothesen over eigenschappen van het spraaksignaal die essentiële zijn
voor de spraakperceptie kan plaatsvinden. De hypothesen nemen ieder een plaats in op het spec-
trum van component-dominante en interactie-dominante ontologie. De analyses laten zien dat
een classiﬁcatie algoritme de beoordelingen van zowel dyslectische als niet-dyslectische lezers het
beste kan repliceren op basis van de fysische eigenschappen van het spraaksignaal die aangegeven
worden door de interactie-dominante ontologie.
Hoofdstuk 5 - Principiële simulatie van theoretische constructen en Sterke Inferentie
In hoofdstuk 5 worden op basis van de literatuur over spraakperceptie en ontwikkelingsdyslexie, en
potentiaal theorie (niet-lineaire dynamica van attractoren van an een fysisch systeem) drie voor-
spellingen getoetst die bij bevestiging een serieus probleem voor de evaluatie van de verisimili-
200
BEYOND THE BOUNDARY
tude van component theorieën. De hypothesen betreﬀen de discreet veronderstelde, categorische
aard van de klankrepresentatie, de uniformiteit van de interne structuur van een klankcategorie
en de biologische ontwikkeling van deze categorieën, gebaseerd op een zogenaamde ‘koppeling-
shypothese’. Op basis van tweedimensionaal potentiaal model dat een nadere uitwerking is van
het neurale netwerkmodel uit Hoofdstuk 3 wordt geconcludeerd dat de component-dominante on-
tologie voor de verklaring van mogelijke verschillen in de spraakperceptie tussen dyslectische en
niet-dyslectische lezers onhoudbaar is.
In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt een algemene interpretatie gegeven aan de resultaten en worden een aan-
tal lijnen uitgezet naar toekomstig theoretisch en empirisch onderzoek.
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ALL IN A DAY'S DREAM:
AN EPILOGICAL PROLOGUEa
The Master of the Labyrinth sighed deeply as he knelt beside me.
I saw his eyes focus on my naked brain and I guessed he was examining it for
abnormalities.
He then spoke to me:
Foolish young creature, your quest continues.
I will share with you the Truths you must pursue,
for they are One and they are All. First, analyse
the manifestations of Order, then delve for the
powers of Chaos. When you are still in possession
of your life after having done these things,
you must begin the search for the Lost Archetype.
Be everywhere, investigate nowhere.
Then he took a piece of my brain
and as he slowly merged with the dark surroundings
he said: ``You won't be needing this.’’
-Fred Hasselman, 1992 (Song Lyrics)
aTo the songs: Confessions of Demi-God Parts 1&2: Random Order & Sentient Chaos
Notes How Did We Do? [So Far]
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